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The Prince of the Peace. Le Prince de la Paix.
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London. Richard Bentley. Paris. Ladvocat.

MEMOIRS

OF

DON MANUEL DE GODOY,

PRINCE OF THE PEACE,

DUKE DEL ALCUDIA, COUNT D'EVERAMONTE, &c.,

FORMERLY PRIME MINISTER OF THE KING OF SPAIN, GENERALISSIMO OF HIS ARMIES, HIGH ADMIRAL, &c.

WRITTEN BY HIMSELF.

36611

EDITED, UNDER THE SUPERINTENDENCE OF HIS HIGHNESS,

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL J. B. D'ESMÉNARD.

WITH

AN INTRODUCTION,

HISTORICAL & BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES, &c.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

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MEMOIRS

OF THE

PRINCE OF THE PEACE.

INTRODUCTION.

Don Manuel de Godoy, Duke de l'Alcudia, Count d'Evoramonte, Prince of the Peace, must be numbered amongst the distinguished characters of the age.

In 1784, when only seventeen years old, and a mere life-guardsman, he was soon promoted to superior ranks: a general officer in 1791; a grandee of Spain, closely allied to the royal family by his marriage with a princess of Bourbon;[a] the

[a] The Infant Don Louis and Doña Maria Theresa de Vallabriga de Drummond had a son and two daughters: one of the latter married the Prince of the Peace, during the reign of Charles IV; the other married, during the reign of Ferdinand VII, M. de Melgareço, who was raised on the occasion to the title of Duke of St. Fernando. The son was Cardinal de Bourbon, and afterwards Archbishop of Toledo and of Seville. He is now dead.

head of all state councils and public establishments; adorned with every decoration awarded to merit, to favour, or to high birth; envied, courted, calumniated, and proscribed, his career runs through a long period fertile in revolutions. None have watched more closely—none from a more elevated sphere—the inward or outward springs which set the imposing and ancient monarchy of Spain in motion.

It behoved him to render to his native country, and to public opinion, an account of what he has done, of what has come to his knowledge, of what has fallen under his observation: the time has arrived for his acquitting this debt; he has, accordingly, written the memoirs of his life.

The First Part contains an account of his private and public life from 1784 to 1800. As prime minister of Spain during a period of six years, (from 1792 to 1798,) he directed the affairs of the kingdom, made war and peace with France, repelled the attempted inroads of jacobinical principles and the political tyranny of England: the struggle was a long and an arduous one, but it was maintained with equal skill and success.

In the Second Part, the Prince of the Peace, who was appointed generalissimo in 1801, and high admiral in 1806, relates the share he again took in the civil, political, and military administration of his country. In 1807, the dark intrigues of a

few court servants and of a priest bring about a double conspiracy. During the night of the 17th of March 1808, the palace is besieged by rebels: Charles IV, surrounded by cowards, and insulted by factious men, exclaims in the depth of his anguish, "*And you, also, my son!*"[b] The Prince of the Peace is thrown into a dungeon, from whence he is rescued by French bayonets,[c] and conducted to Bayonne, where the King and Queen of Spain have likewise been entrapped into Napoleon's protection. . . . After the sentence which, like the lion in the fable, this self-constituted umpire passed upon these illustrious litigants, the Prince of the Peace follows his dethroned king, first to Marseilles, and afterwards to Rome. . . . The Emperor of the French has proved wanting in generosity towards the victims of his baffled ambition. Ferdinand VII. reascends the throne in 1814. Grief, rather than length of years, abridges the painful existence of Maria Louisa and of Charles IV.—their death occurred

[b] *Con que tu tambien*—and you, also! Such was the king's exclamation.

[c] Murat, Grand-duke of Berg, sent off in all haste a detachment of cavalry to the castle of Villaviciosa, and in the emperor's name demanded the prisoner. This detachment was under the orders of Generals Excelmans and Paul de la Vauguyon, Murat's aides-de-camp. The chief of squadron, now Lieutenant-general Manès, another aide-de-camp of the grand-duke, was commissioned to escort the Prince of the Peace to Bayonne.

in 1819. The Prince of the Peace alone remains a solitary being; he comes in 1830 to take shelter amidst the crowd of Paris.

This second part is richly stored with facts, and reveals many interesting occurrences.

The original memoirs in Spanish, and my translation of them, appear in separate works at one and the same time. An English translation is likewise preparing in London. With respect to my own version, I have closely adhered to the text; for the Castilian is a proud and pompous language, and rejects all foreign ornaments. The literary talents of the Prince of the Peace have been as unfairly depreciated as all his actions: this was consistent with the original aim and object of his enemies. The perusal of the work cannot fail to dispel many prejudices; and I can avouch for his having composed, and drawn it up, I might say, under my own eyes. The original manuscript is wholly in his handwriting; the copy confided to the press has been revised, corrected, compared by himself; his flourish at the end of each page, and his signature at the end of each chapter, attest its authenticity.

I have readily accepted the task of translating these memoirs, reserving to myself the right of adding certain developments, together with explanatory and biographical notes. What emanates from myself will not escape observation, being indicated by the initial of my name.

The Prince of the Peace entertains for his beloved Spain a feeling which cannot fail to delight his fellow-countrymen; like a son, the victim of an unjust and passionate mother, he hesitates to speak his mind to her, or reproach her with her wrongs towards him. . . . As I feel more disinterested in this domestic quarrel, I need not imitate his timidity. My own experience of the men and events he speaks of, made me anxious to record my individual recollections beyond the risk of oblivion. The present appeared to me a favourable opportunity, and I have taken advantage of it.

The rapid elevation of the Prince of the Peace, nearly fifty years ago, could not but afford matter for the lively gossiping of the ladies of the palace, the gentlemen of the bedchamber, the usual attendants upon the court, and the suitors for places,[d] so eager to find out in what direction blows the court favour. . . . All posthumous research on the subject would be superfluous at the present day.

Young, well educated, gifted with playful wit and a handsome countenance; brought by the very nature of his daily service in constant con-

[d] Suitors, *Pretendientes*, are in Spain a numerous, and, as it were, a legally acknowledged class. In petitions addressed to the king or his ministers, when speaking of their titles and their rights, they never fail to add: "Suitors during so many years," *tantos años de pretendiente*.

tact with the royal family; Don Manuel de Godoy attracted Maria Louisa's notice. But the favour of Charles IV. so happily coincided with the kindness of his consort, that it never was well ascertained which of them formed the first attachment, or evinced the greatest affection for the young life-guardsman. This august and two-fold sympathy has acquired historical renown: it never experienced any interruption; death alone separated from him Maria Louisa and Charles IV: a friendship so constant and so uncommon is ennobled by thirty-six years of reciprocal fidelity. Detraction has had its day: there is a prescription even to envy, which usually respects misfortune and pursues not beyond the grave.

The close of the last, and the first quarter of the present century, are already a part of by-gone history. We are no longer to consider the Prince of the Peace, at the present day, in any other character than as a public man, a statesman, the minister to whom Charles IV. was alleged to have transferred the care of governing in his stead.[e]

The reign of this monarch has supplied an ample store of historical matter, from 1789 to 1808, independently of what Spain has since fur-

[e] This transfer of power, which always fell short of public report, could only have lasted, at any rate, from 1792 to 1798, when the Prince of the Peace performed the functions of prime minister; which, it will be seen, he never abused. His acts are now about to be laid before his impartial readers.

nished, and *is still likely to provide.* This reign is but faintly, and, which is far worse, is but very incorrectly known.

Since the improved organization of the Holy Office under the reign of Philip II. towards the middle of the sixteenth century, Spaniards never had been afforded the opportunity nor the power to publish their thoughts, even when clothed in moderate language.[f] The freedom of the press in 1808 was for them a novel weapon, of which they neither knew the use nor the effect. Accordingly, it only sent forth, in the first instance, coarse pamphlets replete with exaggeration, with bitterness, with ill-disguised selfish motives.

The statement of Don Pedro Ceballos Guerra, who was by turns the minister of Charles IV, of Ferdinand VII, of Joseph, and again of Ferdinand VII, was a prelude to the overflowing of this *liberated* press. At that time, the whole Continent was silent in presence of Napoleon and his works. The voice of Ceballos alone was heard from afar, and spread in all directions. He denounced his relative, his friend, his benefactor. . . . By disowning the official sanction which he himself, in his capacity of minister for foreign affairs, had given to the negotiations of the state

[f] The formidable tribunal of the Inquisition was commissioned to exercise the right of censure. *Con el Rey y con la Inquisicion, chiton*—with respect to the king and the Inquisition, be silent. A popular Spanish proverb.

counsellor Don Eugenio Izquierdo in Paris, he was the cause that a calumny hovered over the Prince of the Peace, which was the origin or the pretext of all subsequent ones: nevertheless, the king and his minister for foreign affairs were fully acquainted with Izquierdo's mission, which was consequently an authorised, lawful, and official mission, and not a special and secret proceeding carried on for the Prince of the Peace's exclusive advantage. Izquierdo acted in the name and for account of his government. The rank of nominal ambassador was no doubt ostensibly given to the Prince of Masserano; but is it not a circumstance of daily occurrence, especially in an absolute monarchy, that a man of confidence and talents is associated with those titled mannikins covered with stars and embroidery, who are only employed for appearance sake, and in order that they may cut a figure in diplomatic parades? Napoleon did not compromise his dignity: he openly acknowledged the character and mission of Izquierdo, constantly sent for him, and ordered the Grand-marshal Duroc to keep up an intercourse with him. Assuredly the emperor would never have consented to receive in a public capacity an emissary of an obscure, equivocal, unacknowledged character; still less, to enter into a treaty with him. The emperor himself dictated the treaty of Fontainebleau, because it suited his views, was a favourite scheme, and a settled pur-

pose of his mind. This important fact is proved, beyond all doubt, by the Prince of the Peace in the second part of his memoirs. Ceballos is a base man, who designedly, and in opposition to the truth, which none knew better than he did, allowed the Prince of the Peace to be made the victim of an infamous accusation, such as that of *having sold and betrayed* his country to a foreign power. . . .

The Duke de l'Infantado, the Count de Montijo, and many others, published at the time manifestoes in justification of their conduct, or impassioned narratives of the recent occurrences. A countless number of anonymous writers and reviewers, as immoderate in their language as they were insignificant, filled the newspapers and other publications with their remarks: not one of those ephemeral writings has survived the event which gave rise to them.

MM. Azanza and Ofarill, both ministers of Ferdinand VII. when he first seized upon the crown, and afterwards of Joseph, who was doomed to replace him in the regal dignity, are also the authors of an exculpatory memoir; for every one deemed himself bound to protest his innocence in respect of the mysterious occurrences of the Escurial and of Aranjuez. MM. Azanza and Ofarill, who were upright men and lovers of truth, stood not in need of vindicating themselves; they were free from reproach. Theirs is merely a

personal defence, and they speak with becoming reserve of the government of Charles IV. and of the Prince of the Peace.

The Marquis d'Almenara, formerly better known in Paris under his first name of Hervàs, only took up the pen to refute, in brief terms, another perfidious insinuation which M. Ceballos had thrown out.

Almenara formed a very correct estimate of the men who had excited, and turned to their own account, the passions of Ferdinand VII; but he merely sought to save the honour of his son: he observes a respectful silence regarding the events anterior to 1808.

The canon Llorente (Nellerto), an upright, plodding, heavy writer, has collected many official documents relating to that epoch: he has omitted several important ones; nevertheless, his collection is a valuable one. I doubt the authenticity of the letters ascribed to Don Mariano Louis Urquijo. Llorente, however, exhibits two letters from Dr. Garcia Suelto, which would of themselves avouch for the high merit of his collection.

The work of the canon Escoïquiz, the literary and political preceptor of Ferdinand VII, is no more than a false defence of Escoïquiz himself and of his pupil. It well became the principal agent in the intrigue, or conspiracy, to be the historian of it: but he placed too much reliance on the simplicity of his readers. What he says is

sufficient to afford an insight into what he would conceal; and the Prince of the Peace inflicts a signal chastisement upon him.

M. Muriel, another canon, has published a translation of the history of the Spanish house of Bourbon, by William Coxe, to which he has appended notes and supplemental chapters. He might, in imitation of his author, have laid down his pen at the close of the reign of Charles III; but he volunteered an inroad upon the following reign: the Prince of the Peace justly complains of the attack unexpectedly levelled at him by M. Muriel, whom he refutes with great superiority of argument. The reader will decide which of them bears the palm of truth and reason over his antagonist.

We must not omit from this list the Marquises Cavallero and Labrador; the one a former minister of Charles IV, the other a diplomatist of Ferdinand VII, at the congress of Vienna, in Paris, Rome, &c. but now a disaffected man, or a refugee in France, and of late embarked in a strange altercation with the minister Martinez de La Rosa. The Prince of the Peace assigns their true value to the letters and explanations of both *marquises*, who might, in Paris, be mistaken for grandees or men in high authority.

King Ferdinand ordered, on his return, that a *History of the War of Independence* should be drawn up and published by a commission of staff

officers, who have never avowed their names. This pompously announced work ceased at the close of the first volume. The only apparent object of the commission was to hold up the character and conduct of Ferdinand, during the emergency, in a favourable point of view. This first and only volume is dedicated to him: *he was then living, and seated on the throne.* It is a memoir exculpatory of his majesty, who stood as much and in far greater need of purifying himself than any other actor in the scenes enacted at the Escurial and Aranjuez.

The illustrious General Foy, amongst our own countrymen, had undertaken a *History of the War in Spain;* but his premature death prevented his revising and improving his first design. He did me the honour of frequently consulting me, and even attaching some value to my observations. The imperfect manuscripts of that brilliant orator have been reviewed and amended by other hands. In this posthumous history, incorrect and malicious assertions have been imputed to him; whereas I can vouch that he did more justice to the Prince of the Peace's administration. Had an edition been prepared under General Foy's own eyes, those sarcasms would have been suppressed, of which he would himself have felt the unfairness and unbecoming character.

M. de Pradt has derived from Escoïquiz's pam-

phlet his historical romance entitled: *Memoirs on the Spanish Revolution.* In vain does he assure us that he listened at the door whilst Napoleon, the supreme judge, proceeded to a summary hearing of the celebrated cause which was tried at Bayonne: M. de Pradt never had the patience to listen. In haste to compose a pamphlet suitable to the occasion which gave rise to it, and finding the cast-off clothes of Escoïquiz at hand, he formed a French dress out of the turned cassock of the Spanish priest. To be serious, this witty and imaginative historian has never bestowed a thought on the accuracy of his *facts,*—never attempted to make himself acquainted with them. I feel assured that M. de Pradt will readily acknowledge his errors.

I have adverted to the principal works thrown into circulation. The names and peculiar position of their authors gave weight to their testimony.

During a long residence in Madrid, (from 1792 to 1808,) and a further stay in Spain during the whole of the war which commenced in the latter year, I was unremitting in my inquiries,—a practice I ever had through life,—and attentively treasured up the answers given to them. I have read all that has been written, seen with my own eyes whatever was to be seen, and was by no means prepossessed in the Prince of the Peace's favour.....The result is, that I have yet to dis-

cover any clear and precise fact which can be adduced against the public or private character of Charles IV's prime minister.....

The studious and enduring animosity of the Inquisition and the cloister, are alone calculated to work upon so slender a ground.

Every imputation has its origin in popular rumours, which vanish upon the slightest inquiry. It is a torrent without a source; formed and swollen by a heavy shower, roaring and rapid in its progress, it carries everything before it: we notice, on the following day, the traces of its passage, but are at a loss to find how or whence it arose.

The pretended despotism of the Prince of the Peace has not been sullied by a single act of cruelty or even of harshness. How many acts of indulgence and of the kindest good-nature might we not, on the contrary, adduce on his behalf! In a country governed by an absolute sovereign, adjoining revolutionary France, imbued with the unavoidable contagion of new ideas,—in such a country as Spain, where a man's life is held at so cheap a rate, the Prince of the Peace never caused the effusion of a single drop of blood;[8] no liberal opinion was ever persecuted so long as he held in

[8] I must lay particular stress upon this point. When I accepted the task of translating and publishing these memoirs, I did so with the express intention of openly congratulating the Prince of the Peace on his signal humanity.

his hands the reins of government.....He gave away much money in secret charities.[h]

The Prince of the Peace had a taste for literature, and protected those who promoted its improvement. The formation or revival of a multitude of useful institutions and establishments date from the time of his being raised to the rank of prime minister and subsequently of generalissimo of the forces. It would be next to impossible to name a single Spaniard of any talent who did not live in comparative comfort during the reign of Charles IV.[i]

[h] The judge delegate appointed in 1808, with two other counsellors of Castile, to take an inventory of the Prince of the Peace's papers, often told me that he had seen with great surprise the private list of persons who were paid yearly allowances out of his own funds. Genteel families, but straitened in their circumstances, annually received upwards of two hundred thousand francs. The public did not give the prince credit for so much generosity; he was even suspected of parsimony.... I apprehend that neither Spain nor any other country ever afforded so splendid an example of beneficence combined with so much discreetness. The memoirs will afford evidence that this *favourite of fortune* was not possessed of such extravagant wealth as was generally imagined. Spaniards have greatly exaggerated it: this is a Spanish failing; the Castilian is, of all modern languages, that which most abounds in superlative expressions. The respectable magistrate who has supplied me with these details is still living; he even resides in Paris: but he also practises the virtue of discretion, and has requested that I should avoid the mention of his name.

[i] Olavide, the last victim of the Inquisition, underwent the torture during the preceding reign. The power of doing evil or of preventing it was then vested in Counts Florida Blanca and d'Aranda; the latter of whom was represented by his panegyrists

The army is also indebted to the Prince of the Peace for considerable improvements; I will even add, for its being restored to its former character; since, under Florida Blanca's administration, it had been systematically neglected, and humbled in its spirit.

The magistracy has never accused the all-powerful minister of having permitted the interference of arbitrary power in the exercise of the judicial functions. [k]

The high nobility possessed little political influence. Insensible to the ties of family or of

as a lover of philosophy and the friend of French encyclopædists: nevertheless, it was the Prince of the Peace who, at a later period, put an end to Olavide's banishment, and procured him the permission of quietly ending in Spain his venturesome career. Lieutenant-general Urbina had married the niece of that illustrious outlaw. He solicited his pardon from the Prince of the Peace, who resolutely exerted himself to obtain it. The Inquisition took note of this act, and watched the opportunity of punishing the bold man who dared to rescue a victim from its grasp.... Colonel Urbina, son of the lieutenant-general, is in Paris, where he has for a length of years established his residence. His testimony would confirm the above statement.

[k] The respect with which the Prince of the Peace maintained unimpaired the sacred functions of the magistracy is the more honourable to him; as his predecessors, especially the two last, Florida Blanca and Aranda, had left none but traditions savouring of the most absolute despotism. Florida Blanca was the first who arrogated to himself the power of conveying the king's commands by means of a ministerial order: before his time, the monarch affixed his signature to every document. It is notorious what latitude of action the minister derived from the adoption of this new method.

party spirit, alike servile and debased, they conspired not; they bore animosity to no one; they would have even been at a loss how to complain. The ante-rooms of the palace were, as heretofore, open to them. That nobility, once so haughty and so powerful, had, for the last hundred years, confined their ambition to securing to themselves the places in the royal household.[1] The choice of the sovereign, be he who he might, was always secure of their approbation and homage; so accustomed were they to the sudden apparition from the clouds, as it were, or the no less sudden springing up out of the bowels of the earth, of those who were to relieve the monarch of the irksome administration of his vast dominions.

Nothing is farther from my intention than to asperse the memory of these illustrious upstarts, when I recall the uncertainty or meanness of their

[1] The descendant of that distinguished captain, Gonsalvo de Cordova, the Duke of Medina-Celi, the wealthiest of all the Spanish grandees, was the First Familiar of the Inquisition, (*Alguazil mayor*,*) and very proud of that dignity. All the high nobility resided near the court: they amount to nearly two hundred, of whom not more than twenty inhabited Saragossa, Valencia, Barcelona, or the province of Andalusia. The grandees of Spain were part of the *moveable property* of the palace. I doubt much whether two of the number could be named who possessed, in the whole extent of their territorial estates, a manor-house or an humble *chateau* to which they could retire and enjoy repose for the shortest season.

* The *Alguazil mayor* directed in person the arrests determined upon by the Inquisition.

origin. Alberoni the Cardinal, Don Zenon Somodevila Marquis de la Ensenada, Moñino Count de Florida Blanca, were ennobled through their personal merit. However, in presenting those specimens of men unexpectedly elevated to grandeur, who so easily rose about the persons of Spanish sovereigns, especially since the time of Philip V, I have done so with the view of proving that the Castilian aristocracy was used to such plebeian adoptions.[m] For the rest, Don Manuel

[m] Alberoni was only a poor Italian priest, the son of a gardener of Parma, whose facetious wit occasionally enlivened the satirical mind of our Duke of Vendome. He governed Spain under Philip V. His disgrace was owing to external interference, some traces of which might be found amongst the archives of *our younger branch*. Philip the Regent powerfully contributed to, and beheld with pleasure, Alberoni's downfall. Dubois was jealous of his fellow-minister in Spain, both being of the same profession.

The Marquis de la Ensenada, known by his display of wealth, by the splendour of his jewels, with which he delighted to deck himself, and as a minister in high favour with Ferdinand VI, was, I believe, a foundling taken from an almshouse. During his exile at Salamanca, he always affected the same display, the same extravagance in his house and in his dress. His bed-curtains were of lace made with filaments of *amianthus*. As a lady, the Countess de V. G. was admiring this splendid furniture, the marquis suddenly drew near with the light he held in his hand, and set fire to it. It is easy to conceive the flurry occasioned by this supposed accident, which fortunately had no other consequence.... Many more of these foundlings have made their way in Spain, a country which is supposed to be the chosen land of aristocracy, and so swarming with *gentility*. I might adduce many other instances of the kind in the diplomatic career. For the rest, an act under the sign-manual has

de Godoy was not deficient in solid titles whereon to establish his own genealogy. He bore one of the most ancient historical names of the monarchy, which it was never attempted to contest to him.

Neither men of letters, the army, the magistracy, nor the nobility, had any grounds of complaint against him. Under his administration agriculture in general was greatly encouraged: the enormous expenses of the war, first against France, and afterwards against England, entailed

decreed, that those children of chance were nobles or nearly as good. The text of this act has been quoted by the Prince of the Peace in the course of his Memoirs.

Moñino, Count de Florida Blanca, a minister of some celebrity under Charles III, and even at the commencement of the reign of Charles IV, was the son of a cryer attached to a secondary tribunal in the province of Murcia.

What was the origin of the famous Riperda, who suddenly rose after Alberoni's downfall? he is supposed to have belonged to a noble Dutch family. But in what manner, and through what means, did he attain the rank of minister for foreign affairs in Spain? He exercised for a time undisputed influence. His fall was likewise owing to foreign interference, after he had been created duke, grandee of Spain, &c. A perfect adventurer as he was, he hastened to seek his fortunes in the dominions of Morocco, where he turned mussulman, became minister, general, &c.

I shall occasionally bring before the reader those upstart counts, marquises, and dons, created by the several kings of Spain ever since Philip V, who first set the example, and paid all the contractors of his reign in titles. Ferdinand VI. and Charles III. readily followed this precedent. Charles IV. did not abuse his prerogative; but the marquises created by Ferdinand VI. attract special notice by the slenderness of their claims, and the nature of the services rendered by them.

no augmentation of existing taxes. The commercial class acknowledged the protection he extended to them. The financial operations, during the period of his administration, from 1792 to 1798, were applauded, even at a time when a relentless ill-will was bent upon condemning in the mass all that had been done under the pretended reign of Charles IV's minister.

We now turn to another question.

I have witnessed, in common with all the world, that endless stream of compliments poured forth, during an unbroken period of eighteen years; the crowds of flatterers and parasites of both sexes daily inundating the saloons of the Prince of the Peace. I have seen what perfection the art of praising and of begging the means of honourable existence had attained in a country whose monarchical and religious institutions greatly favoured this species of industry.

I have witnessed the generous confidence of the sovereign of Spain and of the Indies, who, for nearly six years, entrusted to his prime minister the almost exclusive exercise of the supreme power; and when the latter, no longer belonging to the administration, came to reside in Madrid, after the year 1798, Charles IV. and Maria-Louisa, alternately residing in the silent retreats of Aranjuez, St. Ildefonso, and the Escurial, during eleven months of the year, only received, on rare and solemn occasions, the overflowings of the

habitual and constant court of the prince generalissimo and high admiral.

Amidst a cloud of incense calculated to turn the strongest mind giddy, the plain gentleman of Estramadura, recently arrived from his province, appeared no way dazzled or embarrassed by such oriental parade; he maintained a calm attitude, and displayed great presence of mind and much power of memory. He listened with close attention; his answers were easy, short, and satisfactory; he readily granted a favour; and if he occasionally felt himself compelled to refuse an unjust or unseasonable request, the struggle within him visibly affected his gentle and good-natured physiognomy. No Spanish minister previously to, none especially after his disgrace, had his saloons beset by so great a crowd of obsequious and frequent visiters. The female sex hurried headlong to them; the most attractive and most distinguished by the gifts of nature and of wit came to display themselves before the Prince of the Peace, endeavouring to win his notice, and anxious to bear the stamp of his protection. If he did not always prove insensible amidst the personal charms which beset him in all directions, —if he had the failings of a man (and he does not deny it), he was ever known to screen his weakness under the veil of decorum; he was never guilty of the slightest act of indiscretion: jealousy has magnified the objects it worked upon;

they were envenomed by ill-will, and hypocrisy affected to be scandalized..... I appeal to the testimony of those who frequented the court circles and society at large at the period to which I allude. Did not the traditional irritability of Spanish husbands appear to have been slumbering? What mother ever invoked the vengeance of heaven or of human justice against the seducer of her daughter? Was a single complaint or reproach ever raised against him? Assuredly not: the licentiousness of public morals was not the work of the Prince of the Peace; for this is the vulgar text for the invectives of a hypocritical and jealous sect. When first raised to the ministry, he found in full maturity the seeds sown by an uncontrolled monarchical power,—ultramontane catholicism, with all its severity and indulgences combined, monastic superfetation, the Inquisition, elderships, and the scorching sun of the Peninsula.... It is proved that the manners and influence of the young minister have, on the contrary, softened down, I may even say purified, that corruption of the age. The African ardour of Spaniards was confined within the limits of civilized gallantry; the ladies of the court no longer ventured to contend before the world for the favours of a stage-player, a butcher, or a gladiator.[n]

[n] In 1789, under the reign and within sight of the wise and pious Charles III, the Duchesses of A. and O. disputed the possession of Castillones or of Romero, the first bull-slayers in

These disgusting tastes fled for concealment to the barren provinces of Estramadura and Andalusia, where the costume of the *Majo*,[o] the coarse revels of the circus, the wantonness of gipsy dancers,[p] still afford delight to the populace, and to some noblemen who frequent the lowest company.[q] In the saloons open to friendship, in the *tertulias*,[r] under the protecting shelter of the balcony, behind the mysterious Persian blind, which admits of our seeing without being seen, churchmen no doubt gave way to men of the world,—the coif and the hood disappeared before the brilliant uniform of the Guards .... One half of the scandal was thus lopped off. The priest continued to subsist upon his perquisites. The

Spain. Such despicable dissoluteness was of public notoriety; high and low, at court and in town, all spoke of it; it was the theme of daily conversation; the episodes, the bursts of passion and generosity of each rival, were related with full details; but none were shocked at the immorality, the insolence, the scandal of this struggle. Such were the morals which the Prince of the Peace was accused of having corrupted!

[o] *Majo.*—Costume of the *Majo* is the peculiar costume of bolero and fandango dancers, of bull-prickers and slayers, of all who practised the art or carried on the trade of bull-fighting.

[p] *Las gitanas*, or gipsies; dancers by profession, and such dancers!

[q] Of this race of amateurs, there only remained in Madrid the Marquis de Peralès, an obscure, inoffensive man, who was, nevertheless, assassinated by the mob during a tumult which occurred at the time when the capital was surrendered to Napoleon in 1808.

[r] Assemblies; social meetings.

first-fruits devolved to others;—where was the evil?

For the rest, this social change, in which morality gained more than it could have lost, was not the exclusive work of one man. *The age was in full march,* according to the military expression of M. de Pradt. There was then springing up in every country, even in Spain, an eagerness for novelty. Urged on, like the rest, by the general movement, but firmer, more enlightened, more generous than his predecessors, Florida Blanca and Aranda,—both restless, mistrustful, and timid old men,—the Prince of the Peace had the courage to face, to forestall, and disarm his enemy.... Making a vigorous appeal to the national honour and patriotism, he encouraged knowledge, the arts, labour, civilization, and refinement in morals as in manners; and thus affording but slender hold to the revolution which threatened Spain from without, he succeeded in arresting its progress at the foot of the French Pyrenees, without turning withal to his own advantage the concessions made to liberty. Slander has never succeeded in pointing, nor could it point at the present day, to two women whose character he ever compromised, so strictly did he observe the rules of decorum:[1] neither the ardent coquetry,

[1] At a later period, the lady to whom he had given the first preference became his second wife; and this great corruptor of morals, according to the hyperbolical language of his enemies,

the gentle voice, the impassioned attitudes, of the veriest siren, ever succeeded in distracting him from his duties of prime minister and of a statesman. He conscientiously fulfilled the task imposed upon him.

After having presided at the council during six memorable years, he ceased to belong to it: he either withdrew, or was removed from office.

In countries swayed by an absolute government, it is easy to attain the height of honours; but once arrived at the summit, the descent is ever abrupt and precipitate. Since the days of Philip II, and even of his great-grandfather, Ferdinand the Catholic, renowned commanders, distinguished ministers, glittering favourites, were sent to expiate in exile or in a dungeon the crime of having ceased to be agreeable to their master.[t]

The Prince of the Peace effected his retreat in good order, and without a slur upon his character. He re-appeared at court; his numerous retinue of friends, literary men and adulators, never deserted him. His exclusion from the cabinet

proved himself a model of the most honourable delicacy as well as a martyr to it. He legitimated the only wandering imputed to him.

[t] Cardinal Ximenez, Christopher Columbus, Fernan Cortès, the Duke of Alba, Alexander Farnese, the renowned Captain Gonsalvo de Cordova, Antonio Perez, the Count Duke d'Olivarès, the Cardinal Duke of Lerma, the Marquis of Siete Iglesias, Roderigo Calderon, Alberoni, Riperda, Ensenada, were all banished, poisoned, or imprisoned. . . . . .

seemed rather a discharge solicited by himself than an actual disgrace. Successors were assigned to him. They were, as it was said in the case of M. de Turenne, the small coins taken in exchange for a single piece of gold.

Nevertheless, a man was found to force his way from the dust of the Record Court, who proved his skill in taking advantage of the royal weakness; in turning to his own account an inborn spirit of mistrust, the irritability, the sudden ingratitude, the constant apprehensions, all the evil passions of the supreme power. This man succeeded in holding for a short time the direction of two or three seals of office, and retained that of Justice whilst Maria Louisa and Charles IV. continued on the throne.... The Prince of the Peace had to endure the affront of this base rivalry, so mysteriously fomented, and which, shunning all external display, allowed the late prime minister to bear the whole responsibility of acts which were not his own, and which he was unable to prevent. The world in general, and all superficial minds, still pretend at the present day that the supposed omnipotence of the Prince of the Peace never experienced any diminution.[u]

[u] The following are the common expressions adopted and repeated by all biographical compilers: "The weak-minded Charles IV! Abusing this weakness, the favourite disposed of everything, did everything, never ceased to do everything at his pleasure." But there is a contradiction in these words,—

Three years of this equivocal and painful position had scarce elapsed, when a signal return of confidence on the part of the sovereign placed him at the head of the army, which had been suffered to dwindle away; but which Spain, harassed on all quarters, was anxious to exhibit to advantage in the presence of her friends and her enemies. He re-organized that army, led it in person against Portugal, and brought the war to a conclusion in a few days; securing to Spain advantages which she had never succeeded in obtaining since the restoration of the house of Braganza in 1640. He had the farther merit of sending back a French auxiliary army, alike dangerous and burdensome to the country, which it was important to get rid of at any price. It was the advanced guard of all the expeditions so long meditated against the Peninsula.

The Prince of the Peace was welcomed on that occasion with fresh congratulations, the unanimity and eagerness of which could only be warranted by his acknowledged superior talents, and the eminent services he had rendered.

In 1808, during the intoxication of its freedom, the anonymous and daily press vomited forth against him a frightful deluge of libels, of absurd

weakness, on the one hand; a prolonged abuse of that weakness, on the other: weak-minded kings can never be governed by one man; they are led by everybody, by whoever approaches them; and none are so accessible as Spanish sovereigns.

exaggerations, which, after inundating the Peninsula, were circulated through foreign countries. The reviewers of France and England, the concocters of contemporary biographies, of apocryphal memoirs, of *histories written at the time,* hastened to quench their thirst in these troubled waters; they swallowed an ample share of mud with their drink.

Those waters have settled, after a lapse of twenty-five years; we may now see the bottom of the stream. Spain, like every other country, had her habitual egotists; men whose course is already run; conservators, according to a modern definition they have assumed; friends of the *statu quo,* because they are already in possession: whether it was foresight, instinct, or jealousy, the appearance of the young minister of Charles IV. gave great displeasure to these conservators. In fact, Don Manuel de Godoy was not raised to that elevation by an organized cabal, by a political, financial, or religious brotherhood; he had no other patron than himself, the occasion that offered, his youth, and his moral, and as yet untried, strength.

His frankness, his liberality, his noble bearing, triumphed at once over an antiquated etiquette, and that proverbial gravity of which Philip II. had laid down the rules and supplied the model. Every thing in this decrepit court seemed to acquire fresh vigour. A new actor on that stage,

where his appearance had not been announced, his lively, natural, and brilliant performance, threw into despair *the old comedians in ordinary to the king.*

"What subversion of everything!" they exclaimed: "this is a revolutionary symptom; a concession made to the spirit of the age, to the pernicious maxims which the French of 1789 had just thrown into circulation."[v]

[v] Long after the peace of 1795, namely, in the year 1806, the Prince caused the army to adopt the new head-dress of French soldiers, the hair *à la Titus* without powder! This example was followed by all young men. Charles IV. himself submitted to the sacrifice of his long tail. The *blockheads* of Madrid were greatly alarmed at this occurrence, which caused far more sensation than did amongst the Athenians the tail of Alcibiades' dog. Few old men would conform to this foreign fashion. Count d'Altamira, one of the first grandees of Spain, and grand equerry of the palace, whose stature fell short of four feet, wore a very long tail, to which he was wonderfully attached. He solicited of the king, as a signal favour, that he should be excused parting with it. This favour was generously granted to him.*

* In 1765, a popular tumult broke out against the minister Esquilace; the cause of it was an order to diminish by a few inches the long cloaks, and especially the broad slouched hats, at that time in vogue. The Jesuits were accused of having excited the commotion; the king's guard was slaughtered; the aged king, Charles III, presented himself at the balcony of his palace, conceded everything to the mutineers, dismissed his minister, and escaped, it is said, by a subterraneous passage. His fear did not subside until he reached the royal residence of Aranjuez. Count d'Aranda, who was on this occasion appointed president of the Council of Castile, caused the guilty to be punished. By great skill and severity he succeeded in restoring order. The minister Esquilace, was compelled to quit Spain; his loss was ever regretted by Charles III. The family name of the Marquis Esquilace is Gregori, or Gregorio.

The alarmed conservators were soon reinforced by powerful auxiliaries. These were the old priest-party.[v] The alliance was a natural one. But the church, which never submits to act a subordinate part, assumed the whole management to itself. The church party became the real, the chief enemy of the Prince of the Peace; an enemy never losing sight of the object of its pursuit, neither in this world nor in the next. . . . And when the sentence of anathema could at last be hurled at the devoted victim, when the wrecks of this fallen grandeur were reviled and irrecoverably dispersed, the habit and the cassock figured in the first ranks of the tumult; the village curate had instructed his country auditory; thousands of strolling preachers issuing from their pious dens harangued in the public places; the hue and cry was sounded from the steeple; from the sacristy the watch-word emanated.[x]

[v] There existed amongst the Spanish clergy, even amongst the monks, men of merit, well enlightened, benevolent, inclined to a spirit of toleration; men, in short, who belonged to their age far more than to the habit or cassock which covered them. But, whatever may be said to the contrary, they were only exceptions to the rule. All the rest, from top to bottom of the clerical ladder, formed the church party.

[x] Already, some years before, the volcano had threatened an eruption; but it only emitted at that time a cloud of smoke.

He was the father of the present cardinal of that name, and of several other children, the youngest of whom bore a surprising resemblance to Charles III.

But the men possessed of any talent—poets themselves, always so prone to worship the rising sun—abstained from insulting the idol at whose feet they had poured forth their homage. None of them has retracted the praises bestowed upon the Prince of the Peace when in the zenith of his prosperity. The breath of calumny has always blown from one and the same quarter: we have, in the first instance, the canon Escoïquiz heading the procession of the league, of which he afterwards constitutes himself the *historical whitewasher;* next comes the Archbishop de Pradt, hastening from afar to join the sacred battalion; and lastly, even the canon Muriel, a writer in other respects so circumspect, so rational, and who might well have acted a neutral part in the quarrel.....

The Prince of the Peace openly professed principles of toleration; the religious police was, in his estimation, an immoral resource unworthy of a government strong in the consciousness of its good intentions. He did not spare the Inquisition; if he did not altogether rid his country of it, at any rate he mitigated the evil. In short, so long as he held the reins of power, he never failed to pare the monster's claws as often as it attempted to stretch them out. These memoirs

The rising star of the young minister dispelled those dark vapours. In the course of these Memoirs will be found the anecdote of the three archbishops, one of whom was no less a man than the Inquisitor-General.

will afford more than one proof of this assertion.

At the same time, the material, the pecuniary immunities of the clergy, were curtailed by the fiscal measures which the Prince of the Peace had the boldness to adopt: the pope had admitted the fairness of them; but the clergy never forgave the author of this *incipient ecclesiastical reform.* Though the breach effected was not wide, it was rendered practicable; it pointed out the weak side by which the enemy might gain access to the fortress. *Inde iræ!*

The reader is now in the right track.

The approach of the French army in 1808 having determined the crisis, and removed every mask, it was discovered that the priest Escoïquiz was the agent, the confidential secretary, of the conspiracy or camarilla of Ferdinand VII.[y] Nevertheless, the *odium of the foreign invasion* was skilfully thrown upon the Prince of the Peace, who

[y] Ferdinand's camarilla was confined to a small group of envious, disappointed, and factious men, who always, and in all countries, gather round the immediate successor to the crown. This party, though weak in numbers, was active and persevering in its object. It only consisted of the canon Escoïquiz, preceptor of the Prince of Asturias, the Duke de l'Infantado, and a few others of his highness's household. In this conventicle, eager for the enjoyment of power, the creditable plan of calling in the aid of Napoleon was meditated and carried into effect. M. T. de Beauharnais promoted it, and was entrusted with the part of conveying the message to the proper quarter.

had constantly endeavoured to avert an event of which he became the first victim.

The idea of this invasion emanated from a higher quarter. We are now to turn to Napoleon.

This great performer, having given up the game in the East, had come to repair his fortunes in Europe. His activity of mind, the wonderful success of his arms, his iron will removed all difficulties. The consulate is but the footstool to the throne; France accepts his yoke, and beholds him with admiration. Old royalties bend to him; the daughter of the Cæsars will come to share his bed. The obsequious autocrat, respecting the afternoon's nap of the great man, will say to him, "*My brother, far be it from me to awake you.*"* Monarchs already rise from their thrones, and uncover at his appearance, waiting till he bids them be seated. At the period of this general prostration, the ambassadors and representatives of all those powers were seen to cringe in the Emperor's ante-rooms, seeking the protection of a doorkeeper of the palace, or of an official clerk, in order that they might not miss the hour of the levee, or the chance of procuring a passport or some wretched police token.

Napoleon commanded, and could set in motion at his bidding, a million of soldiers, mostly Frenchmen. No other human being ever held

* At Erfurth.

control over so mighty a force. The northern princes deemed themselves too fortunate if he condescended to fix a limit to his empire in close contact with their own frontiers, not to have assented beforehand to any territorial overthrow he might think proper to effect in the west of Europe.

Those who argue after the event,—who fancy that the world, as at present constituted, may be governed by protocols,—arrogant men, whose past conduct is a censure upon the meanness they displayed at the time, as well as upon their later ingratitude, are now endeavouring to banish the epoch of Napoleon to the regions of fancy.

Nevertheless, the western empire was a vast reality, as history will yet reveal it to us. Napoleon has increased in importance since his death.

One European nation, and one only, refused to bend the knee before the colossus. Sheltered by the ocean and by her thousand ships of war; strong in her exhaustless resources, in her national spirit, in her powerful aristocracy, in her liberal institutions; reduced, besides, to the alternative of maintaining herself, at all risks, at the summit of greatness, or of descending to a state of irksome mediocrity,—England bade defiance to and waged unrelenting war against the ruler of Europe.

Braved and harassed by a foe who always

eluded his blows, Napoleon exhausted his genius and his fortune in search of the means of reaching him. He conceived the vast project of shutting him out from the Continent, driving him back to his enchanted island, besieging it altogether, and reducing, by a merciless blockade, the fortress he was unable to carry by assault. He ground down and tortured the Continent, fettered the press, attempted to fetter the human mind, to enlist chemistry in support of nature, triumphed over all obstacles, and answered every objection by a fresh victory. . . . .

The northern sea-shore, from the Baltic to Bayonne; that of the south, from the mouths of the Cattaro to the rise of the eastern Pyrenees, were lined with means of defence: the British flag dared not appear in sight.

Nothing remained but to bring the Spanish Peninsula within the circle. . . . . The western empire would then be sufficiently extensive and well-rounded; the new dynasty would find ample space to spread itself and form a settlement; the problem of the continental blockade would then be solved; England would be reduced to the necessity of giving up her sword.

Such were the views, the ambition, the settled purpose of Napoleon.

The grand historical picture of Charlemagne stood before him. . . . .

Louis XIV. had said that there should no longer be any Pyrenees.

At a later period, in 1796, the rising Republic entertained on two occasions the idea of seizing upon Portugal by a *coup-de-main*.

In 1801, the First Consul had scarce arrived, when he directed an army to cross Spain and proceed in its course until it should reach Lisbon.[a] The Peninsula, in the mind of Napoleon, must of necessity belong to him.

The road was therefore marked out, and each march indicated. In 1806, the division of the Gironde was collected at the gates of Spain.[b]

It was at the interview of the Niemen that the two Emperors of the North and of the West agreed upon a territorial division at the expense of their respective allies.

In like manner the triumvirs of ancient Rome, at their meeting in the island of Rennús,[c] set about carving the world, readily awarding to each

[a] Appointed generalissimo of the Spanish army on occasion of the war declared against Portugal in 1801, the Prince of the Peace had under his orders the troops commanded, in the first instance, by General Le Clerc, and afterwards by Gouvion St. Cyr. It will be seen in these Memoirs how this third attempt at an invasion of Portugal was arrested by the Prince of the Peace, who placed himself at the head of the movement, and left nothing for the French to achieve.

[b] The order for assembling that army was issued at Osterode, a few days before the battle of Eylau.—*Memoirs of the Duke of Rovigo*, vol. iii. pp. 213, &c.

[c] Reno, at the present day.

other the spoils or the heads of their respective friends.[d]

"I am no longer the ally of Turkey," said Napoleon. "Well, then, take Spain for your share," was Alexander's reply.[e] Accordingly,

[d] "France required that Russia should frankly espouse her quarrel with England, and consent to certain changes in Spain; the first of which were to be, the departure of the reigning family for America, and the meeting of the Cortes for the purpose of sanctioning the change of dynasty: in other words, to re-enact the work of Louis XIV." Napoleon, very probably, conceived the idea of sending the Spanish Bourbons away to America; but neither the Bourbons, nor the Prince of the Peace more especially, ever adopted such an act of political cowardice. See, on this point, the Second Part of these Memoirs.

[e] "The Emperor of Russia further assented to the possession of Hanover by France: he restored Corfu to her: generally speaking, *he agreed with the Emperor Napoleon*, not only respecting the changes which were consequent upon the open treaty, but in regard to *others likewise which were in the Emperor's contemplation, and as to which he had conferred with him.*

"I will afford the best explanation in my power of the grounds upon which I rest my opinion.

"After all matters had been settled at Tilsit, the two sovereigns took leave of each other with great demonstrations of personal esteem and attachment. The Emperor Napoleon accompanied the Emperor of Russia to the left bank of the Niemen, where the Russian guards were drawn up in order of battle. Here it was that, embracing him, the Emperor Napoleon took off his cross of the legion of honour, and fixed it to the button-hole of the grenadier on the right of the first rank of the Russian guards, saying: 'You will recollect having received it on the day on which your sovereign and I became friends.'"—*Memoirs of the Duke of Rovigo*, vol. iii. pp. 39, 40 and 41.)

when Junot's army made its appearance at Lisbon, on the 30th November 1807, it found the Russian Admiral Siniavin anchored in the Tagus, with an auxiliary squadron of eight sail of the line and a frigate. This was the balance of the account struck at Friedland, and definitively settled at Tilsit:[f] and the Emperor of Austria, for the sake of form, subsequently ratified at Erfurth all that had been done, or that might eventually be done in Spain, and gave his daughter as a hostage!

[f] "On reaching Lisbon, we found there eight sail of the line and a frigate under Admiral Siniavin's orders. This fleet, which, in consequence of *the alliance between France and Russia, and of the war between Russia and England*, was to afford us an additional guarantee for the protection of the harbour, gave us, in the sequel, far more apprehension than security."—*Narrative of the Expedition to Portugal by General Thiebault, Major-General of the French army*, pp. 86 and 87.

The presence of the Russian squadron at the moment of the arrival of the French army, was a *condition agreed on* at Tilsit.

"The treaty of Tilsit had been accomplished for the sole object of humbling England; in other words, of bringing about a general peace; for England was the only obstacle to it. Peace was ever the constant aim of the Emperor Napoleon; he was too enlightened not to perceive that on peace alone depended his safety and the permanence of his system.—England had in full parliament proclaimed perpetual war; she never deviated from this course. France, by binding Russia to her cause, adopted the only means of attaining the object she had in view." —*Memoirs of the Duke of Rovigo*, vol. v. page 198.

Yes, assuredly, Napoleon was anxious for *peace* and for the *stability* of his system; but he desired to combine them with the maintenance of all his acquisitions,—of all that constituted and completed the western empire.

Such was, accordingly, the high ground from whence the torrent was rushing with impelling force towards Spain and Portugal. We are to seek in the exaggeration of mind of Napoleon, in the compliance of Fortune with his will, the motives which determined the double invasion of the Peninsula.

The Duke d'Enghien had already been put to death, an event which occurred on the 22nd of March 1804. The system of Continental blockade, proclaimed on the 21st November 1806, was the announcement of the unavoidable and proximate occupation of the Peninsula. . . . It was easy to foresee the storm which threatened the Spanish territory and the reigning family.

England, who watched the slightest oscillations of the Continent, was manifesting, at this time, the desire of drawing nearer to it; she tendered to the court of Madrid every satisfaction and assistance. Austria gave secret intimation of her readiness to respond to the first signal; Prussia could not fail to run all hazards in the attempt to support her vain boasting at the sword's point, and to recover what she had lost; Russia bade fair to renew her efforts, and bear with all her might upon the common enemy. . . . Napoleon was on the eve of entangling himself in the mire of Poland reeking with blood. . . . Spain was urged on all sides to join the reviving coalition, in order to avert the dangers which threatened her very existence as a nation.

On the 5th of October 1806, the Prince of the Peace published his address or proclamation,[8] a document which has acquired historical importance, and which has at least refuted, beforehand, the numberless calumnies heaped upon him. This proceeding was blamed, after the event had taken place: the defection of those who had urged him to it, who had offered to support the cause he was advocating, exhibited in more glaring colours the too confiding boldness of the Spanish generalissimo; but it is self-evident that the man who carried patriotism, and his sense of national independence, to a degree of temerity, did not deserve to be accused, at a later period, of *betraying his country to Napoleon.*

The battle of Jena overturned the monarchy of Frederick the Great; countless victories followed in regular and rapid succession; the Emperor Alexander, who was at first destined to appear as the Agamemnon of the second coalition of sovereigns, subsequently became the ally of the strongest, and obtained his share of the spoils wrested from the weaker party.

[8] It is inserted word for word in these Memoirs. The proclamation of the Prince of the Peace was antecedent to the Berlin decree by a few days only. The expected promulgation of this decree was already known in Madrid. It was tantamount to proclaiming the Continental blockade; and its consequences were obvious. The battle of Jena took place on the 15th or 16th of the same month of October 1806. See the Second Part of these Memoirs, where the Prince of the Peace explains and justifies the measure he resorted to.

Napoleon, who had long been warned of the disposition of Spain in his regard, never forgave the Prince of the Peace for presuming to penetrate his views, still less for attempting to forestall them.[h]

Whilst the Emperor of the West was meditat-

[h] The Memoirs of the Duke of Rovigo initiate us into the secret of the sentiments entertained at that time by M. de Talleyrand.* The details supplied by the former minister of the

* "It has been designedly asserted that M. de Talleyrand was opposed to this attempt: it may have suited the views of party men to endeavour to convey this belief, but it is at variance with truth. Not only did he not oppose, but he advised it, and laid down the plan for carrying it into effect. It was with the view of acting upon this plan that he evinced so much anxiety for the conclusion of the peace of Tilsit, observing to the Emperor that *the most important business on his hands* was that of the South, where sooner or later a warlike prince might spring up who would exert himself to subvert his work; and reminding him that a single *proclamation* had sufficed to agitate the whole Peninsula; that if a second battle of Eylau should be fought, (which was not unlikely to have occurred in the heart of the Russian provinces, where he would have had to force his way had not the peace been concluded,) it was possible that the Spaniards and Austrians might reach Paris before he could receive information in time to arrest their progress: on the other hand, if he made peace with England ere he could settle at his will the affairs of Spain, he would have to *desist altogether* from the object he had in view, as Europe would not fail to array itself against him whenever he should attempt its accomplishment; whereas, if he should have the good fortune to succeed, he might then treat with England upon a new basis, and consent, on the other hand, to such sacrifices as might be imposed upon him. The *first idea of the invasion of Spain* originated with M. de Talleyrand: he had prepared the springs which were to be set in motion for that purpose; he no doubt desired to effect the intended object by different means, and might indeed have thus succeeded in bringing it to a more successful issue."—*Memoirs of the Duke of Rovigo*, vol. iii. pp. 214 and 215.

These Memoirs were published under the Restoration; and M. de Talleyrand has never contradicted the Duke of Rovigo's assertions. How could he have done so? Proofs are wanting to establish their correctness, had they been called for.

ing and preparing his plan of taking forcible possession of the Peninsula, he received the letter of the Prince of Asturias, (since Ferdinand VII.) dated the 12th of October 1807;[i] and, a few days afterwards, the letter of Charles IV. of the 29th of the same month; both relating to the Escurial conspiracy.[k]

Thus, therefore, the Prince of the Peace, alarmed at the danger which threatened his country and the reigning dynasty, and urged on by the belligerent powers, assumed the initiative on one occasion, the 5th of October 1806, and almost declared war against Napoleon.

imperial police are occasionally wanting in accuracy when he does not relate what he has actually seen or heard; his prejudices, his feelings of jealousy, lead him beyond bounds; nevertheless he has correctly apprehended Napoleon's sentiments when the latter has condescended to lay himself open. The Duke of Rovigo has more than once seen his master in an undisguised attire.

[i] The canon Escoiquiz is well known to have dictated it. The Duke de l'Infantado, and a few others, were in the secret. M. de Beauharnais, at that time ambassador in Madrid, undertook to transmit the letter to the proper quarter, and he was not ignorant of its contents. After Ferdinand's return to Spain in 1814, M. de Beauharnais received in Paris the grand cross of the order of Charles III; it was a reward for the good offices rendered by him in 1807 and 1808. Napoleon no sooner received Ferdinand's letter, than he dictated the convention or treaty of Fontainebleau, signed by Duroc and Izquierdo on the 27th of the same month.

[k] The proclamation of the Prince of the Peace, and the letters of Ferdinand and of his father Charles IV, are inserted word for word in the Second Part of these Memoirs.

We then find the presumptive heir to the crown denouncing his father's government; soliciting, unknown to his father and sovereign, the hand of an imperial princess; and urging Napoleon to interfere in the internal affairs of Spain!

Charles IV, the oldest ally of France, informs the Emperor "that an unnatural conspiracy has just broken out in his own palace; that he is compelled to punish its authors; and that *the order of succession to the crown is endangered!*"

Napoleon is at once courted, enticed, called by the son to his aid; consulted, implored, by the father.... He had been defied and threatened by the Prince of the Peace two years before.

Long before these various grounds of excitement had been afforded to him, the new Charlemagne, the creator, the director of the Continental blockade, had already dreamed the completion of his empire by the annexation to it of the Spanish Peninsula; for all his efforts, all his labours in the north as well as in the south were illusory, incomplete, void of any result, so long as the two lines of coast in the west of Europe were not hermetically closed against England.

Whilst the occupation of Portugal was in course of being accomplished, on the 30th of November 1807, the French armies were simultaneously penetrating into Spain through Catalonia

and Biscay, the two extremities of the chain of the Pyrenees.

The titular generalissimo, Murat—a perfect Apollo of Belvidere on horseback, combining with the accent and gait of a frivolous coxcomb the most conspicuous valour and rashness on a field of battle—surrounded by a staff as glittering as himself, unprovided with positive instructions, not knowing whether he was to wage war or maintain himself at peace, with whom or on what points he was to treat, Murat proceeded at a horse's prance towards the capital in March 1808: his advanced guard consisted of twenty-five thousand men.[1] More astonished than alarmed at his approach, the Spaniards manifested no ill-will towards him.

We are here at a loss to conceive what extravagant and petty Machiavelism led to the adoption of measures more worthy of an Italian prince of the thirteenth century, than of a conqueror having a million of victorious soldiers at his command.

[1] Eight thousand men had just entered Spain through Biscay, independently of the troops which had previously marched in the directions of Lisbon and Catalonia. After treacherously obtaining possession of some fortified towns, twenty thousand men remained stationed between Vittoria and Madrid for the purpose of protecting the communication of the French armies. General Dupont, with a straggling force composed of three divisions, moved on the right towards Valladolid, and took the road to Andalusia, penetrating through La Mancha and the Sierra Morena. Marshal Moncey, with a force of less than ten thousand men of all arms, advanced upon Valencia, hoping to

These troops, which had so signalised themselves in a multitude of hard-fought battles, were employed, on entering Spain, in obtaining by stealth successes, the whole merit of which consists in the reciprocal dangers of attack and defence. General officers[m] received and fulfilled the mission of taking, on their way, and under cover of an unworthy deception, the fortresses of Pampeluna, Figueras, and Barcelona! Fatal beginning of an enterprise! Insulting and useless act of mistrust, unwarranted by any previous provocation! It created less terror than indignation amongst the Spaniards, who were thus treated as enemies whilst they were considering the French in the light of *allies!*

The men of Aranjuez, the confidants of the Prince of Asturias, those who had solicited the intervention of foreigners, rejoiced at witnessing their approach to Madrid.

"Napoleon comes to substitute the son for the father, and us for the Prince of the Peace and his dependants"— such was their exclamation; and their emissaries were unwearied in their praises of the pretended generosity of the great Emperor. Foolish men! Sad parody of the litigants in the

obtain possession of it without striking a blow, in the same manner as Duhesme and d'Armagnac had succeeded in occupying the cities of Pampeluna and Barcelona.

I shall have to advert, in the Second Part of these Memoirs, to the grand movement of the invading army.

[m] D'Armagnac in Navarre, Duhesme in Catalonia, &c. &c.

fable! Was it, then, with a view to settle the internal dissensions of the Spanish Bourbons, and to calm the passions of an obscure and stupid camarilla, that Napoleon crossed the Pyrenees? *Napoleon never deviated from his object.* On that occasion the Prince of the Peace evinced as much courage as patriotism and loyalty. "He advised the king to place himself in the first instance beyond the reach of French bayonets by retiring into Andalusia, and leaving Murat to himself in the heart of the Peninsula, beset on all sides by an excited population, which would soon rise in a body to overwhelm him."

The army sent into Spain consisted at first of an amalgamation of suddenly raised conscripts, and of detachments of various corps loosely organized. This was a notorious fact.

The distance from Bayonne to Seville is three hundred post-leagues, on a single high-road intersected by the defiles of the Sierra Morena.

Murat could not cover so extensive a line; he was compelled to stop, and await fresh instructions.[n]

[n] In fact, after the whole royal family had disappeared or been forcibly carried off to France, after Murat's occupation of the capital, and when he held the chief military and political positions, the difficulties which arose on all sides, and those he encountered in endeavouring to maintain his ground for some time longer, are well known. The various army-corps detached to a short distance were compelled to fall back upon Madrid; Moncey was closely followed in his retreat from Valencia;

The advice of the Prince of the Peace was therefore a prudent one, and worthy of a Spaniard having the good of his country at heart. But this retreat to Andalusia was at variance with engagements entered into, with sordid or guilty interests. Those who had enticed and called in Napoleon were determined to *await his coming*. They hoped much from his presence and protection; they fancied he had been rendered their accomplice. . . . Charles IV, the whole royal family, all the ministers, were at Aranjuez. This residence stands in a borough of three or four thousand inhabitants, the greater part attached to the household of the palace;[o] an idle, hungry tribe, subsisting upon the fragments of the court meals, and viewing with regret the extraordinary journey which the court was about to undertake; the rather so, as the civil list, which was for some time past involved in debt, was not exact in paying the various salaries. They feared to lose their arrears, or to have long to wait for the settlement of them.

Dupont never returned. The aversion in Madrid itself was so openly manifested, that after a stay of eight days, Joseph abandoned the royal residence he had come to inhabit. . . . On the other hand, Napoleon wrote to the Grand-duke of Berg: "*Should the war be once kindled, all is lost.*"—See the *Memoirs of the Duke of Rovigo*, vol. iii. p. 258. The letter is of the 19th March 1808, same vol. p. 264.

[o] The court resided there during five months in the year, from the middle of February to the end of June. It was much

To this alarmed pack of footmen, we must add other officious valets, who also objected to the removal of the court: the numerous retinue of nobles attached to the king's person, who would have been compelled to accompany him on the journey. Those who did duty in the king's stables rendered themselves conspicuous by their violence;[p] the working class of the vicinity was

enlivened from the 15th of April to the end of June; and the population was doubled, owing to the numerous and distinguished visitors who repaired thither to partake the enjoyment of a delightful spring. But on the approach of the great heats, the court quitted Aranjuez for St. Ildefonso or La Granja. Aranjuez dwindled back to its usual population of three or four thousand inhabitants, who were all attached to the menial offices in the king's household.

[p] Amongst these we are to number M. Melgarejo, who was afterwards created Duke of St. Fernando, and married the eldest daughter of the infant Don Louis, sister of the Princess of the Peace: at that time, M. Melgarejo, though a very secondary agent, warmly promoted the cause of Ferdinand VII.; for which service he was rewarded at first by an accumulation of honours, and subsequently by banishment:—Count d'Altamira, Grand Equerry, (*cavallerizo mayor*); Count d'Oñate, husband of the lady who superintended the queen's household, (*camarera mayor*); the Duke de l'Infantado, already so deeply involved in the affair of the Escurial; and some other gentlemen of the bedchamber. They possessed seignorial rights over nearly all the villages within the jurisdiction of Madrid,* and their stewards exercised great influence amongst the peasantry.

* Count d'Altamira, Lord of Liganez and of the lands dependent upon the marquisate of that title; Count d'Oñate, Lord and Count of Batres; the Duke de l'Infantado, Lord of Chammartin, and of a multitude of villages in the vicinity of Guadalajara, where he had a large establishment in the centre of his extensive domains, &c.

brought to Aranjuez in order to add strength to the contemplated disturbance.

The sudden departure of the King of Spain on the approach of the French army, unquestionably evinced great energy and dignity of character. This measure was still more significant than the proclamation of the 5th of October 1806.[q] To abandon his capital, and remove his family and the whole machinery of government to the furthest extremity of the kingdom, was on the part of Charles IV. an open rupture,—an act of independence; it was placing Napoleon under the necessity of declaring in the face of the world that his seizure of Spain was effected by dispossessing without remorse, without a plausible pretext, the most faithful of his allies.

This insurrection of Aranjuez has been much commented upon; it was represented, at the time, in Spain and throughout Europe, as the explosion of a national sentiment, as the vigorous burst of a people oppressed and exasperated by an insolent and destructive *favouritism*. This was a flagrant exaggeration.

Two thousand peasants, attracted by curiosity, perhaps likewise by the hope of plunder; as many valets ill paid, and apprehensive of not being paid at all; others, who were reluctant to separate from their wives and their habits of life; a sprinkling of

[q] It will be seen in these Memoirs to what extent Napoleon carried his animosity against the Prince of the Peace.

assassins by profession, ever ready to enact their part, dagger in hand, when the opportunity offers; certain intimate friends of Ferdinand, those who had advised his having recourse to Napoleon, and who relied upon the protection of the French army; such were the elements of that so much vaunted insurrection.

There was no display of courage, of patriotism, of generosity, of fighting; not even the shadow of resistance. . . . On beholding this tumultuous assemblage, Charles IV. fancied himself surrounded by conspirators and traitors within the precincts of his palace. This was no doubt the case; but their number was insignificant: all the rest were dispirited and trembling like himself; sheep-like courtiers, whose fidelity was no more than a habit of serving their master, and who, rather prepossessed with the dignity than with the person of the monarch, beheld in the Prince of Asturias the natural substitute,—in a word, the equivalent for another king.

But the chief object was to get rid of the man who had counselled the departure, and who might still inspire the monarch with sufficient energy to carry it into effect with greater circumspection at another moment.[r]

The firmness and presence of mind of Charles

[r] Accordingly, the imperial ambassador, M. de Beauharnais, hastened from Madrid to the residence of Aranjuez, in the night from the 17th to the 18th. He was seen to mix with the groups

IV. failed him on the occasion;[s] and the Prince of Asturias betrayed, dispossessed, and delivered up his father.

Ministers, generals, counsellors, body-guards, all proved wanting in their duty. The Prince of the Peace alone "bethought himself of saving the royal dignity and the national independence." Ferdinand and Napoleon took their revenge for the resistance he had opposed to them. The former foamed with rage when compelled by superior force to yield up his victim; the latter, whilst pretending to grant to the Prince of the Peace an asylum in his dominions, forgot to assign to him, or rather affected to deprive him of, the means of existence under this state of banishment."[t]

of disaffected people, however disguised by his careless travelling dress, in order not to compromise his diplomatic character: this did not prevent his being recognized. His presence had been deemed necessary, as evidence that the movement was approved of; this, at least, was the interpretation given to it. It was Napoleon's wish that neither the father nor the son should be supposed inclined to reject his protectorship, or the arbitrement which he claimed to exercise in the character of umpire. M. de Beauharnais, on the other hand, had so familiarized himself with the elevated alliances contracted by his family, that he beheld with mortification, in the removal of the Prince of Asturias, the indefinite postponement of the marriage of which he had himself conveyed the proposal to the Emperor's knowledge.

[s] See the details and circumstances of Charles IV's abdication in the Second Part of these Memoirs.

[t] Napoleon carried his animosity, and the forgetfulness of

We have yet to explain the strange grant of the principality of the Algarves.

After lowering the Alps, swallowing up the whole of Italy, crushing Austria, oversetting Prussia, driving the Cossacks beyond the Niemen, and compelling the autocrat to associate with him, and to look for his share of the profits to the Dardanelles or the regions beyond the Caucasus, Napoleon, Emperor of the French, King of Italy, Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, Mediator of Switzerland, delighted to survey upon a map that splendid portion of Europe which he had so proudly disquieted: he marked, or struck out with his pencil, the limits and compartments of his empire; and the double coast of the Spanish

all political decorum, so far as to set the first example of spoliation. He bestowed upon Marshal Suchet the splendid domain of Albufera, of the annual value of three hundred thousand francs, which belonged to the Prince of the Peace, a refugee in France under protection of the treaty of Bayonne!

King Joseph did not fail, on his part, to distribute to his dependents the Prince's spoils. He stripped his hotel, took possession of its furniture, caused a strict search to be made in the public treasury for the funds which the Prince's debtors had been compelled to lodge there as belonging to him.

The military grants conferred by Napoleon may, strictly speaking, be accounted for: he fancied himself vested with the power of taking away and of bestowing crowns; he had many ambitions to gratify, for he himself had excited them. . . . .

But what are we to say of the pacific, the righteous Joseph, who was said to reign against his will, and who neither had the rights nor the passions of a conqueror? . . . . For the rest, the spoliation of the property of an absent man, of a sub-

Peninsula ever stood before him, as the last link of the chain of the grand Continental blockade.

On the 26th October 1807, he summoned Duroc to his presence: "Attend to me, Grand Marshal. See Izquierdo, whether at your house, at Talleyrand's, or at Hervás's." This must have an end.

"I send the *petty Bourbons of Etruria* to the northern extremity of Portugal, with the title of *Kings of Northern Lusitania; their dominion will be on the sea-coast.* Junot is on the point of occupying Lisbon and the mouth of the Tagus; he will maintain possession of the country; I shall then see what next. . . . .

"What has that Prince of the Peace to do in

ject who was the martyr of his fidelity to his sovereign and his country,—this deliberate plunder, under the government of Joseph, was but giving application to the system adopted by Napoleon. This great man was not altogether free from acts of meanness: he punished the Prince of the Peace for his proclamation of 1806; for the advice given to Charles IV. in 1808, to withdraw at the approach of the French; in a word, for having at all times thwarted his monomania of Peninsular invasion.

And yet the stupid populace believed that Don Manuel de Godoy was bartering away the honour and independence of Spain! The real traitors, if we can give the name to ambitious miscreants devoid of courage and talent, are those who had called in Napoleon. . . . . But when the letter from the Prince of Asturias to the Emperor of the French was made public, the blow had already been struck. . . . Twenty-seven years have since elapsed . . . and the wound is still bleeding!

" Don Joseph Hervás, eldest son of the Marquis of Almenara, and brother-in-law of the Grand Marshal Duroc, resided then in his hotel, Rue St. Florentin, now the property of M. de Tal-

Spain? he acted last year the part of a bully. He it is who leads the court of Madrid. Tell him that he shall have the Algarves: let him be gone: I have no need of him to arrange matters with Charles IV. and his son, who are at variance with each other, and who both call for my assistance."[v] Thus spoke the oracle. Copying word for word the jostled phrases of Napoleon, Duroc drew up the article of the convention of Fontainebleau, which was signed on the following day, the 27th October, and ratified by the Emperor on the 29th.

What means, in this treaty, *the gift of the principality of the Algarves? It was a banishment!* It was important to get rid of a man of spirit, an upright man, who stood in the way . . . . to remove him, render him an object of suspicion to his fellow-countrymen, and force upon him a shadow of nominal sovereignty.

To point out a place of residence; to define, however loosely, the limits of the imaginary sovereignty, were objects not even thought of.

leyrand. Don Eugenio Izquierdo was on terms of intimate intercourse with Don Joseph Hervás, and Madame Duroc, who inhabited her brother's hotel.

[v] I repeat here word for word what I heard from the lips of the Grand Marshal Duroc, in the presence of his brother-in-law, Don Joseph Hervás, the son of my friend the Marquis of Almenara. It is for the reader to judge whether I have ascribed to Napoleon other sentiments or words than those which several persons, still in existence, must likewise have heard.

It was the government which the Duke, in Cervantes, assigns to the esquire of Don Quixote. The Prince of the Algarves would have received the like greeting from his vassals.[w]

The Prince of the Peace forbore accepting that treacherous present, which he had neither deserved nor sought to obtain. Nevertheless, his

[w] "I have seen nothing to warrant the belief that the Prince of the Peace intended to take possession of the *vast* dominions of which he had secured to himself the enjoyment." (It has been seen that they had been assigned to him by Napoleon.) "On the contrary, the Prince of the Peace was already informed of the Milan decree, which appointed Junot governor of Portugal, and directed him to carry on the administration of it in the Emperor's name. The principality of the Algarves was, therefore, no longer in question; and the Prince no longer indulged in illusions respecting it. He summoned the King's Council to the palace of Aranjuez, and, after laying before them the dangers which threatened the monarchy, he caused his advice to be adopted, and every preparation to be made for the departure of the royal family for Seville," &c.—*Memoirs of Rovigo*, vol. iii. pp. 246, 247.*

However, advantage was taken in Madrid of one of the clauses of the treaty of Fontainebleau, in virtue of which an elective province of Portugal, erected by a stroke of the imperial conjuror's wand into a sovereign principality, that of Algarves, appeared to be the price of a cowardly act of acquiescence in Napoleon's wishes. "Behold," said they, "how the traitor has betrayed his country to the usurper, who rewards him with a crown!" Was not the first inquiry that suggested itself, what proof did the treaty of Fontainebleau afford of any

* Napoleon was well known to have entertained the design of assigning Portugal to Prince Eugene. Junot had no sooner reached Lisbon, than the viceroy sent off two of his aides-de-camp to prepare his residence. The English were beforehand with him.

enemies will persist in asserting, and the people will still believe, that it was the price stipulated for his treachery.

But, independently of every other act of resistance, the proclamation of the 5th October 1806, the bold advice to retire into Andalusia, and his dignified conduct in the month of March 1808, are historical facts: they have been visited on the Prince of the Peace with sufficient severity to warrant his claiming the merit of them.

such treachery? How would Spain be injured by raising two adjoining provinces into principalities paying allegiance to the Peninsular sovereignty, one of which was to be conferred on the Prince of the Peace? Spain had formerly been in possession of the whole of Portugal: she had never ceased regretting, since the year 1640, the loss of this gem, which was wrested from the crown of Philip II. The clause in the treaty, so far from militating against the welfare of Spain, was laying, in some respects, the foundation for the wished-for recovery of her Portuguese dominions.

How extravagant was the idea, on the other hand, of attributing to the Prince of the Peace an ambition alike absurd and misplaced! Lord and owner of the Spanish estate of Albufera, in itself almost a province; of the magnificent Soto de Roma, which the generosity of the Cortes adjudged to be an adequate recompense for Wellington's services; of the domain of the Alcudia, one of the finest properties of the Jesuits, purchased as such by Charles IV. and greatly improved by the donor of it; possessor of many other lands, and of two palaces in Madrid, one of which was judicially estimated of the value of four millions and a half of francs; generalissimo of the land and sea forces; married to the cousin-germain of his king, a union which had already brought him a child; invested with the title of highness, which only belongs, on that side of the Pyrenees, to members of the royal family; grandee of Spain of the first

All the jesuitical craftiness of Escoïquiz, commented upon and revived by M. de Pradt, and so foolishly rehearsed by a crowd of ignorant compilers of all countries, will fail to lead any one astray respecting the aim, the treachery, the fatal consequences of the disloyal application made by Ferdinand to Napoleon. Heavy is the blame attaching to a son, the immediate heir to the throne, for having sought, unknown to his father

class, a dignity which, at the time of Philip the Fifth's accession, was not deemed inferior to that of our princes of the blood,* still less to that of the Electors of Germany—by what whimsical or foolish calculation could he have been induced to exchange, or even lose sight of, such vast possessions and such solid honours, for an isolated and precarious sovereignty, of recent existence, enclosed within a country muzzled and already invaded by Napoleon, who always kept everything for himself? Had he thus stripped off his national character and quitted his native country, he must have endangered all his property in Spain. A moment's reflection would have divulged the true sense of that treaty, secretly got up, as yet unratified, and which assuredly stood in no need of ratification.

* A memorial was presented on this subject to Philip V. by the Duke d'Arcos, head of the ancient and powerful family of Ponce de Leon. Instead of complying with the duke's request, Philip V. ordered him to enter the service as a mere volunteer, and join the army in Flanders.

Nevertheless, the claim of the Spanish grandees to be considered and treated as princes of the blood, is not devoid of foundation. Many of these families have contracted alliances with the reigning house, though never since the accession of the Austrian dynasty. The Lacerdas, the Henriquez, the Velascos, the Osorios, &c. are instances of this truth. With regard to the Electors of Germany, some of them had accompanied Charles V. into Spain, a Marquis of Brandenburg amongst the rest: and it is quite certain that those foreign princes never assumed any superiority over the Constable of Castile (Velasco), the High Admiral (Henriquez), the Count de Benavente (Pimentel), and other grandees of the same stamp.

and sovereign, a foreign support against the government or the policy of his king, of whom he was the first subject. Subsequently, and during the last scene of the drama, the authors of this ill-judged and guilty proceeding, the advisers of the Prince of Asturias, paralysed every means of resisting the invasion: they impeded the intention of Charles IV. to place the plains of La Mancha and the gorges of the Sierra Morena between him and the French army, which was assuredly not in a condition to pursue its adventurous design to the gates of Seville.

It is doubtless evident that, under any circumstances, Napoleon would have taken possession of Madrid, and paraded his eagles throughout the Peninsula: such rapid conquest was to him an easy task; it was to be expected: and there is every probability that Charles IV, though protected in the first instance by the space of country which would have separated him from Murat, and by the inadequacy of the French forces to attack him, would, notwithstanding the zeal displayed by the Prince of the Peace, the attachment, the national spirit, the pride of the Spanish nation, have eventually found himself reduced to the necessity of flying for shelter to Majorca or the Canary islands;* thus following the example of

* Not to America, though falsely asserted. Such an idea never entered the minds of the king, of any member of the royal family, or of the Prince of the Peace.—See, in the Second Part of these Memoirs, what gave rise at the time to this unfounded report.

other sovereigns, whose capitals and provinces were by turns visited by our celebrated *grognards*. Yes, the invasion would sooner or later have taken place, and nearly in the same manner as when Napoleon, in 1808, encircled Spain with eight or ten army-corps.[y] The gallant Moore alone had the courage to stand firm for a moment, and advanced to meet him; but the same causes, the same local difficulties, and especially the same men, must always have brought about the same results. The disputes between the marshals, Joseph's false position, the caudine forks of Baylen, the forcible expulsion from Lisbon, the retreat of Oporto, the disastrous siege of Saragossa,[z] the countless errors committed at Talavera and elsewhere, lastly the frosts of Russia, could not fail to raise the fortunes of Castaños and Palafox, and to adorn the brows of Sir Arthur Wellesley with laurels. . . . Charles IV. would have returned to his dominions in 1814, in imitation of the Kings of Prussia, Sardinia, and Naples, and of the elder branch of the Bourbons, who returned from a still greater distance. The aged King of Spain, ennobled by the persecution

[y] Napoleon proceeded as far as Astorga, where, despairing to overtake the English General Moore, and finding himself recalled to Germany by a fresh coalition set on foot, he resolved upon returning to Bayonne, and performed the journey, a distance of upwards of one hundred and fifty leagues, on horseback, and in the space of five days.

[z] These deplorable events are noticed in the Second Part of the Memoirs, and exhibited in their true light.

he had endured, innocent of what it was not in his power to prevent, could never have ceased to reign, according to the chronology of legitimate right: the disgusting revolt of Aranjuez, the sad episode of Bayonne, the mean acts of Valençay, the ingratitude and bad faith rewarded in 1814 with a crown,—these occurrences would not have tarnished the history of the descendants of Philip V; the foul linen of the family would not have been washed in sight of the public; Spain would not have affrighted the civilization of the age by those revolting and endless proscriptions and executions; the national honour would not have been placed in jeopardy.

The wise and prophetic advice of the Prince of the Peace, had it been adopted, might have saved his country from such accumulated disgrace.

What we have since witnessed must have given cause to the Spaniards for regretting the days of Charles IV. and of his former prime minister.

The accomplices of Ferdinand VII, who attained under his reign some degree of power, have given evidence of their capacity: he has himself cast them off one by one, and treated them with every species of indignity.[a]

[a] The last struggles of that obscure and destructive faction are seen in a late letter addressed by the Marquis Pedro Gomez Labrador to the Minister Martinez de la Rosa; in which the ex-minister gives the ass's kick, first to Napoleon, and next to the Prince of the Peace. The wound is by no means dangerous. Fortunately, M. Labrador has no other weapon to wield than

The faithful and conscientious account of the private and public life of the Prince of the Peace will disarm and silence his detractors, if any should still be found.

Don Manuel de Godoy was indebted to chance, or to the special favour of his sovereign, which is no less a matter of chance, for his elevation to the highest employments in an absolute monarchy! After he quitted the ministry, Charles IV. retained for him his former esteem and affection.

Of a gentle and obliging disposition;[b] a friend to literature, to the fine arts, to knowledge of every kind; passionate after his country's glory, he thought that his fortune would be forgiven him if he made a good use of it. His administra-

his pen. The Duke de l'Infantado, Melgarejo, Duke of St. Fernando, and others, have all been successively dismissed by Ferdinand. Escoiquiz died in exile; Macanaz was thrown into a prison, and God only knows what has become of his daughters! Ostolaza, banished and imprisoned, has ended his life on a gallows.

[b] "He was really a mild and good-natured man," says the rigid Colonel Napier. He no doubt adds, "although a sensual and corrupt one," which is carrying English prudery rather too far.—See *History of the War in the Peninsula, by W. J. P. Napier*, vol. i. pp. 12, &c.

Colonel Napier is not open to suspicion when he praises the Spaniards, any more than when he abuses them. His history is written with conspicuous talent and great impartiality. He is called by his fellow-countrymen the *British Tacitus*. In fact, his style is not unlike that of Tacitus; those who have the honour of knowing him can aver that he resembles Cato in stoicism and loftiness of soul. All the Napiers, and they are many, are distinguished characters.

tion of the finances was unsullied: having several millions of money at his command, he never dreamt of placing the smallest portion of it in foreign funds. A Spaniard and a minister, he suffered his enemies to live on, exercised no act of revenge, allowed great latitude of speech and of writing, averted from Spain the dangers of the French revolution; and claims a debt of obligation from his country for the institution of a multitude of useful establishments.

How and in what manner did so general and so bitter a prejudice prevail against him?

His personal enemies, those who coveted his spoils, remained masters of the ground.

The weight of gratitude is irksome of endurance; absent, proscribed, calumniated, none were left to him but weak and timid friends . . . . . many proved ungrateful: — there is but a stage from ingratitude to hatred.[c]

The church party never forgives. A resentment, which had been brooding during a space of sixteen years, was at last enabled to break out under cover of the complicated revolt of Aranjuez.

The faction which was guilty of calling in foreign aid, hastened to direct the people's rage against the Prince of the Peace, who was pre-

[c] "Ah! can it be right in a man to inherit the property of those he assassinates!"—such was the exclamation of a celebrated poet.

vented by the early success of the insurrection from acting or speaking out.

From that moment, the most absurd, the most wicked imputations, circulated over the Peninsula and throughout Europe.

What could France, England, the whole North, conjecture as to what was taking place in Spain? What can be affirmed on the subject at the present day? Beyond the limits of that Spain, which is placed at the extreme end of the civilized world, none felt an interest in raising their voice on behalf of a man who abstained from complaining.

M. de Pradt had formed a slight acquaintance with Escoïquiz in 1808; the work of the latter no sooner appeared in 1814, than the French writer clothed in his lively style the misrepresentations of Ferdinand's preceptor. Contemporary and successive biographies are but the diluting of the impostures of the Spanish hypocrite coloured by M. de Pradt.

Bound by his duty, by an overwhelming necessity, to the sad fortune of Charles IV. and of Maria Louisa, the Prince of the Peace had attended them to Marseilles and Rome. Utterly destitute on quitting Spain, where Ferdinand in the first instance, then Murat, Napoleon, Joseph, and others whom I am unwilling to name, had invaded, confiscated, plundered his hotels, his estates, and his portfolio; exposed to the insolent

vexations of Bargas, of the Marquis Labrador, of St. Martin,—instruments of the severity of Ferdinand VII, for the promotion of whose views they laboured in foreign countries,—the Prince of the Peace's only subsistence consisted of the crumbs which dropped from his old master's table; and the aged king, saturated with parricidal insults, still clung to life. . . . He always feared that his son would suffer him to die of hunger! He enjoined his unhappy follower never to break silence so long as he, Charles IV, should not have descended to the tomb, so long as Ferdinand himself should be living.

The man who, in his sixty-ninth year, without connexions in a foreign land, without books, without aid, without intercourse, and deprived of his papers, has nevertheless rendered so faithful an account of an important historical epoch, embracing a period of a quarter of a century, from which he is separated by twenty-seven years of exile and mental sufferings,—that man, I say, will no longer have to reply to absurd slander or empty insults.

He recalls, in his work, much national glory forgotten or unacknowledged: this inheritance will possess some merit with the Spaniards who were entitled to it, but they will owe its enjoyment to the care of a generous outlaw. Many families will delight to recover their titles of nobility, and Don Manuel de Godoy has also

revived those which belonged to him. If the author has been unwilling to divulge everything, nevertheless what he has said is true; this is a virtue of rare occurrence at the present day. And yet, a prudent reserve affords evidence of great strength of mind!

The work is therefore, in some respects, peculiarly adapted to the time of its appearance. Spain is agitated in all directions; every theory of government is eagerly coveted: the constitutional royalty had many partisans; federalism and the republic, one and indivisible, may also have theirs. It is curious to watch how, fifty years ago, a young minister upheld a pure monarchy, having to combat the French revolution arrayed in his presence, the Inquisition behind him, and the inveterate prejudices of his fellow-countrymen.

The Prince of the Peace has no doubt proved himself tardy in demanding the satisfaction due to him. The wind of calumny has long prevailed; the public are unwilling to retract their opinion. This monster, composed of eyes, mouths, and ears, receives every impression first offered to him. It resembles a sponge soaked in a fetid liquor,—in vain you press and wring it, a portion of the liquid still remains.

Resignation, however, must exhaust the spirit of hatred: the men of the present cannot adopt the feelings of interested rancour entertained by

the past generation; Time has pleaded this cause, and justified the late minister of Charles IV.

What were the charges against him? "*He raised a sacrilegious hand against the altar!*" exclaimed churchmen; whereas, he but gently shook the tree, in order to detach some of the fruit already ripe. . . . They were resolved to punish this extraordinary act of freedom, and be revenged at any price: the blind passions of the mob were excited; the people exceeded their instructions. The church party had raised the storm; their vessel was upset—who is to blame for it?

"*He has betrayed and given up his country to foreigners!*" such was the infamous calumny invented and propagated by the factious men of the Escurial and Aranjuez: they called in Napoleon, who would have found his way without their invitation. Well then, a minister, president of the council, having under his hand all the public and secret negotiations, all the official and officious information which encumbers the archives of the government,—M. de Toreno himself, after having carefully collected the vague reports—the popular traditions upon which a statesman should set no value—acknowledges and proclaims the patriotic loyalty of the Prince of the Peace.

In fact, no other reproach now attaches to him than the splendour and rapidity of his rise. "The

stream of the royal favour has left its channel; the overflowing is complete," said the Spaniards in their Oriental language. There is much exaggeration in this. The wealth of the Prince of the Peace and his influence at court were not unlimited: sufficient was left, however, to excite the feelings of envy,—that fever so inherent to mankind, and which manifests itself amongst our neighbours with more dangerous symptoms than in any other country. If the Spaniards, so rigid at that period, had taken the pains to look back to the origin and titles of their historical families, they would have found how much these were indebted to the munificence of the crown, so often laid under contribution by grasping or rebellious nobles.

The Prince of the Peace never received anything beyond what was spontaneously, lawfully given to him. . . . How and by whom does he see himself stripped of his property?[d] He will find amongst his young fellow-countrymen judges less prepossessed against him, who seem to have at heart to shake off all old prejudices. Sincere and reflecting men of all civilized countries will feel indebted to him for having at last published his Memoirs. Would that it had ere now been in his power to commit them to the press!

J. D'ESMENARD.

Paris, August 1835.

[d] See the Memoirs, vol. iv.

MEMOIRS

OF

DON MANUEL DE GODOY,

PRINCE OF THE PEACE.

CHAPTER I.

Motives of my past silence.—Object of this Work.—Historical Sketch.—Preliminary Reflections.

TOWARDS the close of the month of May 1808, the culpable intrigues of a faction had brought upon Spain the interference of a neighbour alike audacious, inflexible in his vast projects, and all-powerful. I have designated the Emperor Napoleon.

A victim to those fatal intrigues, Charles IV, my venerable lord and master, attended only by Maria Louisa his august consort, and by the infant Don Francisco de Paula, the youngest of his three sons, had just arrived at the dull and solitary residence of Fontainebleau.[1]

Admitted as a stranger into the palace which his ancestors had built, and labouring under ex-

[1] The —— May 1808.

cruciating pains of mind and body, he was reclining on a couch. The majestic old man assumed on a sudden a sitting posture: his head, though large, was erect, and well placed on his shoulders; his broad and bald forehead commanded respect; his eyes, less oppressed than inflamed from want of rest, preserved their striking vivacity; and at this moment, his physiognomy, combining dignity with candour, and abruptness with benevolence,—the faithful reflection of a soul incapable of disguise,—exhibited a calm, grave, and lofty bearing. Indulging at last the freedom of breathing without restraint and unmolested by witnesses, observing round his couch the few friends who thus proved faithful to him in his misfortunes, he alternately fixed his eyes upon each. Our tears, which flowed in spite of our endeavours to check them, sufficiently explained our grief and our silence. The king addressed us in the following words:

"Great indeed should be your affliction, if in this singular vicissitude of fortune we had to reproach ourselves with having deservedly incurred it; but, as our conscience is free from blame, we are indifferent to all other considerations. Power, the splendour of a crown, worldly honours, are no more than imaginary enjoyments; sooner or later, they must be surrendered at Death's summons. What matters the loss of a fleeting possession? Away then with the memory of the

past! . . . We have outlived an appalling storm; we are still together as before; there is opened to us a new existence, far less agitated and painful than the preceding one. Those who have not attended this family meeting,—but the blame of their absence cannot be laid to our charge,—let us beseech Heaven that by their repentance and their tears they may repair their heavy transgressions. Should that grace be vouchsafed them, there may yet be peace for them on earth; their sufferings will be less acute. As for us, a conscience without reproach will be our support; ours is the peace of the soul, which it is not in the power of any one to take away. You, Manuel, the tried friend who have so long proved to me the fidelity of your attachment and loyalty, you will persevere in that course: hear with resignation what I have to say to you. I have been the whole night a prey to my nervous attacks, which have not allowed me a moment's rest; one thought alone has absorbed my mind. I have seriously considered the determination you seem to have formed, and which you mentioned to me on our journey,—that of appealing to public opinion by writing and committing to the press the *defence* of our cause. This is a correct and a generous idea; but I must tell you that your giving it effect at this day would be ill-timed and impossible. Are we not in the hands and under the yoke of him who has overturned our

house? My brother of Naples, and Charles Emanuel of Sardinia, found, under circumstances equally deplorable, a refuge in their insular dominions. There they could write, speak out, and loudly protest against the usurper: we, however, have no other asylum than the enemy's camp; our very host is our oppressor. Would you desert us, and seek in a distant country the liberty to raise a courageous voice in our favour? And if you succeeded in reaching that land of safety, where you might brave with impunity the unjust man who has so cruelly turned to his account the misconduct of my son, how could you write our defence and your own without aggravating the position of the ill-fated Ferdinand, and exposing him to still more rigorous treatment? for such would inevitably be the result. Would you add that further sorrow to the many bitter ones I have had to experience? I feel assured you would not. Compelled to modify, to suppress much, our joint justification would be thus mutilated: weakened by circumspect language, our defence would not, after all, receive a more indulgent interpretation; it would but afford a more signal triumph to our enemies.

"Recollect, Manuel, that from the hour you were first attached to my person, (and it is a long time since,) up to the present moment, my will has always been the rule of your conduct. Well then, it is now my will that we should observe the

most absolute silence; that, on our part, nothing—nothing whatever—should be published: this silent resignation will not be lost on the least reflecting minds; and it will be understood by the more discerning, who are not swayed by mere appearances.

"You will tell me that your work might appear under your own name; but our cause is one—inseparable: whether you recriminate or attack, all this is in my defence. I must necessarily stand in the foreground. In short, Manuel, shall we dare to raise the last veil which conceals the errors of my children? or shall we, apprehensive of saying everything, or of pleading our cause without reserve, consent to appear guilty?

"The men whose evil counsels have ruined my family, are at liberty to calumniate us with impunity; the advantage is wholly on their side in this unnatural dispute: and, if I could stoop to reply to their impostures, they would not fail to invent and propagate others; whilst honour, religion, nature, alike command me to be silent.

"I consent that you should write, though for ourselves only. Write the plain and naked truth. Call up the remembrance of our past deeds; relate our anxiety, our unwearied efforts to avert the storm which was impending over Spain, and to prevent the evils that have at last fallen upon her: let us write to disburthen our hearts, and to procure for each other a mutual consolation

against the injustice and ingratitude which have assailed us.

"The time may come when it will be proper to publish what you shall have written; but what you write must, I repeat it, have no other object in view than to protect your honour and mine: to this object you must confine yourself; I seek for nothing else: nay, come what may at a future time, my resolution is irrevocable; and to give it effect I feel a strength of mind which God alone can have vouchsafed to me. Of this I am well convinced, I never would replace upon my brows a tarnished crown.

"When the violence of passions shall have subsided, Spaniards will recover their natural good sense, and acknowledge their injustice towards us. This is the only satisfaction I expect, and it should suffice us.

"If calumny should not relent in our regard, but retain upon the popular mind its original hold, the moment of speaking out will arrive, rest assured of it: the publication of your work will then be seasonable; you will have attained your aim: and should death overtake us both ere the day of our justification shall have dawned upon us, your testimony will have still greater weight, —there is something harmonious and sacred in words issuing from the tomb.

"Can you suppose for a moment, dear friend, that Divine Providence would abandon a father

so unjustly persecuted and disgraced! O God! extinguish in my heart the slightest feeling of irritation. I forgive both my children, and I do so in all sincerity. The errors of kings and of princes recoil upon their innocent subjects. O God! extend your divine clemency to them; chastise not my children or Spain for the injuries they have inflicted upon me. I feel no regret for the crown I once bore; I have no desire to recover it, no wish to prolong my existence! I never had any other aim than the happiness of all,—would that it were in my power to compass it!" . . . .

The king was unable to proceed; a death-like paleness spread over his face. His convulsive movements hurried us to his assistance; we could only hear the vague sound of half-smothered words. Such was the painful scene that awaited our first awakening in the palace of Fontainebleau: it is ever present to my mind.

We were at last recovering our composure, and our emotion was gradually subsiding, when the sub-prefect caused himself to be announced without previously asking his majesty's pleasure.

The condition of the king precluded his receiving him: he feigned an attack of the gout; and it devolved upon Queen Maria Louisa to submit to this visit, and to many others that followed. Her heart was broken, but she was compelled to compose her appearance.

This narrative, which is wholly free from ex-

aggeration, explains the motives of my silence during the first six years of our long exile. I shall have occasion to exhibit in the sequel of these Memoirs, and in gradual succession, other proofs of the resignation of these illustrious sufferers.

After 1814, the period of the restoration of the Spanish monarchy, or rather of the Spanish dynasty, fresh afflictions awaited us.

The king and queen, however, were elated beyond bounds at the news of their son's restoration to the throne of Spain, and their joy was undissembled. All was forgiven and forgotten. Ferdinand could no longer doubt either the generous resignation or the paternal tenderness of Charles IV; he also knew how zealously and loyally I had co-operated to their reconciliation. The old king felt, assuredly, no longing for a crown already fallen from his head, and which unexpected events had transferred to that of his son.[2] I may even add that his august parents were as delighted at the political resuscitation of Ferdinand as they had been at his coming into the world.

Their parental anxiety was only disturbed by

[2] I shall relate in its proper place how much the situation of Ferdinand excited the interest of his father and mother during his captivity, the means they employed to procure his rescue, and the endeavours I also exerted towards that object. These efforts proved, no doubt, unsuccessful; but it is no less true that I staked my life in the attempt to serve him.

the apprehension of finding in the Peninsula an ill-smothered focus of civil discords, and about the person of the young monarch the greater part of those men who had taken unworthy advantage of his inexperience, and had caused so many calamities.

Powerful considerations, however, tended to allay the king's apprehension. Six years of adversity could not have been wholly lost upon young Ferdinand. He must have acquired sufficient experience to perceive the quicksands of the new career of fortune which the affection of his people was opening for him. Charles IV. had long been intimately convinced of the necessity of preparing by anticipation, and of carrying by degrees into effect, those essential reforms which the march of the times so loudly called for.[3] His majesty, it must be acknowledged, deemed it impossible to govern under the restraints imposed by the Cadiz constitution; which he considered to be impregnated with too large a share of democratic elements. Nevertheless, the opportunity

[3] The wise resolutions of this excellent prince, and my own measures, had for object to bestow upon Spain institutions of a moderate and liberal character. Few persons were in the secret; but many were beginning to suspect it, when they beheld the acts which gradually paved the way for the projected reforms and institutions. I shall have to advert to them at greater length in their proper place. The knowledge which some individuals were enabled to procure of my intentions in this respect, gave rise to that hatred and persecution which from thenceforward unceasingly thwarted my career.

presented itself of improving the legislative system, since many favourable changes had already been effected, and the Spanish nation had familiarized itself with the idea of a progressive movement. That heroic nation was assuredly well entitled, by its recent sacrifices, to be reinstated at least in the enjoyment of its ancient Castilian liberties. Such a concession was due to it by a grateful monarch. Oh! never would Charles IV. have adopted the insane resolution to destroy what was already erected; far less to proscribe men who, urged on, in difficult and stormy times, by a lofty sense of national honour, may have fallen into errors, but whose admirable firmness powerfully contributed to the salvation of the country and the return of the fallen dynasty.

The king was apprehensive, on the contrary, that too much yielding on the part of his son should expose the government of the latter to fresh dangers. The decree issued at Valencia on the 4th of May 1814, gave great satisfaction to Charles IV, and quieted his fears in respect to the future. He who, ever faithful to his word, held that the promise of a king, freely given, was a religious and inviolable engagement, considered that the fate of Spain was thenceforward irrevocably fixed: the decree was no sooner brought to him, than the upright old man hastened to make us acquainted with it. "Fortunate is he," he exclaimed, "upon whom Providence

bestows the favour of enabling him to realise what I could have wished to have performed! If the happiness of my subjects was to be purchased at the price of the afflictions and sufferings I have hitherto endured, I return thanks to Heaven for having imposed them upon me. Yes! let us bless the high judgments of Divine Providence. The project of erecting the tabernacle originated with David; to his son was reserved, by the Almighty, the honour of realising that holy thought. May my crown be happily borne by Ferdinand, since he desires to render himself worthy of it! He will be the consolation of our old age. To you, Manuel, the faithful friend of his father, he will not fail to do justice. Let us rejoice at not having hurried ourselves into publishing any manifestoes; at not having raised the veil that concealed acts into which his youth had been drawn, unaware of their criminality."

The subsequent events are but too well known. The men of Aranjuez and of Bayonne recovered their fatal influence. Those who had upset the throne of Charles IV. trampled under foot the rising institutions which held out a brighter prospect for the future. Everything was destroyed. An unlimited proscription spread mourning over Spain. The whole power became wielded by the chiefs, the accomplices, the satellites of a faction as cruel as it was grasping. The fruits of a heroic resistance, of a victory achieved at so high a price,

were applied to no other object than to fatten the vampires of the new court—a vivacious and domineering faction, which held Ferdinand as the first of its slaves, and has not even respected his tomb... It is still seen at the present time (1833) endeavouring to drown in torrents of blood the feeble rays of light which were beginning to dawn over our country.

But I must return to the period of which I had been speaking. . : . Could I flatter myself—I, the special object of their envenomed hatred—to be forgotten in my retirement, or to enjoy a moment's rest in the capital of a sovereign without an army, under the powerless shield of my own sovereign, who was like myself an exile? Whilst I was daily giving fresh proofs of my unalterable loyalty, of a perfect self-abnegation, the virulence of my enemies persevered in pursuing me as a guilty man unworthy of pardon, and in representing me under the most odious colours. The counsels of clemency, of peace, of sound policy, which Charles IV. occasionally addressed to his son with the only view of conciliating to him the affection and esteem of his subjects, were envenomed with a diabolical art, with relentless animosity. They were designedly tortured into proofs of deeply meditated perfidiousness and treason, of which I alone was the promoter. "This," they alleged, "was braving, was insulting the supreme

power of Ferdinand: was the latter to be so weak as to listen to the unceasing remonstrances of his aged father?" (What unworthy weakness!) By dint of such insinuations it was hoped to efface the last traces of filial respect; to intimidate an old man of seventy, already overwhelmed with sorrows; to wound him in his early affections; forcibly to separate me from him; and to persist in stigmatising me with impunity in the eyes of all Europe.

I must now advert to a circumstance wherein they succeeded in instilling serious alarm in the mind of Ferdinand, and obtaining from him, by the most revolting act of tyranny, a triumph upon which they set the highest value.

The King of France, H. M. Louis XVIII, had written a private and confidential letter to Charles IV, apprising the king his cousin of the object of the congress at which the ambassadors of the principal powers were about to meet. "1st. It was essential to secure the general peace on solid bases; 2ndly, fears were entertained on the side of Spain, where a spirit of discontent was breaking out, owing to the violent reaction in which the scarcely established government was indulging: the slightest disturbances in the Peninsula might spread and penetrate into France. Louis XVIII. added, that reports were circulating in France and in Germany which called again in question the lawfulness of King Ferdinand's rights, as exclu-

sively resting on the abdication of Aranjuez, disavowed by his father as soon as it was made, thus giving rise to dangerous discussions: that it was desirable, for the sake of tranquillity in Spain and in the rest of Europe, that all doubts should be set at rest on so delicate a question; the rather so as the magnanimous generosity of Charles IV. led him to a voluntary renunciation of his rights, and that he no longer aimed at reascending the throne."

The king's reply was of that grave character which the occasion called for. It was drawn up and written by myself. He assured the King of France that, "willing as he was to consign to eternal oblivion the abdication of Aranjuez, the mention of which was uncalled for, he was ready to sign a fresh act of renunciation with suitable solemnity, and under the conditions usually adopted in similar cases. . . . . His affection for his son, the desire to concur in the pacification of Spain and of Europe, and lastly, his fixed determination to end his days in tranquil retirement, induced him to make this free and spontaneous renunciation. . . . . In consideration of these motives, it was his wish that the congress of Vienna should unreservedly confer with his son on the subject, and agree to recognise him as the true and lawful King of Spain; he, Charles IV, reserving however to himself, as a preliminary condition, the same honorary title, as well as the prerogatives, rights, and revenues appertaining to his dignity. He

desired, at the same time, that this solemn act should be guaranteed in its full extent by the principal powers represented at the congress."

It was in the nature of Charles IV. to urge the conclusion of any business which he deemed of high importance. Averse to the smallest delay, ever governed by a kind of presentiment of disturbances and of popular agitations, this habitual fear appeared still more intense on the present occasion. He burned with impatience to revive the act of his renunciation, feeling apprehensive of any sudden accident or obstruction, which would be imputed to tardiness or ill-will on his part. He forthwith addressed letters to their Majesties the Emperors of Germany and Russia, to the King of Prussia, and to the Prince Regent of England.

Loud clamours forthwith break out in Madrid; the privy counsellors take the alarm. "To declare the abdication of Aranjuez null and void, is equivalent to an absolute condemnation of all our acts! . . . We must positively conceal this proceeding from the knowledge of the public. . . . What extravagant conditions may we not expect to receive from Rome!!! The new renunciation may contain the most reviling clauses. . . the officious eagerness of Charles IV. conceals some afterthought." His intentions are calumniated beforehand; the perfidious designs alleged to be in contemplation are ascribed to my suggestions.

Emissaries are sent in all directions. They solicit, they require, they succeed in reluctantly obtaining from the sovereign pontiff, that I shall be separated from the royal family;—the town of the pontifical states the most distant from Rome is assigned to me as my place of residence, or banishment. . . . I only mention what personally concerns me. Other acts of violence, other outrages were committed. We will allow them to remain buried in that oblivion which shelters them from public reproof!

I was not slow in deciding upon my course of conduct. It was my wish instantly to quit Rome; to seek, at any sacrifice, an asylum in a foreign country, and there publish to the world the history of my life; to arraign my cowardly enemies before the tribunal of public opinion, unreservedly to proclaim such truths as would fix an indelible stigma upon them, and save at least my honour,— the only property now left to me,— which I could no longer allow to be so unworthily assailed.

But it had not yet fallen to my lot to recover the natural right of complaining, and of vindicating myself. I was bound by my promise, and fettered by the ties of loyalty. . . . Oh! it is as impossible for me to describe as to forget for a moment that memorable night. We were,—the king, the queen, and I,—closeted alone with the pope; the doors were shut against any one else.

. . . The pope hesitated, with signs of visible emotion. . . . "The court of Madrid," said he, at last, "no longer listens to reason; there must either be an open rupture with it, or its demands must, to a certain extent at least, be complied with, if we desire to obtain some mitigation of them."

Recovering on a sudden that noble assurance so becoming in a king and in an offended father, Charles IV. proudly exclaimed: "What! holy father, are we prisoners here?" "Yes, sire; pledges of the peace of the world, prisoners of Jesus Christ, captives of whom I come to supplicate a favour; of you, the well-beloved son of the church; of that minister who in the days of his power gave so many proofs of his respect for the holy see. . . . This last sacrifice is the least of all the evils which assail us, and will, I hope, prove sufficient to calm every irritated feeling; it will be the means of averting a serious scandal. I shall act the part of mediator; I pledge myself to your majesties that this storm will be of short duration."

I have said enough: the yoke was accepted with resignation; I received a positive command to bear my sufferings in silence. This painful task was, for the second time, imposed upon me by Charles IV. He condescended, no doubt, to give me, at the same time, the assurance that he never would forsake the charge of protecting my honour and providing me with the means of existence.

I repaired to Pezzaro,—the directions given by the holy father having caused every preparation to be made which was calculated, at so short a notice, to *lessen the sorrows* of an exile.

The Spanish minister, M. Bargas,[4] reached Rome at this time, too late however for the object he had in view. He hoped to obtain humiliating declarations in favour of the acts of Aranjuez; but the new abdication had been completed. The king himself had prepared and dictated the terms of abdication, which were inoffensive towards all parties, plain, dignified, and, above all, moderate in what related to the indemnities demanded by the king for himself, and for those of his family who accompanied him in his retirement.[5]

[4] See, in the Biographical Table, the article under the head of *Bargas*.

[5] The preamble of this act of abdication was as follows:

"I, Charles Antoine de Bourbon, by the grace of God, King of Spain and of the Indies, wishing to end in peace the days which Divine Providence may still reserve to me, and to withdraw myself from the difficulties and cares with which the throne is unavoidably beset, perfectly uncontrolled in my conduct and acting of my own free will, sound in body and mind, transfer to you, Don Ferdinand, my eldest son, all my undeniable rights to the said kingdoms of Spain and the Indies, which I renounce; specially enjoining you to see that our holy, catholic, apostolic, and Roman religion be respected, and that no other be tolerated in your dominions: you will consider your subjects as being truly your children, and you will treat with clemency the many persons who, in these times of agitation, have allowed themselves to be drawn into error. I declare and sign the foregoing, under the following conditions, which are never to be violated nor altered, &c. &c. &c."

The

The court of Madrid was eager to take advantage of this guaranteeing title. Once possessed of that document, it recklessly resorted to every means in order to impose fresh sacrifices on the king, whose singular kindness of disposition was well known. The minister Bargas felt the necessity of concealing from the Spaniards the knowledge of the abdication. He invented a thousand pretexts with a view of procuring the consent of Charles IV. to the signing of a separate agreement or convention, which should merely contain the clauses immediately following the preamble of the act; and in this separate and detached agreement the renunciation was only alluded to in general terms as a fact already completed, without either adverting to the *first abdication of Aranjuez*, or to the second, concluded at Rome on the 10th of October 1814. . . . This last act exhausted the remaining strength of Charles IV, which had been visibly on the decline. His subsequent conduct was that of a submissive and resigned vassal, so scrupulous was the august old man in the observance of a promise once given. He retained the apparent, the nominal dignity of a father; but his son had ceased to be a minor. Charles IV. no longer used any other language towards him than that of supplication.

The complete text of this act, as well as of the convention afterwards agreed upon, shall be given in a subsequent part of these Memoirs, according as the order of events will bring us back to the period in question.

I shall abstain from relating the fresh sorrows, the painful disappointments, that occurred nearly at the moment when this treaty of peace and reconciliation was concluded. Napoleon suddenly reappeared on the political stage: Murat was invading the Roman states. . . . The king and queen on the one hand, and I on the other, alternately meeting and separating, we wandered for a long time over Italy, without an object, without money, without support, and unable to fix on any place of residence.

When the storm had blown over, I returned to Pezzaro, where I languished in melancholy exile, until at last the repeated entreaties of the sovereign pontiff and of Charles IV. procured my return to their majesties.

Unalterably devoted to their service, indulging the constant hope that their remonstrances might procure me an honourable reparation of past injuries, and the restitution of the wrecks of my former fortune from thenceforward I never left them.

Not only, however, did Charles IV. persist in opposing my wish to write the history of his reign and my own defence at the same time, but he required of me, as the last proof of my attachment, that I should publish nothing *so long as his son should be living*.[6] "You cannot defend

[6] Born in 1784, (the 14th of October,) Ferdinand was seventeen years younger than the Prince of the Peace. In other words,

yourself," said he, "without attacking, without wounding him, whatever circumspection you may, through a feeling of generosity, adopt in his regard. If, after any publication on your part, one of those popular movements should unfortunately take place which his bad policy is daily provoking, it would infallibly be alleged that you had supplied weapons to the disaffected; and you might well, indeed, supply them, for they are at your command. Let us rather hope that your resigned conduct will open his eyes; that he will at last do us justice, and shake off the fetters and prejudices by which your enemies and ours hold him in subjection. I shall never cease to raise my voice in your favour; and if my efforts and entreaties prove in vain, the whole world will at least acknowledge that, faithful and loyal towards the father who was your friend, you have shown yourself loyal and faithful towards the son who persecutes you."

In state matters, which are always seen and commented upon in so many different ways, those who are the most conscious of guilt are usually foremost in publishing their justification. Accordingly, the *Cevallos*, the Escoïquiz, the *Montijos*, the *Cavalleros*, and other leaders or principal

the latter was condemned to die without the power of defending himself in his life-time; such was at least the natural order of things. The rather premature death of Ferdinand VII. has released the Prince of the Peace from his pledge.—E.

agents in the conspiracy of Aranjuez, hastened to throw out their manifestoes; whilst I, proscribed, gagged, fettered by an imperious duty, was compelled to be silent. . . . A mere glance at those slanderous libels was doubtless sufficient to open to view the perpetual contradictions, the flat denials, the odious imputations they flung at one another; so much so, that their common treachery being partly proved by their own admissions, I was almost relieved from the necessity of refuting them, or at least my justification became an easy task. I had well nigh hoped for a moment, that, amongst the numerous Spaniards to whose solid merit I had shown favour, or whose civil and military career I had promoted, some would be found generous enough to interpret in a fair light the silence to which I was condemned, and to take upon themselves the defence of an absent and calumniated patron.

But a deep sense of fear had frozen every courage; public opinion and liberty were oppressed; evil passions had outstepped all bounds; they were rather fomented than checked by the supreme authority; whilst I, oppressed with misfortune, deprived of the power of speaking out, had my slightest movements watched by the police of France, Spain, and Italy; and my written defence (had it been possible for me to find a printer) could never have crossed the seas, nor the high ridges of the Pyrenees. . . .

"A better time will come," I then said to my-

self: "whilst the storm sets the sea in motion, waves of foam mixed with mud are cast on its shores: let us, at least, prepare materials drawn from a pure source and worthy of being collected. Sooner or later the clamour of civil discord will cease to disturb the public judgment: after us, the truth shall be known. Amongst civilized nations, in Europe especially, printing and the rostrum form an association for mutual insurance: here, perhaps, truth may for a moment be obscured or disfigured by local passions; but, at a greater distance, there is raised an independent voice which proclaims and avenges it."

Alas! may not this hope prove vain and illusory? The art of writing is now no more than a mere trade: the writers of contemporary histories, of memoirs, of biographies, of weekly or daily pamphlets, gather indiscriminately, and propagate without remorse, every species of calumny, even the most indecent gossiping: nothing is sought but sheer scandal; each discovery of this kind is a piece of good fortune. Invention makes up for the deficiency of news, or for the simplicity of facts. Thus it is that the public is treated with the whole life, the most minute details, of a man who was never seen by these writers nor known to them: names, places, dates, events, all are wretchedly disguised or distorted! What matters it? A multitude of people are by such means enabled to exist. . . . . .

Amidst all the sorrows which have alternately

lacerated my heart, I have had to bear with the further infliction of the unrelenting insults of that crowd of shameless compilers who have preyed upon me. They have been unanimous in representing me as a culprit, sentenced without appeal, and who had given assent to his condemnation.

Great is the distance, no doubt, between those ephemeral productions and the authenticity of history destined to fix the opinion of posterity: but since those of my fellow-countrymen with whom I have been in habits of intercourse, have not had the courage to compare my administration with the previous or succeeding ones, and to point out how much the difference redounds to my advantage; since my enemies only have hitherto spoken; would not imposture, by dint of lying with impunity, be admitted at last as an undisputed tradition? The list of eye-witnesses is already diminishing: death has daily reduced their numbers during the last twenty-six years. Their children were born amidst the din of calumnious vociferations, which have unceasingly resounded around them. The reign of Charles IV. is not known. All the evils of a general conflagration in Europe are imputed to his government. It devolves upon me to defend his honour and mine, as well as the honour of a multitude of Spaniards who have illustrated our epoch. Treason, envy, and hatred have laboured

to tarnish their glory; mine is the task of repairing its lustre: a brief exposition of facts will restore each one to his proper place. These Memoirs are designed to record nothing but the truth: many may be beholden to me for having occasionally softened its asperity. The example of my august sovereigns warns me not to remove altogether the veil which screens from public view certain details of a highly deplorable character: I shall respect the last will of those illustrious exiles, who, dying in their banishment, forgave all offences.

Noble and generous hearts! what efforts did it not cost you to spare me the painful necessity of penning these Memoirs! Twenty-six years have elapsed; every term prescribed to me is completed; and I yet doubt whether their publication should not be still further delayed. . . . .

Nevertheless, old age advances rapidly upon me. My ancestors bequeathed to me an inheritance of honour; I am bound to hand it over untarnished to my children. Calumny dies with the man whose life was passed in obscurity; it survives the public man, and proudly rears its head over his tomb, when the pusillanimous endurance of his contemporaries has quietly allowed it to fasten its fangs upon his memory.

Has it not been attempted to forbid my return to my native country? In vain have I called for the severity of a legal judgment: neither the

tribunals nor my bitterest enemies have dared to accept my defiance. My country, which is ever dear to me, can alone, then, indemnify me for so long a denial of justice. I submit to it an account of my life; I disguise nothing. If these Memoirs are admitted to be—as I anticipate they will be found—in strict accordance with truth, Spain will not refuse to reckon me in the number of her children, and amongst those who have served her faithfully, and have suffered in her cause. Whilst I revive the recollection of glorious deeds which a dark faction has endeavoured to throw into obscurity, I shall do justice to many of those who were my personal enemies. My expostulation shall neither be indiscreet nor tinctured with violence: I shall be moderate, in short, in exercising the privilege of defending myself, and of defending, at the same time, the cause of my sovereign and that of my country, which, in my estimation, are inseparable.

If I am occasionally betrayed into the language of self-satisfaction, let my readers of every country abstain from charging me with a misplaced vanity; for I am writing with a view to my own apology. The man who is persecuted, when intimately convinced of his innocence, has a right to congratulate himself for the good he has achieved: this is, moreover, his duty: if he hesitated boldly to fulfil it, he would fail of re-

instating his character, and would not deserve to succeed in that object.

My readers are now acquainted with the motives of my silence during twenty-five years of bitter sorrows, and of abnegation of my dearest and my most sacred interests.

Charles IV. has ceased to live; Ferdinand has also descended to the tomb: the one and the other belong alike to history. I may, then, be permitted to speak out, and to relieve my oppressed heart.

CHAPTER II.

My Birth.—House of Godoy.—First Years of my Life.

I WAS born at Badajoz, capital of the province of Estramadura, on the 12th of May 1767, and not 1764, as asserted by biographers. My father, Don Joseph de Godoy, and my mother, Doña Maria Antoinette Alvarez de Faria, belonged to the nobility: their fortune was limited; it consisted of an ancient patrimonial estate, handed down to them from early times, and diminished instead of increasing in successive generations.

I am aware how misplaced is the pride of old parchments of nobility, especially in the present age, when so many modern illustrations have rapidly reached the summit of human elevation. Nevertheless, the solid remembrances of our ancestors are not without their degree of importance, if they hand down to their children those traditions, examples and modes of living and of acting, which incline us to preserve and improve that honourable trust.

My patrimonial dwelling, which is so ancient as to be almost ruined by the lapse of time, is situated at Castuera, where my paternal ancestors

first established themselves; they removed from thence to Badajoz. That dwelling, with its old appendages, must, at the present day, be in the possession of my niece, the daughter of my deceased elder brother, Don Louis de Godoy. My mother was also born at Badajoz; she was of Portuguese origin, and belonged to an illustrious family very highly connected. The august grandmother of the princes[1] who are contending at this moment for the throne of Portugal, having done me the honour of creating me Count of Evoramonte, and of sending me the grand cross of the order of Christ, was pleased to record in the patent those exalted family ties of my excellent mother. When his majesty Charles IV. bestowed upon me the favour of a cross of the military order of Santiago, into which no knight is admitted without first exhibiting the proofs of *eight* uninterrupted degrees of nobility, mine were required of me with the customary rigour. They testified that many of my forefathers had obtained the same decorations—and the highest commandries: one of them was Pero Muniz de Godoy, grand master of both the orders of Santiago and of Calatrava, the only one in Spanish history who had held those two high dignities at one and the same time.[2]

[1] Don Miguel and Don Pedro.

[2] In what remains of ancient institutions of the nobility, the purest test is, assuredly, the ordeal required in the four military

On the occasion of my being elevated to the rank of grandee, the supreme council of Castile, on whom exclusively devolved the duty of seeing that my titles were regular ere I could be admitted into that class, could not avoid declaring, in communicating to the king the result of its consultation, that it had not, for a long time past, been furnished with proofs of nobility so complete as mine were found to be. On every new distinction which the king was pleased to confer upon me, the same formalities were complied with, and each time with the requisite solemnity.

If I enter into these details, it is certainly not owing to any intrinsic value I attach to them. What human being can be more undeceived than I am as to such wretched testimonials of vanity? Nevertheless, I felt anxious to advert to them with a view to reply once for all to those who

orders; it is even the only one respecting which there has never been any relaxation: my eldest brother, Don Louis, was compelled to undergo that ordeal when he obtained the cross of Santiago; and the youngest of us, Don Diego, had likewise to conform to it when he was created a knight of the order of *Calatrava*.

So rigid is the inquiry enjoined in the four noble corporations, that the proofs previously furnished and admitted in favour of the father do not release the son from the obligation of supplying fresh proofs on his own account, and thus respectively from the son to the father, or even to one of his own brothers. The same ordeal must be renewed for each person; and it does not avail him to allege either public notoriety, the identity of the family, or any other pretext whatever.

have accused me of borrowing mythological genealogies and affiliations. All kinds of weapons have been deemed lawful, even those of ridicule, when it was question of attacking me and of aspersing my character.

I appeal to the common sense of my readers. Sufficiently well-born to present myself openly at the court of my sovereigns, and become their ally, because such was their pleasure, and they obtained the consent of their august family to the alliance, what inconceivable aberration of mind could have induced me to seek a nearly fabulous, or semi-barbarian origin? None laughed more heartily than I did at the pretended discoveries with which my patience was exhausted by those arrant visionaries, those frivolous and needy professors of the science—or rather the art—of heraldry, in their attempt to flatter my vanity. I entertained no less a feeling of contempt, and with difficulty could I disguise it, when certain high personages,—whose family had no connexion with mine, except the common origin of *Adam*, from whom we are all descended,—impelled by motives of base adulation, by an insatiable thirst for court favours, came to converse with me respecting their ancient or modern ties of relationship with my family,—ties hitherto unknown on either side. If an occasional blush betrayed but slightly the emotion I could scarcely suppress,—if I felt reluctant to repel with rudeness those who thus came to make trial

of my patience,—is it, therefore, to be inferred that I set any great value on such acts of meanness? Where is the man who, having attained the summit of power, has not found himself surrounded with flatterers, and greedy, insipid men? Oh! I knew them well: many have afterwards attempted to revenge upon my head their former cringing, to belie which they have eagerly sought to place themselves in the foremost ranks of my enemies.[3]

I shall add little to what I have stated respecting the means of existence of my family. It no doubt possessed but a moderate fortune; my detractors in Spain, and foreign biographers after them, have stigmatised it with being poor. Strange contradiction of those writers, who boast for the greater part of their liberal sentiments, and yet pause to examine empty titles of nobility and the income enjoyed by my family! Yes, my family was poor, if you understand by that term a decent mediocrity of fortune. Our predecessors in life bequeathed honour, and even illustrious titles, but no riches, to their children: however we were not *poor* in the strict sense of the word. The house in which I was born was found sufficiently commodious to become the residence of the royal family on their journey to Seville in February 1796. They passed a few days at Badajoz, and

[3] See the Biographical Table.

condescended to occupy it.[4] My father's means of existence, though very moderate, enabled him to live without being a burden to any one; they also allowed of his rearing his children according to their rank, and even with a degree of extravagance in the choice of the private tutors who were entrusted with our education.

I pause here for a moment.

Those who have taken pleasure in depreciating and vilifying me by ludicrous imputations, have represented me as an adventurer devoid of all education, with no other talent except that of playing the guitar and singing national airs. A modern Orpheus, allege Messrs. Jay, Jouy, and Arnault, respectable members of the French Academy;[5] a great flute-player am I called by General Foy.[6] What is the effect of this rage for making assertions without attempting to inquire into their truth? it leads to the compilation of ridiculous falsehoods, and to the assumption of the responsible editorship of the most silly impostures, of every species of nonsense.[7] It is

[4] I apprehend there is still to be found in our house the chain which the Kings of Spain bestow, as an honourable privilege, on those houses which they have deigned to inhabit; and I hold in my possession the patent of this title granted to my father, Don Joseph de Godoy, by his majesty King Charles IV.

[5] Biography of Contemporaries.

[6] History of the War in the Peninsula under Napoleon.

[7] Dictionary of Conversation, now publishing in Paris,

quite certain that I never played any instrument, that I am wholly a stranger to music,—an ignorance which I very sincerely regret. Envy is generally artful and ingenious, but on this occasion it displays great want of skill; for, in order to lower my character, it ascribes a talent to me which I was never known to possess. . . . . And yet men of gravity will collect all these idle stories, and publish them under their own names! Thus it is they write a contemporary history! the compilers and framers of biographical dictionaries seize upon and give circulation to all such impertinences. . . . . Really the age to come will scarcely know what to credit, when it shall detect the unaccountable levity of literary men of the present epoch. . . . .

Principles of morality were rigidly enforced by our parents. As to those arts which merely generate a taste for extravagance or pleasure, my brothers and I were barely allowed to acquire that superficial knowledge of them which, in our sphere of society, was held to be indispensable. Destined to embark in the military career, our hours of recreation were exclusively devoted to riding and fencing,—those wholesome exercises which warded off the dangers of idleness, whilst they strengthened our physical organization.

wherein the article of Messrs. Arnault, Jay, and Jouy, the academicians above mentioned, is almost literally introduced.

My father superintended all our studies: whether it was owing to the excess of his affection, or to prudent foresight, he preferred our being educated at home and under his own eye; he accordingly called in the aid of tutors. Anxious that the qualities of the heart should be no less attended to than those of the mind, he made a careful selection of talented and virtuous men. We had not the advantage, it is true, of attending public schools, in which the subtleties of peripatetic philosophy, and the endless commentaries of the Roman law, were held in the highest estimation; for these were the only studies which led to fame and fortune: but we learned to apply our reasoning faculties to a proper use, and turned to good account the time we should have wasted away in a different course of studies.

I had for successive tutors Don Francisco Ortega, Don Pedro Muñoz de Mena, Don Alonzo Montalvo, and Don Matheo Delgado. The last was afterwards made bishop of Badajoz: I know not whether he is still living at the present day; in 1832 this learned and venerable prelate presided over his church, in the enjoyment of the esteem and affection of all his diocesans. His cousin, Don Alonzo Montalvo, who superintended, before him, an education for which I am indebted to their joint care, died a few years

ago, a canon of the metropolitan church of Grenada.[8]

My primary instruction being completed, I applied myself, for eight successive years, to mathematics, belles-lettres, and modern philosophy in its various branches, as defined under the comprehensive term of ideology. The professors I have named readily kept pace with the intellectual progress of the age, but were as unwilling to exceed its bounds as to be behindhand with it. They were deeply versed in Greek and Roman literature, and took early pains to convey to me their partiality for the best Latin writers, our masters in history, morals, and politics. Those favourite authors have proved of essential assistance to me in my varied career; and I am indebted to them for my purest enjoyments.

Such was the modest stock of learning with which, at the age of seventeen, I took my departure for Madrid. It has been said, and repeatedly affirmed, that I could scarcely read or write when I entered the service. I have shown who were my professors, all well known and highly valued in their province; and I may yet appeal to persons who were then, and at a subsequent period, well acquainted with me.

Appointed one of the king's body-guards in

8 All these professors were highly esteemed and distinguished. —E.

1784, under the reign of Charles III, my taste for literature and the fine arts was not weakened by court distractions. I met there two of my companions, MM. Joubert, brothers, Frenchmen educated in France, well informed, passionately addicted to study, and both gifted with the gentlest disposition. We immediately contracted the warmest friendship: it bore that impress of truth and candour which is only met with in early attachments. I feel a pleasure in recalling to mind MM. Joubert, to whom I am indebted for my knowledge of the French and Italian languages: all our leisure hours were employed in serious readings, and in long and profitable conversations, from which I had the good fortune to derive great benefit. I must likewise name, with an expression of gratitude which no time can efface, the venerable Father Enguid, and other learned men of his order,—true Christian philosophers, who imparted to me the most valuable rules of conduct: to them I owe the advice, never to be carried away by the warmth of disputation, and to be always on my guard against prejudices and sophistry. . . . . Such were my earliest social relations, unquestionably the most grateful to my feelings; for, at this period of my life, they were of my own choice, and in harmony with those feelings. I was seldom seen at the theatre; more rarely still did I partake of court diversions, or of the

amusements of the metropolis. Gambling I always held in utter aversion; such a pursuit may well be called killing time!

The first years of my military life were thus passed in the king's household. . . . . Have I not some reason to complain of Messrs. Jay, Jouy, Arnault, and their companions in biographical labours? They have substituted romance for history. They banish me to a garret, like a needy bard, or a juggler, subsisting only by means of his guitar, and having no other coin wherewith to acquit his rent than couplets of a *bolero!* What has, then, become of historical gravity; of good sense; of the spirit of discrimination; of sound criticism; of the respect which is due to one's readers and to oneself? Methinks, that distinguished academicians should not exhibit such extraordinary levity of character. Nevertheless, French and foreign compilers are found to propagate these idle stories!

From the first day of my arrival in Madrid, I resided at the hotel of the body-guards, where my elder brother was quartered, who had preceded me in the military career I had just entered upon. My father remitted to us an annuity proportioned to our wants: and I repeat, once for all, that I never had, even as a mere amateur, the least taste for music, or the talent to play the guitar or any other instrument.

My enemies have sought every means of as-

persing my character: every species of falsehood has been circulated in my regard. They have affected to ascribe to gallantry and to frivolous accomplishments the high favours heaped upon me by my sovereigns: I shall be sparing of explanations on this subject; for it is a sacred duty enjoined to me by the respect I owe to their memory.

CHAPTER III.

True motive of my elevation to the Ministry.

This is the field of battle upon which my enemies have so freely manœuvred, in order to fall with odds upon me.

I have assuredly not the vanity to suppose that I possessed any acknowledged or tried personal merit which could justify beforehand the elevation I attained in the lapse of a few years. It were needless to mention in this place the many persons who, like myself, rose to high favour without having to allege any previous right or title which could either afford a ground or an excuse for their success. Numberless are the instances supplied by history: my own dear countrymen have witnessed a sufficient number before and after that period; I feel no desire to name them.

I shall merely observe, and this is in my opinion sufficient for my justification, that I was not called to the ministry for the purpose of answering any views, or executing any plans, hostile to my country. Charles IV. did not select me as an instrument of oppression, or as the leader

of a party; I may boldly make this assertion, and shall have occasion to prove it in the sequel of these Memoirs. If my youth presented at first but a weak basis whereon to rest the elevation to which I was afterwards raised, the whole of my subsequent conduct was one continuous effort to prove myself worthy of it. As to the private motives which induced the king to place in my hands the reins of government, and to grant me his full confidence, an impartial and conscientious historian, though at a loss for the exact clue to unravel this mystery, would abstain nevertheless from adopting reports as vulgar as they are equivocal in their nature, as the means of explaining so grave a determination on the part of a monarch who was neither devoid of instruction, of good sense, nor of a certain degree of experience. Such a historian, after closely studying the whole life of Charles IV. up to the period of his death, would reason as follows:

"The esteem and favour enjoyed by this minister never underwent the least change. We do not behold, in his case, any of those vicissitudes which the capriciousness of princes, the intrigues of courtiers, degrading passions, the natural inconstancy of the human heart, aversion, the usual weariness of constancy in all attachments, are generally found to produce in royal habitations. Charles IV, and his consort Maria Louisa, agreed by mutual consent in calling this minister to the

bosom of their own family, and bestowed upon him the hand of a descendant of Louis XIV. In the plenitude of their power, they loaded him with honours. The affection they evinced towards him was not merely distinguished by its unanimity on the part of the king and queen; but Charles IV. exceeded Maria Louisa in his anxiety to heap upon him every proof of their attachment. A friendship so perfect, so constant, so rare amongst princes, must necessarily have rested upon other foundations than those vulgar tales circulated to gratify public avidity. Charles IV. persevered, to the last moment of his life, in the warmest affection for his minister: in conversation, as well as in writing, he called him *his true friend;* and, what is more wonderful still in a monarch, *his only friend.* This noble friendship was never weakened by prosperity or misfortune. When a sovereign in the plenitude of power, he loved this minister; when dethroned and unfortunate, he loved him still more: he beheld in him the victim of loyalty, the support, the consolation of his old age and of his sorrows. Such constancy reflects undoubted honour upon the minister, and should prepossess in his favour. Whence, then, originated this singular favour at the moment of his just appearing on the scene of life?"

I was myself at first ignorant of the cause; this is the explanation I have to give of it. Charles

IV. and Maria Louisa daily received a powerful moral shock, as may well be supposed, at every intelligence brought of what was then occurring in France. It was the period of the anguish, of the appalling sorrows, of Louis XVI, of Marie Antoinette, and of their unfortunate family. Deeply affected at these disastrous events, Charles IV. and Maria Louisa ascribed them in some degree (and they were not much mistaken,) to the constant renewal of the ministers of that ill-served king, who was kept in a state of suspense by the intrigues and conflicting and fatal influences of his court. The close vicinity of the two kingdoms led to perpetual fear lest the conflagration should communicate from one to the other. Charles IV. looked around him, dreaded to rely upon his own resources, and knew not on whom to repose his confidence. He sought the daylight, and found obscurity—a deceitful obscurity in his path. He hesitated. . . .

It does not become me either to excuse or to blame this irresolution; I merely observe that such was their majesties' state of mind. They could have wished to alight upon a man who should be wholly indebted to them for his elevation,—a true friend, attached and devoted to their persons and their house,—a faithful guardian of the national weal,—a subject, in short, whose private interest should identify itself with that of his masters. Pointed out to their attention by the

name I bore, by the very nature of my daily functions, I was admitted to the palace of my sovereigns with a degree of familiarity far more usual in Spain than will be credited by those who are ignorant of her manners. Their benevolent readiness of access, the constant opportunities afforded, as I have stated, by my daily attendance upon duty, enabled me on frequent occasions to express my opinion respecting public occurrences, which were, moreover, the theme of every anxious conversation in the palace and beyond its precincts. If their majesties formed a favourable estimate of my aptitude for business, of the loyalty of my principles—if they hoped to have found in me the confidential subject of whom they were in search,—this predisposition in my favour, whether well or ill founded, but in the end so fatal to me, was assuredly not the result on my part of any settled or presumptuous ambition. I was, no doubt, as anxious as others of raising myself to distinction; but all my dreams of fortune were limited to the hopes of my gradual advancement in the military career: and before I became acquainted with the king's intentions in my regard, I can safely affirm, (and I may well be believed upon my word,) that I received with reluctance and alarm the distinctions and favours which were in the short space of a few years lavishly heaped upon me.

In the mean time the disturbances in France

daily assumed a more serious aspect, and the danger of contagion became more threatening.... A minister, irresolute and stricken in years,[6] had made way for another minister of advanced age,[7] who, by the rule of contraries, never hesitated, and was prepared to run all hazards. The king mistrusted alike the timidity of the one and the rashness of the other. Provocations and direct insults proceeded from the French rostrum. The throne of Louis XVI. had just given way; the republic was installed; nothing was talked of but revolutionizing foreign states and making war upon them; the north of France was already invaded; Louis XVI, head of the house of Bourbon, the queen and her children, were shut up in the Temple, and on the eve of being brought to trial.

What was to be done? what political course was it safest to pursue? how escape that fatal destiny impending over Europe? The storm had burst and was raging on all sides. It was thus, as it were, in the midst of a convulsion of nature, on the brink of a volcano whose dark smoke portended an immediate explosion, when terror was at our gates and agitated every mind, that I was unexpectedly summoned—O God!—to sit at the helm of the state.

My sovereigns bore testimony to the sincerity of an attachment to their service, which could

[6] Count Florida Blanca. [7] Count d'Aranda.

induce me to brave the dangers of so novel a situation. This will, I trust, claim the consideration of history when it speaks of my exertions, of the success which attended them, of my undeviating loyalty whilst I held the reins of authority and was at liberty to act for the public good.

Of all the nations adjoining France, Spain alone, during fifteen successive years of violent convulsions, whilst empires and kingdoms fell to the ground, or were shaken to their very foundations, and despoiled of their finest provinces,—Spain alone stood erect, preserved her lawful princes, her religion, laws, manners, rights, and the full possession of her vast dominions in both hemispheres.

The conviction is deeply engraven in my heart, so help me God! that this unquestionable result was happily owing to my personal co-operation. Every successive event was calculated to open the eyes of my boldest detractors. Had it not been for the conspiracy of Aranjuez, as perfidious as it was impolitic and coarsely contrived, a plank of safety was yet within our reach, notwithstanding the approach of the Colossus who favoured underhand the dissensions of which he proposed to take advantage. Had it not been for the ambitious and unnatural folly which, by undermining the foundations of the edifice, opened a breach for the enemy who was already preparing to make the assault,—but for this signal act of treachery, I

say, the august Charles IV. might, under favour of Providence, have securely wielded the sceptre of Spain and of the Indies: he would not have wandered as an exile in his old age, moving from country to country, in want, almost deserted by every one, and drinking the cup of bitterness to the last moment of his spotless life! His spotless life,—I assert it in the face of all Europe, and with the full conviction that I shall not even be belied by Spaniards at the present day; the spotless life of a king a friend of peace and of humanity, who always recoiled at the effusion of blood, pitied the weakness of our human nature, forgave all errors, and under whose reign not one of his subjects was ever reduced to the necessity of soliciting relief from the proud compassion of foreigners. . . . .

Let those who have entailed upon us misfortunes hitherto unknown to Spain, let them enjoy happy moments and rejoice in their success: let those boast of their fidelity who were bringing disgrace upon the crown, and did not shudder to hazard the fate of their country at so desperate a game! Spain has not been able to extricate herself, after a lapse of twenty-five years, from the bottomless abyss which is swallowing up all her past glories, all the benefits of a wise and cautious administration.

Those perverse men were, however, in a far greater degree the enemies of Spain than they

were mine. I was in my own person no more than an obstacle to the accomplishment of their evil designs; my name was but a pretext which served to cloak wicked treasons, and to divert the public attention from a parricidal attempt. They have imputed to me the evil which themselves have compassed; and, to fill up the measure of their injustice, they have ascribed to me all the misfortunes, the fatal germ of which, originating in past ages, could not fail to develope itself in the present age. Indefatigable and absurd calumniators! the moment has arrived: I summon them before the tribunal of public opinion. Let them render an account of their deeds, as I am about to account for mine.

CHAPTER IV.

Order of Matters.—Epochs of my Life.

This work must proceed slowly. I beseech the reader to dismiss for a moment any bias, whether favourable or otherwise, by which his mind may have been prepossessed. The first duty of a judge is impartiality: I readily submit to the sentence that he may pronounce after he shall have read me with attention, and without omitting a single line of my defence, in which I have endeavoured to avoid superfluity.

My whole life has been calumniated: everything that has emanated from the government of Charles IV, from the 15th of November 1792, when he named me his prime minister, until the 19th of March 1808, when he abdicated the crown amidst the clamours of a populace misled and secretly urged on to insurrection,—all has been perverted and misconstrued by my enemies, indifferent alike to the dictates of common shame and of justice, which should have suggested at least the semblance of praise or of excuse for some one act of my administration. Everything has been unmercifully aspersed: such is the blind-

ness of hatred and envy! I am therefore under the necessity of explaining the most trifling details of each state matter which has occurred during the sixteen years I have pointed out. I shall follow the natural order of facts, examine them separately, and avoid passing over or anticipating any subject.

I am aware that the rage so skilfully directed against me originates in the epoch of a catastrophe which my enemies alone drew down upon the kingdom; that they have imputed it to me, and loudly proclaimed that I alone was the cause of it. I forgive the error of those whose judgment and penetration were bewildered by the common danger; who, fondly attached to their country, but alarmed for their personal interests, unreflectingly gave credit to the odious calumny directed against me, instead of fixing the blame upon the real authors of the calamity.

But the acts of my public life are so connected with each other,—they have been held up to view with such perfidious address,—that my defence would lose much of its energy were I to attempt, in the first instance, a refutation of the latest imposture, which afforded to my enemies the means of achieving some triumph over me.

A perusal of these Memoirs will show that I have never for a moment deviated from an uniform course of conduct throughout my long political career: the closest examination will illus-

trate this truth. Nevertheless, should the impatient curiosity of my reader induce him to direct at once his attention to the events of Aranjuez, the Escurial, and Bayonne, I beseech him to return to the commencement of the work, and to read again those events in the order of their occurrence: for the question is not exclusively one relating to my own personal interests; it relates to the interests of the country, whose history during that epoch is not devoid of glory, and may present an imposing lesson to nations in general, and to those who are called upon to rule over them.

The plan I am about to adopt will embrace four distinct epochs: the first, from the 15th of November 1792, the date of my entrance into the ministry, until the 28th March 1798, when my retreat was granted to me. The second, reckoning from 1801, when the king was pleased to call me to his service as generalissimo of his armies, ended with the last month of 1806. It was at this latter period that the increasing influence of my enemies paralysed my endeavours to profit by the critical and sudden opportunity which then presented itself, with the view of arresting the rapid and no longer disguised strides of the Emperor Napoleon towards universal dominion, and of preserving Spain from an invasion which was so openly threatened. The third epoch dates from 1807, when the intestine faction, redoubling

its perfidiousness and activity, caused the miscarriage of my plans of national resistance,—the only means of safety left to us, until the fatal disaster of Aranjuez, brought about by the blind obstinacy and the undisguised treason of the leaders of the conspiracy. The fourth and last epoch will contain a narrative of the sorrows of my sovereigns up to the period when death terminated their existence, and of my own sorrows up to the moment at which I am writing.

My enemies have painted in their own colours, and described according to their fancy, the various actions of my life. Strong in their lamentable success after the events of the year 1808, they were nevertheless unable to lay any crime to my charge. My unvaried loyalty, my heroic patience, sufficiently plead my cause. I have the advantage over them of having it in my power to denounce what they were when I held the reins of power, and what they did when that power fell into their hands. Excesses so grievous as to be scarcely credible demonstrate what were their principles, what affection they bore the people, and in what manner they served their country. I appeal to the testimony of Spaniards, and of all European nations.[1]

[1] The faction I am denouncing shows itself in every line, and figures in every epoch, of these Memoirs: unwilling, however, to interrupt the order of events, I shall now satisfy the reader's impatience by a brief historical analysis of this parricidal faction.

My elevation to the ministry, and the march of my internal

and external policy, (the object of the internal policy was to prepare a better state of things by the reform of many inveterate abuses,) excited against me a host of enemies, the more violent as my very elevation placed me beyond their reach. Indefatigable in their designs, but unable to carry them into effect by their unaided efforts, they sought an authority under the mantle of which they might find an asylum in case of failure. They eventually found this protection in the candour and inexperience of the heir presumptive to the crown. Determined to impose upon this young prince the belief that I wished to deprive him of the natural affection of his august parents, they so far succeeded in alarming him, that his highness was brought to look upon me as a dangerous rival who aspired to seat himself on the throne. To such perfidious insinuations they added other indirect practices. They threw a multitude of embarrassments in the way of the foreign relations, which the events occurring in Europe rendered daily more critical; the internal administration of the country also experienced the vexatious obstacles interposed by a dark and malevolent opposition. They at last conceived the idea of making the Emperor Napoleon himself an instrument of their policy and of my downfall. Unhappily for the country, they so far succeeded, as the sequel of these Memoirs will show, in terrifying Charles IV. as to make him tremble at the bare idea of a war with France, whilst I had, in September 1806, firmly resolved upon proclaiming it. This was, in my opinion, the only means of supporting the crown and the independence of Spain. Then it was that these men, blinded by their hatred, carried into effect their fatal design of calling upon the formidable Emperor to interfere in our family dissensions and in the government of the country. A secret intercourse was established with the French ambassador,* who had already avowed himself my enemy. He addressed notes to Paris, in which I was denounced as a partizan of England, and devoted to her interests. The vanity of this ambassador had led him to nourish the hope of marrying one of his nieces with the heir presumptive to the Spanish monarchy; and the young prince, forgetful of the duties he owed his father and sovereign, had the weakness to write clandes-

* M. de Beauharnais.

tinely to the tyrant of Europe, "to solicit a consort at his hands, and to implore his protection: he threw out suspicions respecting the policy of our cabinet; besought him to remove the obstacles which some treacherous men, as he said, were attempting to throw in the way of a close union between the royal family of Spain and the imperial house of France; he implored him to undeceive his parents, and to come and secure their happiness, the happiness of himself, (of him, Ferdinand de Bourbon!) and of the whole Spanish nation!" His letter was made public at a later period. . . . . How little did the Spaniards suspect its existence, whilst I was lingering in a prison, and borne down by the calumnies of those who had dictated that language!

The consequence is well known. . . . . Vanquisher of the fourth coalition, after two sanguinary campaigns in which fortune appeared sometimes suspended in the balance,—proud of his peace of Tilsit,—the successful Napoleon had attained the apogee of his glory. . . . .

What was then the position of Spain? To negotiate with honour, if possible, whilst asserting the integrity of the crown; or, in the last extremity, to make an appeal to arms. Feeling assured that the latter choice was the only one left to us, I resolutely adopted it; my orders were immediately issued, and I recalled our army of Portugal. The most urgent, the most sacred of our duties, in this conjuncture, was that of saving the king, the queen, and the royal family. All measures of precaution had been taken; they were rendered powerless by the intrigues of the faction. Charles IV. was dethroned by an insurrection paid for that purpose; his minister was loaded with irons, declared an enemy to the state, and handed over, like an expiatory victim, to the fury of an unbridled populace. . . . . The conspirators, intoxicated with their success, for which they expected their reward amidst the applauses of the misled populace, drove before them, like a flock of sheep, the whole Spanish dynasty as far as Bayonne, where this ill-fated family fell a prey to the French eagle. . . . .

This slight sketch of the events will be sufficient to put the reader on a proper scent. In the third epoch of my life I shall furnish the details of these facts, when all obscurities will be cleared up.

CHAPTER V.

First Epoch—from the 15th November 1792, to the 28th March 1798.—State of the Monarchy at the time of my entering the Administration.

During a period of more than three centuries, Spain reckons very few moments of calm and prosperity: glorious, and yet always suffering, her virtue has never been rewarded: these are the colours in which history exhibits her to our view.

Happy those who were born in privileged times! happy those who, appointed to guide the vessel of the state, and protected by favourable winds, proceeded on their course with all sails set and in perfect security!

To me was reserved the task of making head against the fiercest storm of which the annals of Europe have preserved the recollection!

The following was the condition of Spain when, on the 15th November 1792, I was called to the ministry.

The unpopular and improvident war[1] waged by Spain, in concert with France, against England in 1779, had for its object to favour the insurrection of the British colonies in North America; a war which exhausted the scanty remains of a public

[1] The war of American independence.

treasury already involved in difficulties. It was no longer possible to maintain the balance between the revenue of the state and the demands upon it. In Spain, as in France, public credit received a fatal shock.

Charles IV. had just ascended the throne; the bank of St. Carlos was rapidly falling and on the verge of bankruptcy. The company of the Gremios[2] could no longer disguise its difficulties, which were notorious to all. The losses of the company of the Philippines; the annihilation of the companies of the Caraccas and of Buena Fé; the destruction of the life annuities; the failure of the chief commercial houses; the discredit of the royal bonds, or *vales*, of the *Juros*,[3] and of other national debts, contracted under previous reigns,—all these grave symptoms of national misery were simultaneously breaking out.

The government bethought itself at first to effect reductions in all branches of the public service; but the peace of 1783 having been concluded, the reforms and economies chiefly bore upon the military forces.[4]

[2] *Los quatro gremios mayores*—the four great commercial companies of Madrid bearing that name.

[3] Old claims against the state, which are traced back to the days of the Catholic kings.

[4] The minister Florida Blanca was always averse to military establishments, and bent his whole attention to reducing them. The Spanish army was a mere skeleton at the close of the reign of Charles III. They are the yermin of the state, said Florida Blanca—"*la polilla del estado.*"

Our land and sea forces, at the approach of an unavoidable war, scarcely amounted in the whole to more than thirty-six thousand men. The cavalry were dismounted, the arsenals empty, our manufactures of arms falling to decay, and our effective forces every way inadequate, with the exception of the royal navy, to the support of which the apprehension of England had compelled us to bestow all the funds which the treasury had at its disposal.

Family alliances with France and Portugal having banished all uneasiness with respect to the Continent, whatever exceeded the number of soldiers strictly requisite for the service of the fortified towns was deemed to be a useless and ruinous extravagance. Nay, this prolonged state of tranquillity had given rise to apathetic idleness; the military art was utterly neglected. During the half century which had just elapsed, Spain had scarcely attempted some wretched partial operations: these were, the unfortunate campaign of Portugal in 1762, directed by Count d'Aranda; the short and disastrous expedition of Algiers, led by Count O'Reilly; those of Buenos-Ayres in 1776, of Western Florida in 1779; the blockade of Gibraltar, and the invasion or retaking of Minorca. But, above all, the study of war on a large scale had fallen into disuse.

Spain might have been in possession of vast material resources had not her preceding governments,

under the sway of antiquated prejudices, recoiled at all times from those innovations and comprehensive measures so long required for the promotion of agriculture, of arts, commerce, navigation, and the natural productiveness of the vast dominions composing the Spanish monarchy. There existed, no doubt, great landed and monied opulence, so unequally distributed however, that it was nearly as useless or injurious as poverty itself. The bulk of the population, being deprived of every element of labour, could not improve their means of existence. Landed property was enfeoffed, confined within a narrow circle of nominal owners, the greater part in mortmain. There scarcely remained a weak impulse of industry amongst the lowest classes; and commerce, which was alone calculated to revive it, was proudly disdained by the nobility as a condition unworthy of them.

Functions in the state and church attracted every ambition; the whole middling class was infected with this baneful and degrading spirit of cupidity. Most families acquired, by dint of privations, the happiness of beholding some one at least of their children a lawyer or a theologian. This general mania had the effect of supplying the church with a far greater number of priests than it stood in need of; the cloisters were encumbered with an ever increasing number of monks of all orders and of all ages: Spain was

overrun by a swarm of lawyers, attorneys, notaries, registrars, special pleaders, and officers of justice; to these are to be added a multitude of inferior agents and solicitors aspiring in their turn to preferment;—unproductive consumers, who lived at the expense of the public.

There existed, as I have said, much opulence and large fortunes: but they were inactive, piled up in coffers, from the dread of fiscal encroachments; and exhibiting no other vital impulse than the foundation of some elderships, pious works, or religious establishments, which tended to swell the enormous mass of mortmain property.

Notwithstanding the absence of knowledge and of sound laws, there was an innate fund of patriotism springing from a pure and active source. This first principle of preservation was combined with a religious sentiment which likewise imparts social and domestic virtues,—another element of strength and power, when amalgamated with the national spirit.

These two distinctive attributes of the Spanish character revived my confidence when I assumed the reins of government. The danger which threatened us on the side of France was self-evident; there was little hope of averting a war; nevertheless, little or no preparation was made for it on the part of Spain. Some corps had been sent towards the Pyrenees, most of them mere frames of regiments. Attempts were made to

form a cordon of troops; the few open points were occupied, and the garrisons of fortresses slightly reinforced. The ministers to whom I was succeeding had bent their whole anxiety to conceal from the Spaniards the true state of France. The only gazette published in Madrid had been silent for three years respecting the occurrences beyond our frontier; the entrance of foreign books and newspapers was strictly prohibited, and commercial correspondence was subjected to the severest scrutiny. The most rigid watch was kept over literary men and whatever related to public instruction; the wisest reforms were arrested in their progress; a retrograde movement was adopted at all points. . . . . Such were the measures resorted to at that moment, when the question of peace or war was to be determined! The mysterious conduct assumed by the government, the more or less exaggerated news clandestinely spread over the Peninsula and circulated from mouth to mouth, aggravated our moral position. General consternation prevailed in the public mind.

CHAPTER VI.

Negotiation with France.—Project of Neutrality.—Mediation of Charles IV. in favour of Louis XVI.

Count Florida Blanca had just been succeeded in the ministry by Count d'Aranda [1]. The political relations of the Spanish cabinet with that of France, after having been for some time suspended, had recovered some degree of activity, and this renewed intercourse was even of a pacific nature. M. Bourgoing, the envoy of his most Christian Majesty, was received in the character of minister plenipotentiary at the court of his Catholic Majesty.

He was the bearer of an autograph letter from Louis XVI, expressive in the strongest terms of his majesty's "adhesion to the constitution he had accepted, and of the necessity of maintaining the general peace, without which he could not venture to answer for the internal tranquillity of France, or for the security of his crown. He was desirous that the Spanish cabinet, far from

[1] May 1792.

adopting the hostile policy of other states, should concur with him in the maintenance of that peace, the object of his most Christian Majesty's anxious wishes: the influence and mediation of Spain could alone avert the calamities which threatened France from within and from without, if war should unhappily break out."

In restoring the amicable relations of the two cabinets, Count d'Aranda might have given them that impulse and consistency which, whilst they afforded to France the most perfect security on the side of Spain, would also have the effect of calming the apprehensions occasioned by the intrigues of the emigrants, by the warlike preparations of Austria and Prussia, and, above all, by the doubts circulated of the sincerity of Louis XVI. in his constitutional protestations.

It might not, perhaps, have been difficult to turn to favourable account the slender hopes which royalty could yet indulge in. Count d'Aranda, who affected a kind of philosophical indulgence, to say the least of it, for the French revolution, ought to have profited by the opportunity offered, and, without compromising the honour of Spain, to have then concluded the treaty of neutrality which was afterwards so haughtily demanded of us. Such a timely and seasonable transaction, bearing the character of a friendly, spontaneous, and free act on the part of our cabinet, coupled with a solemn and explicit

declaration, would have dispelled many clouds in our political horizon. This was not the course adopted; and that so highly vaunted diplomatist confined himself to a pure and simple renewal of amicable and official relations between the two courts.

The events of the 10th of June, those of the 10th of August, the abolition of royalty, the proclaiming of the republic, the establishing of the revolutionary government, followed each other in rapid succession. . . . . Austria and Prussia had been defeated in their combined attack: the enemies of royalty were flushed with the pride of victory. The minister Bourgoing, who had ceased to represent the king, and was no longer received at the court of Madrid, summoned the Spanish government to make known what were its intentions in the existing crisis. "If they are of a peaceful character," said he, "proclaim them without disguise, and let them be guaranteed by a formal treaty."

Apprehensive of aggravating the painful position of Louis XVI, frightened at the danger of a war for which we had left ourselves wholly unprepared, Count d'Aranda prevailed upon Charles IV. to come to an accommodation with the victorious republic, by adopting a course of neutrality towards France and the coalesced powers.

The bases of the treaty had just been settled

and agreed on with M. Bourgoing when I was summoned to the ministry. We were then called upon to make every possible sacrifice; with a view to protect, not only the crown, but the liberty, the very life of the King of France. . . . . These grave considerations—I say it in perfect sincerity—could alone prevent me from arresting the progress of the negotiation which was already so far advanced. I was far more influenced by those motives than by any hope of avoiding a disastrous war. It was obvious that the arrogance of the republicans, and the hatred they publicly avowed towards all monarchical governments, would soon drive us, however reluctantly, into war. Desirous, nevertheless, of combining my predecessor's diplomatic act of neutrality with measures exclusively directed to the protection of the august captive and of the royal family, I proposed to the king that he should, at the same time, interpose his mediation on their behalf. A separate, distinct, and, as it were, confidential communication was to be delivered to the French government simultaneously with the treaty of neutrality negotiated by Mr. Bourgoing. The character of these modern republicans was well known: it was necessary to address them with great circumspection, in order to allay their excitement. Our additional proceeding, thus presented to

them, manifested the king's intentions, without bearing the semblance of a condition imposed upon the French government. It bore the stamp of confidence and friendship, and was calculated, as such, to disarm the republicans. Charles IV. was moved to tears at the suggestion, and readily adopted it. If it were possible by this means to save the life of Louis XVI, the act of neutrality, which appeared in the nature of a sacrifice, was at least an honourable one, justified by the object it had in view, and the price which was dependent upon it. I did not stop at this measure: I wrote to our ambassador in London, and commissioned him, in the king's name, to confer with Mr. Pitt, the British minister, on the subject, and strongly urge his adopting the same course in the name of the British government. The concurrence of two great powers, which were still neutral in the quarrel, could not fail to add weight to their intercession. In order, moreover, to neglect nothing that was calculated to procure the desired result, our ambassador in London was authorised to employ, with becoming prudence and reserve, all the means which might appear to him likely to succeed with the influential members of both houses of the British Parliament.

An unlimited credit was opened in Paris: every effort was tried to excite sympathy in favour

of the august captive, and, at any price, to secure votes in his favour.[2] The instructions given to the court agent were ample and generous. Should the mediation be accepted, it was to be followed, first, by a simple recognition of the French government, as the act of one state towards another, without in any manner interfering with her internal affairs; secondly, by an offer of the mediation of Spain towards inducing the coalesced powers to conclude a peace; thirdly, should the abdication of Louis XVI. be definitively insisted on as an indispensable condition, by the consent of Spain to that measure, and her becoming guarantee for the monarch's subsequent conduct; fourthly, in the last extremity, and if there existed no other means of saving the king's life, by the offer of hostages, who should answer in their own persons for the good faith of that unhappy monarch. . . . . I had brothers and

[2] M. de Pradt states, in his Memoirs respecting the Spanish revolution, that our court authorised its minister to dispose of a sum of three millions, with a view to interest the leading members of the Convention, and of the municipality of Paris, in favour of Louis XVI. M. de Pradt is mistaken as to the amount of the sum. The authority was perfectly unlimited. Money was ordered to be given to any extent that might be deemed necessary for saving Louis XVI. and his family. This was not merely an act of noble and pious sympathy: such profusion was, in the end, a real and well-understood economy; since, the object being once attained, there ceased to be any motive for the war, on the part of Spain at least, which could not have failed to suffer considerably from its burdens.

friends; thousands of heroic Spaniards would also be found willing to devote themselves in such a cause.

Nothing was left untried; couriers were flying in all directions: not a moment was to be lost. Already, a motion made on the 6th November, for bringing Louis XVI. to trial, had been strongly supported. His enemies thirsted for his blood: grown every day more violent, they were fast gaining ground: at each sitting the fatal catastrophe was urged on to its conclusion.

These facts are of public notoriety . . . . This was the opening of my career. The road was beset with thorns and dangers. It has proved long and irksome; but I have not received much credit for my courage and good-will.

In France, praises are lavished on Count d'Aranda, my predecessor. He has been represented as *the man of peace*. . . . . For my part, I aimed at a still higher object. I was anxious to avoid a general war, and especially the scandalous exhibition of a king dragged to the scaffold by his own subjects. . . . . The death of Louis XVI. was accordingly the signal for all the horrors which followed in its train: had it not been for that revolting execution, France would not have plunged into all those excesses which are still a reproach to her at the present day. Is it any fault of mine that my endeavours proved ineffectual; that my voice found no echo

in Europe; that I was left to my unaided efforts instead of being seconded in my generous attempt?

How much those have been at variance with the truth, how little they have sought it, who have accused me in this instance of yielding to foreign suggestions! What follows is an extract from M. Thiers, the historian of the French revolution, who is no less unjust than other writers in his observations.[3]

"Resisting the suggestions of England, the intrigues of the emigrants, and the angry temper of the Spanish aristocracy, the prudent Count d'Aranda abstained from offending the susceptible feelings of our new government; nevertheless, he was eventually dismissed to make way for Don Manuel de Godoy, afterwards Prince of the Peace: thus leaving his country a prey to the most pernicious counsels," &c.[4]

I have just represented the facts such as they actually occurred; facts well known to M. Thiers, and related by himself immediately after the above passage, respecting the mediation of Charles IV, and his firm resolve to come to an accommo-

[3] Mr. Pitt obstinately refused to concur with us in this act of humanity. I am bound to acknowledge that many distinguished Englishmen endeavoured to excite the compassion of this inexorable minister. Fox, Sheridan, Grey, Lansdown, and other worthy members of parliament, wasted their eloquence in vain. Pitt remained unmoved.

[4] Thiers' History of the French Revolution, vol. iv.

dation with the new French government without any other condition than that of their sparing the life of the dethroned monarch.

Can it then be said that Charles IV. and his minister were impelled by foreign suggestions? Did a single cabinet of Europe manifest the same intentions? Did they not all maintain a silent reserve? To assert that Pitt prevailed upon Spain to adopt that step, whilst it was Spain who urged Pitt to concur with her, but failed to overcome his obstinacy in declining it, is to disguise, to violate the truth of history with contemptible levity.

With respect to the celebrated Count d'Aranda, whom M. Thiers so considerately affects to extol at my expense, the following occurrence throws some light on the opinions of that old diplomatist, as well as upon my own sentiments, on this subject.

It has already been seen that I spontaneously proposed to the king to interfere in the character of mediator. The question was an important one, and admitted of no delay. I was desirous it should be discussed in the council of state; few counsellors were admitted, no more than were strictly requisite to form a council: the king, however, well assured of the propriety of the measure about to be adopted, sanguine in his hope of the result, and anxious not to neglect any means of success, summoned Count d'Aranda

to his presence, and spoke to him of my project of mediation as of an act determined upon, urging him to afford me the advantage of his experience.

The count feigned to approve the idea: he afterwards came to my cabinet with the view of endeavouring to dissuade me from it, and to prevent, if possible, its being carried into effect. "I know not," said he, as he entered, "whether my arrival be seasonable; the king has just spoken to me of the measure which he is adopting with a view to save the life of the unfortunate Louis XVI. I was unwilling to contradict his noble and generous determination; but, between ourselves, have you seriously reflected upon the matter?"

"In truth," I replied, "the circumstances allow of little time for reflection; but my mind is bent upon two points, which throw every other consideration into shade: I mean the position of the King of France, and the honour of the King of Spain."

"But," exclaimed the count, "should the king meet with a refusal?"

"The whole blame will then recoil upon the French, and history will pronounce between them."

"The opinion of mankind, however, is not so much swayed by our acts as by the good or bad result which may have attended them. If the

step you are about to take through an impulse of generosity should prove unsuccessful, which may possibly be the case, it will infallibly be said that the Spanish ministry has been guided by a romantic feeling rather than by the lessons of experience."

The count was an old man; I was very young, and bound to respect his age. "But," said I, "the measure I have proposed has its parallel in history.[5] Holland, in a case perfectly in point, sent ambassadors to England with a view to intercede in favour of the unfortunate Charles Stuart." . . .

"Very true; but were they attended to?"

"Assuredly they were not, count; but the conduct of the Dutch was not the less noble and generous because it failed of success."

"Granted. I will suppose, then, that you shall have been more fortunate,—that the mediation may prove effectual, and be accepted; have you foreseen and considered the embarrassment into which we shall be thrown by a king and his son, the heir presumptive of his crown, whose consent to the loss of it must be guaranteed by the King of Spain?"

"Is it not far worse," I replied, "that we should suffer him to be dragged to the scaffold? Setting aside the well-known gentleness and moderation

[5] Spain also interceded.

of Louis XVI, I do not suppose, should we succeed in saving him, that he can ever afterwards feel any great desire to recover his lost crown. Admitting even a change in political circumstances, his enemies have so humbled and offended him, that, happen what may, his abdication becomes an act of necessity. The Dauphin is still very young: who knows what may happen in France before he attains the age of manhood? But, after all, should his crown be irretrievably gone from him, he will not forget that its loss was the price paid for the ransom of his father's life."

"And the king's brothers?" added Count d'Aranda.

"His brothers have forfeited it; they are not entitled to consideration."

"What course will the other cabinets adopt?"

"They will either pay respect to treaties, or make war upon France, as they best like."

"In the mean while the worthy king will remain a prisoner in our hands?"

"The worthy king," I replied, "will no doubt faithfully comply with the condition of treaties which shall have saved him from the scaffold. I can have no better pledge of this than his christian virtues. Let me add, that, in the extraordinary situation in which France is placed, we must leave something to chance, and choose, between two extremes, that which is most in accordance with honour and with the dictates of humanity."

"Right well," said the count; "but let us look at the other side of the picture. If our mediation should be haughtily rejected, and the king humbled by a refusal, what will Spain do? Will it be in our power to avoid a war?"

"The object of the step we are taking is to avoid a war. If the King of France should perish on a scaffold, a general war is unavoidable, not only for the purpose of punishing so scandalous a crime, but also to arrest the progress of an enemy who threatens the overthrow of every European monarchy. By the murder of Louis XVI. they will have flung a challenge at every sovereign. But we are not yet come to that extremity. . . . Nevertheless, be pleased to read this French bulletin which has just reached me."—I handed to the count the decree of the 19th November, by which the Convention tendered its support and assistance to all nations disposed to shake off the yoke of their old governments.—"What will happen then, when those men shall have perpetrated the most heinous of crimes, and, when giving effect to their threats, they shall seek for and perhaps enlist in other countries further accomplices of their misdeeds?"

"I must acknowledge," replied the count, "that your generous views have the sanction of morality; but let us not forget that what is morally good may often prove politically the reverse."

"Well then, count, I beg leave to assure you

that I never will separate political from moral considerations; and in the present case they may safely go hand in hand: a spirit of Machiavelism is quite foreign to me."

Thus ended the discussion. From that day Count d'Aranda became, I shall not say my rival—it were vanity in me to use the expression—but, what is still worse, he avowed himself my enemy,

CHAPTER VII.

The mediation of the King of Spain is rejected by the National Convention.—Trial and Execution of Louis XVI.—Rupture of the negotiations.

THE convulsive movements to which all France was a prey after the fatal 10th of August are recorded in history, and known to all. The armed intervention of Austria and Prussia powerfully contributed to irritate the public mind. Flushed with victory and democratic fanaticism, the constitutionalists had become intractable; the lust of power in some, the thirst after money in others, broke through all bounds; the smallest municipal body arrogated to itself an absolute authority; each club was a focus of anarchy; the infuriated and blind populace threatened or summarily put to death whosoever ventured to invoke the name of justice or the restoration of social order.

A hatred of monarchical government broke through these loud contending passions; nothing was heard but sarcasms and imprecations against Louis XVI. A thousand popular assemblies were clamorous for his death.

A few virtuous men were still exerting all their efforts to save him. Don Joseph de Ocariz, ever indefatigable in his zeal, was watching the moment

when the voice of Charles IV. might be heard with good effect. The Spanish minister was not to be intimidated either by the disfavour which then attached to the envoy of a sovereign, or by the dread of the inquisitorial ochlocracy which kept watch, night and day, over the slightest movements of every public man. He concerted his chief plan of operations with a few deputies who loudly opposed the violence of anarchical men. How many pious artifices was he not compelled to resort to in order to conceal from the revolutionary police his secret intercourse with those deputies, prepared as they were to run all risks in their holy and virtuous opposition? Ocariz sought friends in all directions; he found some in the very committee entrusted with diplomatic affairs. . . . Not one of them betrayed him. . . . I wish it were in my power to record in this place the names of those who aided our envoy with their advice and assistance; and I regret I can only recall to mind, at this moment, Morisson, Lanjuinais, Boissy-d'Anglas, Fauchet, Salles, Henry de la Rivière. . . . Be it also said, to the honour of these now historical men, their devoted conduct sprang from no consideration of sordid interest or of personal advantage. They were flattered, on the contrary, at the perilous confidence which had pointed them out; they consoled, they encouraged Ocariz, who had to bear singly, and unaided, the whole weight of so arduous an undertaking.

It was agreed amongst them, and in conjunction with the illustrious defenders of Louis XVI, first, to await the effect produced by the speeches about to be uttered at the tribune, and in which the trial itself, or, subsequently, the capital punishment, were to be openly resisted; secondly, to address to the minister for foreign affairs the two notes from the court of Madrid respecting the neutrality and the disarming;[1] thirdly,

[1] The following is the literal text of the two notes transmitted to the Spanish chargé d'affaires in Paris: the dates were left in blank.

First note.—"The French government having manifested to that of Spain the desire that the neutrality actually subsisting between both nations should be secured on a firm basis, H. C. M. authorizes the undersigned, his principal secretary of state, to declare by this note that Spain will maintain the most complete neutrality in respect to the war in which France is engaged with other powers.

The present note shall be exchanged in Paris against a corresponding note from the minister for foreign affairs, containing the like assurances on the part of France.

"DUKE DE LA ALCUDIA."

"Madrid . . . . December, 1792."

Second note.—"In consequence of the neutrality agreed upon, under guarantee of the friendship and good faith of the French nation, H. C. M. will withdraw the troops which line the frontiers of the Pyrenees, and only keep up in the fortified towns the garrisons requisite for their service, and the necessary detachments. This withdrawal of troops will take place as soon as France shall have delivered a note in which she binds herself to the adoption of a similar course. Commissaries shall be appointed on the part of both powers, and by common accord, at the period determined upon for the faithful execution of every suitable arrangement. "This

to await still further, and as long as possible, the arrival of the pacific mission solicited from England, and hourly expected, in order to make the mediation of that power concur with the mediation of his Catholic Majesty at the most seasonable moment.

Both notes were duly communicated. The British cabinet not having sent any mission, Ocariz handed to the minister for foreign affairs, on the 26th of December, the first day of the defence of Louis XVI, the request of intercession on the part of Charles IV, which was addressed on the following day, the 27th, to the Convention, with a report couched in the following terms:

"Paris, 27 December, first year of the Republic.

"LE BRUN, MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TO THE "PRESIDENT OF THE CONVENTION.

"I RECEIVED last night, from the chargé d'affaires of Spain, a note relative to the question which engages at this moment the attention of the National Convention and of all Europe. The

"This note, signed by H. C. M.'s principal secretary of state, shall be exchanged in Paris against a corresponding note from the minister for foreign affairs, containing the like stipulations and assurances on the part of France.

"DUKE DE LA ALCUDIA."

"Madrid . . . . December, 1792."

(The date affixed to these two notes by our chargé d'affaires was the 17th December.)

duty of my office requires that I should transmit this letter to the Convention, and accompany it with a few particulars on the subject to which it relates. The hostile preparations on the part of Spain, and the precautionary measures adopted on our part, had of late given rise to mutual complaints. These had led to overtures of reconciliation, and, amongst others, to an offer of reciprocal disarming, under the condition of a clear and formal avowal of neutrality on the part of Spain during the present war. Those negotiations, set on foot three months ago, were interrupted for a time when Count d'Aranda quitted the ministry; but they have been resumed by his successor, who shows himself equally well disposed towards us. I should be happy at having it now in my power to announce that this business has been brought to a successful conclusion, had I not reasons for supposing that the complying spirit manifested by the court of Madrid is, in some degree, dependent upon conditions calculated to lessen its value.

"In fact, citizen president, at the time I received the two notes of which I annex copies, (the first containing the neutrality of the Spanish government; the second, the proposed disarming, as well as the mode of carrying it into effect,) I was already aware that the Duke de la Alcudia had not disguised from the minister plenipotentiary of the republic one of the principal

motives which led the King of Spain to this two-fold act of deference towards us,—the hope of exercising a favourable influence over the fate of the ex-king, his cousin.

"I have been fully convinced of this fact, as the National Convention cannot fail to be also convinced of it, by the contents of the letter of the Chevalier Ocariz, who has remained in Paris since the 10th of last August in the capacity of Spanish chargé d'affaires. I think it right to abstain from any further observation on the subject of that letter.

(Signed) "LE BRUN."

The two notes, and the official letter of mediation, presented by Ocariz, were read in the Convention on the following day, the 28th. A deep silence pervaded the assembly and the tribunes: this was an unexpected display of moderation; for not a word had hitherto been allowed to be uttered in favour of the unhappy monarch.

There was yet a glimmering of hope. . . . Dignity without ostentation, truth without acerbity, calm arguments, the language of friendly persuasion, sincerity, delicacy of expression, a gentle burst of generous sentiments appealing to the interest and the glory of France,—such was in form and in substance that conciliating and withal circumspect document. As we had to deal with proud democrats, the mediation was not solicited in the name of the King of Spain only; the

loyalty of his minister brought the whole Spanish nation to interpose along with their sovereign, and presented the result as a decisive event which would draw closer the bonds of friendship between the two nations,—a friendship the more solid and becoming, as it would be founded on the rights of humanity, acknowledged and respected alike by both[2].

But the dreadful sentence was about to be pronounced by men of blood, who, in default of good reasons, signified their will by insulting provocations. "Away with the influence of kings!" exclaimed the ferocious Thuriot,—"Let us not allow the ministers of foreign courts to come and form a congress amongst us, and intimate to us the orders of crowned ruffians. Would the Spanish despot dare to threaten us?"

"There is not a word of threat," interrupted a solitary voice. Thuriot instantly fixed his serpent's eyes on that spot in the assembly from whence the voice had emanated. "No!" he ironically exclaimed, "not a word of threat for those who will neither see nor understand the combinations which crime and perversity can prepare against the independence of our country. Would it be wished to form a congress of crowned heads, which should sit in judgment upon the ex-king and upon us along with him? Let us

[2] The text of that ministerial letter, which is little known in Spain, will be found in the explanatory documents, No. I.

be mighty and all-powerful under the shield of the law; let us baffle royal intrigues. . . . . Perhaps he who reigns in Spain has not yet renounced the hope of reigning here, after the probable extinction of that branch of his family which once wielded the sceptre of France. The constitution says nothing of his pretended rights; but, although royalty be abolished amongst us, he no doubt still indulges in illusions on the subject, and wishes to make trial of his future power."

These declamations were vociferously applauded in the assembly and in the very tribunes. Courage failed every honest man; no one dared to second the proposal of a foreign court. . . . . Nevertheless, Charles IV. still hoped for success from his forbearance. Persisting in his endeavours to spare France from the commission of a frightful crime, to prevent an occurrence which contained within itself all the elements of a general war, and still to hold out a protecting hand to the deserted monarch so long as there remained the slightest ray of hope; his Catholic Majesty sent fresh orders to Ocariz, directing him to redouble his efforts, and, considering the then peremptory circumstances, to employ, whether publicly or in secret, every means which his talents and loyalty might suggest, without derogating from what was due to Spanish honour.

Meanwhile the French government interpreted to its own advantage the notes communicated to it;

objecting by plausible pretexts to the withdrawal of the French troops stationed at Bayonne, and explaining the text of the notes in such a manner that a mere reciprocal acceptance was equivalent, as regarded us, to a formal acknowledgment of the republic. Proceeding boldly to the object they had in view; regardless of the resentment Spain might feel at their insulting conduct; disdaining to state any reasons for their brutal refusal to listen to our intercession, the French government vigorously urged us to complete the still pending treaty, and coupled with menaces their haughty demand. Castilian pride was made to undergo a severe ordeal; every insult was borne with becoming dignity; what could not be granted was adjourned, with fair words, until a more favourable opportunity. . . . . and some delay was gained.

It was not of long duration; the catastrophe was approaching. A witness to the unbridled violence of those who swayed the Convention, Ocariz had the courage once more to raise his voice; he again interposed the entreaties of the generous and kind-hearted Charles IV. Noble but fruitless entreaties! it was the last cry of distress on the edge of the abyss into which the victim was about to be plunged.

In the dreadful night of the 17th of January the votes had been deposited in the box; they were commencing to decide by ballot in a case of

life and death; when a pressing note from the Spanish envoy was announced to the Convention. Ocariz repeated in it the offers of mediation and guarantee already communicated to the executive council in the preceding December; he reiterated in the most affecting terms the wishes and entreaties of Charles IV, and was even content to ask that they should merely spare the life of the French monarch. He concluded by offering to receive and transmit to the court of Madrid every honourable condition which the Convention might deem necessary to require, provided they would allow of a reprieve. "Considered in a political point of view," he added, in conclusion, "this trial may be the occasion of an honourable treaty, worthy of the present epoch, a sure pledge of a general peace, and from henceforward the most solid basis of the independence of France." No less than three hundred deputies anxiously hoped that the reading of this note should be ordered; and that the discussion being thus opened anew, might present some means of suspending the fatal blow. Those, however, who thirsted for blood, strong in the support of an armed and infuriated mob, opposed the reading. Danton demanded that war should be instantly declared against Spain; the discussion was stifled by the order of the day, and amidst the threatening vociferations and applauses of the tribunes.

By what painful fatality did it come to pass

that Charles IV. was unaided in so pious, so praiseworthy an undertaking? His intercession, his support, his august name, no doubt influenced a great number of deputies whose votes were favourable to his views; but how much the co-operation of England would have promoted his means of success! Had other powerful sovereigns consented to join us! . . . . . Louis XVI. was dragged to the scaffold by a very small majority. In this critical emergency, in which it was impossible to have recourse to arms, policy alone could save the monarch; but a policy, I repeat it, which should merely wield the arms of persuasion and entreaty.

Spain, at any rate, did all which it behoved her to do for the good of France, and for bringing about a general peace. Charles IV. fulfilled every duty of an affectionate relative; in a word, all means of conciliation were exhausted in the attempt.

When the venerable chief of the house of Bourbon perished upon a scaffold, all negotiations were from that moment suspended. The French minister Bourgoing tried to revive them; but I had no difficulty in satisfying him that his presence and his proceedings at such an afflicting moment, were no longer compatible with the mourning of the court: he was compelled to withdraw, to the great regret of both.

Would it be believed that Count d'Aranda

continued to urge the propriety of negotiating a treaty with France still reeking with the blood of the monarch in whose behalf Charles IV. had condescended to supplicate? "No," said I to the count, with a deep sentiment of grief—"no; the treaty of peace with the French republic would now be a disgraceful act of cowardice. We should thus be accomplices in a crime which is a cause of scandal to Spain and to every other nation.

CHAPTER VIII.

Hostile attitude and provocation of the National Convention against the several governments of Europe, at the period of the trial and execution of Louis XVI.

It has been asserted in Spain and elsewhere that I advocated a war against the French republic; I have even been reproached with provoking it: both imputations are equally unfounded. The course I adopted was forced upon me by irresistible circumstances. Far greater blame would have been laid to my charge, had I, in attention to the advice of Count d'Aranda, my predecessor, betrayed the honour of the crown and the safety of the state by consenting to sign a humiliating and precarious peace; had I resisted the prevailing opinion of Spain, and of all the nations adjoining France, which, in order to avert a common danger, were clamorous for war.

Who could evince a greater inclination for peace than I did? What monarch of Europe made greater concessions than Charles IV, or went so far to arrest an eruption on the eve of spreading over every country? If the volcano burst in spite of all our efforts, other hands than mine

had stirred up the fire. Far from exciting the warlike ardour of the conventionalists, Spain never ceased to show herself the friend of France, and her true ally: she urged, she advised a peaceful course; she offered her mediation. Fearless of committing herself in various ways, she was neither arrested nor discouraged by the obstacles constantly raised by the less benevolent, less tractable policy of other cabinets. But the political masters of France at that period were averse to a peace; the coalition had justice on their side, inasmuch as thrones, which were threatened with destruction, were warranted in adopting the means best calculated to avert their downfall.

It is incumbent on the real lover of truth to take a careful retrospect of past events, and to view them in their true character.

By the sentence and execution of Louis XVI. the Convention flung an audacious defiance, steeped in blood, at all the sovereigns of Europe: the greater part had, until then, maintained a strict neutrality. Victorious over Austria and Prussia, whose troops she had driven from her territory, France was in a condition to negotiate with advantage, whether owing to her recent triumph, or in consideration of the valuable pledges she still held at her command. The crime she had just perpetrated being justified by no new danger, by no desperate excitement of the public mind, proved that the fanaticism of a mob haughtily proceeded

towards its object, and that it aimed at effecting, at all risks, that republican crusade which was already avowed in the speeches and the acts of the National Convention.

The pages of history afforded no example of a similar invasion. The rulers of France, urged on, some by a frenzied enthusiasm, others by the ambition of power, the thirst after plunder, and a species of innate perverseness, conceived the daring project of changing the face of the world by holding up to its view, at the bayonet's point, the Alcoran of the republic. To such an object, or such a delirium, Louis XVI. fell a sacrifice.

Out of the multitude of speeches uttered on the king's trial, or in the stormy sittings which took place before and after his death, I shall only select a few passages for quotation.

"Hasten, citizens, to pronounce a sentence which will be a prelude to the agony of kings. See you not that all nations are ready to strike the hour of that agony?"—MANUEL.

"Strike! cut off that head! whilst from north to south your victorious phalanxes are purifying the soil which tyranny had contaminated; whilst the cry of liberty announces throughout Europe the first hour of nations, the last hour of kings."—CHÉNIER.

"Quickly pass sentence upon the criminal. Let the scaffold of a perjured king be the pedestal of the universal republic."—THIBEAUDEAU.

"Let the pain of death be awarded to the tyrant of my country, and, in his person, to royalty."—ROBERSPIERRE.

"Kings are educated in the absurd maxim that they hold their crown from God and their sword. Well then! nations who, like us, are ready to pulverize those monsters, are about to prove, in their turn, that they hold their liberty from God and their swords."—ABBÉ GRÉGOIRE.

"In attention to the welfare of my country and the liberty of the world, I vote for death. Kings have too long presided as judges over nations; the day will come when nations shall sit in judgment upon kings."—ROBERT.

Speaking of the mediation of Spain, Barère exclaims, "What is the subject under discussion? conjectures, diplomatic illusions! Citizens, beware how you lose sight of your splendid mission, that of revolutionizing all nations. Let us not crawl through the rut of antiquated diplomacy; to us belongs the task of opening new roads of communication with other people, and of originating a new law of nations."

It were easy to multiply quotations. What shall I say of the incendiary matter daily vomited by the press in all directions, and scattered through neighbouring states? Can it be pretended that such threatening and desolating language only emanated from a few orators or writers of heated imagination? But the whole National Assembly, on the 19th of November

preceding, heard, applauded, and ordered to be published in every living language, the following decree:

"The National Convention declares, in the name of the French nation, that it promises fraternity and support to all nations desirous of recovering their liberty.

"To this effect, it directs that the executive power shall transmit to all the generals of the republic the order to afford assistance to every nation desirous of being emancipated, and to protect all those citizens who may have been oppressed, or who may be so hereafter, in the cause of liberty."

The way was thus opened, and an encouragement offered to the factious or violent men of all countries.

This decree cannot be called a transient sally caused by a momentary irritation. Orders were despatched to the commanders of all the French armies. They apply for instructions as to the mode of carrying them into effect; a report is presented by the three committees,—of diplomacy, of the finances, and of war; and the Convention issues the decree of the 15th December following, —a perfectly radical measure, destructive of all social order, of all property, of all pre-existing right, wherever such a measure may be carried into effect.[1]

[1] Those who may wish to see the decree itself, and the report of the three committees, can refer to the Moniteur of the

Shall it be urged, in short, that it remained a dead letter, that it was softened down? The principality of Orange, the bailiwick of Armstadt, the duchy of Limburgh, Savoy, the county of Nice, the Belgic provinces, were suffering its severest penalties. With respect to Belgium alone, M. Thiers furnishes a specimen of the effects produced by that extraordinary creation of democratic fiefs.

"A swarm of agents, selected from amongst the Jacobins by the executive power, immediately spread over Belgium. The provisional administrations were formed under their influence, and they urged them on to the most levelling measures. Thus instigated against the middling

19th December 1792. The following is an extract, inserted by M. Thiers in his History of the French Revolution, vol. iv. p. 23. "We must," said Cambon, amidst the warmest applauses,—"we must declare ourselves a *revolutionary power* in all the countries we may enter. It is useless to assume any disguise; the despots know what we aim at; let us then loudly proclaim it, since it is already surmised,—since justice, moreover, need not be dissembled. Whatever countries our generals may enter, let them proclaim the sovereignty of the people, the abolition of the feudal system, of tithes, of all abuses; let the old authorities be dissolved, and new local administrations be provisionally formed under the guidance of our generals; let those administrations govern the country, and devise the means of forming national conventions which shall decide upon its fate; let the property of our enemies, that is to say, the property of nobles, of priests, of lay or religious communities, of churches, &c. be forthwith sequestrated, and placed under the safeguard of the French nation, that an account be rendered of it to the local administrations, and that it may serve as a deposit

classes, the mob were guilty of the greatest excesses. It was the anarchy of 93, which, gradually introduced amongst us by four years of disorders, broke out on a sudden in Belgium without any transition from the old to the new order of things. These pro-consuls, invested with almost absolute power, seized upon individuals as well as their property, and filled the public prisons. They alienated the unfortunate Belgians, so much attached to their religion, by carrying away all the church plate, and were guilty of every kind of malversation. They formed a species of conventions for deciding upon the fate of each district; and, under their despotic influence, the annexation to France was voted at

to meet the expenses of the war, of which the freed nations will have to bear a proportion, since the object of the war was to rescue them from thraldom. The settlement of accounts must take place when the campaign is over. If the supplies furnished to the republic exceed the proportion of expenses owing to it, the republic shall refund the excess; it shall receive, in the contrary case, any excess to which it may have a claim. Our assignats, resting upon the new distribution of property, must be received in the conquered country, and their circulation must extend with the principles out of which they have grown. Let, in short, the executive power send commissioners to confer with those provisional administrations, to fraternise with them, to keep the accounts of the republic, and to carry the decreed sequestration into effect. No semi-revolution for us," added Cambon. "Every nation which shall reject our present proposal will be our natural enemy, and deserve to be dealt with as such. Peace and fraternity to all the friends of liberty! War to the dastardly supporters of despotism! War to the mansions, peace to the cottages!"

Liege, Bruxelles, Mons, and other places. These were unavoidable misfortunes, the more oppressive as revolutionary violence combined with military outrage to produce them."[2]

None can form an idea of those acts of violence except they who were the victims of them. Who will venture to arraign the countries bordering upon France for taking up arms to resist the torrent? Was any calming manifesto addressed by the Convention to its alarmed neighbours? Did it condescend to intimate its intention of keeping within the limits of self-defence, without attempting to disturb social order beyond the French frontiers? What nation was secure from its insolent threats?

Nevertheless, M. Thiers praises the policy of Denmark and Sweden, who maintained their neutrality at a distance of three hundred leagues; adding, that Holland and Spain should have followed their example, and have adhered, as they did, to the armed neutrality.

Might I not ask M. Thiers what nation bordering upon France, exercising the natural right of arming in self-defence, and claiming to remain neutral, could hope to meet with consideration and respect at the hands of the French government?

Did not the Convention declare war against

[2] History of the French Revolution, vol. iv. p. 26.

every power, on the mere ground of their remaining armed? Was not the alternative imposed upon all, of disarming and acknowledging the republic, or of being held as enemies unless they consented to disarm, notwithstanding their offer of observing a strict neutrality?

The same historian, however, is soon found at variance with himself. Immediately after the paragraph I have just quoted, he justifies our conduct, and undertakes to plead our defence: he was alluding to the several powers which were arming at sight of the dangers that threatened them. M. Thiers expresses himself as follows:

"The French government had correctly estimated the general dispositions of those powers; the impatient spirit of the French, which was, moreover, a feature in the national character, did not allow it to await a declaration of war. Everything, on the contrary, urged the provocation of it. Ever since the 10th of August it had unceasingly called upon every other government to acknowledge the republic. It scarcely evinced any circumspection towards England, whose neutrality was of advantage to it, whilst it had a host of enemies to contend with; but, immediately after the 21st of January, it cast aside every scruple, and thought of nothing but a universal war. Considering, thenceforward, that a disguised was no less dangerous than an open

hostility, it determined to sound its enemies and compel them to throw off the mask. With this view, the Convention resolved to brave all European cabinets, and ordered, on the 22nd January, a report to be presented to it respecting the conduct of each, firmly resolving to declare war if they delayed a single moment in giving an explicit answer."

This is M. Thiers' own avowal, and he keeps within the limits of truth. Now, can it be pretended that, under such circumstances, it was possible for any of the nations adjoining France to arm out of pure precaution, and to adopt a system of mere neutrality? Does not M. Thiers soon add, with the same frankness, that "by the execution of the 21st of January, France broke off all intercourse with crowned heads, and was irrevocably hurled into the career of revolution."

Let us conclude from all this, that, if a general war was kindled, it was exclusively to be ascribed to the fact that the rulers of France both willed and provoked it.

CHAPTER IX.

Further importunities of the French Chargé d'Affaires.—He demands of our Government a formal answer.—Answer given to him.—Last interview with M. Bourgoing.

THE painful solution of the trial of Louis XVI. created a lively sympathy throughout Spain. Witness of the general indignation, M. Bourgoing voluntarily withdrew from court. He shut himself up in his residence at Madrid, where he remained for several days, apprehensive that his appearance might still further irritate the public mind, and desirous also of manifesting his respect for public opinion and for the mourning of the royal family. Urged on, at last, by his government, he addressed to me a note, in which he demanded a precise and definitive answer respecting the negotiation already entered upon, and the question of peace or war with France. The reply was couched in the following terms:

"The undersigned, first minister of state of H. C. M. acknowledges receipt of the note addressed to him by M. Bourgoing on the part of the French government.

"The undersigned is commanded to declare, in

the name of his august sovereign, that, under present circumstances, H. C. M. does not deem it proper to follow up the negotiations already commenced; and that, wishing henceforward to regulate his conduct, with regard to the question of peace or war with France, by that which may be observed towards Spain, it is his royal determination to adopt all the precautionary measures requisite for the honour of the crown and the security of his dominions."

Undaunted at the concluding expressions of this reply, M. Bourgoing had it intimated to me, that he was desirous I should admit him to an extra-diplomatic interview, the only object of which was to try whether there was not yet some possibility of avoiding a war. I was acquainted with M. Bourgoing's rectitude of feeling; his great regard for the Spanish nation; the moderation of his principles: I knew that he ardently wished for the maintenance of peace. . . . . Accordingly, after obtaining his majesty's permission, I consented to the interview, and M. Bourgoing repaired to Aranjuez with all the circumspection called for by the public ferment.

Our conversation was perfectly frank and cordial. He opened it by showing me the imperative order, enjoining him to demand his passports if the Spanish government hesitated to sign the treaty insisted on by the French government.

I subjoin the text of the conversation between us:

M. Bourgoing.—"You perceive, duke, that, after the reply which has been given to me, I am now exceeding my instructions. I have taken upon myself to solicit this friendly and courteous conference, in order to try whether we might not come to an understanding, and devise some means of avoiding a rupture between the two countries."

Duke de la Alcudia.—"On my part, likewise, sir, I could only consent to a confidential interview. France has twice refused the friendly and benevolent mediation of the King of Spain. This mediation has been disregarded, rejected with haughty and insulting language; it were quite impossible for me to listen to any direct proposal from the French government without a previous atonement for such an offence."

M. Bourgoing.—"Well, then, since we have opened the subject, and are conversing in confidence, I must own,—and I do so with regret,—that offence has been given; but it should be exclusively imputed to its authors. Those men who, at the present day, reign paramount in France, may be nothing to-morrow. . . . . Does Spain stand in need of accelerating events?"

Duke de la Alcudia.—"Assuredly not. Spain acts without precipitation; she adopts the precautions becoming her power and her dignity. Those who govern France affect to despise us.

By assuming the attitude worthy of a great nation, offended, but always calm in her resolves and confident in her strength, Spain will not provoke a war. We will leave to France all the odium, all the consequences of the aggression; the justice of our cause will be the more apparent: but if France is determined upon giving the signal, she will find us prepared. As to the sovereignty of those destructive men, I also believe it must have an end. Nevertheless, it may still last long enough to disturb Europe, and cause the downfall of many states."

M. Bourgoing.—"Woe be to the proud madmen who have invaded the territory of France at the most critical moment, and have only excited the passions of a mighty nation by threatening it with conquest and slavery! If the aggressors were unable to wrest from France her liberty, they have, at least, achieved the cruel satisfaction of hurling her into anarchy."

Duke de la Alcudia.—"Let us be candid: the French revolution, on its first outbreak, showed a tendency to engraft its dangerous doctrines upon all surrounding states. Your clubs, your factious men, your rage for proselytism, have created well-founded alarms. Every power has a right to watch over its preservation. In virtue of what authority, of what divine or human mission, is it attempted to subvert the whole world by preaching the insurrection of nations? Was it not to be anticipated that go-

vernments, assailed in the very basis of their existence, would think of defending themselves by every means at their command?

"Not long ago, at the tribune of the Convention, did not Buzot, an ardent republican, but of some political sagacity, say to his colleagues: '*Kings desire your downfall, because you have imprudently inspired them with apprehensions for their own safety.*' Whatever may have been the excesses committed on either side in this struggle, the first aggression, that is to say, the first wrong, was on the part of France. This is undeniable. The Convention has placed amongst the orders of the day the subversion of ancient governments: that decree is being carried into effect in every country into which you penetrate. . . . At sight of so frightful a danger, nations are warranted by the universal law to unite against an irregular and turbulent power which aims at nothing but destruction."

M. Bourgoing. — "Thus, then, is the coalition approved and defended by Spain. But I will venture to ask you with the same frankness—are the motives which impel other powers on this occasion as pure as those which actuate Spain? Are they not influenced by views of individual interest, by ill-disguised ambition? Could Spain rejoice at the triumph of a coalition whose aim would be to dismember France, your ancient ally?"

Duke de la Alcudia.—"God forbid that France

should ever experience so great a calamity! Rather let her moderate her conduct, modify her policy, and respect other nations. Should France be dismembered, there is an end to all equilibrium in Europe; but is it necessary for the maintenance of France in her integral state, and of European equilibrium, that Europe should be overturned and subjugated by France?"

M. Bourgoing.—"Let us judge with calmness. Whatever appearance the decrees and measures of the Convention may bear, her real aim, her real intention, at least, is no more than to strike at her enemies. Has Spain become ours?"

Duke de la Alcudia.—"What sinister intention, sir, can be ours, when we require that France should not introduce into her plans the invasion and overthrow of Spain, who is likewise your ancient ally? . . . France is embarked in a war which will daily increase in extent and violence. We held out to her a helping hand; we offered her means of safety—the only means calculated to restore a general, and for her a glorious peace! What have we obtained in return? — contempt and threats! What said Barère, a few days ago[1] in the Convention, amidst the most clamorous applauses? Here are his very words, which are a warning to us: '*Should Spain even offer to be our ally, to fight for us, are we warranted in relying upon the alliance of a despot of eighteen centuries*

[1] The 19th January.—Moniteur of the 24th.

with the nascent republic? Can there exist a community of interests and of principles between us? Citizens, never lose sight of your splendid mission, which is that of revolutionising all nations.'"

"You perceive, then, M. Bourgoing, that France is more bent upon establishing disorder in Spain than upon forming an alliance or sympathising with her. . . . Do you desire more facts in proof of the assertion? Would you know the extent of their insincerity towards us. Take these files of papers, collected together and placed by order of date: they contain substantial proofs of systematic treachery. They are proclamations, addresses, revolutionary plans, profusely scattered over Spain, and exciting to rebellion a people who entertain a religious veneration for their kings. Observe likewise, and point out to your government at a suitable time, that wherever these incendiary writings have been found, Spanish loyalty has hastened forthwith to denounce and transmit them to the public authority; that the king's subjects loudly call for war; that they offer to risk their lives, — the lives of their children — all they possess, in defence of the monarchy. . . Has France to lay any such reproaches to our charge?"

M. Bourgoing.—"Those writings, those plans, are not the work of the French government; they proceed from the clubs, which have unfortunately extended over the greater part of France."

DUKE DE LA ALCUDIA.—"You are quite right in endeavouring to defend your government; but that government sees, tolerates, approves everything of this nature which is proposed by popular assemblies. Can you deny it? The famous decrees of the 19th November and 15th December,—acts unheard of in the political history of nations,—whatever has been done, whatever is still doing, proves that the Convention is controlled by the clubs. If moderate men are to be found—as I doubt not there are—amongst its members, certain it is, nevertheless, that the majority yields and gives way, whether willingly or through compulsion, to every command of an infuriated ochlocracy. . . . What guarantee, what hope of peace can there exist with a government tossed about by every faction, were it even to offer us such a peace, which it is however very far from proposing? . . . Spain is a prey which tempts the republican cupidity. The Convention does not disguise the ambition and hatred with which it is tormented."

M. BOURGOING.—"Everything appears to you, duke, in too dark a colour." . . .

DUKE DE LA ALCUDIA.—"Well then, let us go to the proof: it will be unanswerable. Spain is offended; her honour is compromised: she justly refuses to sign a treaty which, after the late events, would be ignominious to her. . . . To sign such a treaty under present circumstances,

would be to drain the cup to the very dregs. The King of Spain has not obtained the shadow of satisfaction, not even the favour of a common but courteous expression of regret, of which diplomacy is always unsparing: on the contrary, insults have been heaped upon insults; nothing but imperative demands, every species of threat, if Spain does not consent to smother her wrongs, to dissemble her regret,—if she hesitates to sign over the bleeding corpse of the chief of her reigning family an approbation of the crime perpetrated by the French government! ! ! To require so many sacrifices at once, is it not driving us to extremity? Is it not declaring war against us?"

M. Bourgoing.—"Such, however, is the necessity in which the French government is placed; finding itself threatened on all sides, and apprehensive of having given Spain just causes of complaint, it seeks for guarantees." . . .

Duke de la Alcudia.—"The means which it resorts to are not those of a civilized nation. Let it have the courage to brave the danger it has wilfully incurred, but not require of another nation the sacrifice of its honour. There is a middle course open for adoption: time is a healer of most evils: it softens the memory of sorrows, calms the public mind. . . . France should appreciate the moderation of Spain, which, with such just grounds of complaint, has not ordered

the French minister to take his passports. Your government, and they who are unacquainted with our country, view this moderation as the effect of weakness; . . . but by those who have studied our national character, his Catholic Majesty's forbearance will be otherwise interpreted. If the French government had any feeling, what might we not yet hope, and even accomplish, in furtherance of a peace, which is still within our reach, but to which Europe may soon become a stranger."

M. Bourgoing.—"In short, duke, under what conditions would Spain resume the negotiations with France?"

Duke de la Alcudia.—"One condition, M. Bourgoing, a single condition, would satisfy us as well as all Europe. I venture to affirm it. . . . . "Let the French government shake off the yoke of the atrocious faction which tyrannizes over it; let it frankly return to the course marked out by the common law of nations. There are but two ways of acting:

"First. Since the past is beyond the reach of remedy, let us treat of the fate of the illustrious and unhappy prisoners immured in the prison of the Temple.

"Secondly. Revoke the decrees which sanction that disgraceful and subversive revolutionary crusade. Repress internal anarchy; and by the mutual accord of every government, let there be no

longer, under any pretext whatever, a war of *principles* or of *doctrines;* France being thenceforward at liberty to govern herself as she pleases, or as best she may. . . . . Am I asking too much?"

M. Bourgoing.—"Assuredly not. . . . . I could desire nothing better for the happiness of my country," (the worthy M. Bourgoing uttered these words with a sigh,) "nothing beyond what you have just proposed. Sooner or later we must come to that course; at least I hope so. . . . But I must now assure you, duke—and I do it with unfeigned regret, that no human persuasion could, at this moment, induce the adoption of proposals as just as they are honourable. No one will even have the courage to name them to those who now rule over France."

Duke de la Alcudia.—"You perceive, sir, that Spain is a true friend . . . . One word more: since you are so good a Frenchman—since you speak to me with such frankness. I must not be behindhand in sincerity.

"The king's government is still free to act . . . With respect to the war, it may abstain from taking an active part in it; it is at liberty to join, or not, the coalition which threatens France. There is in his Catholic Majesty's council a person well known to you, who always recommends, as likely to be assented to, an *armed neutrality* towards France and the coalition. . . . What would you

say, were Spain to propose such a measure, under the guarantee of a promise which has never been broken,—the promise of a king who has always given proofs of his friendship and good faith towards France?"

M. Bourgoing.—"I should reply, (these words were uttered with evident emotion,) that the French government will not listen to any other proposal than that of a *pure and simple neutrality*, with a disarming on both sides, such as I have represented in my former notes, and admitting of no other exception than the garrisons deemed requisite for the fortified towns along the frontiers. My formal and inflexible instructions leave me no kind of latitude on the subject. In the critical situation in which France is placed, her government cannot rest satisfied with a mere *promise*. If Spain does not instantly disarm, war will be declared."

Duke de la Alcudia.—"In that case Spain will have nothing to reproach herself with."

Thus ended our political conversation. We continued to converse as men of honour, who entertain a reciprocal esteem for each other; who agreed upon many points, but had nothing more to confer upon. M. Bourgoing demanded his passports. . . . On the 23rd of February, he took his departure for France.

CHAPTER X.

The Convention declares war against Spain.

THE French government did not wait for the last despatches of its chargé d'affaires at Madrid. War had already been resolved upon. Persuaded that Spain would not yield to haughty and unbecoming demands, it commenced hostilities. Our merchant-vessels were seized in the ports of France; letters of marque were indiscriminately issued against us. These were followed by the official declaration of war, which was published on the 7th of March, accompanied by a long report of the Committee of General Defence. Barère was the author of that singular document, drawn up in a style of hyperbolical bombast which ill disguised its utter want of argument, as may be seen by the subjoined specimen:

"The intrigues of the court of St. James's are all-powerful at Madrid, and the pope's nuncio is whetting the daggers of fanaticism in the dominions of the Catholic King." Barère thus concludes his threatening invective: "We are now called upon to act; let the Bourbons be hurled

from a usurped throne. Thanks to the support and the treasures which our ancestors have placed within our reach! we may introduce liberty into those splendid regions which are inhabited by the most magnanimous of European nations."[1]

The following are the grievances on which the declaration of war is made to rest.

"1. The Spanish government has never ceased, since the 14th July 1789, to insult the sovereignty of the French people, by affecting, in every diplomatic act, to give to Louis XVI. the title of monarch.

"2. By a decree of 20th July 1791, the King of Spain inflicts numberless vexations upon the French domiciled in his dominions, and compels them, moreover, to renounce their country."[2]

"3. During the revolt of the blacks in the

[1] Whosoever may have the curiosity to read the report of the Committee of General Defence, and the decree of the Convention, will find the one and the other in the Moniteur of 8th March 1793.

[2] This royal decree exclusively emanated from Count Florida Blanca. "*All foreigners, of whatever nation they may be, who should desire to reside in Spain, whether permanently or for a time, were compelled to make oath of professing the Catholic faith and of allegiance to the King of Spain; they were to renounce their character of strangers, as well as all intercourse, connexion, or relations with their native country; and bind themselves not to resort to the protection of their ambassadors, ministers, or consuls, under pain of the galleys, the presidencies, or absolute expulsion from the dominions of his Catholic Majesty, and confiscation of property, according to the quality of each person or the nature of the contravention.*" This

island of St. Domingo, the Spaniards aided the latter by supplying them with provisions and warlike ammunitions, and placing at their disposal several French refugees, whom the blacks immediately put to death.[3]

This measure was dictated by an excessive dread of the French revolution. Florida Blanca trembled at the bare mention of the Propaganda. There were in Spain thirteen thousand three hundred and thirty-two domiciled Frenchmen, and four thousand three hundred and thirty-five persons of that nation travelling, or temporarily established, in the country. In each of these the count beheld an agent of Jacobinism. The complaints of other cabinets, as well as that of France, against a measure as violent as it was impolitic, compelled our ministry to recall many parts of it; so much so, that ere a month had elapsed since the royal decree was issued, it was reduced to the taking of a pure and simple oath, and the renouncing all recourse to the ministers or agents of their nation: this was directed against travellers only, whose residence might the rather create mistrust, as it appeared to be without an object. The oath was moreover limited to a pledge that they would obey the laws of the country, and abstain from all foreign correspondence which might endanger the tranquillity of the country, or impugn the acts of government.

However disposed, therefore, the French government might be to take offence, the royal decree having undergone suitable modification, all ground of complaint respecting it was set aside; and it was absurd to hold up, two years afterwards, that decree as an offence, or as an act of hostility which could justify a declaration of war.

[3] The insurrection of St. Domingo was the fruit of French revolutionary principles. Nothing is more notorious than the fatal discord subsisting between the colonists themselves, the ferocity displayed by the people of colour, and the deplorable excesses which desolated that island. The Spanish portion, from its proximity to the insurgent part, incurred numberless dangers.

"4. The Spanish government recalled its ambassador after the 10th August 1792, and refused to acknowledge the provisional executive council.[4]

The government of His Catholic Majesty, so far from fanning the flame, employed every means to extinguish it. Its chief endeavours were directed to the object of averting the storm which thus threatened our possessions; but the revolted negroes of the French part of the island made frequent inroads beyond their limits, and with superior forces, such was their savage animosity in pursuit of the whites. The Spanish authorities threw the shield of their protection over a great number of fugitives who came to implore their assistance. Some were concealed in the interior of the country; to others were afforded the means of escaping on board ship; but many were unfortunately overtaken on our frontiers, to which they had fled for shelter from the blacks. Their rescue was impossible. . . . .

With respect to supplying their own enemies with provisions and ammunition, it will never be believed that they willingly did so. If the negroes received, or rather were allowed to take any, the reason is that there were no other means of getting rid of their presence. . . . . In the absence of real ground of complaint against us, the French government endeavours to find one in the very disturbances it had created, and which placed the existence of our own colonies in such imminent danger.

[4] That determination had, nevertheless, been taken by Count d'Aranda, who was then our first minister of state, and upon whom Barère, in his report in the name of the Committee of General Defence, bestowed the following encomium:

"This minister, taking experience and wisdom for his guides, had felt the necessity of a sincere alliance with France. Mistrusting the perfidious solicitations of England, he had replied to the belligerent powers, that, owing to the distance at which she was placed from those powers, Spain felt herself dispensed from taking any part in the great quarrel that had sprung up between France and them."

"5. After the Convention had been installed, the Spanish government ceased to keep up the usual intercourse between both nations, and refused to acknowledge the ambassador of the French republic.[5]

[5] In the state of anarchy into which France was thrown, and after the constant insults levelled from the French tribune at all crowned heads, it was assuredly natural for every monarch to refuse acknowledging a new and turbulent government, which, instead of offering the least guarantee, excited the liveliest apprehensions. Nevertheless, this alleged grievance is, like the preceding one, incorrectly represented. A proof of this will be found in M. Bourgoing's work, entitled, "Picture of Modern Spain," vol. iii. chapter x. pp. 195, 196, 197, second edition. "The Court of Spain had anticipated the storm which was gathering over the head of the unfortunate Louis XVI; and believing, or feigning to believe, in the sincerity of this prince's assurances, that court, in the hope of dispelling it, admitted me as his minister plenipotentiary in the month of May 1792. I must observe in this place, that the Spanish monarch and those about his person were inconsistent in their conduct towards me. In appearance, they freely and spontaneously acknowledged my public character; whilst, in the reception they gave me during four months, it was easy to perceive how repugnant was that acknowledgment to their principles. Whilst I was placed in this ambiguous position, the unexpected news of the events of the 10th August reached me at St. Ildefonso, on the eve of the day of St. Louis, the queen's patron saint. I still presented myself at court; this was an effort of courage, but it was the last. I deemed it the more incumbent upon me to keep away, as I was no longer recognised in the character of the king's representative after he had been declared to have forfeited the crown. This circumstance did not prevent my seeing M. d'Aranda, and his successor, the Duke d'Alcudia, as often as the interests of my country required it.

"Notwithstanding the pacific intentions of which I was directed to convey every assurance to the new French govern-

"6. Instead of aiding France with the quota of troops stipulated by the treaty of alliance, Spain raised armaments by land and sea without any other object than that of combating France, and of joining the powers in league against her.[6]

ment, Spain was making preparations which appeared to indicate views of hostility. I kept watch over her movements, and more than once called for an explanation of them. The Spanisb minister appeared astonished that a foreign government should interfere with his measures of internal policy. But *as he was still anxious to maintain peace, and as he more especially entertained hopes of saving Louis XVI, he was about to pledge himself to a course of neutrality* by a formal act. This act was accordingly drawn up in my presence, and sent to Paris," &c.

M. Bourgoing's testimony completely refutes the two imputations I have just quoted.

[6] The report of the Committee of General Defence often dwells upon the ingratitude of Spain, at whose demand France had prepared a naval armament in 1790, to assist her in the war on the point of breaking out between Spain and England respecting the English settlements of Nootka Sound. This was really the case: obstinately bent on asserting the right of Spain over the whole south-west coast of North America as far as the pole, Count Florida Blanca had involved himself in this discussion by acts of hostility which caused a misunderstanding between the two powers.

In this emergency, the count overlooked his avowed antipathy for the innovations recently introduced in the French monarchy, and did not scruple to claim the assistance of France in virtue of the family compact. Louis XVI. gave his immediate assent. The case was laid before the constituent assembly, and it was admitted as a principle that all pre-existing engagements should be respected by the French nation; France reserving to herself the right of investigating the treaties more in detail when the time should come for regulating her external policy, and it being well understood that she would thenceforward recognise no stipulations but what were purely of a de-

"7. The naval armament of Spain was represented as arising from the apprehension enter-

fensive or of a commercial nature. "With regard to Spain, the King of the French would be solicited to treat and negotiate with his Catholic Majesty, through the medium of his ambassador, on all points calculated to draw closer the bonds of friendship subsisting between the two nations, and to favour their common interests." The penetration of Count Florida Blanca failed to comprehend that, after the step he had just taken, the *family compact* ceased to be a *dynastic treaty*, and assumed the character of a *national* one, thereby laying the foundations of a general alliance with France and her government. Neither did he foresee that such alliance might be attended with serious objections, owing to the rapid and monstrous changes which the French revolution would undergo in its progress; nevertheless, the war in which he was involving himself against England, and for which he was contracting such serious engagements with France, had no other object than the insignificant consideration of a petty trade in furs . . . . . Be this as it may, the French government furnished, at first, its quota of twelve sail of the line and six frigates, conformably to the fifth article of the *family compact*. This assistance proved unnecessary. An accommodation took place, by which the English were allowed to establish themselves on the American coast from Cape Mendoza to Nootka Sound. The republic had, however, no ground of complaint against us. First. The alliance founded upon the *family compact* was acknowledged by the constituent assembly, without losing altogether its *dynastic* character; but the head of the house of Bourbon having been dethroned to make way for the republic, Spain was still required to renew a treaty the chief condition of which was already set aside. Secondly. Under whatever aspect the question could be considered, the French government had neither directly nor indirectly, nor in any manner whatever, claimed the assistance of Spain after the 10th of August, when Austria and Prussia invaded its territory. . . . . The very nature of the armament which Spain was preparing at the period in question,

tained of England, whereas Spain was then negotiating with that power.[7]

"8. Spain was sending troops to the frontiers of France.[8]

"9. Spain granted protection and assistance to the emigrants.[9]

sufficiently manifested that no attack was contemplated, and that such armament was barely sufficient to place her in a defensive attitude in the event of a possible aggression on the part of France.

7 This armament had commenced in 1790. Count Florida Blanca was then minister: and on the occasion of the misunderstandings which arose between England and Spain, it had not yet been wholly laid aside; it afterwards assumed a greater degree of activity in order to keep up, according to the dictates of common prudence, a force adequate to meet any future contingency, or to protect our commerce and our colonies under any possible event.

The negotiations and the treaty with England did not take place until three months after the declaration of war against us.

This treaty, which was concluded with some degree of precipitancy, was only sanctioned on the 25th of May 1793. France ought, moreover, to have seen that, ever ready to exert its mediation with the other powers in case its intervention on behalf of Louis XVI. and of the royal family had met with favourable attention, the Spanish government was bound to assume such an attitude as would enable it to give suitable effect to its pacific proposals to the Northern powers, which were on the eve of embarking in a general war.

8 This was not a measure of hostility, but a proper precaution, from the proximity of Spain to a country a prey to anarchy, which had already attempted to disturb the tranquillity of neighbouring states and threatened all established governments.

9 In so doing, Spain had only adhered to the laws of hospitality, which were respected by all civilized nations, and were

"10. She continued to arm; large forces and a numerous artillery were moving towards the frontier.[10]

"11. The King of Spain openly manifested his adhesion to Louis XVI, and the intention of supporting him.[11]

"12. On learning the execution of Louis XVI, the King of Spain insulted the republic by suspending all communication with the French ambassador.[12]

specially consistent with the Spanish character such as it is recorded in history. France, however, was well aware of the pains taken to remove the emigrants from the frontier adjoining her territory. Those who were in a condition to bear arms were only employed in the Spanish service after the Convention had declared war against Spain.

[10] France was adopting similar measures; as a proof of which, her own proposals adverted to a reciprocal disarming. What other course was left to Spain after the publication of the decrees of 19th November and 15th December 1792? after the insults heaped upon her by the Convention in her sittings of 28th December of the same year, and of the 4th and 18th January 1793?

[11] That such imputations should have been charged against Spain would scarcely be credited were they not found at full length in the Moniteur of 8th February, and in the other newspapers of the period (1793). It can only be concluded, after their perusal, that the French government was under the influence of a frantic delirium.

[12] When resting its declaration of war on a grievance of this nature, the French Convention doubtless imagined that all other governments were divested of every feeling of justice, of honour, and of humanity. Such, in fact, appeared to be the opinion formed of all cabinets by these revolutionists. . . . . Let

"13. The Spanish government refused to receive the two official notes of the provisional executive council, despatched on the 4th of January in reply to the note presented by Spain on the 17th December preceding, and consequently rejected the proposal of a strict neutrality coupled with the act of disarming.[13]

"14. The extraordinary intimacy subsisting between the cabinets of Spain and of St. James's was self-evident, although the French republic had formally declared war against England.[14]

us once more, in proof of it, listen to the language of the same Barère, when, amidst the applauses of his colleagues and of the galleries of the assembly, he adverted, on the 4th of January, to our mediation in favour of Louis XVI.

"You are told that the King of Spain urges his request on the grounds of relationship, and that it may, on due reflection, be the means of bringing about a peace; as if the ties of blood could ever be considered by those who wear a crown; as if kings had relations; as if considerations of relationship between crowned heads had ever averted war from any nation," &c. &c.

[13] Without reverting to M. Bourgoing's positive declaration, in his last conference with me, respecting the impossibility of procuring the consent of the republic to an armed neutrality, or adding any superfluous explanations, those which I have already given respecting the pretended offences on our part, will be deemed sufficient to refute this charge. What will M. Thiers now say? What will be said by so many others who have blamed the Spanish government for not confining itself within the limits of an *armed neutrality* towards France?

[14] This grievance is undeserving of refutation. It is not founded on any fact offensive to the French nation. Was it, then, incumbent upon Spain to break off all intercourse with governments at war with the new republic?

"15. The King of Spain allowed the clergy to attack from the pulpit the principles which France had adopted.[15]

"16. The Spanish government suffered the French to be insulted by the people.[16]

"17. Lastly, these offences were real acts of hostility against France, and of coalition with the Northern powers. These acts, taken together, were tantamount to a declaration of war."

I have perhaps laid too much stress upon this decree of the French Convention. But it was incumbent upon me to examine all its articles, in order to prove beyond a doubt that the war was determined upon, provoked, and commenced by the then rulers of France; that it was absolutely compulsory upon Spain to meet a warlike declaration by war; that it was on our part a question of honour, of self-preservation, of personal safety, and not the caprice of a young minister or a party question, still less, the result of any foreign influence.

[15] It is really unaccountable that this grievance should be brought forward by the French Convention, when its members gave daily utterance to the most subversive doctrines, the most violent animadversions, the most furious attacks against all crowned heads. . . . But I have copied the text of the declaration of war.

[16] All Frenchmen then residing in Spain were witnesses to and appreciated the extraordinary measures adopted by the government to protect them from the effects of popular excitement. Wherever any violent commotions took place, they were repressed by the strong arm of power.

CHAPTER XI.

Spanish counter-declaration of war against France.—Public opinion in favour of war.

THE declaration of war against Spain was a tissue of impostures, of frivolous or perfidious pretences. To that provocation his Catholic Majesty opposed the veracity of facts, the power of sound reasoning, well-founded complaints, and the language of moderation. The Spanish manifesto is written with the candour of conviction: it displays the unoffending policy, the enlightened mind of Charles IV, his uprightness and sincerity; for that noble document, worthy of a record in the pages of history, is the production of the monarch himself. The ideas, and the mode of expressing them, are all his own; I unhesitatingly affirm it. Its text is as follows:

"Amongst other important objects which claim my attention since I have ascended the throne, my endeavours have been chiefly directed to the maintenance, as far as it laid in my power, of the peace of Europe. By thus contributing to the welfare of mankind, I have given to my faithful and beloved subjects a special proof of

the paternal watchfulness with which I attend to their happiness,—the object of my most ardent wishes, and to which they are as much entitled by their loyalty as by the generosity of their character.

"The moderation of my conduct towards France ever since that country has displayed principles of disorder, anarchy, and irreligion,—the sources of so many troubles and misfortunes, is so notorious that it were superfluous to give any fresh proofs of it; I shall therefore merely allude to what has taken place of late months, without recalling the frightful and numberless catastrophes, the recollection of which I desire to dismiss from my thoughts, and from the minds of my beloved subjects. I must allude, however, to the most atrocious of all, the mention of which is indispensable in this place.

"I was more particularly exerting my endeavours to bring France to a rational system which should give limits to her restless ambition, to avoid a general war in Europe, and to procure the liberty at least of the Most Christian King Louis XVI, and of his august family, captives with him in a prison, and daily exposed, like him, to fresh dangers. With a view to attain a result so calculated to produce a general peace, so much in accordance with the laws of humanity, so loudly called for by the ties of consanguinity and the honour of the crown, I yielded to the repeated

demands of the French ministry, and addressed two notes to them which stipulated for neutrality, and for the retreat of the troops of both nations stationed along the respective frontiers.

"Whilst this concession afforded a probability that my double proposal would be accepted, the question of the withdrawal of the troops was modified by the French ministry. They were desirous of keeping up a part of their army in the vicinity of Bayonne, under the specious pretext of an apprehended invasion from England, but in reality to employ them in such manner as to France might seem most convenient; so that by maintaining a formidable force in our neighbourhood, a heavy burden was imposed upon us, owing to the necessity of keeping up, on our side, a force sufficient to protect us against any eventual insults from an ill-disciplined and restless soldiery.

"The French ministry also affected to speak in each line of their communication in the name of the *French republic*, in order to lead us in this manner into an acknowledgment of it by implication, as well as by the fact of our admitting its diplomatic correspondence.

"I had ordered, on my part, that, in transmitting to Paris the two last notes I had dictated, the most effectual and conciliatory means should be exerted on behalf of Louis XVI. and his unfortunate family.

"If I was unwilling to require beforehand a mitigation of the fate of that monarch as a positive condition of the neutrality, this forbearance had for object to avoid injuring the success of a cause in which I took so deep an interest. I was well convinced, however, that, unless they displayed the most consummate bad faith, the French ministry could not help acknowledging that my request and interference, offered in so urgent a manner, at the very moment of the presentation of the notes, were so intimately connected with them, that the conditions of neutrality and of disarming could never be entertained without coupling with them the acceptance of the mediation. . . . My abstaining from a previous declaration to that effect was merely owing to a feeling of delicacy, and in order that the French ministry might meet from the parties which then agitated France, and still disturb her repose, less opposition to their endeavours in the accomplishment of the good work which I gave them credit for desiring to bring about.

"Their bad faith soon became manifest, when, refusing to attend to the request and mediation of the sovereign of a powerful and generous nation, they dwelt exclusively upon the point of our admitting their notes thus qualified; and each fresh entreaty on our part was answered by a threat of the immediate recall of the French chargé d'affaires at our court.

"Pending this stormy and often insulting discussion, they were perpetrating in Paris the cruel and unheard-of murder of a sovereign; and at the time when I was, along with the whole Spanish nation, a prey to grief and indignation, the French ministry obstinately insisted upon treating with me, assuredly not with any hope of my compliance, but in order to level a fresh insult at me and at my people; for they felt that, under such circumstances any demand on their part was no other than an act of bitter derision which a sense of our own dignity would forbid us to tolerate.

"The chargé d'affaires of the republic insisted on his passports; they were given to him. . . . At that moment a French vessel seized a Spanish one on the coast of Catalonia; I immediately ordered the officer in command to resort to reprisals. Intelligence was brought in regular succession that other captures had been made, and that at Marseilles, and in several other ports of France, an embargo had been laid on Spanish shipping. At last war was declared against us on the 7th of this month, though it had been actually waged without any such declaration, ever since the 25th of the preceding month; for such is the date of the letters of marque issued against our ships of war and trading vessels, as is proved by the papers found on board the French privateer the Renard, Captain J. B. Lalanne, when it was recaptured by our

brig the Ligero, under the orders of Lieutenant Don Juan de Dios Topete, along with a Spanish vessel, laden with powder, of which the privateer had taken possession.

"In consequence of these provocations, and of the hostilities thus commenced by France without any declaration of war, I have given the necessary orders for checking and repelling the enemy, and falling upon him by land or sea, wherever he may be found. I have also determined, and I ordain, that war against France, her possessions and her inhabitants, be made public in this capital, and that throughout my dominions the requisite measures of defence be adopted for the protection of my subjects and the annoyance of the enemy. . . . Let this decree be well understood in the council, who shall carry it into effect as far as concerns them.

"Aranjuez, the 21st of March 1793."

"To the Count de la Cañada."

In this manifesto, conveying in unostentatious and unrevengeful language the expression of deep sorrow, the King of Spain resents and deplores far less a personal offence, than he regrets the ill success of his efforts to save Europe from the evils he had foreseen: those efforts were not confined to mere professions; their sincerity is attested by his generous proceedings and by the conduct he actually pursued. They were calculated to soften the most envenomed hearts,

had it not been for the fatal influence of the men who ruled over the Convention. This manifesto, and the facts I have previously adverted to, will, if calmly considered, evince, I repeat it, that neither blind fanaticism nor aristocratic egotism, any more than the urgent entreaties of French emigrants or the suggestions of foreign cabinets, drove us into the war. Insult and aggression did not emanate from Spain. We accepted, but we had not provoked the war. In thus accepting, and in courageously sustaining it, we were influenced by no other than a sense of national honour and independence,—those vivifying and conservative passions, without which nations would be disgraced by an enemy who should insult and wound them with impunity! Our country was threatened in her religious opinions, in her political laws, in her peaceful habits.

Accordingly, she did not display on this occasion a silent loyalty, reluctantly submitting to the sacrifices imposed, as in the five years' war, by a capricious ministry.[1] In 1793, the public voice was unanimous in calling for war against France; nor did it vent itself in mere clamour. The nation was not satisfied with urging on the war; each one placed his property at the dis-

[1] The war waged by Spain and France against England, under the administration of Count Florida Blanca, respecting the American question.

posal of the state,—the nobleman tendered his wealth, the poor man his pittance.[2]

Spain never displayed, at any time, a more unanimous or determined will. The patriotic donations of France in defence of liberty, in 1789

[2] Enthusiasm displayed itself in the very lowest classes of society. The patriotic gifts lavished for upwards of two years, exhibit an example without its parallel in the history of modern nations. The official gazettes, in which the donations were recorded, presented the names of common workmen, of obscure artisans, of lonely women, of poor people supported by public charity. The indigent blind of Madrid and of other large towns, where their only resource is derived from the popular songs and wailings which they hawk about in the streets—bards of a novel character, not content with gratuitously hawking about the war against France, they would also loosen their purse-strings, and contribute out of their poor but honest earnings. Some of them made donations at which the rich man's pride would not have blushed: humble manufacturers, who had no ready money to bestow, supplied goods and the product of their trade or labour: those who possessed nothing solicited to be enlisted as common soldiers. The municipalities of the kingdom, which, being for the most part elective, correctly represented public opinion, rivalled one another in activity and devotedness to their country's cause: they raised extraordinary means for equipping and arming the volunteers of their respective districts. Many persons tendered their property and their personal services; widows consented to part with their children. A single fact will suffice to illustrate the public feeling. The enthusiasm or instinct of national preservation were at such a height that the government had no occasion to resort to the ordinary method of drawing for the militia or of recruiting for the service. The army was placed upon a war footing by the surprising influx of Spaniards of all classes, who, of their own free will, hurried forward to fill its ranks.

and 1790, did not amount to a tenth part of the donations made in Spain for the support of the throne and of the independence of the country. This liberality was ascribed by superficial observers to the exclusive influence of priests and monks. There is no doubt that the religious spirit of our clergy, alarmed at seeing their altars in danger, had its share in this splendid manifestation of the public feeling; but there existed in Spain a sentiment even more energetic than the spirit of religion—this was the sense of nationality, of the ancient, the immemorial honour of a mighty people, the declared enemy of every institution, of every control, nay, of every benefit, which foreigners might attempt to impose upon it. If some few were found to envy in secret the new political principles of France, not one, I affirm it, would have consented to receive them as a gift from the conventional proconsuls. . . . . High-minded, heroic nation! a nation worthy of the happiness of which her destiny has so long been sparing towards her!

CHAPTER XII.

Perfidious and absurd imputation refuted.

M. ANDRÉ MURIEL, a Spanish refugee priest residing in Paris since 1813, published in that city, in 1827, a French translation of the English work entitled *Spain under the Kings of the House of Bourbon*, from the accession of Philip V. in 1700, to the death of Charles III. in 1788, &c.

The translation is accompanied by notes and supplements added to the text of Mr. Coxe's work, which terminated with the close of the reign of Charles III. Proceeding from that point of time, M. Muriel makes an attack against the government of Charles IV. He was quite at liberty to write and to qualify the events of the latter reign, by way of commenting upon, and of continuing Mr. Coxe's history; but his only object has been to gratify a feeling of resentment against myself. Instead of relating positive facts, of a nature which entitles them to be correctly described, he indulges in accusations founded on conjecture; he hastens beforehand, of his own authority, and upon mere supposition, to pass judgment upon a monarch,

and upon a period of events of which history has not yet supplied the records. Some angry voices have no doubt been heard, some obscure calumniators have attempted to asperse the memory and the reign of Charles IV. This grave subject has not, however, up to the present time, been discussed by a calm and conscientious writer; by him who weighs men and events; who takes into account the times, the intentions, the very chances. The subject, in a word, has not yet found its proper historian.

To lower the character, to contest the personal merit of any one, without possessing or exhibiting proofs of an assertion, is tantamount to an act of defamation. But if to such defamation, which can only be an itching for slander, be fearlessly added imposture in holding up as positive and notorious certain alleged facts which have no existence, or in wilfully suppressing others the knowledge of which would demonstrate the truth in its proper light, what else is it but actual calumny?

It has already been seen upon what clear and authentic data I have established the statement of my conduct during the four first months of my elevation to the ministry, from the 15th November 1792 to the 28th March 1793, the date of the published declaration of war against France: my readers have the means of estimating the value of the insinuations of the pretended historian who

places me under the necessity of refuting him. If he has deemed himself at liberty to insult me with impunity because I had the appearance of being dead, and the dead cannot take their own part,—well then! he who was supposed to be no longer of this world claims to speak in his turn, and summons all those compilers of falsehoods before the tribunal of public opinion. . . . . I meet them with facts and dates,—testimonies they cannot pretend to reject. The only difficulty of my task proceeds from the necessity of classifying and refuting, one by one, imputations as vague as they are false and insidious, since they present events through a distorted medium, purposely confound dates, and heap calumny upon calumny. My defence will be methodical and unreserved.

At the close of the ninth additional chapter of the sixth and last volume of his translation, under the title of *Conclusion of the Work* (p. 249), M. André Muriel presents, in the form of an epilogue, a short review of the occurrences of the epoch under the reign of the Bourbons to the end of 1788,—year of the demise of Charles III.

After pointing out the crisis which threatened Spain, owing to the contagious anarchy which convulsed France, he speaks as follows:

"It forms no part of our subject to determine in what degree the reign of a weak prince like Charles IV, and the inexperience of a favourite to whom he confided the management of state

affairs, have influenced the course and progress of the French revolution, and, as a necessary consequence, the destinies of Europe."

He proceeds to add:

"It is reasonable, however, to suppose, that, if death had not summoned away Charles III. at the commencement of the French revolution, a prince attached as he was to his family, with the ascendency which his age, his experience, and especially the firmness of his character could not fail to command, would have proved himself of the greatest service to the French monarch under the difficulty of his position, by his advice, by the steps he would have adopted, or the assistance he would have procured him at a seasonable moment."

Both the above passages are literally extracted from the work: those who are unacquainted with the particulars of the contemporary history of our country will place faith in such malevolent insinuations, and believe that the government of Charles IV, when it was confided to my charge, might have directed at will the course of the French revolution; but that it favoured, on the contrary, its progress, and basely contributed to the evils which it entailed upon Europe. They will also believe that Charles IV. did absolutely nothing to save the unfortunate Louis XVI. . . . Assuredly my bitterest enemies, those most eager to injure me, have not, in this instance, gone to such lengths as Father Muriel.

To ascribe to my ministerial policy such an influence over the French revolution and the evils of Europe, is an imputation so singular, of so novel a character, that no one had yet uttered or probably harboured the idea. Is this nothing more than an absolute ignorance of facts, or is it sheer bad faith and a monomania for slander? For how are we otherwise to account for such cruel levity in a matter of so delicate a nature? but this sainted man could not but be aware that the minister, Count Florida Blanca, on whom he lavishes such encomiums, was the exclusive director of the policy of Charles III. during a period of twelve years, until the death of that prince; that he likewise exclusively directed the policy of Charles IV. in 1789, 1790, 1791, and a part of 1792, until the close of February, when he was replaced by Count d'Aranda. There was an interval of four years from the convocation in France of the States General until my assuming the direction of the Spanish cabinet, on the 15th November 1792. . . . . The French revolution dates, at least, from the month of February 1787, epoch of the first opening of the Assembly of the Notables. From that moment the revolution moved in an onward course, and grew more powerful in its progress; it took a decided turn in 1789, and precipitately hurried forward to its object in the subsequent years. . . . . .

When Charles IV. called me to the ministry in November 1792, the work was accomplished

and consummated. Louis XVI. had been dethroned and imprisoned; royalty had been abolished and the republic installed; the Jacobins had reached the highest degree of enthusiasm; a frightful anarchy was organized with a character more appalling than it ever had assumed. How can this man, who ventures in a doctoral tone to pronounce upon the events of that epoch, dare to render me responsible for what has been done or what has remained undone, and ascribe to me a decisive, all-powerful influence over the course and progress of the French revolution, when, politically speaking, I was not yet in existence,—when I was so far from having the slightest share in the government of the kingdom? Strange complication of ignorance and calumny! Was Muriel, then, so utterly unacquainted with what I did on the very first day of my entering the ministry?

Placed as I am under the painful necessity of often repeating myself, I claim the indulgence of my readers.

All that remained for the French revolution to accomplish, was the perpetration of one more act of atrocity ere it plunged headlong into a career of which it could not foresee the bounds; this was the crime of regicide, and everything was in readiness for committing it. I endeavoured to arrest the deed; disdaining the ordinary rules of diplomacy, I laid aside the lofty tone of official

language. The critical situation of France and of Europe, the imminent danger impending over the victim devoted to destruction, authorised my adopting an extraordinary course. Entreaties, money, solicitations suited to every emergency, burdensome engagements, whatever was calculated to bring about the desired result, every possible means were exerted on the occasion. I evinced neither lukewarmness nor the slightest hesitation; I beseeched other cabinets to join their efforts with mine, sought friends and support in all directions, and have assuredly not to reproach myself with having remained for an hour, for a single minute, inactive, from the moment the administration was confided to my care. Whose was the fault?—assuredly not mine, if these efforts came too late!

Let us even suppose that my efforts had been crowned with success: the French revolution would only have produced a change of government—a painful transition, doubtless to be deplored, but of frequent occurrence in the history of every country; for, had our mediation been accepted, the main danger, that of an armed intervention, which raised the passions of the people to their greatest height, would have wholly disappeared. France, grown more calm, would probably have listened to the counsels of moderation. Impressed with the advantages of peace, having no longer the dangers of the

moment to apprehend, the powers of Europe would have been less bent upon their warlike system. How many examples of a similar political compliance have not been witnessed by men younger than myself? It needed no long study of the practical policy of courts to consider the question in this light. Louis XVI. once rescued from death, there was everything to hope, after some lapse of time, from the national habits of Frenchmen, from the very excess of republican violence: they could not fail to be soon weary of popular tyranny. The moderate, well-intentioned, and conciliating conduct of other powers would have hastened the return of France to monarchical ideas. Left to her own direction, and at liberty to choose, France would sooner or later have bethought herself to recall the ancient dynasty of her kings.

Such were my sentiments, such my expectations. Oh! who would have then prognosticated to me that at a future day any one would have dared to accuse me of having encouraged and fomented the progress of the French revolution!

Let us now attend to this writer,[1] who, in order to depreciate Charles IV, alleges, upon his wonted ground of conjectures, what the father would have done in the place of his son, had not Providence called him away a few years before.

[1] *Escrividor*, says the manuscript—meaning a scribbler.—E.

Charles III. lived long enough to witness and appreciate the spirit of innovation, the deep-rooted restlessness, which were fermenting in France. The wavering conduct, the errors of the ministry of Louis XVI, the open struggle between the parliaments and the court, the inadequacy of the remedies applied to daily increasing dangers—were not these the manifest forebodings of a portentous revolution on the point of breaking out in a kingdom with which Spain was so closely connected?

Nevertheless it has never, to my knowledge at least, been asserted that the Spanish monarch had endeavoured, at the approach of this imminent danger, to exercise an effectual influence over the counsels of France, or to avail himself of his ascendency over the other cabinets of Europe with a view to avert in time the storm which impended over all. Seized with apprehension, dejected, sharing the pusillanimous hesitation of his prime minister, Charles III. suddenly suspended the useful reforms to which he had applied himself; he exclusively confined his attention to a gloomy and rigorous superintendence over his own dominions. Florida Blanca, who knew not how to govern except by ministerial *absolutism*, was distrustful of every one. Insulating himself from all, he forbade every foreign communication; the supreme authority wrapped itself up in impenetrable mystery in order to crush the very semblance of discussion; he consummated the de-

struction of the council of state, and made the whole administration centre in his own person. The other secretaries of state, whatever might be their department, were bound to meet in general deliberation, which he insisted upon presiding in person; a measure very well calculated, no doubt, for establishing a unity of operations, but the chief object of which was to place everything under his exclusive and absolute direction.[2] His loyalty was never called in question; his intentions were doubtless pure, but he committed a signal error. Divested of the aid he might have derived from a more unfettered discussion in the *council of our statesmen*, he had to contend alone against every difficulty. Irresolute, perplexed, weak under circumstances calling for energy, this diplomatist,

[2] This measure, sanctioned by a royal decree of 8th July 1787, virtually created a *council of ministers*, hitherto unknown in Spain. Count Florida Blanca named it the *Supreme State Junta*; a title well adapted to palliate in some degree the removal of the old *council of state*, the functions of which appeared to him, at that time, of a dangerous tendency. An absolute power was thus centred in the ministerial body, which was already subordinate to the directing minister, who exercised every control over it. When Charles IV. became sensible of the disadvantages of that organization, he immediately restored the old council of state on a broad and solid basis; all the ministers were to be members of this council, and to take part in its deliberations.—(Royal Decree of 28th February 1792.) Ever since 1787 no personal responsibility, in regard to the policy of Spain, had rested upon any other minister than Count Florida Blanca.

who had distinguished himself by the suppleness and resources of his mind when representing Spain at the court of Rome, always dreaded to act, and failed to accomplish anything in a more elevated sphere. The convocation of the States General of France came upon him by surprise whilst in this state of moral languor.

Charles III, when at the point of death, had recommended this minister as a *protecting angel* in the critical condition in which was placed the mighty kingdom our neighbour. Charles IV. accordingly accepted Florida Blanca at his father's hands, and gave him his implicit confidence. Can it then be deemed an act of weakness on the part of a son, who has just ascended the throne, that he should adopt the advice of his father, and rely upon the experience and talents of a minister imposed in some measure upon him as if by hereditary transfer?

Florida Blanca continued to pursue, under the new reign, a policy characterised by the same features; for it was timid, irresolute, expectant,—often contradictory, always equivocal and mysterious.

For the rest, the manifest strides of the French revolution did not prevent his treating with it in virtue of the family compact. He demanded, in 1790, the assistance stipulated in that compact, on the occasion of the war on the point of breaking out between Spain and England. Had it not been for the reconciliation, which opportunely occur-

red to suspend hostilities, a war so imprudently undertaken would have involved us in the struggle which France had to maintain against the principal powers of Europe. Charles IV. was forewarned in a private conversation with the British ambassador. His majesty repaired the error of his minister, and ordered forthwith an amicable settlement of the disputed point. Nevertheless, Count Florida Blanca had revived the family compact. No subsequent measure bore any infringement upon it; on the contrary, so long as the ordinary communication was kept up between the two courts, they viewed and treated each other as being mutually allied.

Neither did these occurrences prevent Count Florida Blanca from lending a willing ear to the Emperor Leopold's proposals. It was a question of a joint understanding on the subject of the armed *intervention* in the affairs of France. Would to Heaven that the views of this illustrious prince had been frankly adopted by the other powers, according to the terms which he suggested with apparent earnestness of purpose! The object of those views, in fact, their ostensible object at least, —and I can have no doubt of Leopold's sincerity,— was not to startle France by exorbitant pretensions, but to agree to the principles of reform which were rendered indispensable by the situation and wants of that kingdom; to require no more of her than a proper respect for the dignity

of a monarchical government, and a check upon those reckless writers who disturbed the tranquillity of nations: this species of intervention, urged Leopold, was in reality the offer of an alliance with the immense majority of Frenchmen, a majority openly pronounced in favour of a temperate monarchy; and it was the most effectual means of supporting it against the factious minority who perverted the public mind, and aimed at establishing a democracy. In accordance with this plan, the Empire, Austria, Prussia, the Swiss Cantons, Sardinia, and Spain, powers alike interested by their geographical position in the maintenance of social order in France, were to assume a strong but pacific attitude towards her; to determine upon a congress, to which France should be invited, when her right to regulate her own internal government should be acknowledged, and the common rights and reciprocal interests of all the powers should be likewise fixed and assented to. No appeal was to be made to arms, except in the event of France obstinately refusing her concurrence in such reasonable measures.

Had this project been adopted ere the government had fallen into the hands of the democratic faction; had it been carried into effect with good faith and unity of purpose, without regard for individual interests or exaggerated pretensions,—the French revolution might have taken a happy turn.

Unfortunately, however, the cabinets were not agreed respecting the conditions; the majority would compel France to restore an *unrestricted* monarchical authority, and would force the revolution to retrograde to the 20th of June 1789; a pretension which may have been useful and just in itself, but was wholly unattainable in the then state of the public mind. Such was, nevertheless, the condition which Florida Blanca required for the adhesion of Spain, in concert with Prussia, Sardinia, and especially Russia, on which he placed his greatest reliance. He had little experience of the character of the Empress Catherine, who fanned the flame of the coalition, though she had nothing less at heart than to afford it any effectual support.

There was no less misunderstanding as to the time and mode of carrying their views into effect. Those who desired to re-impose the yoke upon France were in no hurry to act: they hoped that the progress of anarchy and the revolutionary excesses would lay the country open to invasion, and render its projected dismembering an easy task. With respect to Spain in particular, Count Florida Blanca had but faint hopes of a good understanding with the other cabinets: whether he felt displeased at Leopold's sentiments; dreaded that by taking the lead, he might be left to engage single-handed in a disproportioned struggle; or that he preferred keeping back, and watching the

movements of other powers,—he wholly neglected to place Spain in an attitude suited to the emergency; he omitted to form any friendly alliance, and had not the common prudence to dissemble his violent hatred against France.

Amidst this irresolution and uncertainty, the most favourable opportunities for applying political remedies were allowed to slip away, if any did really exist which could arrest the revolutionary disease. The acceptation by Louis XVI. of the constitutional act, a general amnesty, the decree of restraint issued against the *clubs*, followed in succession; and Leopold paused in his warlike movements. He "proposed to the coalesced powers to suspend carrying their respective engagements into effect, without prejudice to their afterwards pursuing them if fresh disorders should break out, and France should transgress the limits within which she appeared disposed to confine herself for the future."

It was during this interval of lucid reasoning that the Emperor Leopold consented to re-admit M. de Noailles in the character of ambassador from Louis XVI, and was the first of all European sovereigns who allowed the tri-coloured flag to wave unmolested in his harbours.

The official demonstrations and replies of other princes, when Louis XVI. announced to them that he had accepted the constitution, bore a less peaceful aspect. None of the replies, however,

were of a repulsive nature, except those of Spain, Sweden, and Russia. Ever yielding to the suggestions of the latter, the Spanish minister declared that the Catholic King would pause until positive proofs were afforded that the King of France was in the enjoyment of his full liberty; and that, so long as he was not convinced of the monarch's having freely accepted the constitution, he, the King of Spain, would decline replying to every despatch transmitted to him in the name of the King of the French.

Loud were the complaints beyond the Pyrenees when this declaration became known. Florida Blanca disguised from Charles IV. the more moderate course of proceeding recently adopted by the Emperor Leopold. The first intelligence the king obtained of it was from the minister plenipotentiary of the court of Austria. At the same time, M. d'Urtubize, the chargé d'affaires of France, succeeded in procuring a private audience of his majesty. At this interview, M. d'Urtubize depicted in the strongest colours the dangers to which such conduct exposed Louis XVI, and the hostility or cruel indifference evinced by certain cabinets. "The factions which have vowed hatred to the throne only await a pretext on the part of foreign monarchs. They discover it in those hostile manifestations against the system of constitutional monarchy which France has chosen for herself. The existence of that monarchy, in its

present state, depends on the support which may be afforded to Louis XVI. by the friendship of monarchical cabinets, and especially of the Spanish king and of the other branches of his dynasty, allied to him by virtue of the *family compact.* The exasperation of the public mind on the one hand, the instigations of the promoters of democracy on the other, cannot fail to call in question the duty of obedience to Louis XVI. He will be held up as guilty of duplicity, and of conniving with the emigrants and with the dissenting cabinets. If the King of the French is thus attacked, if he should succumb, the monarchy will die with him."

Charles IV. found himself unsupported; bereft of any other council than the *supreme junta,* consisting, as I have observed, of none but the ministers secretaries of state, and rarely venturing upon the incidental discussion of our foreign policy. The king determined to look for information without resorting to his prime minister. He sought the advice of those he deemed worthy of his confidence. M. d'Aranda was one of the persons consulted. With his wonted boldness of character he stigmatised the conduct of Count Florida Blanca as bearing the impress of folly and temerity: the latter could not boast of many friends; the higher nobility felt themselves humbled by him, and ardently longed for his downfall; the chief public functionaries, reduced to a species of nonentity in all that concerned state matters, shared the dis-

content of the nobility. The clergy were not better disposed towards him. All the information which the king was enabled to obtain proved unfavourable to the minister. Such were the motives of his disgrace.

Charles IV, who entertained much esteem for Florida Blanca, and had long granted him his confidence, was compelled to yield to the paramount interest of protecting the head of the house of Bourbon from danger: this consideration appeared to have been compromised or neglected through the policy of Florida Blanca; the king resolved to pursue a different course; Count d'Aranda was appointed, *ad interim*, prime minister; his name was popular in France; his appointment might prove extremely serviceable to Louis XVI, who stood in great need of all the support that Spain could afford him.

I have already detailed the subsequent events from that period until war was declared.

It only remains for me to inquire of M. Muriel how, and in what manner, the conduct of Charles IV, and mine in particular, when I was raised to the ministry, could have exercised any influence over the French revolution. I shall yet have occasion to put a few questions to him on the subject in the course of these Memoirs.

CHAPTER XIII.

Preliminary Observations respecting the War with the French Republic.

PROTRACTED wars of more recent occurrence, a state of interminable confusion, the obstinate struggle of principles at variance with each other, of private interests and of every species of ambition,—all having their rise in the French revolution, have obscured and nearly obliterated the part taken by Spain in the coalition of European powers. Nevertheless, our campaigns of 93, 94, and 95, are singularly entitled to remembrance.

Victory had declared in every quarter in favour of France. Fortune had betrayed the efforts of all who ventured to compete with the rising republic, ... whilst Spain added fresh gems to her ancient military crown, and shone, not only in successful combats, but in the display of unbending firmness: she beheld the despondency of her allies without yielding to dismay.

The faithful portraiture of the reign of Charles IV, a final tribute which my loyalty pays to his memory, will recount many achievements, the more glorious for our army as its character had

been, for a long time, as it could not fail in many respects to be, inferior to that of the French army. The theory and practice of the science of war had been completely neglected under the two preceding reigns. Nothing had been foreseen by the two ministers to whom I was succeeding; no preparations had been made: the only substitute I could discover for the want of experience and discipline was to be found in the good disposition of the officers, the devotedness of the soldiers; in a word, in the national spirit.

Nevertheless, we gleaned a sufficiently ample harvest of glory in this unequal, difficult, and, as it were, extemporized war. It abounded in acts of courage and even of heroism. If in those modern times, grants of land, of titles of honour, of ready-made elderships, had been, as in our ancient struggles with the Moors, or in our enterprises in the New World, the admitted, the necessary reward of military distinction, how many thousand Spanish families would now date their nobility and their fortune from the memorable campaigns of 1793, 1794, and 1795!

In vain does a spirit of envious malevolence affect to throw into oblivion that brilliant episode of the national history. Spanish valour and a wise policy preserved the country from a foreign yoke. What nation adjoining France can boast that its ancient institutions escaped destruction, that its provinces were not mutilated, nor its treasures

dilapidated? How many sacrifices had not each of those invaded nations to submit to, in order to ransom by dint of supplications a portion of their territory?

If our country was enabled to preserve itself from such humiliations, and from losses so painful, it was indebted for this to its brave army. Proud France no doubt maintained her imposing attitude towards us; but Castilian pride yielded none of her rights, and never dreaded to face her formidable opponent. It was then made a subject of reproach to me that I had by anticipation promised victory to our arms; the French themselves, in their official accounts, have redeemed my word. After a struggle of three years, in which the honours of the war were equally balanced, Spain appeared to yield for a moment to superior forces; but the colossal power of France, victorious over her other enemies, far from deeming itself safe in the portion of the Spanish territory of which it had obtained possession, proposed peace to us upon equal terms; and this peace was accepted without our yielding a single inch of territory, or submitting to the slightest pecuniary sacrifice. The republic was, moreover, taught by this war that our Peninsula was irrevocably closed against all foreign dominion.

For my share in this great crisis, I deem it sufficient that I was placed at the helm of government, and had the satisfaction or the merit

of selecting, of employing, of aiding by all the means in my power, the illustrious defenders of the country, who so valiantly fought her battles.

Honour to the brave leaders and to the soldiers of our glorious army!

There cannot justly be denied to Charles IV. another merit, the lustre of which must reflect upon the minister who, as the confident of his wishes, was directed to superintend and direct their being carried into effect. This merit consists in the loyalty, the uprightness of his policy. Naturally attached to France, his intention was to rescue, not to enslave her. Persuaded that she longed for the restoration of order, but was ruled by a tyrannical faction, an audacious minority; that she was less intent upon fighting for an absurd democracy than for her independence threatened by foreign aggression; wherever our victorious troops penetrated, the king ordered that the white flag should be immediately hoisted,—announced his intervention as being that of a sincere ally, of a disinterested friend, who desired alike the happiness of France and of Spain. Accordingly, the political morality of Charles IV. was never called in question: the republicans themselves did justice to his sincerity. However mortified he might have been at the personal offences unsparingly heaped upon him, Charles IV. never sought to take his revenge upon France; he never yielded

assent to any project of dismembering her; and of all the sovereigns of Europe, he whom the republic had at first affected to brave, was the first whose friendship she solicited, to whom she subsequently gave the most positive proofs of respectful deference. This observation has not escaped French writers; they have all paid homage to the noble frankness, the high morality, of the Spanish monarch.

It is proper to observe in this place, that the war on the part of Spain, and of the other allied powers, which failed in some measure to make an impression upon the republic, produced, nevertheless, a result of considerable importance. The French government modified its system of propaganda and of general subversion with respect to the nations who entered into treaty with it: it was admitted in principle that the republic was bound to pay deference and to exhibit sincere good faith towards those sovereigns who relinquished the project of attacking her. If this principle of wise reciprocity was not applied without exceptions, certain it is, however, that the Kings of Spain and Prussia, and many princes of the Germanic empire, after having vigorously asserted their honour and their rights, were thenceforward treated with respect. This was not the case with regard to those states which, during the common danger, and whilst the republican frenzy was at its height, main-

tained a cowardly neutrality which merely betrayed their weakness: such were Genoa, Venice, Switzerland, and Tuscany.

I have now fully answered the objections of those who blamed me, at first for resorting to arms, and afterwards for putting an end to hostilities. It is alleged that we failed to take advantage of the national energy; this reproach is equally unfounded. There is no doubt that the whole Peninsula protested as with one voice against the conduct of France; that Spain, like the rest of Europe, beheld in the coalition the only means of arresting the progress of the French revolution: but Spain never had the intention of co-operating in that crusade otherwise than within the limits marked out by the coalition itself. Notwithstanding the embarrassments of the treasury, which had long been exhausted, and with no other disposable resources than such as were presented by the spontaneous generosity of the nation, never having harboured the thought of receiving foreign subsidies, Spain developed extraordinary means for the contest: nevertheless the idea of a general levy of troops was not adopted, and could never enter a rational mind; first, because no civilized nation had set the example of it; secondly, because the incumbrance and enormous expense of such a multitude set in motion would have at once paralysed and endangered their efficacy.[1]

[1] The reader will not have forgotten that the deplorable state

The sudden and monstrous reaction of France baffled the foresight and calculations of policy; still, in the third campaign, our army, already superior in numbers, had resumed the offensive with a vigour which filled the French with astonishment.

Peace was offered to us by the republic.

The details of the negotiation will be found in the sequel of these Memoirs.

Thus fall to the ground the insinuations of compilers of pamphlets who have spoken of this war in such terms of contempt, not knowing, or affecting ignorance of, the circumstances which preceded it, and of the manner in which it was carried on. I shall present the facts in their proper light. Spain so calumniated, so little known, will recover that portion of glory which it has been attempted to wrest from her.

of our finances was to be traced back to a very early period of time; and that scarcely four months had elapsed since I was appointed to the ministry, when I was under the necessity of embarking in a war for which no preparations had been made by my predecessors.

CHAPTER XIV.

Continuation of the same subject.—King Charles IV. and his favourite.

M. DE PRADT inflicts at once upon me the vulgar appellation of *favourite*. This is his malignant interpretation of a title I always aspired to merit,—that of the *friend of my king*, which Charles IV. gave me throughout life. Strong in the testimony of my conscience, convinced that I shall receive justice at the hands of all who have known me, of every impartial man who may investigate my political career, I proudly reject the base qualification of *minion* or *favourite*, and every other appellation as inapplicable to the conduct I have faithfully pursued at the court of my sovereign as it is insulting to the distinguished favour which was bestowed upon me.

That favour never paralysed the acts of the other ministers: each of them was perfectly free in the exercise of the privileges of his department. I had often to confer with them for the good of the public service, and in order to introduce concord and harmony in the machinery of government; but I never attempted to govern single-handed, or

to transgress the limits of the power confided to me. The king's will was always the rule of my conduct; I did nothing without consulting him, not even in matters of little moment. Every weighty subject, whether relating to our internal or our foreign policy, I submitted without delay to the discussion of the council of state. So far from apprehending any display of talents or of knowledge in its members, I was eager to set them off; instead of encircling myself or the throne with men of plausible mediocrity, with servile nonentities, as a vulgar *favourite* would have done, I brought to light all men of acknowledged merit, and drew forth others from a state of complete obscurity. Unchecked by fear or by any feeling of jealousy, I set to each an active and conspicuous part, and thus reared up for future emergencies a crowd of talented men, who were afterwards found available when their services were required, and have, many of them, miraculously escaped the ravages of time and of political storms, to serve their country with credit to themselves at the present day.

With regard to myself, I never was guilty of any culpable proceeding or premeditated ambition. Charles IV. formed the determination of attaching to his person a subject who should be the special creature of his own making; who should have no other interest than that of his master; who should be indebted for everything

to his august benefactor; whose advice and judgment, unfettered by any previous influence or prepossession, might enlighten and support him in the critical situation in which Europe was then placed. Governed by that idea, which wholly and exclusively belonged to him, Charles IV. bound me to his person by every tie, made me an allowance out of his private purse, created me a grandee of Spain, adopted me as a member of his own family; in a word, he identified my existence with his own. This is assuredly true: but is it, therefore, to be supposed that he would have deposited in my hands the whole care and burden of the state,—of his own sovereign power? This I as assuredly deny: he neither would have confided the trust to me nor to any one else. Those who think otherwise have neither known nor seen Charles IV. in the intimacy of private intercourse. Jealous of his prerogative, to the full as much as his father Charles III, he wrote down or usually dictated his sentiments: after having thus declared his will or manifested his intentions, he would scarcely listen to a reply. A cautious or self-evident argument arrested his attention but for a moment: the starting-point was laid down, the principle of action established. He allowed, however, sufficient latitude for carrying it into effect; but he required a minute account of proceedings. Nor was his mind wholly free from a tendency to mistrust: not that he

willingly suspected a design of deceiving him; he apprehended that his very ministers might be deceived. Whoever wandered from the rule established or the principle laid down was soon discharged from his service.

I carefully applied myself to acquire a knowledge of his intentions and scrupulously fulfil his views, which, in his judgment, were always correct and consistent with justice. By this conduct I won much of his confidence; but it never was complete or exclusive; he often preferred the advice of others to mine: as an instance of which, in the year 1806, he was dissuaded from the only measure which, if properly executed, was calculated, in my opinion, to protect his threatened crown. He occasionally maintained in place ministers whom I could have assuredly wished to see removed from his service; the Marquis de Caballero amongst others, who so long held the seals of justice, and for a time added to it those of the war and marine departments.

This magistrate was a perpetual obstacle to the improvement of public instruction, and to all the salutary reforms I had meditated. Thus my power, which I fearlessly acknowledge was great, was nevertheless limited in extent: more than one proof of it will be afforded in the course of these Memoirs; and the reader, having the facts before him, will judge whether that power, or the manner of its exercise, warrant my receiving the

injurious nickname of *favourite*, or whether it be not more correct to designate me as the true friend of the monarch and of my country. This, for the present, is enough. I return to M. de Pradt.

"From the remotest part of the palace, a favourite assumed to direct the armies as he governed the court."

According to this assertion of M. de Pradt, no small share would accrue to me of the military renown of which our armies reaped so abundant a harvest, at first by their brilliant triumphs, and afterwards by their very reverses. Has M. de Pradt forgot our successes in the first campaign, our firmness in withstanding the disasters of the second, and the noble efforts of bravery and talent which arrested the progress of the French at the outset of the third campaign? But any praise or blame arising out of this war must be ascribed to others than to me: success or failure was not the work of one, but of many. The generals having all been pointed out and specially selected for the command, it was no longer the court, but the generals themselves, who, being assembled at a military council, of which I was no more than the nominal president, proposed and discussed plans, adopted the basis of them, regulated the operations, and were directed to carry them into effect, with a discretionary power to modify them in such manner as circumstances might render expedient. They immediately took their departure

for the army, enlightened with the suggestions of the council, confident of success, eager to add fresh lustre to the Spanish arms. These are facts known to all, of which there yet remain many eye-witnesses. It is, moreover, notorious that it is not the practice in Spain to direct the operations of the war by orders from the cabinet: were we likely to alter the practice at a time when we had to contend against an enthusiastic and valiant nation, who, disdaining the usual tactics of Europe, invented for itself a new science of war, and baffled at every moment the old system of warfare and all political combinations?

CHAPTER XV.

War against the Republic.—Reply to Archbishop de Pradt.

ALL the world knows M. de Pradt, whose fertile pen has supplied the politics of the time with so many memoirs and pamphlets. Amongst those productions of the moment, that which most attracted notice was a work published in 1816, bearing the title of *Historical Memoirs of the Spanish Revolution.* Of all the writers who have so bitterly inveighed against me, none have carried their slander to such lengths as the Archbishop of Mechlin. From what source has he drawn the gratuitous insults, the odious imputations, he heaps upon my head? Ignorant of all that occurred under the reign of Charles IV, he has picked up, commented upon, diluted the treacherous small-talk of Don Juan Escoïquiz, the bitterest of my enemies; he who is the first, the real author of all the evils of Spain, and whom I shall not fail to treat as he deserves in the progress of this work. M. de Pradt's penetration is here at fault; he has been the dupe of a wretched impostor; Escoïquiz is his oracle. Such is the poisoned source at which M. de Pradt has quenched his thirst. The French prelate has only

repeated the lesson of the Spanish priest; nevertheless, the scholar was a man of more merit than the master.

Let us first quote the ex-archbishop, who unintentionally begins by sounding my praise.

" Charles IV, King of Spain, was the only sovereign of Europe who, at the period of the ever-to-be-lamented catastrophe of Louis XVI, gave active proofs of the interest he took in the fate of this unfortunate prince. The proposals are well known which he caused to be publicly addressed to the governing powers who were on the point of sacrificing the life of the monarch; and there can be no doubt that those advances were backed by many others intended to propitiate the men who at that time exercised a control over public opinion in Paris. That Louis XVI. was the head of the house of Bourbon — that he was seated on a family throne, were grounds sufficient to make it an object of the deepest anxiety for Charles IV. to avert the blow which threatened his unhappy relative. All his efforts were in vain; and the consummation of that frightful act of iniquity became the signal of a war between France and Spain. If that crime carried consternation throughout Europe, it kindled a fire in the breasts of the Spaniards: too ardent to restrain the impressions made upon them, they fell upon the French who happened to be then in Spain, heedless of the considerations which should have

induced them to look upon those who were attracted to or were settled in their country through mere motives of private interest as perfect strangers to the event which excited this manifestation of animosity.[1] In a moment the fire spread over the whole nation; all tendered their services and their money. Whatever modern history may at any time record of offerings made by patriotism to governments requiring its aid, was far surpassed by the Spanish people. Thus, whilst under the Constituent Assembly France had only furnished a sum of five millions; whilst in England, at the commencement of the same war (1793), the public donations did not exceed forty-five millions; the voluntary offerings in Spain amounted to seventy-three millions. This is assuredly the most splendid patriotic gift ever made by any modern nation."

Was M. de Pradt, whilst relating these facts, ignorant that the epoch of my entrance into the ministry perfectly coincides with the period at which those active and generous steps in favour of Louis XVI. were adopted? I am much inclined to think that he is only guilty of ignorance. How could he, in fact, wilfully suppress the cir-

[1] I have adverted elsewhere to the measures adopted by the government with the view of allaying the first burst of popular irritation; its restraint quickly followed upon the evil: all the rights of hospitality were maintained. Great indulgence was, moreover, shown to some Frenchmen who had compromised themselves by expressions highly indiscreet during such a crisis.

cumstance, and level at me a train of abuse couched in the following words:

"But it is not enough that a war should be undertaken to avenge the laws of honour and justice; its operations should be directed with consummate knowledge; and the want of it proved a stumbling-block to the success of the Spanish arms. *The same hand which paralysed the action of Spain in time of peace, paralysed its action during war.* From the remotest part of the palace, *a favourite* assumed to direct the armies as he governed the court; but as there is a wide contrast between them, and as an enemy, said Frederick, is no courtier, failure was the necessary consequence. The innate bravery of the soldiers, the devotedness of their commanders, were alike ineffectual, and the enemy penetrated into the very heart of Spain. The government entered into negotiations, and it is well known what are treaties by which the vanquished seeks protection against a reverse which is perhaps irretrievable. The French had crossed the Ebro, and were marching upon Madrid. They were arrested by the signing of a peace, of which the favourite assumed the name; thereby displaying even more folly than arrogance, and decking himself with a title recalling the public misfortunes; in contrast with other countries, where men are decked with titles which recall their prosperity and glory.'

The share taken by Spain in the general coalition against France has never been contested by those who have deliberately or accidentally alluded to this war. In the first campaign, our successes were at least as brilliant as those of any other power; none of them displayed more firmness than we did in moments of reverse. More fortunate than they, Spain at last, after having satisfied the call of honour, terminated the struggle at a seasonable moment, and alone succeeded in concluding a peace without humbling herself or submitting to any sacrifice. This result sufficiently proves that she sustained her part with becoming energy, and that her troops, though composed of fresh levies, and unpractised in military evolutions, were neither ill-instructed nor ill-commanded; for the absence of these two conditions cannot be supplied by valour alone in an open country and under every inclemency of the weather. It is moreover notorious, that wherever the republic was triumphant, and the vanquished were compelled to humble themselves before her, she evinced little mercy towards her enemies. If she did not fix her fangs upon Spain, or glut herself with booty; if she failed to enlarge her territory at the expense of ours; our protection from those evils is due to the courageous bearing of our warriors! In support of this reasoning, I may adduce the numberless testimonies recorded in all the accounts given by

the French themselves, who did not think that by doing justice to us they were lessening their own glory.

Of his own authority, however, and overlooking what has been officially published, as well as the uniform testimony of all historians,—mostly military men, who were witnesses of those memorable campaigns,—and acted a part in them,—M. de Pradt wrests from Spain and from me, in a few short lines, all the honour we achieved in a three years' struggle against the French republic! At what source, I repeat it, can he have drawn information of so novel a character? Throughout his Memoirs, when there is question of accusing me, he quotes no other authority than the assertions of Escoïquiz and of Ceballos, my open enemies.[2]

[2] Nevertheless, M. de Pradt declares that his only object has been to collect materials for the history of the Spanish revolution: he admits that it can only be written after scrupulously consulting the memoirs, the private accounts, the principal actors, eye-witnesses, &c.

"But at the present day," he adds, "each individual can only supply his own share of the work, confining himself to a detail of what he has witnessed and heard, and keeping strictly within the limits of truth; since it is unusual for eyes to see clearly, and for ears to hear distinctly: in times of revolution, there are party-eyes and party-ears; scarcely any others are to be found."—*Preface*, p. 9.

We thus find M. de Pradt pronouncing sentence upon himself: his eyes have seen nothing; his ears have only heard the men of the Escurial, of Aranjuez, and of Bayonne,—wretched intriguers who plunged Spain into an abyss of evils! He has

"The same hand," says M. de Pradt, "which paralysed the action of Spain in time of peace, paralysed its action during war." I have related, in sufficient detail, what was done during the four first months of my administration. M. de Pradt had himself related it with praise, without naming me, it is true,—having probably forgot who was minister at that period. Now, can it be alleged that to have thus acted was to have paralysed the action of Europe?[3]

But M. de Pradt's inattention, or his suppression of facts, with respect to the war, are altogether unaccountable. Has this writer, whose object was to collect materials for history, been ignorant that in less than three months three Spanish armies hastened forward to the Pyrenees, before the republican troops had yet made their appearance? That many naval armaments were fitted out within the same time; and, amongst

only repeated the accounts derived from such men, has only read what they have written; and yet M. de Pradt concludes with this exclamation: "Woe to the vanquished whose vanquishers constitute themselves their historians and their judges!" As I say, *having probably forgot who was minister at that period:* but M. de Pradt cannot plead utter ignorance of it; for in the small biography placed at the head of his work, he mentions me, at page 20, as prime minister in 1792. If the omission of the circumstance in the sequel of his Memoirs arises from absence of mind, it evinces a serious proof of inattention on the part of an historian who pretends to judge me with so much severity; if it be wilful forgetfulness, the reader will be enabled to estimate the good faith of my detractor.

others, the expedition destined for Toulon, consisting of twenty sail of the line, four frigates, numberless vessels of war and transports, with a select division of infantry and marines, which formed of itself a fourth army? That a second naval expedition was sent to South America; a third to the islands of the Sardinian dominions;[4] besides reinforcements to the Eastern seas, and a multitude of cruisers, which sailed from our harbours to protect our trade and to attack the enemy wherever he might be found?

M. de Pradt is perfectly silent respecting that immense and costly display of the naval forces of Spain, which were fitted out as soon as war was determined upon.

These simultaneous arrangements were rapidly carried into effect, and were productive of happy results. Treaties of peace were also concluded with England and Portugal.

Such were the occurrences of a few days, from

[4] It was stipulated by an old treaty between the Kings of Spain and Sardinia, that in case of invasion of their respective states, they should afford one another the mutual aid of eight thousand infantry and four thousand cavalry. Faithful to all his engagements, but unable to dispense with his land forces, which were needed in Spain, Charles IV. determined to offer to his ally an equivalent; he despatched a squadron under the orders of Don Francisco de Borja, which, amongst other operations, was to recover various islands of the Sardinian dominions, of which the French had taken possession. Those islands were, in fact, re-conquered, and immediately restored to their legitimate sovereign.

the moment of my accession to the ministry! M. de Pradt does not bestow a word upon that immense material of war, created as if by magic; upon those splendid military equipments; those well-stored magazines, which, as long as the war lasted, our armies ever found at hand. He further omits all mention of our hospitals, which were unquestionably, at that time, the most complete, the best organized of any in Europe.

What shall I say of the excellent selection made of the commanders of our land and sea forces? The greater number had been neglected; some, the most distinguished amongst them, had long been kept in utter disgrace under the ministry of Florida Blanca, who took umbrage at their talents, and whose mean and timid policy it had always been to lower the military spirit. Those whom I appointed to serve with the army of operations were neither courtiers, intriguers about the palace, nor importunate place-hunters; I selected our choicest officers wherever I could find them, without distinction of birth, party, or opinions. The military history of that period, agreeing with the testimony of natives and of strangers, has recorded the glorious names of Ricardos, Caro, Cuesta, Cagigal, Crespo, Izquierdo, Arias de Saavedra, La Romana, the gallant Duke d'Ossuna, the brave and rash Count de la Union, the cautious and veteran public servant Count de Colomera; of admirals Langara, Gravina, Alava,

Borja, Aristizabal, the pride of the Spanish navy; and of that crowd of generals of all arms, amongst whom I shall quote Urrutia, Offaril, Vives, Solano, Escalante, Venegas, Novarro, Taranco, Morla, Mendinueta, Castaños, Someruelos, Amarillas, the Duke de Montellano, the Marquis de Cifuentes, the Baron de Kessel, Escofet, Cornel, Oquendo, Villalba, Adorno, &c.; and you likewise, my excellent brother, Brigadier Don Diego de Godoy, who so nobly served your country, who added one more distinction to your family, and are now without a country and banished on my account by the unjust government of Ferdinand VII, that ill-fated monarch whose reign has been an uninterrupted series of proscriptions. O! my brother; nothing more is left to us for the support of our existence than the scanty remnant of the bounty of Charles IV, who has already paid the debt of nature amidst the sorrows of exile and penury, and whom we are soon likely to follow to the grave.[5]

The renown of a more recent date cannot efface

[5] I shall be excused for recording in this place the brotherly interest I feel for General Don Diego de Godoy, one of those who most distinguished themselves in the province of Roussillon. Passing over his various exploits in the three campaigns of 1793, 1794, and 1795, I shall merely advert to the circumstance that at the battle of Truillas, so glorious for our arms and so fatal to the French, he was the officer who, with two regiments of cavalry, a semi-brigade of carbineers, and a small body of infantry, broke through the principal column of attack,

that which was then achieved; and the country is still indebted for its later and proud harvest of glory to most of the warriors of that period.

I feel a degree of pride, then, in repeating it: those illustrious warriors were not employed or selected at the caprice of an imbecile and presumptuous court. A government must be judged and characterized by the men it employs. At the period I speak of, independently of the disinterested and patriotic attention bestowed upon the choice of the generals and officers of the army, due credit must be allowed for the anxiety evinced in placing every military and political resource at their disposal. During the war the army was in want of nothing; all the services were abundantly provided for, and without the slightest restriction; the generals were left by the court at full liberty to act as occasion might require, and according to their unfettered judgment. Between them and

commanded by General Dagobert, made prisoners a part of that column, and secured the victory to the left wing of our army. The official gazettes, all public and private accounts, have ascribed the honour of this exploit to Don Diego de Godoy, who directed and led the charge. My beloved brother! the implacable hatred of my enemies may have involved you in my disgrace, have driven you away as an exile from the domestic hearth; but it never can erase your name from the list of the gallant defenders of the country, where it must ever be inscribed! What matters to you the disgrace inflicted by a court which has rewarded the most distinguished men of our native country by banishment, a dungeon, or the penalty of death?

the court there was perfect unity of mind: the moral feeling and the discipline of the army were admirably kept up; harmony in every measure adopted was the result of a mutual and generous confidence. There existed no rivalry, no petty jealousy, no struggle arising from self-love, because the government made no distinction of persons, but showed honour to merit wherever it displayed itself, and liberally rewarded every brilliant or conspicuous deed of arms.

I am recalling the memory of an epoch the contemporaries of which are yet in sufficient numbers to belie me if I have overcharged the picture; reference might, moreover, be made to the national archives, the official documents and reports.

After this explanation of facts, I ask M. de Pradt, and all who may have been prejudiced against me by the perusal of his work, whether the minister who gave effect in the manner above described to the will of the monarch deserves to be accused of having paralysed or nullified the action of the war.

We will now afford fresh evidence of M. de Pradt's unjust accusations.

CHAPTER XVI.

Campaign of 1793.

THE council of war was composed of the general officers who were about to take the command of the several divisions of the army.

After a lengthened discussion of the plans and projects submitted to their examination, it was determined that there should be formed three armies: the one to occupy the frontier of Guipuscoa and Navarre; the other to defend the passes of Arragon; and the third, which was destined to assume the offensive, to enter Roussillon by the province of Catalonia, and from thence to threaten Languedoc, being sheltered and protected by the mountains of Corbières, the chain of which extends from the Pyrenees to the sea. The last plan was not unattended with difficulties, as we had in our front natural and artificial fortifications, which protected the enemy's frontier. But the point was determined by military and political considerations: first, the position of the French in Rousillon gave them a great advantage over us, if, as there were reasons to apprehend, they should be the first to attack, their rear being well secured, whilst Upper Catalonia might easily be invaded; se-

condly, Roussillon being once occupied, it was less difficult to maintain at that point a footing on the French territory, than towards the western Pyrenees, in the open country of the *Terre de labour*, presenting no fortified town, no military position to enable us to preserve the first advantages we might obtain, no means of covering a forced retreat. To these considerations of locality were to be added other powerful arguments. It was necessary to second the projected expedition against the ports in the South of France ; an expedition highly important, not only to draw off and divide the enemy's forces, but especially to take advantage of the disturbances at Marseilles, Lyons, Toulon, and the adjacent country, which had more or less risen against republican tyranny. An invasion on the side of Navarre would not find the same spirit of disaffection amongst the inhabitants. A coup-de-main upon Roussillon might, besides, if effected with rapidity, escape the penetration of the French government, as the attempt could not fail to appear rash on our part, or at least too daring for the first operation of an army so long inactive, and so ill-prepared for warlike operations on a large scale. An imposing display of our forces on the borders of Navarre and Guipuscoa would not fail to attract the notice of the French government; whereas the army cantoned in the interior of Catalonia only showed

itself by its garrisons, which were barely adequate for the service of the advanced posts.

Such was the plan of the first campaign; it was accordingly carried into effect, so great a reliance may be placed upon Spanish soldiers led on by a general like Don Antonio Ricardos.

Shortly afterwards, he entered, at the head of four thousand men, the province of Roussillon, in which sixteen thousand Frenchmen were scattered. When the other divisions of our army overtook the troops forming the advanced guard, Ricardos had already turned and possessed himself of the first line of defence of the western Pyrenees: he occupied Ceret; was opening a military road on the Col de Portell, and removing his artillery to the plain. Those who are not intimately acquainted with the topography of that frontier are unable to estimate the value of so bold a movement. But the officers and soldiers of the Spanish army distinguished themselves by so many brilliant achievements in the course of this campaign, that their last feat obscures, as it were, the preceding one, and we are left to bestow upon all indiscriminate praise. In less than a fortnight, nearly the whole of Cerdagne, in advance of Puycerda, was occupied. A strong detachment stationed at La Jonquière watched the fortress of Bellegarde. Forced from their position at Arles, and gradually driven back, the enemy were completely routed at the general en-

gagement of Masden,[1] and abandoned the three intrenched camps which General Deflers had formed upon the Thuir. Our own army encamped at the Boulou, thereby commanding the *course* of the Tech; the siege of Bellegarde was entered upon, the inhabitants of Argélès, Elna, and Cornella having submitted and given up their arms, could afford no assistance to the blockaded towns; and all the efforts of General Deflers to supply their wants proved utterly unavailing. The fort of Bains capitulated on the 3rd of June, and that of La Garde two days afterwards; the Upper Vallespir was conquered, and our frontier protected along that line; the castle of Bellegarde,

[1] The battle of Masden was fought on the 18th May, with forces inferior in number to the French. Our troops carried the three entrenched camps which defended the approaches to Perpignan: the enemy's artillery, ammunition, and provisions fell into our power. Our troops had accomplished a march of five leagues, in order to reach the ground where they fought for sixteen hours without intermission: having no horses to drag the cannon abandoned by the French, our soldiers cheerfully performed the task, and brought them to the Boulou, a distance of five post-leagues. Ricardos ordered them to halt at this place, and prepare their evening's meal. The intrepidity of our soldiers in this first general engagement spread so much terror at Perpignan, that the batteries of the town fired upon the French troops which were hurrying to seek shelter within its walls. Nearly a thousand national volunteers refused to continue their service during this campaign, and were ignominiously expelled the army by General Deflers. The civil authorities of Perpignan withdrew to Narbonne, carrying away with them the public records: many inhabitants quitted the town, and sought an asylum in the interior of the country.

half dismantled, surrendered on the 24th, after an obstinate resistance; Ricardos spread his forces along the Thuir, and in spite of the reinforcements which the enemy were receiving from the interior, we occupied anew the camp of Masden; the enemy were defeated in every encounter, and a part of our army took up a position at Truillás. The month of July was approaching; the French were anxious to commemorate by a battle the anniversary of the 14th, and redoubled their preparations in the hopes of winning a victory. Ricardos anticipated their project, chose his own ground, and himself offered them battle. The republican general was fearful of accepting it, and thus allowed the great day to pass away which his troops, after so many reverses, had selected for taking a glorious revenge.

Fresh successes opened to our army the plains of Roussillon as far as the Tet. Seeing the danger which impended over its capital, Deflers attempted to divide our forces by drawing them towards Cerdagne. The fortune of war was, at this point, alternately favourable and adverse to the French and to us; but our progress was not retarded by the advantages obtained by our enemies. All that remained to them in Roussillon were the entrenched camps in front of Perpignan and the position of Peyres Tortes. We stood in need of the latter to enable us to reach Rives-altes, and to rest our left wing upon Estagel. We soon dislodged the French from

Arles and Cabestany, but with heavy loss on both sides, especially at Cabestany, where General Fregeville was taken prisoner. Both attacks were attended with severe loss to us, for the enemy defended themselves with great obstinacy.

Action of Peyres Tortes. — In the heat of this engagement, which took place on the 28th, a battalion of the regiment of Navarre, and a few companies of provincial grenadiers, braving a shower of grape-shot, rushed, bayonet in hand, on the French batteries. Victory declared in our favour. The enemy received reinforcements from Salcès on the following morning, renewed the engagement, and forced us to abandon the position we had carried on the preceding day. Our troops fell back in good order upon Masden and Truillás. On this day the gallant General Courten, though attacked by forces four times his own numbers, stood his ground for seventeen hours, succeeded in extricating himself from a fearful conflict, and brought his division back to Truillás. Two republican generals, Joye and Vidal Saint Martin, fell in this desperate engagement. If these details were only to be found in the Spanish accounts, some doubt might be entertained of their veracity; but they are recorded in the French reports, which are even more lavish in their praises of the valour we displayed: I merely transcribe their official documents.

The French made demonstrations of trying the

chances of another battle, and Ricardos took measures to disconcert their plans; but the enemy's army had been reinforced by ten battalions of old troops of the line, and the Convention had given positive orders to renew the attack. Dagobert had the command in chief of the whole army; the national representatives, Cassagne and Fabre, kept watch over his conduct, and fanned the flame of war; our soldiers were in readiness; our right was at Masden, the centre at Truillás, the left upon the Thuir, the advanced posts at Pontellás. Dagobert had pledged himself to bring the contest to a close by a decisive blow; his object was to force his way through the centre of our army, and thus cut off its retreat. Such was the movement to be operated at the battle of Truillás. The combatants fought hand to hand, and face to face; the engagement was worthy of being compared with the most obstinate and memorable that took place in the northern campaigns during this war. The details of it, which were so honourable to our army, have been published in the French accounts; our very adversaries acknowledged and admired the military skill displayed by Ricardos. From that event may also be dated the fame of so many gallant Spanish officers of all ranks who so quickly improved at the school of that illustrious commander. They won their honours in that immortal fight; the victory was wholly ours; the

lowest soldier had his share in it. It is but just, however, to name as deserving of more special notice the Generals Duke of Ossuna, Count de la Union, Courten, Crespo, Baron de Kessel, and Brigadier Godoy, my excellent brother, who decided and completed the rout of the column of troops of the line commanded by Dagobert, and upon which he had founded his highest expectations. The Thuir overflowed with dead bodies; the field of battle was so strewed with them as to impede the movements of the cavalry. Towards the close of this horrible slaughter, the French fought with a rage bordering on ferocity. Dagobert exhausted all the resources of the military art, and conducted himself with consummate skill; but all was in vain; the old regiments of Vermandois, Champagne, Medoc and Boulonnais, the battalions of volunteers of the Gers and the Gard, were nearly annihilated. Dagobert estimates his loss at upwards of six thousand killed and wounded, and admits that ours could not amount to a third of the number. Desertion spread amongst the ranks of the French army; many fugitives took advantage of the night to escape to the mountains. . . . . .

Was M. de Pradt ignorant of this historical achievement and of its consequences?

Up to that date the northern powers had also been successful in the war; but when the revolu-

tionary volcano vomited forth from its bosom a million of armed men, the northern star was obscured—Fortune deserted the standard of the coalition, with one exception only, the standard of Spain, which waved triumphant over the territory of the republic.

Let M. de Pradt consult the pages of history, and he will be compelled to admit an acknowledged truth, of far less importance to myself than to the honour of my country. "Insulated in her geographical position at the extremity of Europe, reduced to her own resources, Spain rivalled, in zeal and exertions, every other power in the vast efforts displayed during the campaign of 1793, and experienced none of the reverses which overwhelmed the coalition towards its close." Let M. de Pradt compare the events which occurred from the north to the west of Europe at corresponding periods. At the famous battle of Hondschoote, fought on the 9th September, sixty thousand English, Hanoverians, Hessians, and Dutch, are defeated by forty thousand Frenchmen commanded by a general of slender talents;[2] whilst nearly at the same time, or a few days afterwards, (the 22nd September,)

[2] Notwithstanding this victory, Houchard was accused of infidelity to the republic for having permitted the escape of the Duke of York, which was in fact a matter of perfect astonishment. Houchard might have cut off his communications with Furnes, when nearly the whole British army must have necessarily surrendered.

we won the battle of Truillás, of which I have just spoken. The Prince of Cobourg and the celebrated Clairfait, with an army of 80,000 men, are driven beyond the Sambre on the 16th of October; whilst on the preceding day we had vigorously repelled, before the Boulou, the furious night attack of the French commanded by Turreau, Dagobert's successor in the command :[3] in the engagements fought at Céret

[3] The French army received a reinforcement of 15,000 men during the night after the disaster of Truillás. This powerful aid put a stop to the desertion, which threatened to become general. The French recovered themselves, and took up a position on our left flank. The forces of Ricardos being then greatly inferior in numbers, he fell back on the camp of Boulou; a manœuvre effected with calmness and consummate skill; since, after having held the position of Truillás until the 30th, he quietly brought back all his materiel, notwithstanding the repeated attacks of the enemy's advanced guard; for the French had at heart to avenge their defeat of the 22nd.

Our troops having again taken up their position at the Boulou, had to sustain three general attacks and eleven partial engagements. The army thus harassed, were under arms day and night from the 1st to the 14th of October. The French general, finding all his efforts unavailing, and despairing to contend with advantage against the superior tactics and penetration of Ricardos, resolved to attempt a general assault during the night from the 14th to the 15th at six different points. Fruitless obstinacy! Sensible of his adversary's talents, Ricardos bent his whole attention to unravel his plans, and anticipated them at all points; his presence of mind, his firmness, shone conspicuous on these various occasions, on all which our army covered itself with glory. The following may be taken as a sample. The gallant Colonel Don Francisco Taranco, my distinguished and faithful friend, was defending the important

on the 26th of November; at Villalonga, La Roca, and St. Genis on the 7th of December; at the Col de Banguls[4] on the 14th; and on the

battery of Plá del Rey against a column of 6,000 men consisting of veteran soldiers just arrived from Lorraine and from the legion of the Moselle. Turreau excited them with his voice and marched at their head. Taranco had only 1,500 men under his orders: but, notwithstanding his numerical weakness, he repelled seven successive attacks; lost his battery three times, and as often recovered it; defended himself for an hour and a half, in close fight, with a force reduced to 600 men: driven against the parapet, he still made a vigorous resistance; fortunately the darkness of the night prevented General Turreau's discovering our relative inferiority, and kept him under the delusion that he was contending with a far greater number; at last our troops received at daybreak a reinforcement of 300 men. Revived by this seasonable aid, Taranco rushed upon the French, bayonet in hand; made a frightful havoc amongst them; and compelled Turreau to yield the field of battle with 197 prisoners, amongst whom were the colonel of the legion of the Moselle mortally wounded, an adjutant-general, and seven or eight officers. The slaughter was such that the battery of Plá del Rey was thenceforward called the *Battery of Blood.* These brilliant deeds of arms, besides a thousand others, are not mere narratives of official bulletins; they are historical facts. Spain proved herself worthy of her ancient military renown.

[4] After a long series of fruitless attempts to turn us and take possession of the bridge of Céret, our most important point of communication with Spain, and foreseeing that Ricardos meditated a general attack by sea and land, General Turreau fancied he had now a favourable opportunity for action, and he did not allow it to escape. A violent hurricane, which lasted three days, drove upon the coast the greater part of our vessels intended for this expedition; our bridges upon the Tech were carried away; the roads of Morellás, from Bellegarde to La Jonquière, were inundated and rendered impassable; all communications with Catalonia were cut off; our army was without

19th, 20th, and 21st at Banguls des Aspres, Portvendres, St. Elme, and Colliouvre, where the enemy left in our possession all their intrenched

forage, and had only two days' rations of bread; the bridge of Céret was alone left to us in case of a retreat, and this bridge was ready to give way from the effects of the increasing inundation: it was, moreover, commanded by the enemy's batteries. In this emergency, Ricardos determined to assume the offensive, and to be the first aggressor. The Count de la Union was directed to take the lead of three columns composed of our choicest troops. The Portuguese division was to maintain three points,—the great redoubt, the bridge, and the town of Céret. Turreau was watching our movement: he rushed upon and carried the redoubt, which the Portuguese abandoned with deplorable weakness. It fortunately happened that the Count de la Union, being compelled to stop half-way on his march, in consequence of the obstruction of a torrent which the sudden rise of waters rendered impassable, was retracing his steps: seeing the enemy's successful advance, he hastened to the spot, expelled him from the redoubt, drove back the French columns which were hurrying to join their comrades, pursued them, conjointly with the Portuguese, who had quickly rallied and were anxious to repair their error, and beat the enemy off to the heights of St. Fereol, which he seized upon as being an important position, calculated to protect the bridge of Céret and to leave the country open to our movements. Our soldiers remained five days under arms: though wet to the skin, with melted cartridges, and with no other weapons than their bayonets, they had, with the courage of lions, carried four batteries in less than an hour; and yet these gallant men had, for the greater part, scarcely recovered from an endemical fever with which the army had been attacked in the camp of Boulou ever since the month of September preceding. The Portuguese had nobly repaired their error. The army was at last enabled to take breath; its left was strengthened; the Vallespir remained in our power; all our communications were now perfectly open, and the soldiers were in a condition to gather fresh laurels.

camps, their artillery, baggage, and magazines, and were compelled to shut themselves up in the town of Perpignan,—M. de Pradt will find, I repeat, that these occurrences, so glorious for Spain, correspond with the events which took place in the north at the date of the 26th December;[5] that the dreadful encounter of Gersberg, where the Austrians, the Prussians, and the emigrants of the army of Condé abandoned the famous lines of Weissemburg,—the raising the blockade of Landau,—the taking of Lattersburg, of Kaiserslautern, of Gersmuschein, Spire and Worms,—also

[5] The French accounts describe in the gloomiest colours the various disasters of their army, especially those of Banguls des Aspres, where Fabre, the intrepid conventionalist, perished in the fight; of St. Elme, and in the several intrenchments along their line, which the enemy defended with heroic courage, until the fortresses fell into our power. This series of reverses was ascribed to treachery and to the cupidity of the generals, who were supposed to have sold themselves to Spain; but I declare upon honour that the imputation is utterly false. The governor of St. Elme was denounced as a traitor by the Convention; he was accused of having fired upon the French troops: it was assuredly not he who gave orders to fire; our soldiers, with no other arms than their muskets, their swords, and a hatchet, rushed from rock to rock, under a shower of balls; impelled by blind courage, they leaped headlong over the palisade and the ditch, broke the chains which secured the draw-bridge, burst open the principal gate, and compelled the garrison to lay down their arms. They immediately rushed to the batteries on the rampart, and fired upon the French, who were hastening to seek shelter within the fort; nothing could exceed the skill, valour, and obstinacy displayed by the enemy's troops. When the return of milder weather enabled us to resume the offensive,

occurred at the very period when Spain occupied, on the French territory, all the forts and towns I have named, including Bellegarde, the principal key of France in that part of the eastern Pyrenees. Lastly, when the Austrians were withdrawing in all haste from the banks of the Rhine, the Prussians sheltering themselves under the canon of Mentz, and the French triumphantly taking up their winter quarters in the Palatinate, the Spanish army was quietly encamped on the line of the Tech, in the very heart of the province of Roussillon.

Ricardos carried his daring plan into effect in the most brilliant manner: our right was completely extricated, and we took up our winter quarters in perfect safety in the midst of the French territory. The conclusion of the campaign was worthy of its opening. Courage, talent, and a rigid adherence to the plans of the general-in-chief characterized our army. General Doppet replaced General Turreau; he was the fourth whom the republic was opposing to Ricardos, and he had promised to his soldiers the rich spoils of Catalonia. Immortal thanks to those valiant warriors, those worthy Spaniards who, having to contend against the elements and the efforts of a formidable enemy, confounded the boasting of General Doppet, and preserved our hearths from a foreign invasion! The accounts of the gigantic actions fought in this memorable campaign cannot be read without emotion; our soldiers displayed inconceivable boldness in those deep ravines amidst the precipices of Villa Longa, La Roca and Banguls, on the reverse of the Puy de la Calma, at the Vierge des Abeilles, the Col de Suro, the Plá de las Heras, the Puyg de Bercet, on the heights of Corpilá, Bellausy and St. Elme, and along that steep chain strewed with intrenchments as far as the Puyg d'Oriol. Every inch of ground was defended by thirty thousand men posted along the

Is M. de Pradt desirous of further proofs, further testimonies to establish the parallel between the campaign of Ricardos and that of the northern powers? Let him open the Moniteur of the time. In reporting to the Convention, at the commencement of 1794, the events of the war, Barrère expresses himself as follows:

"You have learned with enthusiasm, citizens, the conquest of Toulon, the victories of the Rhine, the destruction of the ever-reviving monster of La Vendée: listen now with resignation to the reverses, the losses which treason has inflicted upon us on the side of Perpignan, threatened at this moment by the Spanish forces; our army has been defeated and is in open rout,

crests of mountains crowned with batteries, besides other batteries at a less elevation, which protected each other by cross-fires. Our soldiers carried everything before them. The last engagement took place on the right and centre of the enemy, near Tresères and Banguls des Aspres, with three brigades of cavalry. My brother had once more the good fortune of deciding the victory. The result of these actions was twelve thousand prisoners, sixteen standards, the park of artillery and the supplies in store at St. Genis, the cannon of upwards of twenty batteries, a multitude of artillery-waggons and of draught horses; the arsenal of Colliouvres, with eighty-eight pieces of artillery, which formed the defence of that fortress; thirty vessels laden with flour, forage, articles of military equipment, and provisions of all kinds for the army and the hospitals. Being thus in possession of St. Elme, Portvendres, Puyg d'Oriol, and Colliouvres, the only useful harbour along the coast, after nineteen hours of triumphant fighting, we quietly settled into winter quarters in the French territory. ... An honour unachieved by any of the coalesced powers.

but the Committee of Public Safety has already adopted the most vigorous measures, &c."[6]

We have thus a campaign which the French themselves admit to have been glorious for our army.

None of the coalesced powers could lay claim to such brilliant successes as those which signalized the Spanish arms in this campaign of 1793, as I have shown by our successes in Roussillon. The war was less animated on the side of the western Pyrenees; for it was part of our plan to maintain in that quarter an attitude of defence.

No portion of our territory was invaded; our left wing crossed the Bidassoa on more than one occasion, and maintained a firm footing in the enemy's country, at a greater or less distance, as circumstances suggested. Our troops were thus afforded the opportunity of distinguishing themselves; the general or partial attempts of the enemy against our frontier proved complete failures, whilst our attacks upon the French territory were at times

[6] We must avouch in this place, to the mutual honour of the Spanish and French armies, that treason had no share whatever in the events of the close of the campaign. It is well known that, in order to excite the public mind, and to persuade the republicans that they were invincible, the government ascribed its reverses to the treachery of the generals, many of whom paid the penalty of death for no other guilt than their having proved incompetent, or rather unsuccessful. It is established by evidence that the forts of St. Elme, Port Vendres, and Collioures were defended with desperate courage, and according to all the rules of art.

crowned with success. I shall merely relate one instance of this fact, taken from the report of a superior French officer, M. de Marcillac, adverting to the attack of Castel Pignon in Upper Navarre.

"The French, to the number of four thousand five hundred men, occupied three ridges of mountains; two of which, being covered with batteries defended by palisadoed intrenchments, protected the third, which was commanded by the fort of Castel Pignon. This position might be considered unassailable; for the backs of those three peaks rising from the basis of steep mountains present numberless indentations; and the only path through which the intrenchments may be arrived at is narrow, and runs along the edge of very deep ravines. Nothing could check the ardour of four thousand Spaniards engaged in this affair of the 9th of June; their courage increased in proportion with the obstacles and dangers they had to encounter at every step: after efforts of bravery wholly incredible to those who are acquainted with the ground on which they were fighting, they carried the first intrenchment, the defence of which was as heroic as the attack. The batteries crowning this mountain assisted the conquerors in obtaining possession of the second peak. But there yet remained the fort of Castel Pignon, the garrison of which was strengthened by the troops driven from the two first positions. Encouraged

by success, and animated by the presence of their general-in-chief,—who commanded in person, and who, though suffering from an attack of gout, which deprived him of the use of his limbs, had himself carried in a sedan-chair to the very foot of the intrenchments, then placed on horseback, and remained thus exposed to the enemy's fire during the whole of the action,—the Spaniards scaled the third mountain, and after four hours of the most obstinate fighting, carried the fort by assault, and pursued the enemy, who escaped to the heights of Oresson, defended by a considerable corps of reserve, which was also unable to resist the impetuosity of the victorious troops. The French general La Gennetière, who commanded this corps, was made prisoner, and the Spaniards encamped in the very tents of the French soldiers.

"Camp-marshal Don Ventura Escalante, major-general of the army, who placed himself on the occasion at the head of the advanced guard, and the Marquis de la Romana, more especially distinguished themselves in this action, which will be handed down to posterity as one of the authentic monuments which attest the courage of the Spanish troops. Worthy descendants of the soldiers of Ferdinand and Isabella, of Charles V. and Philip V, the soldiers of Charles IV. spontaneously proved at Castel Pignon in Navarre, at St. Laurent de Cerdá, at Arles, at the bridge of Céret, at the battle of Masden, at the taking

of Bellegarde, at Thuir, Argèles, Pontellas, Canós at the battle of Truillás in Roussillon, that valour is hereditary amongst them, and that it only requires to receive a proper direction. Just and worthy appreciators of courage, the French could not resist a feeling of admiration for the conduct of the Spaniards at the engagement of Castel Pignon. They manifested it in the public papers of the period; and the French government had not assuredly in view, at that moment, to heighten the glory of its enemies."[7]

Such is the language of M. de Marcillac, whose work was published at Paris in 1808. Charles IV. was no longer King of Spain at that period: the object was not to pay compliments to the court of Madrid; still less to a monarch fallen, proscribed, and forgotten in his banishment.

Thus, then, a whole campaign, nearly a whole year of warfare was prosperous to our arms, and was maintained with honour and glory along our extensive line of frontier. We remained encamped on the French territory, and masters of the two principal avenues to the Pyrenees; for on the side of Navarre, in spite of efforts persevered in during six months, the enemy never succeeded in forcing us out of our positions at Viriatu, or in compelling us to recross the Bidassoa.

Will M. de Pradt now tell me, that, from the

[7] History of the war between France and Spain in 1793, 1794, and part of 1795; pp. 24, 25, and 26.

remotest part of a palace, a favourite paralysed the successes of the Spanish army, and rendered unavailing the natural courage of the soldier, and the patriotic devotedness manifested by the generals?

Really, since the object of the archbishop was to impute to me the relatively slender share which at a later period fell to the lot of Spain in the general defeat of the coalesced powers, should he not, by way of fair compensation, have also ascribed to me some share in the glorious successes of the preceding campaign? The same hand held the reins of the Spanish government at one and the other period.

Far be from me, however, the foolish vanity of exclusively claiming to myself the good that was achieved: I did not govern alone. All the king's ministers rivalled each other in zeal and fidelity to their sovereign. All co-operated in the success of our arms. No doubt I presided over the council; this is all I can allege in my favour; and M. de Pradt, in his character of historian, was bound to make that honourable mention of my name. In Spain, my bitterest enemies acknowledge my claim to it. Ah! may all the laurels gathered by our brave soldiers remain theirs, and theirs only; I would not pluck from them a single leaf to decorate my brows: what I exclusively claim is, the merit of having sought, found out, and procured employment for those

worthy leaders; they corresponded with my confidence and justified the hopes of the country. I brought forward all those who by their knowledge and talents had distinguished themselves in their profession, and I urged them on to the career of honour. So far from being envious of their fame, I was the first to proclaim it; my friendship was secured to them, and I procured them every species of favours. I impressed every service upon the mind of the monarch, — an inviolable archive in which the memory of each noble deed was faithfully recorded! None, not even those who were in the humble station of common soldiers, had to complain of having been forgotten: the bounty of the court bordered upon prodigality. Great care and attention were, no doubt, bestowed by the government to the object of maintaining a spirit of harmony, of exciting a feeling of enthusiasm amongst the defenders of the country; but we had to deal with the select part of the nation: some were proud of the fame they had inherited from their ancestors; others, of the glory they had personally acquired, and which they were anxious to uphold and improve; we beheld, accordingly, in this newly-created army, the old prowess of our ancient warriors. Let us award them a full meed of justice; they had to combat the wild fanaticism of a nascent republic,—a warlike people hurrying on to battle in countless numbers. . . . In this struggle of giants, the Spanish

army secured advantages which Fortune did not concede to the other coalesced powers; our territory remained unsullied.

Why then such harshness, such affectation of contempt on the part of M. de Pradt? How was the action of the Spanish army paralysed? Was it in the extraordinary creation of so many armies which so nobly performed their duty? Four months had scarcely elapsed since my entrance into the ministry; I found no preparations going forward; my predecessor, Count d'Aranda, had insisted upon maintaining peace at any price.... Was any time lost,—was there any neglect evinced in assembling the troops and in providing them with suitable equipments? Assuredly not: whilst the patriotic gifts were collecting, and pending the arrival of the galleons from America, I was unwearied in my exertions to raise money: on the pledge of my word, and at the king's name, private coffers were opened; everything was profusely furnished; arms, horses, military clothing, provisions, stores, and those admirable hospitals which were on a far better footing than any that had yet been seen in Europe. Our wants were so abundantly supplied that Spain never had, within the memory of man, exhibited so prompt, so complete a developement of our national resources.

Was the action of the war paralysed by the dependence of the military leaders, their subser-

viency to plans originating at or circumscribed by the court? All the generals in chief had full powers to act; they had only to carry into effect what they themselves had proposed, and what the court had approved beforehand; they were at liberty to modify their operations according as the rapid and mutable circumstances of the war might suggest. . . . In what then was the action of the armies paralysed? Notwithstanding our inferiority of numbers, we were almost invariably successful; we again raised the white flag, and hoisted it by the side of the Spanish colours, on the forts and in the open country of the French republic, after a whole year of combats fought on both sides with equal obstinacy.

Such are the historical facts, the notorious results which I oppose to the false and calumnious imputations so inconsiderately entertained and repeated by M. de Pradt.

CHAPTER XVII.

Expedition of Toulon.

This series of successes in the first campaign was only interrupted at one point. Wherever our troops fought without auxiliaries, without extraneous support, they were often victorious: united with the troops of the coalition, they shared the reverses which discord and contending ambitions could not fail to occasion. Should the disgrace of them be borne by us rather than by the Sardinians, the Neapolitans, and the English? Did we err more than they? And, first of all, was it an error to concur in the occupation of Toulon?

No other project entertained up to that moment had held out brighter hopes: the whole of the south was in a ferment; not the royalists only, but the constitutional patriots likewise, who, after having so ardently upheld the rights of the people, were revolted at the tyranny of the *mountain* party. The insurrection of Provence, if seasonably fed and supported, might favour the rising of the federalists of Lyons, Bordeaux,

Brittany, and Normandy, even derive assistance from the indefatigable Vendeans, and eventually overset a sanguinary and turbulent government. But in this case the coalesced powers should have acted with perfect frankness and moderation, and have renounced all projects of invasion. France might then have adopted a system more in accordance with the general wishes,—a middle course, at which the revolution might then have stopped, and which it was ultimately compelled to submit to, after twenty years of political wanderings and of every species of calamities. I call God to witness that the Spanish cabinet never harboured any other thought, and that its political conduct was never directed to the object of oppressing or dismembering France, or of favouring a spirit of revenge or reaction in that country.[1]

[1] It may be objected, that however upright the views of the Spanish cabinet, it should not have fallen into the error of believing that the other powers, such as England, and particularly Austria, would renounce the idea of invading France and dismembering her territory; still less, that the royalists would consent to anything short of the restoration of the old *régime*, or, in other words, of absolute power. Yes; but the public mind had made manifest progress; France had advanced with rapid strides; the political attitude of the whole body of the nation was conspicuous and imposing. For my part, I did not then, nor do I at the present day believe, that any large portion of the federalists would have given themselves up, bound hand and foot, to foreign powers. Those who had just shaken off the yoke of the Convention were far more disposed to join the national troops in an attempt to repel a design upon their

There was unfortunately wanting a leader competent to direct this comprehensive movement in the south, and to bring so many individual opinions to combine to a common object. It also happened that the occupation of Toulon did not take place until after the defeat of the federal army of Provence; added to which, the policy of England rejected the advice of the Spanish generals, whose instructions authorised them to adopt such measures as they might deem calculated to favour the rising in the interior of France. The English preferred being shut up in Toulon, though it was obvious that this town must fall, sooner or later, if the insurgents should be put down. On the other hand, the Toulonese unceasingly urged the adoption of a comprehensive measure; and I moved heaven and earth to induce some of the cabinets to accede to it: the

liberty, from whatever quarter it might be attempted to impose fetters upon them.

In 1793 there was greater vigour or less lassitude than in 1814; and yet, though vanquished at the latter epoch, and her capital in the occupation of the coalesced sovereigns, France was still respected in her principles and in her acquired rights. The reaction of the people of the south, if frankly and openly supported by the allies, would have produced, by means of wise modifications, that temperate monarchy which is the only government adapted to an enlightened, industrious, and powerful nation. What evils would thus have been spared to France herself, to Spain, to the whole world! The cabinet of Charles IV. could only indulge the illusion, which was, however, honourable to its feelings.

plan was to request the immediate presence of the Count de Provence on the spot.

England obstinately refused her concurrence; her ambition was limited to the object of destroying the port, burning or bringing away a French squadron, and prolonging the troubles of a nation at whose greatness she took umbrage. What will M. de Pradt think of this? I am not indulging in chimerical suppositions. The conduct of Spain was frank and generous; no doubt was entertained of her sincerity; nor did the Toulonese ever raise a complaint against us.

With respect to the pitiful military defence of the town, what charge can be alleged against the Spanish troops? Their conduct was marked by heroic constancy and spotless honour! and, alas! by too much consideration towards allies who abused it, and caused the expedition to fail of its object! Our only error consisted in having relied upon them, as if they had been impelled by kindred feelings.[2]

[2] Notwithstanding the habitual moderation of the political manifestoes of Spain, the following extract of the declaration of war against Great Britain (7th Oct. 1796) is sufficiently expressive:

"One of the principal motives which compelled me," says Charles IV, "to conclude a peace with the French republic as soon as her government had assumed a regular and consolidated form, was the conduct of England towards us during all the past war, and the well-grounded mistrust I entertained for the future from the experience I had acquired of her bad faith; this

The loss of the forts of Faron and Malbousquet was not to be attributed to the Spaniards. . . . Those forts having been surrendered to the enemy, the shipping could no longer safely maintain themselves in the road, nor the troops retain possession of the town. Honour to the gallant Mendinueta, who, shut up in the fort of St. Antoine, sustained to the end the honour of the Spanish arms on the fearful night of the 17th December, repelled the French, and gave shelter to the English general, who had been taken by surprise, was driven from Malbousquet, and came to him for protection! During the whole of the 18th, the Spanish flag waved over the rampart of St. Antoine, which the garrison only quitted on its way to the place of embarkation, when the retreat was deemed indispensable, and was by superior command carried into effect. The forts which were to have protected the retreat had been given up without a struggle, previously to the

bad faith had manifested itself at the most critical moment of the campaign, in the treatment experienced from Admiral Hood by my squadron at Toulon, where he only thought of destroying what he could not carry away." Recalling afterwards to view the further evidence of this feeling on the part of the British cabinet, in its endeavours to remove all chance of making peace with France, the king adds: "I could not disguise from myself its bad faith, in the repugnance it felt at adopting any course calculated to abridge the duration of the war." I make these quotations with a view to confirm the truth of what I have asserted respecting the noble and generous intentions of Spain in that fatal expedition of Toulon.

appointed time;[3] the commanding heights of La Malgue were immediately re-occupied by our troops; and, though burning with indignation, these troops resolved to give the English a lesson of devotedness to their duty; they proudly made way to let them take the lead in embarking; the Italians' followed; our soldiers formed the rear-guard, and left the ground at a slow pace, without confusion, without leaving a soldier, an invalid, a wounded or a forlorn inhabitant behind: the regiments of Cordova and Majorca were the last to step into the vessels; Major-general Don Joseph Ago, of distinguished memory, saw the last man of his troops, the last Toulonese safe on board: it was already broad day-light (eight in the morning). That gallant officer then rushed from the mole, after firing a last musket-shot at the enemy.

I crave the indulgence of my readers for having related, in the progress of my narrative, some of the gallant achievements of that expedition. I felt myself called upon to hold up to the young generation of Spaniards the noble example of their predecessors, and was also impelled to speak in defence of my own honour and for my personal justification: under a timid and immoral govern-

[3] The forts of Pommets, St. André, St. Catherine, &c.; this fatal desertion left the royal road open to the enemy's fire; our troops had to take the lower road towards the postern on the right of the Italian gate. This arrangement, and the forming of our troops in order of battle on the left of the citadel, had the effect of simultaneously saving the army and the squadrons.

ment, there can exist no civic virtue, no emulation, no courage, no generous feeling. As a minister at that period, and as the organ of power, I claim a share in all the generous and noble actions which have illustrated it. Whether a confidant, a courtier, a minion, or a favourite, just as it may please M. de Pradt to designate me, I have fufilled the duty of a loyal subject, of a sincere friend of my king and country. Whoever pays homage to truth — my very enemies — must acknowledge that in the emergency in which I was called upon to contend against the unheard-of dangers that assailed Europe, Spain had nothing to envy in other powers; for none could lay claim to more signal successes—none adhered to more prudent counsels,—none could boast of subjects more devoted to their country.

CHAPTER XVIII.

Discussion in the Council of State on the subject of continuing the War.

THERE existed in Spain, ever since the commencement of the war, a party small in numbers, and keeping itself aloof, but exercising a certain influence, which beheld with regret the coalition formed against the republic. The general opinion was decidedly in favour of the war; but it was alleged by this party that the bulk of the nation displayed a merely factitious enthusiasm, which was excited by the aristocracy and by churchmen.

These sentiments had spread to a certain extent amongst the middling classes, amongst young lawyers, professors in sciences and *belles lettres*, students, suitors for places in the various branches of the civil career. They were also shared by adepts of a higher rank; some of whom, out of mere pretensions to wit, others imbued with philosophical principles, and many instructed by foreign writers and civilians with whom they had held intercourse abroad, adopted the new ideas,

which filled the world with bright hopes, and, at the same time, with sinister forebodings.

It is but justice to say that none approved the violent strides of the French revolution; though all readily embraced the theories out of which it had sprung, and viewed with regret a crusade in arms to crush it. Very few of these Utopists ventured to hope that France would effectually resist such mighty and combined efforts. Nevertheless, being attached to their political religion, they were content with expressing their doubts of the issue of the contest; and, in order to prevent its taking place, they foretold the triumphs of the republic, without relying too much upon their predictions. When those triumphs began to be verified in the North, the party which would be called *liberal* at the present day increased in numbers and in boldness. It now discovered fresh arguments against the war, recalled to remembrance its previous predictions, exaggerated the evils impending over Spain should she persist in her chivalrous policy. I am compelled to introduce in this place, and between the two campaigns, an episode which, in a sense diametrically opposed to that which M. de Pradt has chosen for the text of his imputations against me, has supplied ample matter for other imputations of a quite opposite nature; for such has been my wayward fate, that, whether I determined upon war when it was forced upon us and unavoid-

able, or whether I sought a peace when the moment was seasonable and it could be obtained without dishonour, my enemies have equally blamed me, without regard to their conflicting and contradictory opinions.

We had entered upon the year 1794. The generals in command of our three armies, who had been summoned to the court in order to come to an understanding respecting the next campaign, had discussed and arranged the plan of operations.

Their decision was submitted to the council of state. The question to be considered was not whether the war should be continued or put an end to, or the mode in which it was to be carried on. All idea of a peace was impossible; the Jacobins would not listen to it. Anarchy was daily increasing in violence. It would have been disgraceful and unavailing to make advances to those who held sway in the Convention, or to expect any from them, especially as Spain, victorious until that moment, could not abandon her allies on the ground of their having met with reverses. . . . But the party which was anxious for peace, or, to speak more correctly, the French party, was not wanting in advocates; a champion ready to support their cause entered the lists, with visor raised, and threw down the gauntlet to whoever might think proper to take it up. . . . The original question of peace or war was started in the council.

Count d'Aranda, upon whose partiality for peace as much praise was bestowed as blame was heaped upon me, for having waged war when honour and necessity alike required it,—the count began by condemning that war, and invocating peace so earnestly as to avow that it were better *to unite with France against the coalesced powers, should her existence be endangered by the attempts of the coalition.*

It seemed, however, to escape him that the French revolution, by its present acts and its openly avowed system, threatened the stability no less than the constitutional principles of all governments, and struck at the heart of all monarchies.

Whatever may have been his opinions on the state of politics under circumstances of so critical a nature, the count presented to the council an elaborate statement in writing: I was called upon to reply, and to oppose to it my own sentiments, which were participated in by the king, the council, and the rest of the ministers. The subjoined account of the discussion will enable the reader to decide between us. It furnishes an exposition of my principles, explains most of the acts of my public life, and affords me the opportunity of refuting the calumnious falsehoods so gratuitously invented by my enemies.

The speech of Count d'Aranda, though ob-

scure[1] and unconnected, may be reduced to the four following propositions.

1st.—The war against France is unjust.

2ndly.—It is impolitic.

3rdly.—It is ruinous, and our forces are too inferior to carry it on.

4thly.—Besides being ruinous, it compromises the very existence of the Spanish monarchy.

1st.—The war is unjust. He attempted to prove it by several theories, by peremptory prin-

[1] Count d'Aranda spoke with more facility and ease than he could write. Gifted with an ardent temperament, full of self-conceit, he grew animated in a discussion. When speaking extempore, his language was even forcible; but his vehemence made him often forget the consideration which was due to his hearers; his angry and loud tone of voice checked his powers of persuasion; his style exhibited the same proud, domineering, though somewhat subdued spirit: nevertheless, his writings were crude and elaborate, the ideas confused and entangled, the locution rough, the reasoning abrupt and incoherent: he could seldom find a word adapted to convey his exact meaning; hence those lengthy circumlocutions and that final obscurity in which he always lost himself.

This opinion of him does not originate with me: Count d'Aranda has always been so described by those who have known him.*

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* The Marquis de Caracioli, the Neapolitan ambassador, who had much frequented him in Paris, ingeniously compared his mind *to a deep well with a narrow opening;* others say, *to a bottle containing good liquor, but scarcely allowing it to run out, owing to its narrow neck.*

Count d'Aranda was President of the Council of Castile in 1765: called to the ministry in 1792, he made way for the Prince of the Peace towards the close of the same year; was exiled in 1794, and died on his estates in Arragon, in 1798.—E.

ciples. "This war," he said, "attacks the first of all national rights,—their natural and political independence: this right does not depend on the form of their government, or on whatever leaders may rule over them; it is an intrinsic right, inherent in each nation; a government, therefore, which represents a nation, is in possession of that right. Revolutions are by no means of modern date, their origin is extremely remote; they swarm in the history of every people. The right which nations justly claim of modifying and improving their laws is innate, eternal as they. The power of all associations, whether they be monarchical or republican, emanates from God; it is therefore sacred. The only duty or office that devolves upon a state with respect to intervening in the internal dissensions of a neighbouring state, is the office and duty of friendly intervention, as is befitting between equals. All attempts to impose laws, or specific forms of government, by force of arms, is a violation of the natural right, the right of nations; but it would be still more unjust to wage war with the view of imposing upon a nation any individual or any family which has been rejected or set aside by that nation. . . .

"My duty as a true Spaniard and a loyal counsellor of the king being to speak the truth to him according to the suggestions of my conscience, I cannot forbear declaring that the war

against France had not even the foundation of a plausible pretext or of a semblance of justice. Appearances or pretexts cannot be drawn from private interests, or the ties of relationship between princes: it is befitting to maintain those ties and interests when they serve to cement the friendly intercourse between nations; but they must be broken off, as detrimental and injurious, when they only serve to exasperate and divide them. If the natural feeling of relationship, and the pious wish of the Spanish monarch to behold the crown of France, so long borne by his ancestors, restored to its possessor, be entitled to every praise, it is still more praiseworthy to make a heroic sacrifice of his dearest affections to the common law of nations, to the maintenance of peace between Spain and France. There exist, in the natural and political intercourse of nations, rights and interests far more positive and elevated than the personal rights of the two reigning families; in short, the knowledge and respect of those rights, by keeping within the bounds of moderation and justice, reflect much higher glory on a king than he can derive from avenging, at the expense of his people, a family insult, which has been, besides, sufficiently punished by the triumph of our arms."

The count then maintained that the war was impolitic, and he did so principally upon the following grounds:

1st.—This war opened the door to a dangerous principle,—*the interposition of foreign powers in the internal affairs of another nation:* the principle, if once admitted against the French republic, might in turn be retorted against a monarchy, as we have already witnessed in the system adopted by the Convention.

2ndly.—It was imprudent to plunge any deeper in a war of principles, because the cry of liberty vibrated far more loudly in the ears of nations than the antiquated precepts of *submission*, of *vassalage in virtue of a divine or natural right.*

3rdly.—Besides this double inconvenience, which is an inexhaustible source of future accidents and dangers, the political interest of Spain clashed with a war which would have the effect of favouring the natural enemies of Spain and France. France was the only nation whose interest was truly identified with ours; if that nation be once crushed and dismembered by the northern powers, the Bourbons of Spain and Italy would become insulated, and without support against the attacks of England and Austria.

4thly.—The great work of the *family compact* had been planned and realised to secure our continental and maritime power; this compact was no less important to the positive prosperity of the countries over which the Bourbons held sway, than the very existence of these princes. Kings and governments, be their origin what it may,

were liable to the vicissitudes of fortune; but nations were imperishable; their interests underwent no change. Instead of making war against France, and concurring in her ruin, we ought rather to aid and support her against England and Germany: after having been long combated and kept in check by the naval forces of France and Spain, united like twin sisters in a common bond, England was delighting in the idea of seeing them disunited; thus hoping to destroy, one after another, their navy once so powerful, to exercise thenceforward uncontrolled sway over the two oceans which border our American colonies, and seize upon our commerce. Setting aside all question of family or of principle, the apprehension of such a danger should induce us to renew the alliance between both nations, because personal wrongs or feelings of repugnance ought to yield to the paramount consideration of the national welfare. A king, whose exclusive and noble ambition was directed to the object of securing the happiness of his subjects, should not sacrifice them to the very uncertain hope of restoring his relatives to the throne, or suffer Spain to be ruined in a war which was alike unjust, impolitic, burthensome, and beyond her means of sustaining it.

With regard to our resources for continuing the war, it is notorious that Spain is groaning beneath the weight of an exorbitant debt; that, in consequence of the enormous expenses of the

preceding reign, the companies formed with the view of giving a fresh stimulus to commerce and to public credit, were either completely ruined or threatened with bankruptcy. The war with France, though favourable to our arms in the first instance, could not be carried on with continued success, because the spirit of independence and liberty with which that nation was animated gave it every advantage over dependent and mercenary soldiers, and the resources of Spain would soon be exhausted; for she could only rely upon her pecuniary means. In this, however, he was bound to bestow his meed of praise upon a minister who carried on the war without subsidies, and preserved the independence at least of our cabinet; but he could not pass encomiums upon the excessive confidence of that minister with respect to the zeal which the nation appeared to have manifested on the occasion of the war. The patriotic gifts, however great, served at most to display the honour and loyalty of the Spaniards, but never could cover the expenses of so costly a struggle; we must not flatter ourselves that such a spirit of enthusiasm would be indefinitely prolonged, because the impulse did not in reality proceed, as in France, from popular fanaticism; neither did it proceed from a sincere religious enthusiasm, so little in accordance with the spirit of the age,—an enthusiasm which, if it existed at all, was of itself competent to make head against the re-

publican excitement. The catholic zeal hitherto manifested was but a passing flame fanned by the priesthood—an artificial fire which would soon die away for want of nourishment. The government might no doubt rely at this moment upon a species of popular zeal; but this zeal was unaided by those violent means of action which France is enabled to put forward owing to the spoils of other countries, with which she carries on the war. . . . . Should our first successes be followed by defeats, should the ardour of the nation abate, confidence would immediately disappear: no more money could then be raised! What would be the chances of the war, when we consider the prodigious efforts of France, and the swarm of combatants which she sends forth to her frontiers!

The count omitted nothing that could darken the complexion of the picture. "Behold," he said, "that countless people, whose invincible spirit of liberty manifests itself as in the mighty ages of Greece and Italy! Unequal is the war in which to soldiers who are mere machines, mere passive instruments, France opposes millions of intellectual citizens, inflamed with the love of country!—a war in which nations grown old under the yoke, and bent under the lash of their masters, are attempting to struggle against compact bodies of men grown young, and still drunk with enthusiasm and democratic ideas!—a war, in short, declared against a nation who add

to the power of intelligence, industry, and real wealth, the power of a mighty revolution, and dispose at pleasure of the fortune and the services of all—a character no parallel to which could be found in any other country."

After thus passing in review and extolling the superiority of France; the general rising already effected of all citizens in a condition to bear arms; the sudden and magic promotion of common soldiers to the rank of generals; the success of troops scarcely yet standing in line, against the most renowned military commanders of Europe —"Suppose," added the count, "an occurrence which is within the range of possibility, that one of the allied powers should be vanquished and forced to withdraw from the field of battle; the whole weight of the war would then fall upon others—upon the most loyal—upon those most implicated." The orator here entered upon a variety of minute details: he exposed the ambitious and contradictory views which rendered the union of the several cabinets impossible; their fatal rivalry, the unconnectedness of their contradictory plans, which secured the triumphs of the French armies over a coalition deficient in compactness and regularity of action.

"In the event," he continued, "of one or two defections, of any decisive reverses in the north, which are equally to be dreaded, Spain, left alone and insulated, will be compelled to contend against an

overwhelming force, which will crush it with its weight; no resource will then be left to us except that of beseeching St. James the apostle to extricate us by a miracle from our embarrassment. According to the natural course of things, nothing can save us from destruction; Spain cannot fail to be invaded and conquered. I know France, and the grounds which new ideas are daily gaining in that country; I know the fiery ardour of the nation. I say, and foretell it with deep regret, if the danger be not averted in time, as I think we yet have it in our power to do; if we do not separate ourselves from the coalition; if at this moment, when fortune still favours our arms, we do not conclude a solid peace, the horses of the French cavalry will sooner or later, perhaps ere long, trample upon the walks of the *Prado*, and quench their thirst at its fountains. I am sensible that my forebodings are gloomy. Will it hence be inferred that I do not justly estimate the national courage and spirit? Ah! let not those feelings be put to a rash test; let not impossibilities be required. The dictates of truth and of prudence are of more value than a rash presumption. Courage alone is not sufficient to conquer a powerful and exasperated foe. Let not the avowal of my gloomy presentiments afflict the heart of his majesty; my loyalty must pay him the tribute of a long experience acquired in the service of three august monarchs,—his ancestor

Philip V, Ferdinand VI. his uncle, and Charles III. his father. Let the purity of my intentions plead my apology for the freedom of my language. God send that Spain may be so fortunate as to avoid the dangers impending over Europe! May the two nations, burying in oblivion a dispute respecting persons and principles, which compromises their dearest interests, renew their old friendship and the basis of their ancient alliance!"

Such was the speech of Count d'Aranda, as far as my memory enables me to recollect it. I shall not be reproached with attempting to diminish anything of its energy. The ideas, the substance are all his own. As to the method, the fitness, the urbanity of his language, I candidly own that I have perhaps been over-scrupulous in strictly adhering to it, in order that I might not be suspected of endeavouring to derogate from its merits.

CHAPTER XIX.

CONTINUATION.

Reply to the Speech of Count d'Aranda.

CHARLES IV. had listened to this speech without manifesting the slightest emotion; his eyes shone with majestic brightness, which seemed to dart a pure and gentle light; his calm and dignified bearing bespoke the monarch: he soared at that moment above his fellow men. More than one counsellor had shuddered at the count's temerity. Every one trembled, and I more than others, to approach the discussion on the dangerous ground on which the fearless old man had flung it. The king commanded me to speak, and by so doing gave a temporary respite to our colleagues, who felt relieved from an oppressive weight.

I endeavoured, in the first place, to allay the painful impression which the maxims laid down by the count could not fail to produce. For maxims such as these, which are rarely avowed elsewhere, it was the height of rashness to utter within the walls of the council of state.

Their rigorous and peremptory application, so strongly enforced by the count, made it imperative upon me to refute, whilst I endeavoured to soften and explain away what was most objectionable in them. It fortunately happened that my sentiments in regard to peace greatly coincided with his own; I desired it as much as he; the only difference between us consisting in his urging its immediate conclusion, whilst I advocated our awaiting a seasonable opportunity for enforcing solid guarantees from France, and for adducing sound motives to warrant our terminating the war, without suddenly deserting the alliance contracted with foreign courts; in a word, without staining our national character. Accordingly, I indulged a hope that upon calm reflection, and on becoming sensible of my good intentions, the count would explain himself in a more reserved manner than he had done, in order to allay the irritation caused by the novelty of his opinions and his unwarrantable freedom of language. In asserting my own opinion in measured terms, I was cautious not to wound his self-love, and I kept as near to his principles as I consistently could without renouncing mine: though attacked by him, I evinced every respect for his age; and if he felt mortified at witnessing the triumph of my opinions, he could not, at least, find fault with the manner in which I sought to procure their adoption.

"If there exist in the world," I said, "a place where political theories may be unreservedly discussed, it is assuredly in this assembly, in which the contest of opinions never can be attended with evil consequences. It is important for our present guidance and our future proceedings, that the question under debate be properly understood; that every argument be brought forward, and followed up with perfect candour, on whichever side it be urged, whether its advocate enforce his own sentiments or the views of others. Discussion cannot fail to throw light upon the subject. We will thus be enabled to conciliate diverging opinions; the question will be seen under every aspect: this will be the means of eliciting the truth, to the evidence of which all who respect its dictates will yield assent, and thus secure its triumph.

"Whatever diversity of ideas may prevail in respect to state affairs, this assembly is animated with one spirit,—a uniform sense of loyalty and love of country. There may be a disparity of opinions amongst us, but we all aim at the same object: mine it is to discuss, and not to reprove; to persuade others, or to yield to the influence of persuasion, well prepared to abandon my own views if it can be proved to me that they are founded in error.

"On our present determination may depend the fate of Spain, the preservation of the crown,

the honour of the country. Who could presume to render interests so dear to us subservient to a vain caprice of self-love?

"I aspire after peace, I always desired it; and Spain stands in need of so valuable a blessing. The country was just beginning to breathe, after the embarrassments and losses entailed upon her by the deplorable five years' war. The government had much to repair, much to accomplish for the reviving of commerce, industry, and credit, and for restoring to circulation the capital which that war, from the apprehensions it excited, had caused to disappear. The present war has destroyed our rising hopes. The resources of the state, as well as private fortunes, will be again compromised. But I appeal to your impartial judgment; whose will be the fault? Assuredly the present government cannot be reproached with the misfortunes which other hands have prepared for us. This is neither the time nor the place for recrimination. Human foresight is often deceived by events. . . . . What must now be deplored is the fatal consequence of the struggle so unseasonably engaged in with regard to the North American question. Happy would it have been for Spain and France if all the mischief springing out of that war, which alone deserved to be called an *impolitic* one, had been limited to the enormous expenses it occasioned! But an evil genius has profited by the

occasion to kindle a fire; the first sparks of which are already spreading in all directions. I might have refrained from touching so tender a chord. . . . . But our elder has himself quoted the American war as the source of our financial embarrassments; and I am bound to add, that it has been still more fertile in political disasters. Truly fatal war! first link in the chain of misfortunes which the present war is entailing upon us,—with this remarkable difference, however, that the former one was wholly spontaneous and uncalled-for; whereas the latter, in which we are now involved, was neither provoked nor desired by us! It was one of indispensable necessity, notwithstanding all our efforts to avoid it.

"Yes, it is a *necessary* war, which is as much as to say that it is a *just* one, for no war is just unless it be necessary. I now come to the question. I shall first prove by the axioms of common right, as it is universally understood, that the present is a just one. Rights and duties, all are equal and reciprocal between nations: the axioms which determine rights are never named apart from those which also fix the limits of duties. If you violate the latter, rights are then devoid of force. Nations are independent of each other: no nation has the right of interfering in the internal affairs of another nation; this is an incontrovertible principle: but it is likewise laid down as an axiom, or well understood, that this principle

holds, *so long as the latter nation respects the principle, and refrains from disturbing or injuring its neighbour.* Has France fulfilled this condition of the principle? Behold her popular assembly, her democratic haunts, her incendiary writings, flung at the face of Europe from the first days of the revolution. Is not this intermeddling in the internal affairs of other countries? Is not this encouraging nations to insurrection, outraging their governments, and openly preaching rebellion? Will it be alleged that the right of publishing one's thoughts, orally or in writing, is the right of a free people? Agreed, if you will it; but this must be with respect to its own affairs, not as regards those of others. What has given to France, or to any other nation upon earth, the right to insult other governments, and to breathe discord and sedition amongst them?

"By tolerating such excesses, even if the present government of France be not the original promoter of them, she places herself in a state of hostility towards all others. It matters little whether the attacks against the laws, the repose, the existence, or the social order, whether good or bad, of a neighbouring country, proceed from France or her agents. There are other weapons wielded besides warlike ones against the existence of a state: bitter censure, invective, sarcasm, cutting irony, audacious provocation, are also to be classed as

offences, violations, hostilities far more insulting than actual weapons; for a war openly waged provokes and meets with more or less resistance, but the moral poison of seduction infuses itself and corrodes in spite of every precaution. Let us be candid: to force a people, by means of an invasion, to receive or submit to any particular form of government:—to disturb a country by urging it into insurrection against the established order of things by means of firebrands, by lighting up the torch of civil war,—are unquestionably acts of intervention in the affairs of a neighbour of an equally pernicious tendency: and this character of interference is infinitely worse and more odious than the other. Will it be asserted, that one has not the right to check and repel a nation or a government which resorts to the latter course? The simple dictates of reason, the mere interest of natural defence, warrant us in opposing, in punishing, the troublesome incendiaries. Civilians are all agreed as to the right of uniting to combat, under any form he may assume, an enemy who stirs up disturbances and attacks the basis of social order. Such are the principles of eternal justice, founded upon the interests of all, according with the rights of preservation and of legitimate defence, which are the privilege of private individuals, and far more so of society, in which each one has contributed to the common stock his individual strength, his knowledge, his virtues, and placed

them under the fostering care of a 'government which is to protect him in the peaceful enjoyment of his lawful rights.

" Such are likewise the principles of human justice, in virtue of which we are waging war, not against France, but against the tyrants who oppress her, and who, abusing her name and power, compel every nation to oppose her.

" There are other principles, other rules of common right, which we may be allowed to invoke. The French nation is waging war against herself: two parties, the one a popular, the other a royalist party, are tearing her very vitals. Lyons, Toulon, Marseilles, other towns scattered over the country, have avowed the feelings of animosity they bear to the Convention which has reduced them into obedience. From the Gironde to the Loire, along the western coast, from the Loire to Havre, a general wish is expressed for a government tempered by a political law: the royalist spirit of a great part of Brittany, and of the Vendean insurrection, is well known. I can affirm, without being guilty of exaggeration, that three-fourths of France are far from hostile to royalty. The frightful persecution directed against that spirit, the law issued against suspected persons, the dungeons choked with prisoners, the blood rushing in torrents from the guillotine and the fire of grape-shot, fully prove that there are two parties; the one tyrannical and

oppressive, the other oppressed, groaning beneath the yoke, or appealing to arms, either in the interior or along the frontiers of France. This is a civil war with all its horrors. Have not neighbouring governments the right—is it not an act of generosity in them—to support the party which they deem worthy of their assistance? Can it be unjust to afford aid and succour to royalists in a country where the destruction of the throne has caused the instant overflow of crime in every direction? Are we not bound to protect the only party which offers us any guarantee? Is there not, for Spain, an additional motive in the family compact—an actual and a personal treaty in favour of the Bourbons,—an obligatory treaty which is neither abolished nor proscribed? Has not the fallen branch a right to claim the fulfilment of that compact, so long as there remains a possibility of restoring it to the throne?

"There are circumstances, no doubt, however rare in my opinion, in which the positive interests of the nation may overrule the dynastic interest of a reigning house. I have said, and I maintain, that such cases are of rare occurrence. Dynastic or family rights are seldom at variance with the interests of the country. I am unwilling to lay stress upon that or any other opinion; but who will venture to assert that the interest of the house of Bourbon is not identified with that of Spain? The family compact, as I have already

observed, was at once a real and a personal one: on the one hand, it secured the throne to the Bourbons; it secured, on the other, consideration, a common defence, mutual advantages to every nation subjected to the sway of a member of that august house of France, Italy, and Spain; all their subjects were united in one and the same family. What have not been the improvements of our country under that noble dynasty? What strength and splendour were not derived from the alliance of these princes with each other? This is well known to all, and an undeniable truth. Can we then be placing the rights of that royal family above our own, if we take up arms, when the storm has shivered its trunk, in order to uphold a branch under the shelter of which the Spanish nation has prospered and delights to live? Have our monarchs so ill deserved of our country?

"If it was an act of justice, therefore, to check the crimes of the French government; if humanity ordered us to succour the oppressed victims of the civil war; if there exists a compact binding Spain to the family of her princes; if gratitude, unless it be an empty sound; if the faith of treaties be not a chimera,—on a proper consideration of the subject, and without departing from the sphere of theories, or from the rules on which a nation may and ought to rest its acts, no man of sense and impartiality will designate the

present as a useless war; still less when it is witnessed with what prudence and circumspection Spain, after having exhausted every honourable means of preserving peace, has finally determined upon the war. For it is only in the full conviction of her justice, of her infringed rights, and of her moderation, that she has so determined.

"I can affirm it without fear of being belied in Spain, in Europe, or even in France, by any one not blinded by passion,—the present war is not the effect of a caprice of power, of an imprudent burst of enthusiasm, of a desire of revenge, or even of a family interest to be upheld: if we were to suppose, what Castilian pride will never allow, that the interest of the crown is of little importance to us, none will ever be indifferent to what concerns the well-being of the state.

"That such are the motives which have compelled us to maintain the war, I appeal to Spain herself, who not only wished, but was loudly clamorous for it, and spontaneously tendered us the means of carrying it on. When a war breaks out which originates in mere caprice, or in what is so considered by the nation, the silence of the people, the indifference of public opinion, and oftentimes a general murmuring, warn the cabinet of its imprudence. Even in the case of a just war, the people are always prone to complain; they bless the government which seizes the first opportunity of bringing it to a close without in-

flicting too great a sacrifice upon the national pride. Have we, in the present instance, witnessed such indifference, or heard these murmurings? Assuredly not; for it is too well known, that, to secure the benefits of peace, the government has exerted every means not incompatible with the safety of the country and the dignity of the crown. Whilst we were labouring to obtain that peace, the object of our wishes and of our constant efforts, the people grew indignant at the delay; the whole nation uttered the cry of war without awaiting a signal from the government; no difference was manifested in public opinion, no evidence of fear, no hesitation; grandees and humble peasants, nobles and plebeians, rich and poor, all vied with each other in eagerly depositing their offerings on the steps of the throne; all urged on the war, I repeat it, ere the cabinet, driven to extremity, had suffered its determination to transpire. Are not these acknowledged facts sufficiently indicative of the course we were to follow? Can the whole Spanish nation be wrong? Is this general desire no more than a suggestion emanating from religious fanaticism and from the privileged class?

"Those who still appear to entertain this opinion (and they are few in number) have not closely watched the slow but progressive advance of the public mind. Late events had riveted the attention of all. If the burst of a mighty nation

aiming at reforms in its institutions may, in its origin, have excited apprehensions in a calm observer accustomed to read the future in the history of the past, the greater number did not at first give way to such mistrust, but rather, on the contrary, to pleasing anticipations. They beheld a monarch entering into a bond of union with his people, and endeavouring, in this mutual concord, to remodel the state and fix it upon a liberal and a noble basis. What prospects were not entertained from the concurrence of every virtue, with every talent in the promotion of so splendid an object?

"The illusion was not lasting; it was the dawn of a fine day, but the sky was soon overcast; a violent storm succeeded; the passions let loose soon silenced the voice of reason; France gave herself up to every excess. From that moment our repugnance of such deeds was manifested in a general feeling of horror: this was not yet a war-cry; the good sense of the Spanish people, the prudence of the government, inclined us to respect the independence of our neighbours: no country bordering upon one so prone to war exhibited greater reserve than we did. Other powers had at once recourse to arms, though they were afterwards slow and timid in executing their projects; their early tone of command only added fuel to the fire: Spain acted with more discrimination; her first wish was to pay homage to the sound principles which our neighbours affected to dis-

own; she offered her mediation; she even condescended to have recourse to solicitations, and went no farther than to tender advice to her ancient ally, to dissuade her from a crime which would entail disgrace upon her, and be followed by a deluge of evils. Who could have believed it? Those offices of goodwill on the part of a magnanimous and powerful people, anxious to prevent the perpetration of a crime, and setting no other price upon her friendship than the attainment of that object, — those noble exertions were only met with insolent disdain. A ferocious demagogue proposed that war should be declared against us, and his motion was applauded by the sanguinary men who exercise unlimited control over France, and unmercifully prey upon her! The atrocious crime is soon consummated, and anarchy increases by its perpetration. That nothing should be wanting in their arrogant conduct, they intimate to us that we must disarm. ..... The Spanish monarch is allowed no other alternative than that of treating with cordiality the savage murderer of the chief of his family, and signing a treaty of peace over the corpse of Louis XVI, or of having those ferocious republicans for enemies..... What Spaniard would have hesitated a moment in the choice of his answer? War! war! exclaimed the whole nation; such was also the resolve of our august sovereign; but it was not the tumultuous accla-

mation of fanatics or of privileged egotists. . . . It was the true cry of national honour,—the '*St. James for ever, and Spain forward,*' which has at all times been the banner of Castilians hurrying on to glory.

"I have said enough to prove the justice of this war; but is there not, besides the sacred law of honour, a right, the first of all, that of self-preservation, of natural defence, of resistance to an enemy who has framed for himself a system of indiscriminately attacking the laws, the manners, the habits, the religious belief, the dearest affections of other people? who assumes to call in question all established institutions, and attempts by means of terror or of cunning to impose his principles, his errors, his delirium,—in a word, to procure accomplices in the crimes he has been perpetrating? Good heavens! what times have we reached? The philosophy of the age has justly censured the crusades of old, which were undertaken for the sake of religion; will this so much vaunted philosophy approve the crusade of atheism and anarchy? What text of divine right, or of the common law of nations, will be invoked in favour of those who trample upon both? in favour of a government which preaches impiety, sacrilege, spoliation, the ruin of whatever exists, and gives practical effect to its frightful doctrines wherever its insatiable delegates are enabled to penetrate? Behold their writings, the speeches uttered in

their public assembly,—fatal eruptions of the volcano which daily vomits forth those decrees of rancour and blood, those missions of death and extermination, which are to desolate France and every country adjoining her! Figure to your minds the anguish, the sorrows of the people of Savoy, of the county of Nice, of Belgium, of Germany, of every country which those Vandals have entered as friends or enemies, with a branch of olives or a sword in hand! . . . . . Threatened as we are by such dangers and insults, there exists nowhere a law which forbids our waging war against those disturbers of public tranquillity, whose excesses disgrace the present age, and who, by the horror they inspire, will cause the light of knowledge to be shunned, and prolong the state of degrading ignorance in which so many nations are yet plunged. Shall we allow our children to become slaves, and be reared up in the school of such monsters? I hesitate not to declare that against these monsters alone we are waging war: the question is not to avenge a family quarrel; to impose such or such form of government upon France; to restore, in opposition to the public will, a throne which rebellion has destroyed; or to force the country to receive any particular sovereign for their ruler, who, possessing no right to their confidence, would be powerless to give them a rallying point or to hold the reins of government. Would to Heaven, indeed, that, free

from the yoke which oppresses her, France would herself recall her legitimate princes and be restored, under laws emanating from that exalted family, to her former days of happiness and glory! There is no knowing what may yet come to pass! France at the present day—true France—maintains the silence of terror. There is but one determination openly manifested, that of *not being brought under the yoke of foreigners;* and this is the noble sentiment which, oh heavens! a handful of tyrants work upon and turn to their own exclusive advantage!

"But the day is not far distant (I have reasons for anticipating it) when the patriotic zeal of a few citizens, in unison with their personal interest, will overthrow and crush that band of wretches who lacerate and tarnish the honour of France. The day of a salutary re-action is not far distant, when other men, other laws, other political maxims will become more solid guarantees to us; it will then be possible to open a friendly communication with France. Such should be, in my opinion, the proximate termination of this war, carried on without ambitious views, of a purely defensive character, firmly entered upon, but pursued without obstinacy though not without mature reflection; a war unsubsidised by foreigners, undertaken at our own expense, which we are ready to bring to an end so soon as the anti-social condition of France shall cease to endanger our honour and safety.

"Is this hope likely to be realised? Shall we have long to wait? The most circumspect plans often evaporate into air; but one thing certain is, that a government such as the one which now vexes and preys upon our neighbours cannot last. France is not a country in which barbarism can become indigenous to the soil; a reaction is infallible. No sooner will it take place, whosoever may gain the ascendency, than the mere fact of the fall of her present tyrants will impress upon their successors the necessity of adopting an opposite course, and of returning, for their own sakes, to the common law of nations. The important point is to discriminate with judgment, and take advantage of the seasonable moment; on this depends the repose of Europe and the salvation of France. Whatever government shall eventually be established, whether it be republican, monarchical, a mixture of both, or of any other form, provided it will abstain from attacking others, pay deference to the general principles of justice, and offer some guarantee,—we may then let the torrent run on without attempting to impede its course; for to persist, after it shall have returned to its channel, in still carrying on the war, would only be provoking a fresh overflow of its waters. I will not presume to answer for the future proceedings of other cabinets, but I can affirm that Spain is engaged in the general alliance by no other conditions than those which the honour and

safety of our country impose as a law upon us, as it would upon any other government. None can make it imperative upon us to continue the war beyond that limit; any attempt to do so would be alike misplaced and superfluous.

"This candid exposition of the principles which actuate the ministry shows that so far from being opposed to the restoration of peace, it is ready to claim at the hands of the whole nation the merit of it. Will it be said that the moment has arrived? I dare not venture to believe it. Our military honour is untarnished; but that of the cabinet, which is no less so up to this moment, would be grievously prejudiced were we to desert, without a motive, the cause of our allies, and to treat separately, I shall not say with France well or ill represented, but with tyrants who rule and decimate her; with men devoid of religion, of every divine or human law which could be taken as guarantees for the fulfilment of their engagements. What would be said of us, if, at sight of the horrors which appal the whole world, we appeared freely to sympathise with men sullied with so many crimes, when there existed no overwhelming necessity to compel us to such conduct? Would we not be held as their accomplices, and really be assuming that character? Have they not avowed their enmity to all who disapprove of their acts, and who desire to break off all connexion with them? Have they

revoked the decrees of the 19th of November and 15th of December 1792, in which the declaration to that effect is recorded? Those decrees are still in full force. What government jealous of its self-respect could consent to be a member of such a community? This cannot by any possibility take place. A peace at this moment!—why, do the Jacobins themselves desire it? nothing is further from their thoughts. Are we humbly to solicit it at their hands? Shall Spain exhibit the first, perhaps the only example of having concluded a peace with such men, no matter on which side it may have been solicited or tendered? Let us suppose the cabinet capable of so debasing itself; where shall we find a Spaniard willing to undertake the task of treating with them, and to affix his signature by the side of those of Collot d'Herbois, Couthon, St. Just, or Roberspierre? Will ministers of his Catholic Majesty, acting on the behalf of religious and monarchical Spain, authorise by their presence the assassinations which daily embrue Paris with blood? or calmly listen to the insults unceasingly poured forth against the God of heaven and against earthly majesties in their public assemblies, in the streets, and in the open places? Will they, in a word, officially assist at the bacchanalian revels of those wild, infuriated men, who call themselves republicans? Surely not. Let us leave them to themselves; their presence is shunned by every nation.

Shall Spain have a representative in that desolate abode of crime?

"Let us not then call this war either impolitic or unjust so long as France bends beneath the iron yoke of tyrants, so long as every neighbouring nation is threatened with the same yoke. France is oppressed: the war we are waging to assist her in shaking off a yoke which is disgraceful to her people, and raises against her so many enemies from without, if contrary to every probability she consents to endure such tyranny, and even encourages it,—that war becomes necessary, whatever may be the issue of it. If France should succumb in the struggle, policy will interfere to prevent her becoming the object of foreign ambition, and to maintain the balance of Europe: if this balance should cease to exist, the loss of it would be a far minor evil than that which threatens us at present, and which it behoves us in the first instance to guard against. Should Spain, with a view to prevent France from falling a prey to foreigners, expose herself to the danger of falling a prey to France? of two evils, let us adopt the least, and make others, if possible, bear the penalty of it. To save our neighbours from shipwreck, we must not expose our vessel to the danger of being upset. To obtain a friendship which, when tendered by us, has been disdainfully rejected, let us not, in this emergency, compromise our existence. Such ought to be our political course of conduct.

"For the rest, the council may be assured that we have not closed our eyes to future events; we have not neglected our relations with other powers interested in the maintenance of the European equilibrium. With regard to Great Britain, I am the first to acknowledge and deplore the advantages she derives from this war. France and England appear to us at the present day in the light of two evils which it is our fate to have to encounter in opposite directions; but the fault is not ours; it has not depended upon us to avert them. The one is a pressing, an immediate danger; the other is also a serious one, but its progress is slow, and allows us a short respite. Let us apply a remedy to the most urgent; this is the part of prudence. We may resort to palliatives with a view to neutralise the other, and prevent its gaining ground: the time will come for dealing with it according to its character; time occasionally brings a remedy in its train.

"But what if France should be triumphant in a struggle in which success has already dawned on her first warlike attempts? . . . . . This, in the long run, is scarcely possible whilst there is an utter absence of regularity in her government,—whilst she fails to adopt laws which can constitute her into a nation; when this shall have taken place, she instantly becomes our friend. But if, in spite of all, anarchical France should eventually triumph? . . . . . Spain would bend to the de-

crees of Providence; but she will not have to reproach herself with a betrayal of the duty imposed on every nation, of looking to their defence and to their self-preservation. Happen what may, I here affirm that any possible event will find the government prepared to meet it: it is alive to whatever may take place; whether the fortune of arms abandon us, whether the allied powers alter their political system, our course of conduct shall remain unchanged. Neither frivolous caprices nor the suggestions of foreigners shall prevent our concluding a peace as soon as it may prove seasonable or of possible attainment.

"The government will not stand alone on the field of battle, or when any opportunity shall present itself for treating. More than one cabinet shares our views, our moderate and conciliating intentions; in every event, those cabinets will harmonise with us; but the king's government, whilst it prefers the blessings of peace to the splendour of victories, is still bound, in my opinion, to brave every danger, even the frowns of fortune, rather than subscribe to treaties which would tarnish its honour.

"I abstain from dwelling on the expenses of the war; it is national in its character; the people eagerly submit to sacrifices which the glory and security of the country imperiously call for. Each one contributes his share at this moment with a profuseness as affecting and honourable

as on the first day. It is a war undertaken for the maintenance of the nation's rights, of its religious creed, of its threatened altars,—for the very existence of the country. In the social overthrow publicly proclaimed by the French, in the stupendous reforms they announce, the national gravity beholds with contempt so many fatal gifts which foreigners would impose upon them. When a people display so lofty a character, they enrich themselves by every gift they offer at their country's shrine; their virtue is ennobled and increased by the offering; theirs is for the state an inexhaustible treasure.

"The French have fallen far short of the Spaniards in patriotic generosity. We shall not be reduced to the necessity of paying our troops with *assignats;* we will not resort to their system of robbing private individuals, of plundering the churches, in order to support our armies. Let others extol to the skies the power, the enthusiasm, of the republicans; there is much, in my view, to be deducted from such an exaggerated picture. I know that, in order to fill up the void of the public coffers, the French government has recourse to confiscations, to forced requisitions, and to the guillotine. Once the terror of the sword shall have ceased, when each one shall be at liberty to express his sentiments, you will soon be enabled to try the test of that republican zeal, and will discover that the dazzling fire is but

apparent, without warmth, like the rapid and fugitive spark emitted from steel when coming into contact with a hard substance..... How great is the difference with respect to us! All is with us real, spontaneous truth,—the vigorous expression of a deep, a sublime sentiment, rooted in the old soil of the country, in which all virtues naturally grow and flourish; fidelity to our kings, religious fervour, love of country! Nothing can dry up these three burning sources of Spanish energy.

"As to the dangers to be incurred in the present war, I own the war to be far more serious than the military parades of another epoch, when diplomatists, always closely following the army, after a battle won or lost, met together at a banquet to treat respecting nuptials, or to prepare chivalric feasts..... The present rather resembles the old wars of religion; the enthusiasm of the public mind heightens the physical strength. This is a war of principles, of popular interests, of social subversion; a frightful crusade unexampled in history! Science may flourish by the aid of warlike deeds! If the result of a struggle be doubtful, probabilities are in our favour: ours is a just cause; we must leave something to chance. Finally, one of two things will happen: either the faction which at this moment rules paramount in France will be hurled from power, and make way for other men, for another

system holding out the hope of a peaceful, a regular, an encouraging accommodation; or that faction, intoxicated with victory, will pursue its fatal career to the end. In the first, which is the most likely case,—I may add, a case which will infallibly come to pass,—peace is at our gates; we open our arms to greet its approach. In the second case, should the enemy triumph, we must put on the armour of stern courage, and make head against him. I speak under the influence of a deep-rooted conviction: fortune may prove, by turns, favourable and contrary to us; but we cannot succumb, we can never bend to the yoke. Spain fights for her king, her God, her domestic hearths; for the soil of the country which foreigners have never invaded with impunity!"

CHAPTER XX.

Bitter language of Count d'Aranda.—The King is offended at it.—The sitting of the Council is adjourned.—The Count's disgrace.—My conduct towards him.

AMONGST the many onerous duties of the office of prime minister, there is one for which nothing can make amends. Whatever may be his loyalty and the constancy of his endeavours to accomplish the good he has in view, its attainment generally depends upon secrecy; the public must be ignorant of the object of the measures adopted by the government,[1] for the slightest indiscretion may occasion their failure. Nay, when they have actually been carried into effect, it is often requisite to withhold, for a long time at least, a knowledge of the real motives in which they have originated, and of the means employed for their accomplishment.

To this unavoidable necessity the man in power

[1] The Prince here alludes to a monarchical or absolute government, such as that of Spain at the period in question. A representative government must, on the contrary, seek and obtain its support from that publicity which is viewed by absolute power as a hindrance to its measures.—E.

must submit: the field is therefore open to his enemies, who calumniate him beforehand; and history at last adopts the most unjust imputations as truths, in the absence of more correct information. No part of my life, beset as it has always been by difficulties of more or less magnitude, was ever free from this painful necessity: I shall occasionally have to allude to it in these Memoirs. I may quote the following instance, with reference to the discussion provoked by Count d'Aranda.

It has been asserted that this old counsellor of state recommended peace; that I, an inexperienced young man, insisted upon war; and that the count fell a victim to his philanthropic vote. Those who beheld and deplored his disgrace are not aware of any other motive for it. They knew that a discussion had arisen in the council between Count d'Aranda and the Duke de la Alcudia: they were utterly ignorant of the arguments urged by either. I remained a minister, and at the summit of power; he was exiled, and his friends laid his downfal to my charge. In the mean while, what had occurred within the walls of the council necessarily remained unknown to all but its members: the contest was not of a nature to be made public: we were all strictly forbidden to mention the subject, under pain of failing in our duty and betraying the secret of the state.

How much this compulsory reserve has appeared to warrant honourable men in dealing in the most calumnious imputations!

To what cause was the count's disgrace to be attributed?—to the violence of his temper, the irascibility of his self-love. The most undeniable, the most self-evident truths must be clothed in moderate language, even in countries which enjoy a freedom of discussion: they stand in need of being cautiously and clearly developed, if we wish them to be heard without alarm..... This gentle and salutary circumspection is far more necessary in an absolute monarchy, where the person of the monarch is the object of a religious, even a superstitious respect..... What shall I say? In a tempered monarchy, does not the king, by general and understood assent, represent also the majesty of the people? Here my readers have to pronounce,—first, between my principles and those laid down by the count; secondly, whether he urged his principles with becoming moderation; thirdly, whether in my refutation I avowed myself his rival or his enemy. I could not possibly acknowledge him to be in the right: entertaining, as I did, a contrary impression, I was bound to contradict him,—not in order to flatter the king, who no doubt claimed our respect, but held a debasing adulation in abhorrence. I contradicted the count, not to assume a tone of importance: I was too well aware that

my downfal was unavoidable in the event of fortune proving adverse to our arms, as it had already deserted the standard of the northern powers. I combated the count's doctrines, I repeat it, because I differed with him in opinion, though persuaded that if my views should prevail, I was preparing for myself those anxieties and cares from which a peace would have preserved me. I had unquestionably the right, though I did not abuse it, of combating the advice of my colleague; I had abundance of reasons to justify my views, but sacrificed part of my strength in order to give him the benefit of such share as might in fairness be allowed to him. I far exceeded the limits of my duty by revealing with perfect candour the intentions of the government: I hinted at a prospect of settling the disputed question in a manner which made my views appear to approximate to those of the count: I did not even hesitate in frankly and openly meeting him half-way towards conciliating his good-will; but, so far from encouraging, he rejected my advances. He was no doubt quite at liberty to do so; but it behoved him to reply to my arguments, to soften down his principles or explain away what was repugnant in them: this was his right, and I had afforded him a favourable opportunity to exercise it; but self-love had obscured his sight.

The fact is, that when I developed my opinion

and the impressions of the government, several members of the council, and the king himself, gave evidence of their approbation by signs which were almost involuntary, but were nevertheless the spontaneous tokens of a conviction suddenly felt or of a conformity of ideas. Without betraying the slightest displeasure, but with an air of calm satisfaction, Charles IV, as soon as I had ceased to speak, turned towards the count as if to invite him to resume the subject. It occurred to the whole council that this circumstance was of fortunate omen, and placed it in his power to soften and moderate the asperity of his language and the rigour of his political axioms.

The contrary came to pass: visibly mortified, and assuming an offended tone, ill suited to his age, and to his position in the presence of the monarch, whose exalted station claimed more respect and circumspection at his hands, the count uttered these words, which are still fresh in my recollection:—"For my part, sire, I have nothing to add or to expunge from what I have stated both orally and in writing. It were easy for me to refute the arguments, far more obsequious than solid, with which it has been attempted to support the course of war. But what would be the use of it? All I could say would be in vain: your majesty has bestowed unequivocal signs of approbation upon the address of your minister. Who would venture to displease your majesty by giving utterance to arguments of a contrary tendency?"

One of the counsellors endeavoured to interfere, in order, no doubt, to cut short an explanation which was assuming a character of acrimony; but the king broke up the sitting. "Enough for to-day," said he; and he immediately proceeded towards his cabinet, traversing with a quick step the hall of the council in which we still occupied our respective places. As he passed near the count, the latter lisped a few words, which I was unable to collect: they were, probably, words of apology. . . . . We all heard the king's reply: "In your intercourse with my father you were always headstrong, and wanting in due respect; but you never went so far as to insult him in the midst of his council."

What followed is known to all the world. Many persons were witnesses of my efforts to induce the king to pardon this unfortunate sally, in consideration of the count's age. Biographers have scarcely alluded to my good offices on behalf of the noble exile; neither has it been recorded that as soon as his disgrace became known, the tribunal of the Holy Inquisition fancied it had discovered an opportune moment for sifting the documents in which the count figured so conspicuously in the celebrated *Olavide* proceedings, and had the presumption to demand the surrender to it of this new victim. Had I really been his enemy, what more favourable occasion could I desire than that of consigning to others the task of effecting the count's ruin, without ap-

pearing to take any part in it? So far from adopting this course, I claim the merit of having rescued the count from the dreadful affront which awaited him. He lived and died without being aware that he was indebted to me for this good office. A civil procedure, or rather the semblance of one, was instituted by way of gratifying the first moment of irritation of Charles IV; a good and clement king, but the more jealous of the respect of his subjects, as he prided himself in evincing courtesy towards all. I used every personal exertion towards the judge-delegate, in order that he might overlook in his report the count's philosophical opinions. The judge consented to my request: several of his enemies had come forward to volunteer their testimony against him; they were not attended to. Being thus rescued from every imputation with regard to his opinions, there only remained the charge of want of respect to the king, a fault not to be palliated. The severity of the sovereign was satisfied with the banishment of the offender to the Alhambra of Grenada. . . . . Abbé Muriel has departed from the truth in asserting that the count met with rigorous treatment in his exile. Every inhabitant of Grenada, if appealed to, would disprove the assertion. In consequence of the orders I had previously issued, Count d'Aranda was less a prisoner than a guest in the palace of the Moorish kings. Its delightful gardens and

beautiful walks were thrown open to him; no guard or sentry was placed as a check upon his liberty. He was permitted to receive every visitor he thought proper to invite; nor was he deprived for a moment of the means of communication, or of the revenues of his estates, on which it never was intended to lay hands. He preserved all his honours; and I exerted myself in the mean while to procure his release from banishment. I succeeded, after a short time, in obtaining an authority for his residing on his estates in Arragon, his native country. Another minister might have felt some degree of uneasiness at the count's character and principles, especially at a period when his presence in the midst of his vassals and on the French frontier appeared not unattended with danger. I disregarded various insinuations made to me on the subject, and had the satisfaction of exerting in his favour all the influence which my position enabled me to command. However, he still persisted to the last in bearing me a rancorous enmity, which he even carried to the tomb!

Those who commiserated the last disgrace of the count in 1794, were well aware it was not the first that had befallen him; the lively sympathy of his friends having been put to the test on more than one previous occasion: first, under the reign of Ferdinand VI, the chief command of the artillery and engineers was taken away from Count

d'Aranda, and he was removed from Madrid under the pretext of a diplomatic mission to Poland: under the reign of Charles III, he exhausted the patience of this excellent prince by the haughty and exclusive ascendency which he claimed to exercise over his mind, and he lost by such conduct the presidency of the council: Grimaldi replaced him in the king's favour; and in order to get rid of his presence, he was sent into exile under the title of ambassador to Paris. His third mishap occurred during the administration of Florida Blanca, who had him recalled from the court of France, and buried, for a length of years, in the Pantheon of the council of state.[2] Can this have always been the work of envy, or was it not rather the count's fault? Who has not heard of his harshness of temper, of his Arragonese obstinacy,[3] of the irascibility of his self-love, of his intolerable philosophical pretensions? What friends was he likely to secure by that proud disdain of the capacity of others, those constant sallies, that offensive language, that want of consideration which never failed to mortify all who came in contact with

[2] In Spain, counsellors of state might be assimilated to our French ministers of state. H. C. M. neither convoked them at fixed periods, nor all without exception. They were like invalids, who might be again called upon to perform temporary service. This is all: the title was no doubt highly honourable, but the office was nearly divested of every function.—E.

[3] To give an idea of the proverbial obstinacy of an Arragonese, he is represented attempting to drive in a nail with his forehead.—E.

him? He praised toleration, though no one ever displayed less towards those who had the courage to differ from him. It is very far from my intention to deny or undervalue the actions or good qualities which entitle him to praise; but I have no apprehension of being belied by those who have had the means of forming a just estimate of his worth. Count d'Aranda evinced more empiricism than sound learning. No one will ever deny him the possession of extensive knowledge, which he exhibited more particularly in his younger days; it was, however, a crude and shallow knowledge. Connected with the most distinguished literary Frenchmen of the middle of the last century, welcomed by writers who caressed princes and nobles with a view to enlist them under the banners of the Encyclopædia, anxious to figure at any price amongst the modern sages, (for military renown was not within his reach), he treasured up with little discernment whatever came from that source, whether good, bad, or indifferent, and proved himself a proselyte of greater zeal than discretion; retailed the doctrines of the school; and being divested of religious prejudices, though swayed by philosophical enthusiasm, he could only lay claim to the inferior merit of a sectarian attachment.

If this be deemed too severe a judgment, let us listen to Don André Muriel, a great panegyrist of Count d'Aranda, who, in note lxvi. p. 27, of his

translation of the sixth volume of Coxe's work, speaks of him as follows:

"Count d'Aranda was neither a man of genius nor a great man; but he was of an independent mind and possessed extraordinary firmness of character. This was his chief merit. It was fortunate for Spain that he applied to the reform of abuses those qualities which are so valuable in a statesman. His country was indebted to him for important improvements in the social system; however, it is but just to acknowledge that he was powerfully seconded by such men as Campomanès and Florida Blanca, on whom devolved the internal administration of the kingdom. Both were *Fiscales* (Attorneys-General) of the Council of Castile, from which emanated, at that period, the impulse given to reforms. It is well known that, during his stay in Paris, Count d'Aranda had contracted a close friendship with the authors of the Encyclopædia, from whose intercourse he derived the ardent longing for innovations which tormented him. His notions upon many subjects were sound and correct, but tinctured with great exaggeration upon others. Amidst the crowd of new ideas propagated by the French philosophers of the eighteenth century, it was not always an easy task to discriminate the truth from the mass of more or less paradoxical theories. The count's understanding did not keep pace with his energetic character. The Marquis de Caraccioli, who

had much frequented him in Paris, ingeniously compared his mind to a deep well with a narrow opening."

Peace to the ashes of the dead! exclaim my

[4] It is remarkable that Abbé Muriel presents this note as his own, whereas he has literally copied it from the Universal Biography of Contemporaries, a work published previously to the translation of Coxe's work. The plagiarism is of little consequence; suffice it that M. Muriel has adopted the ideas and the text of the article. He assents to the opinion of the biographers, and lays claim to it, doubtless from a conviction of its correctness.

* Others have said, "to a bottle containing good liquor, but scarcely allowing it to run out, owing to its narrow neck." Making the most of the expression, it conveys but scanty praise. The qualification which invariably follows a compliment shows that M. Muriel, who is a man of talent, is also a churchman; for he gives sufficient evidence of Jesuitism. There is far more rigidness and candour in the sketch furnished by the Prince of the Peace; he has drawn Count d'Aranda in full face: Bourgoing, the Biography of Contemporaries, and M. Muriel, have only given us his profile. Their representation of the count proves, in spite of all their circumspection, that the portrait drawn by the Prince of the Peace must be a good likeness.

The biography of the brothers Michaud may be referred to on the same subject. The article is written by M. Bourgoing, who had been intimately acquainted with Count d'Aranda, and who, notwithstanding his benevolence towards every one, speaks of him in nearly the same terms. However, he is mistaken in placing under the reign of Charles III. the count's mission to Poland, where he remained seven years. Ferdinand VI. only died in 1759. Aranda had already been recalled to Spain, where Charles III. had an opportunity of employing him, after his accession to the crown, first as Captain-general of Valencia in 1762 or 1763; and afterwards as President of the Council in 1765, about the period of the expulsion of the Jesuits, which took place in 1767.—E.

readers. I readily assent to the observation. But I also beseech that the peace of the living may not be disturbed; that the bones of those who are no longer of this world may not be constantly flung at their heads.

CHAPTER XXI.

Calumny published by Don André Muriel.—Observations.

I MUST dwell a short time longer on this episode, the historical portion of which has just been detailed at sufficient length; for I feel bound to refute a scandalous calumny.

As a sequel to the note I have quoted at foot of the preceding chapter, and which is a literal extract, as I have observed, from a biographical article, Don André Muriel adds the following remarks, which are unquestionably his own:

"Count d'Aranda replaced Florida Blanca in the ministry of foreign affairs when the latter was dismissed from office. His administration proved as it were a stepping-stone to that of the young Duke d'Alcudia, who was, in fact, soon appointed minister. Reverting to his place in the council of state, where the conduct to be held towards France, then tormented by the revolutionary storm,[1] was under discussion, the count maintained that there would be danger in openly declaring against that nation, whilst the public

[1] The same phrase will presently be found repeated in inverted commas.

mind was under so violent an excitement. The Duke d'Alcudia was of a contrary opinion. In the heat of the discussion, he dropped some unguarded expressions respecting the count, intimating that age had frozen his zeal, and rendered him unapt to advocate a bold line of conduct. Aranda reminded the favourite of his youth, and of his inexperience in such matters. The count was shortly afterwards banished to Grenada, and confined in the castle of the Alhambra, where he was not treated with the attentions to which his exalted character entitled him.[2] This excessive rigour was relaxed at a later period, and he received permission to repair to Arragon, where he died in 1794."[3]

M. Muriel here confounds periods, and merely echoes the reports propagated respecting the causes which led to Count d'Aranda's disgrace. We will at once overlook the silly and conceited affirmation that the count was only called to the ministry as a stepping-stone to my appointment, and with the view to keep the place for a moment in reserve for me; as if the king, whose will was absolute, stood in need of any such circumspection. We will also forgive M. Muriel's false assertion as to the pretended inattention evinced

[2] This false assertion has been disproved in the preceding chapter.

[3] Muriel is wrong in this date, as in so many other circumstances. Count d'Aranda died on the 9th of January 1798, at the age of 78 years and a few months.

towards the Count d'Aranda in his banishment. These inaccuracies only prove, after all, the manifest intention of assailing my character. What follows is of a far more serious nature.

He alleges that certain documents have been supplied to him from Madrid,— that weapons against me have been put into his hands. He who had hitherto laid claim to impartiality; who, unbiassed by impressions favourable or otherwise, confined himself to repeating what he had heard; suddenly discovers an opportunity *to flatter the reigning power*. He is at once transformed into another man; the credit of his gown, the duties of an historian, respect for public opinion, common sense, sound criticism,—everything is disregarded. The absent is the only guilty man in his eyes; and yet that unhappy absent is still of this earth, though he maintains an absolute silence, and has abstained during so many years from uttering a word to disarm the voice of calumny.

"We avail ourselves of this occasion," continues the worthy ecclesiastic, "to rectify what has been stated at page 129 of the first volume, as to the cause of Count d'Aranda's exile from Madrid to Grenada in 1794. Original and authentic documents, which have been confided to us since that volume was published, place it in our power to furnish positive information on the subject."[4] Thus promises and affirms Don André Muriel.

[4] Vol. VI. additional chapter iii. p. 60.

What are then those documents? Their number is, it appears, limited to one,—"A Narrative written by Count d'Aranda himself." Who has supplied this document? M. Melgarejo, lately created Duke of San Fernando, who, having forfeited the good graces of his master in 1823, was endeavouring to recover them by fresh services! During the reign of Ferdinand VII, the court of Madrid maintained political travelling clerks in various quarters, in Paris, and especially in London, in order to watch the movements of emigrants of all opinions, and tamper with all writers whose pens might have laid aside all restraint on the subject of the Spanish government. These emissaries were to enter into arrangements with newspaper writers, and with concoctors of biographies or histories, who should lavish as much praise as possible upon the existing reign, and at all events be unsparing in their aspersions on past times, especially on the preceding reign and on the unfortunate man whose name was wielded as the pretext for a parricidal rebellion. Those manœuvres are of public notoriety, and were well rewarded. The man who thus kept in pay the detractors of his father and mine,—he who was principally interested in that infamous and unnatural speculation,—fed as long as he lived upon this personal rancour; parched as he was with a thirst of implacable hatred, a hatred produced by remorse. Should any one ask me what profit

Father Muriel derived from the insults he has heaped upon me in his additional notes, I reply by referring to what is manifest to all. Whether an emigrant or a refugee of an earlier date, and under more serious circumstances than Melgarejo, his provider of documents, he was anxious, as may well be supposed, to be reinstated into favour. In his work he heaps contumelious reproaches upon me, and worse than that, upon his first, his excellent sovereign Charles IV. Accordingly Ferdinand VII. has created him a knight of the royal and distinguished order of Charles III.

This stands in need of no commentary. But what do we find after all in the posthumous written narrative ascribed to Count d'Aranda himself? Let us set aside the vulgar rumours, the coarse falsehoods, the perfidious insinuations so unworthy of a grandee of Spain of the old stamp, and so derogatory of the respect due to the august personages designated in that written document, the exaggerated praises which the count either bestows or is supposed to bestow upon himself. Of all the invectives which he hurls at my head, one imputation only has deeply affected me. After reporting in an incorrect and unconnected manner the speech delivered by Count d'Aranda, the writer pretends that instead of replying to his objections, or attempting to refute him with arguments, I assumed a haughty tone, and denounced him as a dangerous man, urging

that he should be put upon his trial along with all those who met together and professed the count's doctrines. An imposture so revolting, so gratuitously invented with a view to tarnish the generous and conciliating disposition I had displayed throughout the discussion,—so base an imposture has inflicted, I acknowledge it, a deep wound upon my feelings. Never in my life did I wield the weapon of persecution: I have never persecuted, or suffered others to persecute, as long as it was in my power to prevent it: my bitterest enemies have never raised against me the charge of intolerance. The reign of Charles IV. (I claim this as a personal title of honour) was not a reign marked by acts of rigour, of imprisonment, of criminal procedure, of torture for political opinions. With respect to religious opinions, although the Inquisition was still in existence, and was so against my will, the reign of Charles IV. was the most indulgent, the most gentle of any upon record in Spanish history. No more pious martyrdoms or holy piles were seen during this reign. . . . . My principles, my system, my conviction, enjoined me to respect the human thought, to win over by persuasion the public mind; thus it is that I had the good fortune to maintain internal tranquillity in the dominions of his Catholic Majesty in both hemispheres as long as I held the reins of administration.

No! never did I raise the trap of terror over my beloved country. That terror which withers up the soul, the denunciations of informers, civil discords, chains, gibbets, all those scourges of more recent growth, are owing to my successors, my enemies, who, in acquiring possession of power, have inflicted them upon unhappy Spain. Will Abbé Muriel, who is my contemporary, have the boldness to deny the fact?

However, let us revert to the document, the pretended narrative of Count d'Aranda. What proofs or indications of its authenticity do we find in it? Were the very handwriting of the count held up to my view, it would be repugnant to my feelings to believe him the author of the work. The revolting falsehoods, the contradictions to be met with in every line of the passages quoted by M. Muriel; the ignorance of the most notorious events of the period; the tone, the style of writing, so little in accordance with what Count d'Aranda is known to have said and written,—everything leads to the supposition that the *authentic* narrative, so far from emanating from him, has been fabricated by some person wholly ignorant of what actually occurred. I feel that I am paying the count a compliment in disbelieving his authorship; for, if he ever wrote anything respecting the event in question, another pen than his must have been employed in arranging and perverting the text.

Let us examine the passages which induce me to suppose the narrative to have been forged or perverted.

1st. "France was then tormented by the revolutionary storm." (The same phrase had already been inserted word for word in the note to the fifth volume.)[5] "All the cabinets of Europe were preparing to wage war against her. The King of Spain, allied by the ties of blood to the reigning family which had just been sacrificed, placed in the vicinity of a volcano which threatened to swallow up his kingdom, was deliberating on the part he was called upon to act under circumstances of so critical a nature. Count d'Aranda was of opinion that Spain should not involve herself in a war against France; but that it behoved her, nevertheless, to arm, and be in readiness to engage, if necessary, in the conflict. This appeared to him the only attitude consonant with prudence, situated as the country was at a distance from the other powers, and unable to derive any assistance from them in her military operations: future events would point out the conduct to be adopted towards foreign nations; for by organising large armies with a view to the protection of the country from invasion, favourable opportunities would infallibly arise either for acting in concert with the allied

[5] M. Muriel affirms that the volume was printed previously to the narrative being communicated to him.

powers, or for entering upon an advantageous negotiation with France, if her interest should induce her to procure, at the cost of some sacrifices, the neutrality of the cabinet of Madrid. This prudent advice did not predominate; the party anxious for war obtained the ascendency."[6]

These few lines afford evidence that the author was ignorant of the details of the facts which he relates. What then could have been Count d'Aranda's wish, according to the narrative in question? That Spain should not involve herself in a war; but that she should arm, and be in readiness to engage, if necessary, in the conflict. What else did Spain actually do? The count was also desirous that large armies should be organised; but he had never prepared himself for this emergency, and the task of raising those armies wholly devolved upon myself.

He recommended that we should await future events. . . . What! . . . Did not Spain remain quiet until after the catastrophe of Louis XVI? A month had already elapsed since that tragical execution; the French chargé d'affaires was still in Madrid! he had not received intimation to depart, for M. Bourgoing himself applied for his passports.

He recommends, in fine, that we should pause in expectation that the interest of France may

[6] See the previous quotation, pages 60 and 61.

induce her to procure, at the cost of some sacrifices, the neutrality of our cabinet.

But Spain was acting a neutral part at a time when, instead of consenting to sacrifices with a view to the continuance of her neutrality, France imperiously and menacingly demanded a formal treaty, and, in addition to this, a disarming on our part, without a reciprocal proceeding on the part of the republic. In consideration of what was due, in the first place, to her own honour, and secondly to her safety, Spain hesitated to sign this insulting and unequal treaty: whilst we were still maintaining an actual neutrality, the republic declared war; the conflict was thus forced upon us.

Whether the count gave any other advice; whether in the emergency of impending events he still insisted upon a peace, and upon the country's disgrace; I am unable to say, for the narrative is silent on the subject.

How can the author of that production affirm that the war was resolved upon in spite of Count d'Aranda's advice? And if the count be the real author of it, how are we to explain the omission of so many essential particulars with which he could not fail to be acquainted; such as, the negotiation begun by himself, and by me followed up; the mediation or friendly intervention of Charles IV; the contempt which it met; the insults heaped upon him in return? Could the

count have written with such bad faith as to have intentionally omitted facts of so much importance? Is it not fairer to suppose that the narrative was fabricated and prepared at a subsequent period, and that its compiler was ignorant of what had taken place.

We have said enough on that point. When M. Muriel quotes from the speech of Count d'Aranda, he selects the following phrases:

"If it could not fail to be more pleasing for the King of Spain to behold a prince of his own dynasty at the head of the French government, this consideration, nevertheless, could not have such powerful weight as to induce him to compromise the safety of the state; an event of certain occurrence if reverses should be experienced, which were not unlikely to befall us, so great was the neglect evinced in making suitable preparations for the emergency of a war."[7]

Can this statement proceed from the pen of Count d'Aranda? Against whom is it directed? probably not against himself. Can he have intended to praise me? for I was the person who, having replaced him in the ministry, and finding no preparation made for war, actually organized in a short space of time the three armies of Navarre, Arragon, and Catalonia. Is it not extraordinary that the author of this narrative, in attempting to advert to facts of which he was igno-

[7] Pages 62 and 63.

rant, should have practised a deception upon the count; in other words, that he should have pulled down his statue, and raised up mine on its pedestal?

2ndly. "The preceding campaign was an unfortunate one."[8] Quite the reverse; that, our first campaign, was alike successful and honourable to our arms. Who can have had the boldness to deny the fact?—not the count assuredly. How could he have dared so to express himself at the council board without being immediately contradicted by all his colleagues? No: the falsehood does not proceed from him; but from the anonymous author of the narrative, who, incorrectly informed upon every point, has confounded the first campaign, so glorious to our arms, with the second, in which such serious reverses befell them.

Count d'Aranda is shortly afterwards made to say, in the same page:

"A great number of those new soldiers voluntarily enlisted, instigated to do so by the sermons preached from the pulpits, or by the vanity of having their names inserted in the official gazette.[9] But their aptitude for service is by no

[8] Page 83.

[9] The names of soldiers who voluntarily enlisted were not inserted in the gazette; though the author of the narrative pretends they were so. A reference to the gazettes of the time will show that they only notified the number of volunteers of each town or village.

means in keeping with their numbers. In proportion as they leave their towns or villages, and spend their enlistment money, their ardour and enthusiasm become abated."

I can never sufficiently deny this assertion; the count's speech assuredly never contained such an insult towards our gallant youths who won signal victories and could so ably wield their bayonets. It is impossible such language should have been held, at variance as it is with recent and notorious facts, which peremptorily refuted the perfidious insinuations ascribed to Count d'Aranda. He merely spoke in a conjectural sense: it was to be apprehended, in his opinion, that the zeal hitherto manifested should abate, and our resources prove inadequate to the struggle. It is rather singular that the task should devolve upon me of defending him from the officious awkwardness of his friends.

3rdly. The following silly observation is also imputed to him in the same page: "The French are well acquainted with our frontiers, and will profit by this knowledge to attack and invade us." It is obvious that each nation is well acquainted with her own frontier, and is thus enabled to attack her neighbours, should her means be adequate to the attempt. The French, therefore, having the advantage of being acquainted with the Spanish frontier, we must tremble for fear of their profiting by such knowledge to invade us. This is strictly the sense and bearing of the phrase. Were such an

argument to be actually found in the original statement, the author of the note ought, in mercy, to have suppressed it; for it is perfect nonsense, and the translator thinks that by inserting it in his note he has been bestowing praise upon the count! Weak, short-sighted judgment!

We limit ourselves to the few passages above quoted. Those who may desire to read the whole note, will find in it other silly remarks, and a mass of contradictions and ill-assorted reasonings, clothed in a French diction by no means creditable to M. Muriel's acquaintance with the language. Neither the logic nor the style of Count d'Aranda would ever have won him admiration; but so long as I have not actually seen his handwriting, I will not do him the injustice to ascribe such a rhapsody to his pen. The gross falsehoods to be met with in every line add to my disbelief. With respect to the facts which are related with a view to vilify me, I see nothing in them but impostures swept up from the streets, with the exception of the calumny, unworthy of every writer having any respect for himself,—the most cruel of all calumnies,—that of charging me with having replied to the count's speech by a denunciation, and urged his being put upon trial for his political opinions. Be the author of the infamous assertion who he may, I am content to rejoin, like the Latin orator: *mentiris*, &c.[10]

[10] It is no great recommendation for a document that it should be found in the manuscript collection of Duke Melgarejo;

If the authorship be not to be ascribed to Count d'Aranda, it would be curious to trace it back to its real source. For the rest, be the author of this pretended narrative who he may, I am warranted in complaining of the levity and want of discernment of Abbé Muriel, who by the addition of such a document has disfigured Coxe's valuable work. If the manuscript was only a copy, the nature of the text should have raised doubts in the translator's mind respecting its authenticity; if it was an original in the count's handwriting, surely Abbé Muriel has too much penetration not to have detected its errors and contradictions: why, then, in his character of historian, engaged or interested in the task of publishing the work, has he not accompanied it with explanatory notes, which would have manifested his good faith, or at least have saved the credit of his judgment? He has acted a different part, and has published his narrative, which is the evident, however lame, production of an enemy obstinately bent against me. This circumstance alone, had the compilation been ever so good, should have awakened his suspicions; whereas

whoever is satisfied with such a guarantee runs the risk of propagating a falsehood. In short, if the narrative has been actually written by Count d'Aranda, I refute it by mine, which claims an equal right to be attended to; the rather so, as it is in perfect conformity with the well-known occurrences of the epoch in question, whereas the other is almost invariably in contradiction with the same occurrences.

he has not hesitated in eagerly laying hold of it. He has received, embellished, and reproduced it as an authentic document, as information to be relied on, as a rectification of errors. He has identified himself with my aggressor;—was I not warranted in complaining of him, and in refuting his assertions?

CHAPTER XXII.

Second Campaign—1794.

We are entering upon a new series of events: my adversaries will hope to find me weaker on this ground, because, Fortune having proved contrary at all points to the armies of the coalition, Spain came in for her share of the common calamity. Thus, will it be said, were accomplished the predictions of Count d'Aranda, whose object was to preserve his country from the dangers that threatened it. The events, in fact, justified, at least in part, the count's forebodings. We experienced reverses; nevertheless ours, comparatively speaking, were not the most disastrous. Though we always calculated upon the possibility of their occurrence, it was consistent with the dignity of the country not to be alarmed beforehand. Spain could not, in this conjuncture, withdraw herself from the struggle without compromising her ancient and distinguished fame; for no loss in the materiel of our resources could be put in competition with the loss of national honour. We doubtless suffered reverses, but they spared us from more fearful ones; witness Genoa, Venice,

Switzerland, whose timid policy manifested a preference for peace at any price. Betrayed by Fortune, we proved to France that Spain could be unfortunate in war without, therefore, submitting to ignominious conditions; without trembling before an enemy, however powerful; without bending to the yoke of foreigners. Was our determination the offspring of mere temerity? Was it a mistaken point of honour which drove us to arms with a view to secure the repose of Europe? Were we so unreasonable in looking forward to a more favourable result from our efforts united with those of the several allied powers? The plans, the formidable armaments preparing in Flanders, were well known: it was equally well known that the army of Pichegru, composed in great part of young soldiers, ill equipped and destitute of everything, was threatened with impending destruction from the overwhelming masses of hostile forces, greatly superior to it in numbers. La Vendée, a giant with a thousand arms, was stirring amidst the western provinces of France: the Austro-Sardinian army, strengthened by daily reinforcements, was descending from the summit of the Alps, and about to fall upon the south: on our side, the frontiers of Arragon, Navarre, and Biscay were protected; our left was firmly established in the French territory, and the army of Catalonia also occupied the soil of the republic, and defended the two banks of the Tech, by a

well-defended line of posts extending to the sea; forty thousand volunteers were marching forward to fill up the skeletons of our old regiments; the materiel of the army was undergoing repair, and increasing in a surprising manner; the zeal of the Spaniards responded to the impulse given by the government; Portugal promised to send a fresh supply of troops to our aid. Accordingly, I repeat it, there was nothing rash in our system, supported as we were on all sides by such a combination of means for maintaining the war. In this state of affairs, to have deserted the common alliance, in order to treat with men who disgraced France and their age by a frightful mania of general subversion, would have been, beyond a doubt, an act of cruelty and cowardice which no terms of reproach could adequately qualify. . . . . I was, moreover, informed, by means of a correspondence on which I could rely, that the sway of those disturbers of the general tranquillity was drawing to a close; that public opinion was fermenting in France, and would soon pronounce itself against the promoters of anarchy; in a word, that a reaction was on the point of breaking out: the least check they might experience in the campaign, ready to open could not fail to bring about, in the interior of the country, that salutary crisis. What Spaniard, what man of courage, what minister of his sovereign, even amongst those who differed with me in opinion, would

have dared, circumstanced as I was, to adopt another line of conduct? Who would have ventured to brave the general opinion of Spain, and of all Europe?

I may be told that this argument is not founded in reason; "that the success not having corresponded with the efforts and mighty preparations of the allied powers, the war was impolitic, the coalition a folly, and that the Duke de l'Alcudia committed a grave error in supporting that system and in persisting in the war."

Such is the ordinary logic of those who judge after the event, and only blame or approve according to the success or failure of the undertaking. But is it not unjust to attribute to me the fault of the share which fell to the lot of Spain in a common disgrace, from which all the other powers suffered in a far greater degree than we did? "If Spain bore her share of the disgrace," allege my adversaries, "I alone, being the king's minister, ought to be held responsible for it." Were not the ministers of England, Austria, Prussia, Holland, Sardinia, and afterwards those of Naples and of the whole of Italy, as culpable as myself? I may add, that if, by a natural consequence, the magnitude of the error is to be estimated by the losses experienced by each of those states, I am the least reprehensible of all, since Spain, after having suffered less than any of those powers, was the only

nation which eventually succeeded in securing the integrity of her territory. It does not fall within my province to discuss the merits of others; my object is to defend myself, and to show the character of distributive justice exhibited by my merciless detractors. Since all were involved in the heavy calamity of that period, it is an act of signal malevolence to impute to me only the share of it which befell Spain. Did it depend upon me that victory should not occasionally desert our banners? Was it my fault, or that of the worthy officers selected by the government to command our troops, if the issue of the second campaign was less glorious than the first? Did the government neglect any means of upholding the moral character, the spirit of emulation, the courage of the army? Provisions, ammunition, succours of every kind, rewards,—were not these eagerly and abundantly provided? Did court favour influence the nomination of chiefs destitute of military renown or unworthy the confidence of the soldiers? and having at their disposal all the information and means of instruction which the government always hastened to furnish for their guidance,—were those brave generals crippled or opposed in their operations by arbitrary orders? Were they not always at liberty to act according to circumstances, to their practical knowledge, to their best judgment? Was there one who com-

plained, or was warranted in complaining, of restrictions, of caprices, of obstacles emanating from the court? Never, on the contrary, was more frankness displayed, or more unfettered or open intercourse kept up, between a government and the chiefs invested with its confidence? . . . . . Everything was prepared, arranged, and carried by common accord into effect. If, notwithstanding so many grounds of confidence, our arms were not so successful as they had previously been, this unforeseen change of fortune could only be ascribed to the general, irresistible cause which produced in all quarters similar effects. Of all the coalesced powers which concurred in the war, none displayed more prudence or skill; none, assuredly, proved less unfortunate than we.

We maintained our banners on the soil of the republic for a period of six months longer than any other power. Our first check, at the beginning of May,[1] had been preceded, in the pre-

[1] The loss of the camp of Boulou and of the lines of the Tech. The army had been deprived of her distinguished general-in-chief on the 3rd March preceding: it became necessary to replace him by an officer whom Ricardos had in his last moments recommended for his successor,—Count O'Reilly, his old companion in arms, whose glory he had shared on his first entering the military career, as he afterwards shared his disgrace under the administrations of Llerena and of Florida Blanca. O'Reilly took his departure for the army of Catalonia, but, like Ricardos, he was carried off by a sudden illness which attacked him on the journey. The command next devolved, as a matter of right, upon Count de la Union, who,

vious April, by the defeat of Clairfait in the north, at the mills of Cassel, which was followed by the loss of Menin; in Italy, by that of Oneille, Garessio, Ormea, Saorgio, Bocabigliera, San Martin, Montevalesano, and Little St. Bernard. Eighteen days afterwards was fought the obstinate battle of Turcoing, where the Duke of York owed his safety to the swiftness of his horse, and the Prince of Cobourg was thrown into complete rout: the Emperor of Germany

having already distinguished himself under the orders of the latter, gave the fairest promises of success.

General Dugommier had likewise been recently called to the command of the republican army. He succeeded early in April, by feigned attacks, in detaching large forces from the centre of our army; and made, on the 1st of May, a general attack. After an engagement of six hours' duration, and a considerable loss, he took possession of the great redoubts of La Trompette and Montesquieu, the main defences of the camp of Boulou. Don Ildefonso Avias, at La Trompette, and Don Francisco Xavier Venegas, at Montesquieu, notwithstanding the slender means at their disposal, fought with desperate valour. The latter, ere he quitted the redoubt, had already received two serious wounds, and was carried off the ground in the arms of his soldiers. The line being thus forced, not a moment was to be lost; but Dugommier being already in possession of the causeway of Bellegarde, the only means of retreat left was by the narrow and difficult road of Morallès. We abandoned a great part of our artillery, and had much difficulty in saving some of our camp-equipage and the military chest.

The detachments which, to the number of eight hundred men, occupied the advanced posts of Plá del Rey, were taken prisoners: we succeeded, however, in removing our wounded. General La Union, by his extraordinary activity and prudent arrangements, succeeded at last in rallying the army, took up a position in front of Figueiras, and covered that fortress.

had hoped that his presence would revive the ardour of his troops, and, from the high summit of the hills of ————, he had the mortification to witness their total defeat. Thus it was that the formidable plan combined in Tournay, which was to terminate the campaign at a blow, vanished into smoke.

During these successive disasters in Flanders, our garrisons in the forts of St. Elme, Portvendre, and Colliouvre were determined to make a stout resistance to the enemy. Besieged by Dugommier, who being in possession of all the surrounding passes intercepted every egress, these gallant men only relinquished their post after having vindicated the honour of our arms. These three points were occupied by scarcely eight thousand men; and the fierce Dugommier, at the head of thirty thousand men, was constantly summoning them to surrender. In order to approach the small fort of St. Elme, he had to open, mostly through the rock, a road of two leagues in extent, for the purpose of bringing up heavy artillery. Be it remarked that our soldiers had carried the fort by storm, with no other weapons than their swords and bayonets. In the night of the 16th of May, the handful of brave men who defended St. Elme, had the boldness to make a sortie and attack the French on the peak of ——, where Dugommier was present. This movement was so suddenly effected, that the republican general,

taken by surprise and wounded, had the greatest difficulty in effecting his escape. He was saved by his grenadiers, many of whom were killed by his side. Our soldiers, after spiking two guns, returned to the fort with scarcely any loss. At last the breach was opened; the garrison still refused to capitulate. Finding, however, that it was impossible to maintain itself any longer in the midst of those ruins, and under a continual shower of grape-shot, it determined to abandon the fort. The garrison of Portvendre being no longer protected by St. Elme, which formed its only defence, also retreated upon Colliouvre. The latter place, being commanded by Portvendre and St. Elme, and completely blockaded on all sides, could not resist a serious attack. There was no other alternative but to capitulate, or to effect a retreat by sea; but the very elements were against us. The squadron which had sailed from Rosas under the command of Admiral Gravina, was beat off by the storm, and unable at this critical moment to approach the harbour. There was no course left but that of surrender. The capitulation was as honourable as it deserved to be; the garrison obtained all the honours of war, with leave to return to Spain by land, under condition of its being exchanged for an equal number of French soldiers, prisoners of war. Previously to signing the capitulation, and in spite of a dreadful bombardment which battered the place by sea and land,

General Don Eugenio Navarro persisted in holding out two days longer, with a view to procure the escape of a corps of French emigrants who had already been doomed to death by the laws of the republic. He took advantage of a favourable night to embark in fishing boats those noble remains of the Legion of the Queen, who were safely removed to Rosas.[2]

This extended line of frontier was, for two months longer, the theatre of repeated engagements, some prosperous, others unsuccessful, which neither procured to the French nor to us the acquisition of a single mile of ground. The enemy's forces were, nevertheless, superior in numbers, and daily increasing.

On the 1st of August, the French occupied Fuenterabia on the side of the Western Pyrenees. The actions in the valley of Bastan and of St. Martial proved disastrous to our arms, but the enemy dearly purchased their victory. The openings of Arizcun, and the Peak of the Commissary, defended to the last extremity by the valiant Gagigal, witnessed the hostile columns alternately driven back and advancing, with a

[2] Lieutenant-colonel Don Francisco Amorós, who had just distinguished himself in the brilliant and daring sortie of St. Elme, conceived the idea of this embarkation, and carried it into effect with equal intrepidity and skill. The honour of saving that brave legion may be wholly ascribed to him. M. Amorós is well known in Paris, and is a colonel in the service of France at the present day.

heavy loss of men on each occasion. Our retreat reflected honour on the regiments of Ultonia, the Walloon guards, and the provincial guards of Tuy, which, being supported by some squadrons of the regiments of Farnese and Montija, and of the brigade of Ubeda, arrested the progress of the enemy. Whilst those regiments were covering themselves with glory in the critical position in which they were placed, the order to set fire to the powder magazines of Oyarzun was executed with such precipitation that they blew up at the moment the troops were passing near them. Many persons were killed by the explosion. Notwithstanding this frightful accident, our brave soldiers calmly filed off, strictly preserving their ranks, and baffled every attempt of the enemy. This signal trait of firmness and of military discipline was recorded by an appropriate inscription on the banners of the different corps.

I have spoken of our misfortunes and of the losses we experienced to the end of July or middle of August. Were the allies more successful in the north? Ever since the month of June, each day had proved fatal to their arms: witness the defeat of Clairfait at Hoogstedt on the 13th; the surrender of Ypres on the 18th; that of Charleroi on the 21st; the battle of Fleurus on the 26th, which again opened Belgium to the French, and added stability to the republic; the taking of Ostend on the 1st of July, of Louvain and Mech-

lin on the 15th, of Landrecies on the 16th,—on the same day the Austrians abandoned Namur, without waiting the arrival of the French: Neuport was occupied on the 19th, and Antwerp and Liege on the 27th; lastly, on the 28th, the republicans took possession of the island of Cadsand and all its dependencies. Let a comparison be now drawn between our losses and those of the coalition!

In the month of August, after the surrender of Fuenterabia, a fortress of the third order, we had to deplore the disgraceful act of treachery by which St. Sebastian was delivered up to the enemy. Tolosa, an open town, but the capital of Guipuscoa, was abandoned almost immediately afterwards. Such were the successes of the French arms in that quarter. The enemy contented himself with taking up a military position in order to preserve his recent acquisitions, and to distribute from thence various detachments around his camp. . . . Biscay rose up in a body; and the French did not obtain a single inch of ground beyond what they had secured by cunning, and not by force of arms.[3]

[3] The capture of St. Sebastian was not a military exploit. Pinet, the conventionalist, succeeded in seducing certain inhabitants of Guipuscoa, by promising to raise their province into an independent republic. These credulous men surrendered the town, notwithstanding the readiness of the garrison to hold out with the means at their command, which were amply adequate, for a time at least, to prevent its fall.

The alcalde Michelena, of infamous memory, and a few notable citizens of St. Sebastian, bewildered with the hope of a

Our army in the eastern Pyrenees having been reorganised, was encamped in front of Figueiras; it had not only re-established its line of defence, but, being strengthened by reinforcements, had resumed the offensive. Various attacks of advanced posts took place in June and July; in these we often had the advantage, particularly at Olers, at the Hermitage del Roble, in the plain of the Llobregat, at Villarnadal and Basagorda, at the Camp del Principe, in Cerdagne, at Massarach, St. Clement, Mollet, and other places.

In August, the Spanish army made a general attack from Campredon to the sea, in order to break the enemy's line, and force its way to Bellegarde. This movement took the French wholly by surprise: after having carried St. Laurent de la Muga, an important position, we remained there a few hours, expecting the column which

chimerical liberty, so different from what they enjoyed under their ancient laws and privileges, proved faithless to their country. However, their crime soon met its reward: anticipating that Pinet's promises were about to be realized, they had assembled at Guetaria in the character of deputies from the province; the ferocious representative of the French people had them arrested and brought to trial as rebels; several were handed over to the executioner; others were left to the remorse of their own conscience, which must have ever afterwards reproached them with having betrayed their country, and opened to the enemy a basis of occupation without which he never would have dared to establish himself on the Spanish territory. . . . The Guipuscoans abandoned their hearths to escape the presence of the French, and to join the gallant bands which were in arms in the provinces of Biscay and Navarre.

was to turn the position and facilitate or complete our success. Unforeseen delays, and the reinforcements received by the enemy, compelled us to abandon the conquered ground; and the half-won victory thus escaped from our grasp. Our troops retreated in good order; the loss of the French was severe; the republican General Mirabel, who had brought the reinforcement and restored the fight, lost his life on the occasion, as well as several superior officers; Generals Lemoine, Sauret, and the celebrated Augereau were mentioned amongst the wounded officers. The conflict which took place in the pass of Teradas was courageously maintained by Courten, and fought at the bayonet's point. Generals Belvis and Taranco covered themselves with glory at Canta . . . on the same day. Two days afterwards, General Dugommier, apprehending a renewed attack, abandoned St. Laurent, La Madeleine, and the height of Teradas. Count de la Union caused those three points to be occupied; and it is to be regretted that he did not moderate his ardour, or display greater military tact in operating this excentric movement.[4]

[4] All subsequent actions, until the middle of November, were of a partial nature, and frequently in our favour, such as at Capmany, and in the gorges of ——. The action at Mouroïg might have proved fatal to us. The advanced posts which occupied the heights were carried away by their zeal, and kept up an irregular firing with a French battalion stationed on the parallel slope; a panic seized those scouts, and extended to the

Whilst affairs were taking this turn on the side of Spain, what, I must persist in asking it,—what were the proceedings of the northern coalition?

Treves was captured on the 8th of August, and Quesnoi on the 16th; the fort de l'Ecluse was wrested from the Dutch on the 25th; Valenciennes was retaken on the 27th, and on the 29th the town of Condé, which was the last remaining stronghold of the allies on the French frontier.

Of all the powers of the coalition, Spain was the only one that, thanks to the excellent spirit with which her troops were animated, still held in her possession, as a glorious proof of her old warlike tenacity, and retained for three weeks longer, one of the principal frontier towns of France!

The fort of St. Elme, Portvendre, and Colliouvre

attacking column. General Taranco, who marched at its head, was left alone with his staff and the superior officers: the enemy, who had only sought to defend himself, took advantage of this disorder, and fell upon the flank of the column. Count de la Union no sooner saw the danger than he quickly sent forward Don Diego, my brother, with the reserve; the charge was so sudden that the French, apprehending the flight of our troops to be a mere feint to draw them into a snare, and struck in turn with the like panic, retreated with a precipitation which baffled our pursuit. Count de la Union determined to make an example of the authors of this rash enterprise; he ordered that they should be deprived of their uniforms and perform duty apart from the rest of the army, until, by giving proofs of better subordination, they should have repaired their error. This punishment was of short duration; they recovered the esteem of their companions in arms by dint of daily exploits, and many of them even obtained well-merited rewards for their conduct.

had fallen; Bellegarde still remained in our hands. During the fifteen months of its occupation by our troops, it had been put in repair, and the exterior works greatly augmented: whether it was with the view of avoiding the effusion of blood which must have attended a hasty attack, or of recovering possession of the town whilst still in good condition, General Dugommier only thought of closely blockading it. Bellegarde was surrounded by a numerous army, whose operations were protected by a detached corps of eight thousand men. Count de la Union made several attempts to force his way to Bellegarde, but in vain. All communication and intercourse were effectually shut out, and the garrison was completely ignorant of what was occurring without the walls. It found itself surrounded by a circle of iron, and, as it were, by an armed solitude; a state of solitariness the more appalling, as the soldier's courage is then tried by a severer test than when called upon to brave the dangers of a field of battle.

Hunger and sickness tried the constancy of the Spaniards. Ever since the end of July, the ration of meat, which was in a state of putrefaction, was reduced to a quarter of a pound. All means of prolonging this patriotic fasting were exhausted; the most unclean animals had been used as the soldiers' food; nothing was left. June, July, and the first half of August had elapsed. At last, on the 18th of August, it became necessary to

surrender. The distinguished Marquis de Vallesanctorum was governor of the place.

The National Convention decreed that the taking of Bellegarde should be celebrated by a public rejoicing. It was the last point of the French territory which had been occupied by foreign forces! Spain at least achieved this honourable distinction, amidst the general despondency which pervaded the coalition.

Landrecies had held out a fortnight, Quesnoi twenty-four days, Valenciennes nine, Condé no more than three; whereas Bellegarde only surrendered after a siege of three months, though it had less prospect than any other town of being supplied with provisions, or of the blockade being raised. Spain was thus the last of all the coalesced powers which gave up the contest.

This was the extreme limit of our losses from the commencement of September until the middle of the following month: whilst the English, after the defeat of their advanced-guard at Boxten on the 16th September, were precipitately abandoning the right bank of the Maese, leaving unprotected the important fortresses of Breda, Bois-le-duc, and Bergen-op-Zoom; whilst the Austrians, attacked at Eyneux, at Aspremon, and in the strong position of La Chartreuse, were falling back in disorder upon Juliers: whilst, on the 22nd of the same month, Jourdan was taking possession of Aix-la-Chapelle, and General du

Merbiou, on the side of Italy, was beating the Austro-Sardinians at Cairo on the 21st; and whilst, ten days afterwards, the formidable camp of Juliers was forced at Aldenhoben, the garrison of Juliers was surrendering at discretion, Macdonald was carrying the fort of Orthen on the 27th, and Crévecœur, and soon afterwards Bois-le-duc, were signing terms of capitulation.

CHAPTER XXIII.

Continuation.—Second Campaign, 1794.

The signal victories achieved by the republic over the northern armies could not fail to kindle a spirit of emulation in the French troops which were waging war on the frontiers of Spain.

This spirit was kept alive by the government, who unceasingly stimulated their self-love and courage. "When," said the government, "are you to announce to us the taking of fortified places and of provinces, instead of wasting your efforts in marches and countermarches which lead to no result; in the attacks of heights and redoubts, where, conquerors and conquered by turns, neither party go beyond the petty circle of a few miles in circumference?"

On the other hand, the decided advantages obtained over the armies of the coalition enabled the French government to send copious reinforcements to the republican phalanxes of the Pyrenees.

Towards the middle of October, the enemy's forces, which were spread over the provinces of

Guipuscoa and Navarre, independently of the Basque Frank companies, consisted of sixty-six battalions of regular infantry, for the most part veteran soldiers,[1] four thousand cavalry, and three brigades of artillery.

General Muller was replaced by Moncey, who received orders to invade the Basque provinces, occupy Navarre, seize upon Pampeluna, and transfer his camp to the banks of the Ebro. Nothing short of this would satisfy the republic!

Our army was deficient in numbers, but brave and well-disciplined: we maintained a strong line from the valley of Roncal to the Deva. Moncey, a general of consummate skill, was desirous of concentrating his forces and of making preparations for well-sustained attacks, in order to strike decisive blows without leaving the result to chance. Fortunately for us, the proconsuls entertained very different notions of war; they only dreamed of general attacks in flank or in front along the whole line. These men, unskilled in military tactics, calculated upon separating our army into two bodies, beating the one, turning the other, and, in the confusion of vic-

[1] A column of that army, called the *infernal* column, had acquired general notoriety at the period in question: it chiefly consisted of veterans seasoned in the campaigns of La Vendée. There were also two complete regiments, the fifty-seventh and seventy-second, belonging to the celebrated garrison of Mentz. The new recruits were distributed amongst the old skeletons of regiments which had been brought down from the north.

tory, suddenly marching upon Pampeluna, which was to surrender without resistance to their arms.

What was the result of so rash a plan? The representatives were convinced that they were about to bring the war to a close at a single blow. During two whole days of fighting, the 16th and 17th October, blood flowed in torrents, without their deriving any other advantage than that of occupying for a moment the valley of Roncesvalles, and pulling down an ancient monument.[2]

[2] This monument was an old time-worn pyramid, which popular tradition venerated as a remembrance of the true or fabulous defeat of Charlemagne's army. The commissioners of the Convention entered upon serious researches to discover Rolando's club, and the slippers which Archbishop Turpin had left behind when he pulled them off as impediments to his flight. It was found impossible to send those trophies to Paris, however great was the desire to do homage to the Convention by presenting those relics of by-gone days, as is manifested by the strange bulletin which I textually subjoin:

"Citizens, the army of the western Pyrenees, by obtaining a signal victory over the Spaniards, has avenged an old insult inflicted on the French nation. Our ancestors, in the days of Charlemagne, were defeated in the plain of Roncesvalles. In memory of that event, the proud Spaniard had erected a pyramid on the field of battle. Defeated in turn, on the same spot, by the French republicans, he has, with his own blood, effaced all traces of it. Nothing was left but the frail edifice, which has been instantly demolished. The banner of the republic now waves where floated the standard of kingly pride, and the fostering tree of liberty has replaced the destructive club of the tyrant. The inauguration was followed by an affecting and warlike music. The shades of our forefathers have been comforted, and the army of the republic has sworn to conquer

This ephemeral triumph cost France at least three thousand men. All the troops behaved well: there were even displayed some signal traits of valour and ability. Every bayonet was engaged, and the retreat was fully equivalent to a victory. The enemy completely failed in the plan which he had meditated; our army and Pampeluna were saved.[3]

Apprehensive of the danger which his troops might incur from a general engagement, Moncey insisted upon the necessity of their concentration. Colomera, our general, who was prepared to give him a warm reception, watched all his motions, and sought by affected delays to make him exhaust his resources, whilst he himself strictly maintained a defensive attitude. He knew the French army to be ill supplied. We had reached

for the glory of the French name of all ages, and for the happiness of the country."

This whimsical document, worthy of the hero of Cervantes, bears the signatures of the conventionalists, Baudot and Garaut. In truth, the valour and military glory of the French stood not in need of this paltry garland being added to so many laurels. It was a poor amends for so much effusion of blood! but the representatives wished to spread a lustre over a foiled enterprise.

[3] The honour of that retreat is mainly owing to the military talents and to the presence of mind of Lieutenant-general the Duke of Ossuna, with whom the praise must be shared by the worthy commandant of Orbaleyta, the Marquis de la Cañada. Ibanes. The division commanded by General Cagigal performed prodigies of valour. The French General Castelperg was completely routed.

the 26th November; winter was fast approaching; the campaign could not be much longer prolonged. The representatives of the people, ever impatient of delays, compelled Moncey to attack us a second time, so eagerly were they bent upon the conquest of Pampeluna. On this occasion, the left wing of the French was defeated at Ortiz, Soranzon, Olaya, and Haiz; another division was on the point of being cut off, when Moncey ordered a retreat; and, with a view to conceal his disappointment, he attempted a diversion, which answered, for a few hours, his expectations. He executed his retrograde movement under cover of the night, and in perfect silence. Nearly the whole of his sick, who were very numerous, were left behind in the different villages. On the 29th November our troops resumed their old positions; the right at the Aldudes, at Orbaceyta and Eguy; the centre towards Ulzama, in a northern direction; the left at Lucumbery and Amaiz. The French took up their cantonments in the part of Guipuscoa of which they had obtained possession, in the valley of Bastan, and at St. Jean Pié de Port.

Thus ended the campaign in that quarter. Our arms were less fortunate in Roussillon and Catalonia. Fully confiding in the redoubts which protected his whole line from St. Laurent de la Muga to the sea, Count de la Union was making preparations for an offensive movement, at the very

time when Dugommier was forming the project of forestalling him. It unfortunately happened that La Union, who was always dreaming of fresh redoubts, and wished to take in every position which he deemed likely to prove of advantage to us, scattered his troops, which, though numerous, were inadequate to the object of strengthening so many points of defence. Dugommier perceived the error into which our general had fallen; he determined to avail himself of it, regardless of the sacrifices which might be consequent upon the attempt.

The engagement was obstinately contested, and lasted three days. The Spanish and French generals here met their fate. The first attempt, on the 17th November, was made upon our left, and proved favourable to the enemy; but he was defeated at the centre of our line and driven back to his entrenchments of Cantallobs and Espolla. Night put an end to the conflict, which had lasted since daybreak.

The attack was renewed on the 18th: Dugommier was killed at the beginning of the engagement, whilst watching from the summit of the Black Mountain the movements of our left. The bursting of a howitzer terminated his glorious career.[4] The battle continued to rage with un-

[4] The death of this general was not the mere effect of chance. The general of artillery, Autran de la Torre, was visiting the batteries of the left wing. On reaching the battery of La Salud,

abated obstinacy; our centre, our right, and part of our left, resolutely defended themselves. The enemy, wearied at thus fruitlessly attacking the front and flanks of our first line, determined to try their chance upon our second line, and succeeded in turning, from a distant point, one of our great redoubts, which was supposed to be proof against every attack. Night suspended all operations; the advantage on our side was less signal than that of the preceding day; nevertheless, victory had not yet declared for either of the contending armies.

The 19th was a day of inactivity. Both armies stood greatly in need of rest, and the number of dead to be interred was considerable. It was thought for a moment that the enemy had abandoned his attempt. Count de la Union intending to renew the battle, concentrated all his forces, regardless of the danger he was incurring of being

he perceived on the Black Mountain a knot of cavalry which seemed to be watching our position. The intervening distance was about fifteen hundred toises. Don Benito de Ulloa, a distinguished captain of artillery, proposed to the general to throw an eight-inch grenade among the group of Frenchmen; for he felt convinced that, considering the opening of the angle and the charge which a piece of that bore would admit of, the grenade might reach its destination. It was the first we were about to fire towards that point, and it burst in the very centre of the group. A few hours afterwards, a deserter from the enemy's camp came to announce the death of General Dugommier. This intelligence infused fresh ardour and confidence into our soldiers.

turned by his left. Full of ardour and of confidence in his troops, the idea of a retrograde movement never occurred to his mind; it would have appeared degrading to his honour. Prudence, however, should have suggested that movement, by which the second line afforded protection to his army, without endangering the safety of Figueiras.

On the 20th, at day-break, General Perignon, the successor of Dugommier, renewed his attack on the centre, whilst other columns turned our batteries by our extreme left, and carried them all in succession. Victory had declared in favour of the French. Count de la Union rushed forward, placed himself at the head of the troops of the centre, and died fighting like a common soldier. Our troops stood for some time longer the enemy's onset, in order to check his advance and maintain some of the positions; but no effort of valour could avail. The batteries del Roble and of the camp of Llers having been carried, no other resource was left but that of a speedy retreat. It was alike perilous and difficult of accomplishment. The enemy, already in possession of the Pic d'Oréal, intercepted the road of Figueiras. Our army, thus broken, only rallied at Bascara, a position between that place and Gerona, four leagues in its rear. To crown our misfortunes, the fortress of Figueiras surrendered to the French. The great strength of that citadel is well known;

it was abundantly provided, and contained a garrison of upwards of ten thousand men. It is doubtful whether we are to ascribe this disaster to frenzy, panic, or treachery. The council of war before whom were arraigned the authors of this scandalous act of cowardice, pronounced sentence of death against the commandant of the fortress and three other superior officers.[5] The clemency of Charles IV. induced him to entertain the doubts suggested as to the real character of the crime, and he commuted the capital punishment; the four delinquents were sentenced to degradation, banished for ever his majesty's dominions, and their conduct was declared to have been criminal and ignominious.[6]

[5] Brigadier-general Torres, Messrs. Keating, Ortuzar, and Allende, superior officers of engineers and artillery.

[6] The French general Perignon, when ambassador in Spain at a later period, affirmed to me upon his honour that the surrender of the fortress was neither owing to venality nor treachery, but simply to the terror caused by the occurrences of the 20th; a terror heightened by the exaggerated reports of the fugitives, by the capture of the entrenchments adjoining the place, and the great display which he affected to make of his victorious army in order to intimidate the besieged, as well as to the effect of his reiterated threats of giving the assault and putting every man to the sword. "But," I observed to him, "upwards of two hundred pieces of heavy artillery crowned the ramparts; the fortress was supplied with ten thousand quintals of powder, an immense quantity of ammunition, as well as of provisions, such as flour, salt meat, vegetables, wine and brandy, cisterns full of water, a complete pharmacy, every article not only of necessity but of comfort, and ten thousand men to defend its walls! What

This disaster was soon repaired by the strong and prudent measures subsequently adopted. Such was not the case in the north, where far weightier occurrences were on the eve of taking place. Irreparable losses had marked the campaign.

On the 19th November, the advanced guard of the English army was driven by Pichegru from the dikes of Ondwatering, whilst Jourdan, after having beaten a division of the Austrian army, made his entry into Bonn and afterwards into Cologne, forced the lines before Coblentz on the 23rd, and took possession of that town. Three days afterwards, General Laurent, under the orders of Moreau, compelled Venloo to capitulate:

was wanting to enable them to sustain a siege of many months?" "One deficiency only existed," replied the ambassador; "the commandant of the place and his council had lost their senses. They were frightened by the threat of an assault which was impracticable, but which they had the weakness to think otherwise. I must add," said Perignon, "that in consequence of the mode of warfare we have adopted, the fall of Figueiras is not the first or the only occurrence of the kind in this campaign. The taking of Namur, Antwerp, Juliers, and Venloo are events still more unaccountable. The garrison of the latter place was superior, or at least equal in numbers, to the troops which threatened to lay siege to it with no other weapons than their muskets. One hundred and fifty pieces of artillery defended the ramparts of Venloo; its stores and arsenals were filled with provisions and ammunitions of war. That which in our new tactics has secured more than one victory to our arms, and holds out a promise of many others, is the secret or talent of striking terror into our enemies."

Desaix and Meunier had already taken Worms, Kirtchien, Altré, and Oppenheim. At the end of October the French were masters of the left bank of the Rhine from Bâle to Coblentz. There only remained Mentz, Rheinfelts, and Luxembourg to impede their undisputed possession of the river. On the first threat of a siege, on the 2nd of October, the Austrians abandoned to General Laurent the second of those places, the important town of Rheinfelts.[7] Kleber forced the Prince of Hesse on the 4th of November to give up Maestricht, one of the keys of Holland.[8] On the 6th of the same month, General Souham took possession of Nimeguen, within view of thirty thousand English troops encamped on the opposite bank of the Wahab.[9] Each successive day was marked by a fresh triumph; each engagement

[7] This fortress, so important from its natural position and the works of art which had been added to it, independently of its very numerous garrison, was defended by a line of batteries on the right bank of the Rhine, and had her communication secured on that side by a large bridge of boats. The commandant who surrendered it was tried and condemned by a council of war.

[8] The French found in it three hundred and fifty pieces of artillery, chiefly brass cannons, twenty thousand quintals of powder, a well provided arsenal, ample stores, &c.

[9] The French artillery began to fire upon the flying bridge forming the communication between the town and the English army. The affrighted garrison, as soon as the night had set in, hastened to repair the bridge and quitted the town, leaving to the Dutch the care of defending it. The latter, mistrusting their means of resistance, attempted to withdraw at break of

proved a victory for the French arms. Their march was not arrested by the winter; on the contrary, the ice afforded them a means of passage, and the whole of Holland was conquered. Unable to witness any longer the sight of demoralised troops, the Duke of York resigned the command to Generals Walmoden and Harcourt. The stadtholder sued in vain for peace or an armistice. Compelled to withdraw from Gorcum, his last remaining hope, he took leave of his dominions and embarked for England.

The King of Prussia, feeling wearied of this disastrous war, seriously meditated to bring it to a close. Several princes of the empire openly manifested a wish for the termination of a scourge which desolated Germany, and might endanger their own existence. Austria alone, notwithstanding her enormous losses, still acted in concurrence with the English, and endeavoured to draw closer the ties of the coalition which the force of circumstances had broken asunder.

day; they fled to the boats whilst the French were rushing to the ramparts. The English, though under protection of their camp, and beyond the reach of danger, became so alarmed that they fired upon the boats loaded with Dutch soldiers. Observing this frightful misunderstanding, and more humane towards his enemies than the English proved themselves towards their allies, Souham exclusively directed his fire against the English; he even despatched several light boats from his own side of the river to save the fugitives from unavoidable death.

Disasters such as these throw our unfortunate surrender of Figueras into the shade.

Spain was not, assuredly, the first to break off those ties which were now bearing with increased weight upon her. The misfortunes of her allies, and her own, had not had the effect of discouraging her. But the moment for our concluding a peace had not yet arrived, so long as the coalition was kept up, so long as France should not manifest the wish to conclude a solid and honourable peace, guaranteed by the conviction of our strength; for it was incumbent upon Spain not to sue for it in a suppliant tone, nor to enter uninvited upon the subject. Fresh efforts and still greater sacrifices were made to carry on the third campaign.

CHAPTER XXIV.

Third Campaign; 1795, up to the end of June in that year.

This campaign has been exhibited under the gloomiest colours by some whose judgment was blinded by their hatred against me; by others, either ill-informed, or who had lost the recollection of events which had occurred almost within their immediate view.

Nevertheless, it was the most vigorously contested of any; it exhibited splendid instances of courage and constancy, arrested the torrent of invasion, and gave evidence to France that Spain could never become a conquered country. All that I have said, all I have further to say regarding this subject, are positive facts, bearing the impress of truth, and beyond the reach of contradiction, though denied or unacknowledged by men who basely sacrifice the honour and glory of their country to their own selfish passions. These facts are less borne out by the official reports to the government than by the still more explicit accounts of foreigners, especially of Frenchmen,—unexceptionable witnesses when speaking in our

favour. I am therefore asserting the honour of the Spanish nation rather than my own. My enemies may vent their rage against me with impunity; but let them beware of impugning the national character.

The French coveted for their winter quarters the mild and cheerful district through which the Ebro bends its course. Entrenched on the banks of the Uriola, Moncey had gathered his whole army within a very limited space of ground, feeling always apprehensive of a movement which might cut off his main communication with France. Thus situated, he endured with fortitude a cruel famine, and the still more cruel disease which consumed his battalions.[1] Completely blockaded on the sea-side, shut up within his entrenchments on the side of Spain, indifferently supplied by the contractors employed by the republic, which laid it down as a rule that the army should be subsisted from the invaded territory, the general had the mortification of seeing his soldiers reduced to a half ration of rice or potatoes for their only food, whether in camp or in hospital! What was then the impediment to his quitting his lines and breathing more freely? What prevented his abandoning that

[1] It is affirmed that the typhus fever prevailing in the French army, thus collected in a small space, carried off 30,000 men. The natives suffered greatly from it; but Moncey's troops suffered still more. This was to be expected.

insalubrious spot and taking up positions in all respects more advantageous to him? Can it be that the half-naked republicans, who were at that time effecting the conquest of Holland, were arrested by the snow and frost of Spain? Can it also be alleged that the winter prevented our continuing to fight at the other extremity of the Pyrenees? Honour and glory to the army of Navarre and Guipuscoa, which compelled the French to this patient endurance, and checked the ardour of the strongest army that had hitherto threatened our frontiers!

At the beginning of March 1795, the enemy's forces, reduced to half their original strength, were thus dying away, and appeared to be besieged in their own camp. They were joined by fresh reinforcements three months afterwards. . . . . All France was indignant at this state of continued inactivity, whilst we were contemplating to avail ourselves of the return of a milder season to assume the offensive; our troops were full of life and vigour.[2] Perceiving the disadvantage of

[2] Count de Colomera, the successor of General Caro, was blamed by many for this long procrastination; his reply was that he had spared the lives and the health of his troops during the unfavourable season. The government left him, and every other general in command, full power to act according to circumstances and the suggestions of his own judgment. Colomera preferred allowing the hostile army to consume itself in its struggles against famine and the typhus fever, which were gradually destroying it: nevertheless, he was preparing to strike a decisive blow, which the impatience of our soldiers, less

being attacked; and always uneasy respecting his communications with France, Moncey formed the resolution to forestal us. The epidemic disorder had abated: two columns of his best troops were advancing towards Azcarate, on the first day of the equinox; they were both vigorously driven back, were closely pursued in their retreat, and experienced a severe loss.

On the 11th of April, a more serious attack was renewed against our left; this led to a fresh defeat of the enemy at every point of attack,[3] and two French generals of brigade fell into our hands.

influenced by prudential considerations, was endeavouring to anticipate. Had the reinforcements received by Moncey been delayed a few days longer, every one would have applauded the prudent slowness of the Spanish general. It is however to be observed that the state of the roads did not admit of the removal of the artillery at that season; that any operation would have had a multitude of obstacles to encounter; and that by merely blockading the enemy, without hazarding any movement, he preserved his army and the country from a contagious disorder, and inflicted upon the enemy a loss far more serious than they could have experienced by his defeating them in an attack, the result of which must have been doubtful. However, whether the count felt offended at murmurs which were grating to him, or was influenced by his advanced age and enfeebled state of health, as he represented it to the king, he beseeched his majesty to accept his resignation. The Prince of Castel Franco, commander-in-chief of the army of Arragon, was named to replace him, and retained the double command of his former army and of those of Navarre and Guipuscoa.

[3] Pagachoeta, Elguibar, and Sassola. . . . . The first of these attacks exhibited a characteristic trait of religious enthusiasm, well calculated to contend with republican fanaticism. Our troops were falling back, and the enemy advancing to the

The French persisted, for two months, in their attacks upon our left, and with as little success as on previous occasions. The position of Muchiruchu was twice taken and retaken; the engagement on the 23rd of May lasted several hours, without any decisive result on either side. At the beginning of June our army occupied the same positions as at the opening of the campaign.

The struggle was still more obstinately maintained in the eastern Pyrenees. The only loss we experienced was that of the fortress of Rosas; doubtless a grievous loss, but mitigated to our feelings by the courageous resistance of the besieged. The Spaniards have had no occasion to proclaim it — the French themselves have borne testimony to their heroic defence. From the end of November to the 3rd of February, the day on which Rosas was evacuated, the besiegers and the besieged exhausted all the resources of art in the attack and defence of the place.* The

heights they had abandoned: we received on a sudden the unexpected reinforcement of a brigade of five hundred volunteers of the general rising of Biscay; they were commanded by their rector, Don Antonio Achutegui, who marched at their head in his full sacerdotal vestments; their banner represented the image of the Blessed Virgin (our Lady of the Rosary): the mountains re-echoed the sounds of voices singing, on the one side, the Litany of the Saints, and on the other, the Marsellais Hymn. The courage of our soldiers revived at the sight; and, with the aid of their pious auxiliaries, they succeeded in driving back the French, and taking five hundred prisoners.

* General Domingo Izquierdo was the governor of Rosas; the artillery had opened upon the fortress on the 28th of No-

French had much less to suffer from the inclemency of the season, which often paralysed the operations of our squadron. After having irreproachably fulfilled all its duties, the brave garrison voluntarily withdrew from the ruins of Rosas, and embarked for the purpose of joining and reinforcing the troops on the line of the Fluvia: this was an addition of five thousand able soldiers to our numerical strength.

This river was the limit interposed by General Urrutia between the republican army and our own. The same representatives of the people who, in the preceding campaign, had ordered Moncey to encamp on the banks of the Ebro, were also insisting that Perignon should move upon Tolosa without stopping in his progress. In every other direction Fortune appeared to await

vember; the besieging army amounted to upwards of twenty thousand men, commanded by General Perignon. The only fortification of Rosas consisted in a double enclosure without ditches, covered ways, or glacis. The garrison made several sorties; and although the breach had been effected at the little fort of La Trinidad, and in the very body of the place, the garrison persisted in holding out a few days longer. . . . . Eleven batteries, one of them mounting twenty pieces of cannon, had kept up an incessant fire ever since the last days of January. Forty thousand cannon-balls, shells, or grenades, fell upon the town; and were answered by 13,633 balls, 3602 shells, and 1297 grenades. Our gun-boats, which were enabled to approach the coast when the weather was favourable, fired 4763 balls, 2736 shells, and 2793 grenades. The shells discharged against the French were fired from an elevation of 198 feet above the level of the place.

in submission the command of those haughty proconsuls. In Spain only, the car of Victory became occasionally entangled. Perignon attempted in vain to accelerate its motion; it never succeeded in passing beyond the boundary of the Fluvia.

I should exceed the limits I have prescribed to myself, were I to relate the many splendid achievements of our army of Catalonia. Officers and soldiers of the line, volunteers, natives of the country, all distinguished themselves alike from the commencement to the end of the third campaign.[5] More successful as a commander-in-chief

[5] The history of Charles IV. will transmit to posterity a multitude of names unjustly buried in oblivion; I do not merely allude to general officers, but to officers of all ranks, and to common soldiers, who nobly devoted themselves to the service of their country. Volumes might be filled with the narrative of their deeds, worthy of the most brilliant epoch of Greece or of Rome. I will merely select one instance amongst many.

Don Manuel Joseph Pineda, a captain of infantry, volunteered to take advantage of a dark and tempestuous night of the month of January, to surprise and destroy the reserve park of General Augereau, stationed at the Plà del Coto, between Bellegarde and Figueiras, five leagues in the rear of the French line. He took with him, for this bold coup-de-main, about a thousand volunteers of a Catalonian battalion, and two hundred somatenes (armed peasants). This second Leonidas partook of a farewell supper with his chiefs; and, after a patriotic toast in honour of the king and of Spain, commenced his march with his brave companions in arms. He crossed the Muga, with water up to his waist, passed over defiles and precipices, reached by unknown and frightful roads the park of reserve, and fell suddenly upon the enemy. The French commander was killed.

than as a general of division, Urrutia, and especially the chief of his staff, Don Gonsalvo O'ffarril, displayed conspicuous talents. The lines of attack and defence which they established resisted all attempts of General Perignon, and of Schérer, his successor in the command, to force them. They were successfully maintained against every aggression.

The army was always in readiness to defend itself, or move forward. The contest continued without intermission during the whole month.

Whilst part of our soldiers were putting to the sword all who offered resistance, the others spiked the cannons, and set everything on fire. The heroic Pineda received a mortal wound; the second in command took prisoners all who had escaped the bayonet, and completed the enterprise of his chief, whilst the alarm was spreading, and the neighbouring camp was sending troops in all directions at random. This camp contained ten thousand French, and not Moorish, soldiers. At the epoch of the Cid, such an exploit would have been held as a miracle; but at the time I speak of, they were the soldiers and officers of Charles IV. About fifty of these Spanish Spartans perished in the attempt; the others returned in safety to their standards, bringing with them a French captain of artillery and other living trophies of their glorious expedition.

Amongst the multitude of memorable deeds, we must not omit the bold and persevering incursions of the miquelets and somatenes, furnished by the principality of Catalonia. These detached corps, always in motion, eluding all pursuit by their swiftness, were constantly harassing the division of the camp of Figueiras. Their partial attacks and perpetual surprises allowed the enemy no rest. These indefatigable rovers penetrated as far as French Cerdagne. Their boldness and their exploits were the theme of every praise. These deeds are all forgotten at the present day.

We occasionally had to fight general battles, which were sometimes unsuccessful, often prosperous to our arms. A circumstance worthy of remark is, that the two armies appeared to agree in taking their respective turns for attacking, and persevered in this regular course of conflict. If Urrutia assumed on one day the offensive, Perignon, or Schérer after him, never failed to renew the attack on the following day. The intermediate ground seemed to be a field for warlike exercises, in which each party by turns made its appearance. It was not, however, a mere representation of a fight; much effusion of blood occurred in these encounters. The position of Bascara, situated at an equal distance from two points of departure, alternately fell in our power and in that of the enemy, and was the theatre of this obstinate struggle. It may be averred, that the French and Spaniards recovered in these dreadful conflicts the lost practice of entertaining for each other a mutual esteem. Their strength and courage being equally balanced, the war was carried on by both parties with a kind of national dignity, with reciprocal ardour, but without angry animosity or provocation. Each one respected the standard of his opponent whatever might be its colours or its emblems. From this loyal and chivalrous turn, which a war commenced under different auspices had now assumed, it was easy to foresee that the ancient friendship would soon be revived between them.

Accordingly, the dawn of spring brought us the reports of an approaching reconciliation: they proceeded from the enemy's camp. In fact, from what was occurring in Europe, and from the new political turn which France had adopted, the time had arrived for listening to any proposal leading to an honourable peace, provided it held out, with the prospect of a happier futurity, a reasonable guarantee of its duration.

CHAPTER XXV.

Negotiations for Peace.—Definitive Treaty of Bâle on the 22nd July 1795.—Last events of the Campaign until the termination of the war.

It will be in the recollection of my readers, that in the discussion which took place in the Council of State in 1794, as related in chapters xvii, xviii, and xix, of these Memoirs, respecting the continuance or termination of the war, I made the following, amongst other observations:

"The day of a salutary reaction is not far distant, when other men, other laws, other political maxims, will become more solid guarantees to us. It will then be possible to open a friendly communication with France. Such should be, in my opinion, the proximate termination of this war, carried on without ambitious views, of a purely defensive character, firmly entered upon, but pursued without obstinacy, though not without mature reflection; a war unsubsidized by foreigners, undertaken at our own expense, which we are ready to bring to an end so soon as the anti-social condition of France shall cease to endanger our honour and safety."

I further added:

"Happen what may, I here affirm, that any possible event will find the government prepared to meet it; it is alive to whatever may take place; whether the fortune of arms prove faithless to us, whether the allied powers alter their political system, ours shall remain unchanged. Neither frivolous caprices, nor the suggestions of foreigners, shall prevent our concluding a peace as soon as it may prove seasonable or of possible attainment. The government will not stand alone on the field of battle, or when any opportunity shall present itself for treating. More than one cabinet shares our views, our moderate and conciliating intentions. In any event, those cabinets will harmonise with us; but the king's government, whilst it prefers the blessings of peace to the splendour of victories, is still bound, in my opinion, to brave every danger, even the frowns of fortune, rather than subscribe to treaties which would tarnish its honour."

No event has obtained more celebrity than that of the famous 9th Thermidor, second year of the French republic (27th July 1794). The factions, whose doctrines had alarmed Europe, witnessed the downfall of their leaders on that memorable day, and the disappearance of a fatal ochlocracy, which was never to return. Exulting in her strength, and victorious over her foreign enemies, France viewed with feelings of indignation that

civilized nations should, by an affected estrangement, visit upon her the crimes perpetrated, not by herself, but by the sanguinary men who had brought disgrace upon her.

The party which had gained the ascendency felt the want of a reconciliation with foreign governments, which all France so eagerly desired.

The revolution, moreover, might be considered as an event actually accomplished, and rendered legitimate by the power of cannon, the last argument of nations. Public opinion had improved; the recent crisis had instilled more rational views. Were we to oppose their developement? France had tolerated the tyranny under which she had groaned, with no other object than to save the national independence. Freed from the rule of her tyrants, and restored to sounder doctrines, nothing but the apprehension of losing what she had so recently conquered could have revived the reign of terror, and brought back to the political stage the men who had organised it. Placed between a domestic and a foreign yoke, the nation had shown its preference for the former. So long as neighbouring nations ran the risk of being led away by the contagious example of revolutionary excesses; so long as the perpetrators of those unheard-of crimes endeavoured to secure accomplices in all directions by propagating their baneful doctrines; so long as they were bent upon imposing by force of arms a European dictatorship, the coalition was assuredly an act of duty

incumbent upon the powers composing it; it was alike just and necessary.

However, France had since returned to a more rational path; she had with her own hands hurled from power the men who wielded it as an instrument for disturbing the whole world; she had vowed to destruction the remnants of that savage faction, and was bent upon modifying the seditious theories, the dangerous application of which to all had now become manifest to her. From this moment it behoved the coalition to suspend its operations, and await the effects of so fortunate a reaction. Having no longer to contend against foreign enemies, France could turn all her efforts against her internal ones: the instinct of order, the desire for the return of the reign of justice, the lassitude of anarchy, the sense of religion, which never dies, the power of old habits, the impressive and recent lessons of experience,—everything showed her tendency to return to a monarchical authority, resting upon solid and well-considered bases calculated to put an end to past agitations and calamities. At no period of the revolution had royalty numbered so many partisans; all the prisons were empty; the liberty to complain was no longer fettered; the extent of the evils from which France had just emerged was manifest to her; she deplored the loss of a million of victims who had fallen a sacrifice to such weighty misfortunes; and the impression they had left

led every one to consider a monarchical restoration as the only means of preventing their return.

But the governments which had been unanimous on the question of waging war, could never be brought to agree on the subject of concluding a peace; for the advantages and losses of the struggle in which they had embarked, were not equally balanced. To a contest of principles succeeded that of interests, which was marked by still greater animosity. France had acquired important possessions, which her glory as well as considerations of safety prompted her to retain. The self-love and the interest of the vanquished required their restitution. This complicated position was the means of protracting the war, and the republic derived fresh strength and life from its continuance.

Amidst so many obstacles, and in spite of the conflict of passions, a sovereign of the first order determined upon bringing the war to a conclusion. He who had first embarked in it, because he had deemed it unavoidable, hesitated not to desist from his views when he found that the enemy alone derived advantage from the struggle. Frederick William, King of Prussia, felt that his honour and the interest of his subjects authorised his signing a treaty of peace with the French, even at the cost of some sacrifices.[1]

[1] The peace with Prussia was signed at Bâle on the 5th April 1795. Frederick William consented that, until a general peace

This unexpected event was the cause of greater rejoicings in France than a victory itself. It instilled in the public mind a still greater desire for the adoption of a moderate system of policy. When Reubel came to announce to the National Convention the first treaty concluded between a monarch and the republic, he expressed himself as follows:

"Citizens representatives, you are on the eve of reaping the fruits of your wise principles: governed by tyrants and lacerated by factions, the republic drew down upon herself the hostility of all the powers, who seemed to have vowed her destruction. Behold them now returning to a friendlier feeling. They adopt the course of peace as soon as you give evidence to the whole world that justice and humanity are henceforward to be the rule of your conduct."

The princes of the empire urged the Emperor to open negotiations. Notwithstanding the opposition of Austria, several accepted the mediation of Prussia, being desirous of entering into direct treaty with France.[2] These were the events

should be concluded with the empire, France should retain possession of all his provinces on the left bank of the Rhine, which her arms had conquered.

[2] The following is the list of their ministers assembled at Bâle in July and August. Count de Lehrbach for the Emperor, Baron Hardenberg for the princes of the empire, M. de Bergneuve for the palatine branches of Saltzbach and Birkenfelt, M. Vaitz for Hesse-Cassel, M. de Meisner for Bruns-

occurring in Europe at the time when Spain was invited to lay down her arms. The general opinion amongst us was in favour of peace; such a peace, of course, as would leave the honour of the crown unsullied, and the security of the state uninjured. A peace thus tendered to Spain, who was not the first to accept it, was flattering to Castilian pride. There remained, however, the enactment of a condition, the most important of all, to the effect "that France should not stipulate for any sacrifice on our part." The republic had at first insisted upon retaining, until a general peace, the four fortified places which she held in her power: she received a negative answer. We were then asked what were our intentions. "To continue the war, submit to fresh sacrifices, and rise in a body if circumstances required it." This led to fresh proposals on the part of France. "On what bases would H. C. M. treat with the republic?" "On such as we hope to obtain by force of arms; that is to say, on the absolute integrity of our territory, and on the restitution

wick, Count Diodati for Mecklenburg-Strelitz, M. Keppler for Hesse-Darmstadt, and Counsellors Lung and Grenham for Lemmingen-Durckheim. The Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, being unwilling to submit to the delays of diplomacy, separately signed, on his own account, and to the Emperor's great regret, a private treaty of peace and alliance with the republic; leaving to France the fortress of Rheinfelt, the town of St. Géar, and some other districts on the left bank of the Rhine, until a peace should be concluded with the empire.

of whatever portion has been invaded, without exception of the smallest hamlet." Adhering to that loyal perseverance in the good offices of humanity and relationship which had marked our conduct previously to the declaration of war, we annexed to this double condition, " That in the event of the negotiations being followed up, and of the republic being acknowledged by Spain, our government could not refrain from requiring that the French government should be guided, as became a great nation, by principles of generosity and justice towards the innocent orphans who were groaning in the prison of the Temple." [3]

The first effect of this answer was to produce great irritation in the minds of the majority of those who were at the head of the republican government. The most urgent orders were instantly sent off, directing the march of all the disposable troops in

[3] Such was, on all occasions, the loyalty of Charles IV. and of the Spanish cabinet towards the royal family of France. The Duke d'Havré has had repeated proofs of it. This consistent, frank, and disinterested conduct was manifested as long as the war in which we were engaged did not present an insuperable obstacle to the prospect of succeeding in our interference. If the wishes and efforts of Spain were not crowned with happier results, the blame of it attaches to those who showed a preference for the subsidies and the support of England. Having recorded in this place this forgotten incident, which is now devoid of interest, I shall merely add, that having, at the period of the restoration of the elder branch of the Bourbons, repaired to France, a wanderer without a country, not one member of the royal family condescended to honour me with a sign of remembrance.

the south; the armies of the Pyrenees were reinforced, and the war was on the point of being renewed with increased vigour: five generals and many superior officers of Moncey's army were dismissed from their command; this operated as a warning to the lukewarm as well as to the inactive. In the eastern Pyrenees, Perignon himself, who had rendered such signal services, was replaced, very fortunately for Spain; for his successor, General Schérer, proved far inferior to him in talents. The leaders of the republic could not conceive how the French armies could be so tardy in earning triumphs, or fail to carry every day by storm towns, provinces, many leagues of country; having, as they conceived, no other difficulty to contend with than the trouble of overtaking the fugitives, or of making long and fatiguing marches.

On the part of Spain, fresh reinforcements and immense supplies of provisions and ammunition were directed to the frontier. Catalonia sent forth thousands of miquelets; the kingdom of Valencia furnished intrepid velites of unrivalled swiftness; Arragon her formidable mountaineers, so hardy, so quick in the use of their bayonets, which are always at their side. A corps of reserve from Old Castile, consisting of soldiers who had, for a twelvemonth past, been trained to every military evolution, had already reached the banks of the Ebro. Two squadrons, one of which swept the coast of

Cantabria, the other that of the Mediterranean, protected the operations of our two armies, and completed our system of defence.

It is not irrelevant to observe, that in the midst of these preparations, which appeared to remove all hope of accommodation, the two illustrious orphans, whose name had been pronounced by Spain in the last negotiations for peace, began to be treated with diminished rigour, and even with some degree of kindness, by the French government. The unhappy dauphin received, though too late, the visit of the celebrated Dussault; but his painful existence was at least softened during the short period he had yet to live: his august sister, less unfortunate than he, had received, ever since the month of May, those attentions and consolations which had hitherto been so unfeelingly denied her. The news of this favourable change was circulated with much display. The newspapers written under the influence of the French government no longer teemed with invectives against Spain; they even contained articles which might be called flattering to us. At last, at the end of a few days, citizen Bourgoing was entrusted with the mission of opening a conference with us on the frontier respecting a peace between the two nations. This old admirer of the Spanish nation addressed letters to me full of candour and frankness. His honourable character, his moderate principles, his well-known sense of jus-

tice, inspired me with the utmost confidence. His communications were clear and positive, such in fact as he would not have ventured upon without special authority. In one of his numerous letters he went so far as to annex an original one written by Tallien, at that time a highly influential member of the Committee of Public Safety, directing him to inform me[4] "that, if I earnestly desired peace, the violence of certain individuals would be no obstacle to it; every onerous condition would be removed; the present was a favourable time, because weighty political reasons, which might vary from one moment to another, were now urging France to make peace with Spain; a good understanding might easily be brought about; full power to treat with the minister his Catholic Majesty might name had just been given to citizen Barthelemy, as well as ample instructions, which were alike advantageous and honourable to both nations.[5] Besides their mutual

[4] The political motive which then gave rise to the wish manifested by Tallien of concluding a peace with us, (though he merely hinted at it,) was no doubt the apprehension entertained of the English expedition, which then threatened the western coast. The result of it was seen, at a later period, in the frightful disaster which befell the emigrants who landed at Quiberon. It cannot be alleged that the negotiations with Spain facilitated or promoted the success of the republic; at the moment when that signal catastrophe occurred (the 20th of July), our troops were fighting against those of France with greater animosity than at any other period of the war.

[5] The date of the full powers in virtue of which M. Barthe-

political interests, private feelings and personal attachments, which might easily be understood without further explanation on his part,[6] led him to the adoption of this step. M. Bourgoing was to communicate with me in his name, and to urge me not to interpose unnecessary delays: from his certain knowledge of the sentiments entertained by the government, the republic would never disturb the internal tranquillity of those states with which she might conclude a peace; still less the repose of Spain, whose friendship

lemy was empowered to treat, is the twenty-first Floreal, corresponding with the 10th of May, two months before the date of the full powers granted by Spain, which were of the 2nd of July only.

[6] Theresa Cabarrus, formerly Madame de Fontenay, afterwards better known under the name of Madame Tallien, now Princess of Chimay. No historian of the French revolution could refrain from paying her a tribute of praise. To her happy influence is mainly to be ascribed the event of the ninth Thermidor, which broke the axe in Roberspierre's hands. In the interior of a prison, from whence she was shortly to proceed to the scaffold, she formed the plan of saving her life, and those of three hundred thousand victims devoted to the same fate. Her talents, the energy of her character, her perseverance in so noble a design, were rewarded with that glorious result. Never did the graces or the power of the fair sex win so sweet, so sincerely applauded a triumph. This celebrated woman had not forgotten her native country, neither was she a stranger to the treaty of which Tallien had sketched the preliminaries. I feel pleasure in acknowledging that she contributed to the restoration of peace between two great nations, Spain and France; the one proud of having given her birth, the other of having adopted her.

was essential to the tranquillity and welfare of France."

Tallien spoke the truth; his letter was written in perfect sincerity: the French government assented at last to the bases proposed by Spain, the *status quo ante bellum*, without, however, renouncing the idea of obtaining for France an indemnity in return for the restitution of the fortresses occupied by her troops. "It is easy to adopt in that respect," said M. Bourgoing, "those means which, without being oppressive to Spain, will be amicably treated of in subsequent conferences, and will offer a species of compensation to France, rather as a pledge of friendship and good will on your part, than as a sacrifice imposed by the republic."

To this well-meant and guarded overture, I replied by a note equally courteous, but still more explicit. I began by declaring "that the Spanish cabinet was ready to sign a treaty of peace in the joint interest of the contracting parties, and consequently a durable one. The pretensions on either side should therefore be clearly laid down." I added, "that in order to open conferences calculated to produce a decisive result, it was proper to determine beforehand the bases of them, without leaving anything in doubt, and as it were to the effect of chance; so that the two governments being thus agreed, they might convey to their respective plenipotentiaries instruc-

tions dictated in the same conciliatory spirit; this was the best mode of avoiding delays and of cutting short the scourge of war."

The French government was not behindhand in earnestness; it transmitted to me the declaration called for, and proposed as a friendly, an only condition, by way of indemnity for the restoration of the fortified towns and districts occupied by her troops,—the surrender of the Spanish part of the island of St. Domingo.

This fraction of our colonial possessions was not only useless to Spain, but burthensome in its then existing condition, whereas it might assist the republic in extending and consolidating her relations in the archipelago of the Antilles.

The proposal was submitted to the council of state, which unanimously acknowledged its admissible character; the more so as the insurrection in that island, and the settled anarchy into which it had lapsed, condemned the titulary possessor of it to every kind of losses and sacrifices. The king readily confirmed the vote of the council; and on the 2nd of July, full powers to conclude a peace on the part of Spain were sent to an old and distinguished minister plenipotentiary, Don Domingo Yriarte, formerly ambassador in Poland, and residing at that moment in Berlin or Vienna. This choice was pointed out as well by Yriarte's tried talents in similar negotiations, as by the ancient friendly intercourse subsisting between

him and the minister vested with powers from the French government.

In order to avoid any delay, two couriers were sent off with the same despatches in duplicate, and a strict order to make inquiries on the road, and to travel without stopping until they should overtake the new plenipotentiary. It unfortunately happened that he was neither to be found at Vienna, at Berlin, nor in any part of Germany. This disappointment gave rise to some doubts in France as to the sincerity of our wish to conclude the peace; for these delays, the cause of which was unforeseen, did not indicate much alacrity to open the conference agreed upon. English diplomacy was on the alert; no news from Yriarte! Tallien on a mission to Brittany!—the war was accordingly protracted for upwards of a month longer. Yriarte was at last found in Venice, and instantly proceeded to Bâle: peace was signed on the 22nd July, and forthwith ratified by the republic on the 1st, and by Spain on the 4th of August.

Meanwhile, the concluding engagements of the war were vigorously contested. On the side of Catalonia, Schérer lost the hard fought battle of Pontòs.[7] Partial combats were daily renewed, and

[7] In no other action of the three campaigns were displayed so determined a courage and firmness on the part of our troops as at the battle of Pontòs. Generals Cuesta, Offarill, Vives, La Romana, Arias, Laburia, Cornel, Godoy, Autran, Mendinueta,

our troops were gaining ground. Rosas, blockaded by our squadron, suffered a dreadful bombardment; Schérer's troops, which defended the place, experienced every difficulty in repelling the continued assaults. Towards the end of July, the enemy was driven from the Cerdagne; Belver surrendered to our troops; three thousand prisoners, including two general officers, a whole park of artillery, and abundant supplies, were the price of Cuesta's bold expedition. This general, whose merit was above all praise, was preparing to attack Mont Louis when the news of peace spread on a sudden in the two camps: harassed by this lengthened struggle, the soldiers laid down their arms, and hastened on both sides to greet each other with cordial congratulations.

At the other extremity of the Pyrenees, the war was still more vigorously carried on, but proved less successful to the Spanish arms. Nevertheless, Fortune was not altogether opposed to us. The skill of our generals constantly baffled Moncey's obstinate purpose of falling upon Pampeluna.[8] It was an object of the highest importance

Iturrigaray, Guernica, Ordoñez, Cagigal, Taranco, St. Hilaire, Moncada, Perlasca, Aguirre, San Juan, as well as a multitude of officers of all ranks, and of common soldiers, greatly distinguished themselves. See the report of Urrutia, the commander in chief, in the Madrid Gazette of the 3rd July 1795.

[8] The two generals, Crespo and Filangieri, manœuvred with admirable skill. By the accuracy and promptness of their strategic movements, they covered by turns the approaches of

for us to prevent at all costs the siege of that fortress. Our anxiety on this point afforded the French general the glory of taking Vittoria and Bilboa during the first fortnight of July. A column of three thousand men advanced even as far as the Ebro, and occupied for a few hours the castle of Miranda. They were expelled by the Castilians on the same day, 24th July. The temerity of Miollis, who had made this bold attack, cost him a great number of prisoners and many slain; amongst the latter the gallant Mauras, commander of the Mountain Chasseurs, and other officers, who had fancied that Castile was defenceless and open to inroad.

This is, accordingly, the proper place for refuting an error which was at first credited without inquiry, and was warmly propagated by my enemies. It has been asserted as a positive fact that "the French army had crossed the Ebro, had maintained itself on its banks, and that, threatening from thence the province of Castile, it had alarmed the court of Madrid and compelled it to sue for peace."

Pampeluna and the frontier of Castile. Moncey often indulged the hope that he had turned or cut off both divisions, a hope which gave way to the apprehension lest he himself should be turned or cut off. In the last days of the war, the Prince of Castel-Franco was collecting all his forces in Navarre in order to attack the enemy's rear, by placing himself between Moncey, then engaged in the province of Alava, and the fortified posts which protected his rear on the Bidassoa. Moncey was precipitately hurrying back to face this new danger, when he received the intelligence that peace was concluded.

The column of three thousand men which penetrated as far as Miranda had no other object, in obedience to General Moncey's instructions, than to draw our attention to that quarter, and thus favour his attempt upon Pampeluna. This is the first answer I make to the charge; my second answer is of a more explicit nature. Let us compare dates. The peace was signed at Bâle on the 22nd of July; the excursion of Miollis towards the Ebro only took place two days afterwards, the 24th of that month!

What reply can be made to this comparison of dates? It might with equal truth be asserted that France concluded the peace because the Spanish army threatened Mont Louis in the last days of July, and effected an opening towards the frontier of Roussillon.

CHAPTER XXVI.

RECAPITULATION.

I HAVE related facts which all contemporaries have witnessed and avouched, and which are now of the dominion of history.

I must again bring under the reader's notice the insulting and calumnious tirade of the venerable Archbishop of Mechlin, who has so little respected truth and the rules of courtesy in his Memoirs on the Revolution of Spain.

"But it is not enough that a war should be undertaken to avenge the laws of honour and justice; its operations should be directed with consummate knowledge; and the want of it proved a stumbling-block to the success of the Spanish arms. *The same hand which paralysed the action of Spain in time of peace, paralysed its action during war.* From the remotest part of the palace, a favourite assumed to direct the armies, as he governed the court; but as there is a wide contrast between them, and as an enemy, said Frederick, is no courtier, failure was the necessary consequence. The innate bravery of the soldiers,

the devotedness of their commanders, were alike ineffectual, and the enemy penetrated into the very heart of Spain. The government entered into negotiations, and it is well known what are treaties by which the vanquished seek protection against a reverse which is perhaps irretrievable. The French had crossed the Ebro, and were marching upon Madrid. They were arrested by the signing of a peace of which the favourite assumed the name; thereby displaying even more folly than arrogance, and decking himself with a title recalling the public misfortunes, in contrast with other countries, where men are decked with titles which recall their prosperity and glory."

Such was the language of M. de Pradt. I leave it to my readers to qualify the merit of a writer who has prostituted his pen by echoing such malevolent and false imputations.

M. de Pradt is succeeded by another churchman, but a mere acolyte of the archbishop, M. Muriel, a Spanish priest, with whom I have yet some account to settle.

This compiler so completely disregards historical truth and the glory of his country, that in his analysis of the pretended manuscript of Count d'Aranda, already noticed, he writes as follows:

"The disasters which soon befell our arms warranted but too well the apprehensions of that talented statesman (Count d'Aranda). Spain was unable to arrest the progress of the French troops,

which had reached the Ebro, and threatened to march upon the capital; and she found her only resource in submitting to a disgraceful peace, shortly afterwards followed by a still more disgraceful alliance with the so much detested revolution. The counsels of Count d'Aranda, which had caused him to be prosecuted, became, too late, the compass of the government, when it was no longer time to derive advantage from them."[1]

The above words contain as many falsehoods, which betray the bad faith of the writer, and the bitterness which dictated them. It has already been seen that the progress of the French was, arrested by our troops on the very banks of the Ebro, and that, at the moment when General Miollis ventured upon an unsuccessful attack, the peace of Bâle had already been signed.

With respect to the epithet *disgraceful*, I will presently give the very text of the seventeen articles of the treaty. It is proved beyond a doubt that peace was proposed and sought by France; the full powers of the republic were despatched on the 10th of May, whereas those of Charles IV. are only dated the 2nd of July.[2] Since that peace

[1] Spain, under the Kings of the House of Bourbon, vol. vi. additional chapter iii. pages 69 and 70.

[2] Those who feel desirous to read the text and date of the full powers given to both plenipotentiaries, may consult the first volume of the Collection of the Pragmatics, Notes, Royal Decrees, &c. of the reign of Charles IV, 3rd edition, pages 497, 498, and 499.

has, to M. Muriel, appeared so disgraceful, by what name will he qualify the treaties then or subsequently signed by other powers? He will no doubt inform us what advantageous treaties were obtained by those who, like us, came to an understanding with the French republic.

Three other powers, Prussia, the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, and Holland, concluded a peace in the same year. The first and second ceded to France the country she had invaded on the left bank of the Rhine; the Prince of Orange, though he had still an army on foot, and could rely on the auxiliary forces of Great Britain, sued for peace, offered to the conqueror eighty millions of florins, and was not attended to. Holland, soon afterwards, opened her arms to France, adopted her principles and mode of government, and was nevertheless compelled to surrender to the republic a large portion of her provinces, the towns of Graves, Bois-le-duc, and Bergen-op-Zoom, with an indemnity of one hundred millions of florins. We will say nothing of the burdensome conditions imposed, in the following year, on all the princes of Italy; nor of those which, at the close of six campaigns, and when the enemy was at a distance of thirty leagues from her capital, Austria was condemned to submit to, at Campo-formio in the first instance, and afterwards at Luneville. . . .

These disastrous events are known to all: I regret being compelled to revive the recollection

of them; but who could repress a feeling of indignation at hearing the character of *disgraceful* applied to a peace which we accepted with arms in our hands, and the leading clause of which we ourselves dictated? . . . . .

Spain had continued the conflict after the signature of that peace,—that glorious peace I may call it,—for which we had not to sacrifice a single hamlet, an inch of ground within our hallowed frontiers! Where is its disgraceful feature? Did we enter into a covenant with the French revolution, as Abbé Muriel so shamefully reproaches us with having done? No; Spain did not truckle to the principles or to the men of the reign of anarchy. She would in reality have stooped to the revolution, had she followed the advice of the indiscreet old man in whose praise Abbé Muriel is so lavish; Spain would then have contracted an alliance with the monsters who, the year before, inspired Europe with such well-grounded apprehensions.[3] I treated with France restored to

[3] I have no occasion to prove that such was Count d'Aranda's advice. Abbé Muriel, in his summary of the speech of that state counsellor, ascribes to him the following language. Vol. vi. page 65.

"There exists amongst nations an intercourse of a more elevated order, and of higher interest to them than that of reigning families. *At no time was it more incumbent upon Spain than at present to form an intimate union with France* (March 1794); for the very reason that other powers may avail themselves of their disunion to dictate laws to both,—an object wholly unattainable,

sounder doctrines, already affording symptoms of a moral restoration; with that government which the several cabinets of Europe soon acknowledged in succession, for they all concluded a peace: we were neither the first to pave the way, nor the last to follow the example of others.

At the period when the count proposed a union with France, she stood alone and without allies; the whole world shuddered at her contact. . . . . When I treated with her, Prussia, Sweden, Tuscany, Switzerland, Venice, had taken the lead in sending their ambassadors. The representative of the Emperor of Germany was also at Bâle, and the diet of Ratisbon strongly urged the head of the empire to come to terms with the republic. . . . . Had those governments and princes absolved the revolution of its errors and of its crimes? Assuredly not; but the question was decided. France had acquired, sword in hand, the right of taking her place amongst nations, and of being respected by them. The governments and sovereign princes acknowledged

if they could always remain, as they have at all times been, closely united."

Although the pretended manuscript contains many errors and falsehoods, it is true that the count uttered these words as they are ascribed to him by his apologist. It is also true that I fully concurred with him in admitting the importance of a close union between France and Spain; but I added that, in the state of wild frenzy exhibited by our neighbours, such an union was alike impossible and unbecoming.

an accomplished fact. Had they erred in keeping up the war? They had not; for it was undertaken in defence of their rights, their religious creeds, their existence, which were alike threatened. They had acted in virtue of the natural right of self-preservation. Fortune having betrayed their efforts, the same right authorised them to make peace. In suits of this kind, "jurisprudence hangs upon the fate of battles; reason is silent before might. Such is the supreme law."

Was it requisite that I should recall to mind these trivial truths in order to reply to the unjust provocation of an obscure priest, whose intellect appears too shallow to comprehend them? But the candid reader is easily led astray; it is proper to warn him against the faithlessness of the guide whom he follows; and I must not leave unnoticed this last phrase of Abbé Muriel: "The counsels of Count d'Aranda, which had caused him to be prosecuted, became, too late, the compass of the government, when it was no longer time to derive advantage from them."

I know not whether these words display more perfidiousness than ignorance and gross error. I have elsewhere related, that the marks of indignation evinced by Charles IV. against Count d'Aranda were provoked by a direct insult. The king felt his dignity wounded by the count's daring language. As to the advice given by the latter, that we should make peace with the men

of blood who ruled over France, such pusillanimity was rejected by all. The idea of treating for peace as soon as more propitious circumstances might enable us to do so with honour and safety,—such an idea, I repeat it, was mine, and not the count's. The whole council agreed with me in opinion, and our united advice prevailed. The government had no other *compass* to guide it.

The question is, whether peace came too late? I request every impartial man to say whether it was possible to think of it at an earlier period; to select a more favourable opportunity? whether a single stipulation was omitted in the negotiation, which the honour or interest of Spain called for? whether there ever existed a more equally balanced, a more candid or just treaty, than that of the 22nd July, concluded, I may say, at the request of France.

I can better than any one aver the fact; I who, more than others, was called upon by duty and by a sense of honour to weigh with intense anxiety the events and circumstances which led to it. This negotiation could not have been brought to a successful close at an earlier or at a later moment; a single proof will demonstrate the fact. For a long series of years, no treaty concluded previously to or after the treaty signed at Bâle, on the part of Spain, ever proved more advantageous, more honourable, to any nation or go-

vernment. The task of comparison is an easy one; it may be seen whether I exaggerate: and yet Abbé Muriel presumes to style it a *disgraceful* treaty!

The abbé is in Paris. My observations are addressed to him. Let him reply to them.

CHAPTER XXVII.

Treaty of Bâle.

WERE the glory acquired in those three campaigns, and the noble bearing assumed in the negotiations for peace, belied by the conditions of the treaty? The following terms of it will be my answer:

"His Catholic Majesty and the French republic feeling equally animated with a desire to put an end to the calamities of the war; intimately convinced that their mutual interests require the renewal of a friendly understanding between the two nations by means of a solid and lasting peace; and anxious to restore the happy harmony which formed for so long a time the basis of the mutual intercourse of both countries, have appointed for this important negotiation, namely:

"On the part of H. C. M. his minister plenipotentiary and envoy extraordinary to the King and republic of Poland, Don Domingo Yriarte, knight of the royal order of Charles III:

"And on the part of the French republic, Citizen François Barthelemy, her ambassador in Switzerland:

" Who, after having exchanged their full powers, have stipulated the following articles:

" 1st.—There shall be peace, friendship, and good understanding between the King of Spain and the French republic:

" 2nd.—All hostilities shall cease in consequence, between the two contending powers, *from the moment of the exchange of the ratification of the present treaty;* from which date the said powers shall not in any manner, or under any pretext whatever, furnish against one another any assistance or supplies of men, horses, provisions, money, warlike ammunition, ships of war, &c.

" 3rd.—The two contracting powers shall not allow the transit through their territory of troops hostile to either.

" 4th.—The French republic restores to the King of Spain all her conquests over the states and dominions of H. M. arising out of the present war: the fortresses and districts now under occupation shall be evacuated by the French troops within the fortnight following the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty.

" 5th.—The fortresses above-mentioned shall be restored to Spain, with the artillery, warlike ammunition, and every article belonging to the service of the said fortresses, such as they shall be found at the moment of the signing of the present treaty.[1]

[1] I request my readers will take the trouble to compare this article with the sixth article of the treaty of Luneville, by which,

"6th.—The contributions, deliveries, requisitions, and all obligations of the like nature, which have been imposed during the war, shall cease, as a matter of course, after the signing of the present treaty.

after having fixed the demarcation of the frontiers between the French republic and the Germanic empire by the Talwerg of the Rhine, it was stipulated as follows: "The French republic formally renounces all possession whatever over the right bank of the Rhine: she consents to restore to their legitimate owners the towns of Dusseldorff, Ehrenbreistein, Philipsburg, the fort of Cassel, and the fortifications before Mentz, the fort of Kell, and Vieux-Brissac; under the express condition that those towns and forts shall remain in the state in which they may be found at the moment of the evacuation." What is the object of this article? That of demolishing and rendering useless the places which were to be restored, whilst negotiations were still pending, and the exchange of ratifications was experiencing some delay. The orders given in consequence led to the complete dismantling and levelling of the fortifications of Philipsburg and Ehrenbreistein. The same occurred in Italy with respect to the works of Porto-Legnano, and the castles of Verona; in short, all the fortified places which the French engaged to surrender were delivered up in a dismantled state.

In Spain, on the contrary, not only were our fortresses restored to us uninjured, but many in excellent repair: Rosas rebuilt; all stored and provisioned, and in the state in which they happened to be on the 22nd July, the day on which the treaty was signed. The good faith and friendly disposition evinced by the republic on the occasion of their surrender are well established by her designedly omitting to determine the precise date on which the treaty should be concluded and ratified. The result of leaving this point in doubt was, that, until the double ratification, it was impossible to remove any of the objects composing the materiel of the service of those places in the state in which they had been placed by the French with the intention of resisting our attacks.

"The arrears owing at that period, or engagements contracted in respect to the war, shall be declared void and null; and any portion that may have been delivered or required after the above-mentioned period shall be restored in kind, or its equivalent in money reimbursed.[2]

"7th.—Commissioners shall be appointed on the part of each to draw up a treaty fixing the limits between the two countries; and they shall, as far as possible, adopt for basis, in respect of the ground which had been the subject of contest previously to the present war, the crest of the mountains which separate the double fall of waters, the one on the side of Spain, the other on that of France.[3]

[2] This article was conceded and fully carried into effect *in favour of Spain only.* It will be proper to compare it with the eighteenth article of the peace of Luneville. "The requisitions, contributions, warlike supplies, &c. were only to cease after the ratification of the treaty, which could not fail to take up much time, since each member of the empire was to concur in the ratification. With respect, moreover, to the payment of arrears of contributions, requisitions, bonds, &c. no portion of the territory intended to be restored was to be evacuated by the republican troops until after the actual recovery of all sums due to them without any exception." To the prolonged occupation until full payment of all debts, must be added the executions and processes, carried on with such unrelenting rigour that the inhabitants of the Tyrol rose up in arms, and gave reason to apprehend, for a moment, the breaking out of a popular war in that province. Moreau exercised the greatest severity in repressing the discontent. All arrears were paid up.

[3] The object of this article was to put an end to a multitude of reciprocal encroachments, the perpetual cause of quarrels

"8th.—After the lapse of a month, dating from the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, neither of the two powers shall be at liberty to keep up along its frontier a greater number of troops than what actually existed in garrison before the present war.[4]

"9th.—In consideration of the surrender stipulated in Article 4, the King of Spain, for himself and his successors, cedes and transfers to the French republic, in full property, the Spanish part of St. Domingo in the Antilles.

"One month after the date of the official announcement in that island of the ratification of the present treaty, the Spanish troops shall be prepared to evacuate the places, harbours, and other settlements they occupy, in order that they may be delivered up to the French troops when they present themselves to claim possession.

"The places, harbours, and settlements above

between the inhabitants of both frontiers. The simple rule of the division marked out by the fall of waters on opposite sides determined all doubts, as well as the question of property, upon which it had hitherto been found impossible to come to an understanding.

[4] In what other treaty of peace between the republic and the rest of the belligerent powers, have we seen this condition laid down, by which each party relied on the good faith of its neighbour, without endeavouring to claim for itself the balance of securities? By this article, the republic relinquishes its old pretension to maintain along the French coast a greater number of troops than was stipulated on the part of Spain, under the pretext that France had to guard herself against expeditions from England.

mentioned shall be ceded to the French republic, with the artillery, warlike ammunition, and articles requisite for their defence, such as they may exist at the moment when the official news of the present treaty shall be known in St. Domingo.

"The inhabitants of the Spanish portion who, through motives of personal interest or any other cause, may be desirous of removing with their property to the other possessions of H. C. M., shall do so within the space of a year from the date of the present treaty.

"The generals and commanding officers of both nations shall mutually agree upon the measures to be adopted for the execution of this article.[5]

"10th.—All effects, revenues, or property of any kind which may have been sequestrated, seized, or confiscated on occasion of the war between H. C. M. and the French republic, shall be restored to the individual owners, of each nation respectively. Justice shall be fairly administered in all that relates to the private claims which those individuals might have in the respective dominions of the contracting powers.

[5] The acquisition of this part of the island of St. Domingo was so insignificant that the republic neglected to take possession of it until four years afterwards: even then it was not an act of the republic, but of Toussaint Louverture, who accelerated the measure, without awaiting the orders of the French government, to whom the commissioner Roume had addressed a report on the subject.

"11th.—All intercourse and commercial relations between France and Spain shall be re-established upon the same footing as before, until a new treaty of commerce shall have been drawn up.[6]

"Spanish merchants may resume their commercial enterprises in France, or form new ones in that country if they so desire it, provided they conform, like others, to the established laws.

"French merchants shall enjoy the same privilege in Spain, under the same conditions.

"12th.—All prisoners made on both sides since the commencement of the war, without regard to the difference of numbers or of ranks, including seafaring men captured from Spanish or French vessels, or in any other way; every individual, without exception, who may be detained in Spain or in France in consequence of the war; shall be set at liberty within two months at farthest after the ratification of the present treaty: no demand or difficulty shall be set up on either side, to impede them: each one, however, shall be

[6] It is worthy of remark, that this treaty did not even procure to France certain advantages which are usually stipulated in negotiations of the like nature. "*All on the same footing as before.*" This treaty is important in another respect; for it omits to notice our commercial or friendly relations with England or any other power then at war with the republic. Such was the over-anxious good feeling of the republic towards us. Can any other treaty of peace be cited in which France has proved herself equally tractable and accommodating?

required to discharge the private debts he may have contracted during his captivity. The same clause shall apply to the sick and wounded so soon as they are restored to health.

" Commissioners of each nation shall forthwith be appointed for the execution of this article.

"13th.—The Portuguese prisoners, forming part of the troops of that nation who have served either in the armies or in the fleets of H. C. M., are comprehended in this exchange.

" The same clause shall apply to the French taken prisoners by the Portuguese troops in question.

" 14th.—The same peace, friendship, and good understanding which are stipulated in this treaty between Spain and France, shall also subsist between the King of Spain and the United Provinces in alliance with France.[7]

" 15th.—The French republic, being desirous of affording a proof of her friendly deference towards H. C. M., accepts his mediation in favour of the Queen of Portugal, the Kings of Naples and Sardinia, the Infant Duke of Parma and the other states of Italy, with a view to the restora-

[7] Our friendly relations with Holland had experienced no interruption. They had even been drawn closer on the 14th of May 1795, after a negotiation entered upon between the cabinet confided to my care and the government of the States General. M. Vander-goëns, their minister plenipotentiary entrusted with this mission, had found every facility of access to me in the furtherance of his object.

tion of peace between the republic and each of those princes and states.

"16th.—The French republic, aware of the interset which H. C. M. takes in the general pacification of Europe, will likewise accept his good offices in favour of the belligerent powers who shall apply to the King of Spain to open negotiations with the French government.[8]

[8] The new directors of the French government having at heart to win over public opinion, adopted, in good earnest, the idea of reconciling France with the other governments of Europe. This gave rise to the studied courtesy of offering to the King of Spain and to the sovereign of Prussia the honourable part of *mediators*.

Can it be supposed that the two monarchs degraded themselves by accepting this part? No rational man can withhold his approbation, and even his praise, of such an act of condescension. It has been published to the world that the King of Prussia had no other object in view than to acquire a certain degree of influence and ascendency over the Germanic body. If so, I should still sincerely congratulate him for his conduct; since that course of policy had also for object his own preservation amidst the dangers which threatened the empire. With respect to Spain, I may aver that the cabinets of Madrid and Berlin came to a frank understanding, and were fully agreed on these points: "that the return of France to sounder doctrines, to a better system of government, might be promoted by a general peace; that the military enthusiasm becoming gradually allayed, the nation would direct its attention more exclusively to her domestic interests; and that this might be the first step towards a return to monarchy." The only difficulty arose from the circumstance that Austria, having experienced heavy losses, repelled all idea of a peace which did not stipulate, as the first condition, the restoration of her provinces; and that England fed the hopes of Austria, and offered her aid and support if she continued the struggle. Those two powers persisted in a war

"17th.—The present treaty shall only have effect after the ratification of the contracting parties; and the ratifications shall be exchanged within a month from this day, and sooner if possible.

"In faith of which, we the undersigned, plenipotentiaries of H. C. M. and of the French republic, have signed, in virtue of our full powers, the present treaty of peace and friendship, to which we here affix our respective seals.

"Done at Bâle, the 22nd July 1795, or 4th Thermidor, third year of the French republic.

(L.S.) DOMINGO DE YRIARTE.

(L.S.) FRANÇOIS BARTHELEMY.

Such was that treaty, which, if it had been concluded between high-minded sovereigns, united

which was attended with such fatal consequences: 1st. it strengthened the republic; 2ndly, it aggravated the losses of Austria; 3rdly, it called forth a man whose high capacity and unbounded ambition might have remained buried in obscurity, like so many others which fail to come to light owing to the absence of circumstances favourable to their developement. The continuance of the war brought upon the political stage a man who was destined to astonish and overturn the world!

Giving to these observations their due weight, will any one venture to blame the wise and cautious policy adopted by Spain, Prussia, and various other princes of the empire? I deny that personal interest was the only motive which influenced them in favour of peace; their determination arose from an anticipation of incalculable dangers, and of a futurity big with storms, from a policy eminently conservative in its effects as well as in its intentions. If such policy failed to be properly appreciated at that period, subsequent events have sufficiently justified it: history will pronounce upon its merits.

by close ties of relationship, could not have been more equal in its provisions, or more equitably drawn up. At that period, the republic proved far less indulgent towards every other power; neither did she become more so in the sequel. We had to submit to no sacrifice, unless it be attempted to qualify as such the cession of the Spanish part of the island of St. Domingo; a land of malediction for the whites! a perfect cancer, which will eat up every European power that may henceforward persist in disputing to the Blacks that fatal possession! The principal Spanish colonists had already abandoned it. It was a burdensome weight upon the mother country: many of its parishes had already fallen under the yoke of the revolted slaves. Bonaparte himself was unable to arrest the conflagration. After making prodigious efforts, incurring enormous expenses and an incalculable loss of men, he was forced to relinquish the fatal colony to its ferocious possessors. Far better had it been to have abandoned it at an earlier period.

If we except that concession, the insignificance of which may now be appreciated, all the conditions of the treaty were in favour of Spain: no secret articles, no pecuniary sacrifices, no indemnities, no secret gratifications, such as have occurred in so many other transactions with France. I defy my enemies to prove that the peace was not such as I represent it, or that I have suppressed

any of its clauses. During the long time that has since elapsed, every facility has been afforded of searching the archives of every cabinet. There exists no reserved case in respect of this treaty.

How does it happen, will it be said, that France, so greedy, so unbending in her armed negotiations, should have proved so easy, so gracious towards Spain? I reply, that her conduct affords evidence of the good opinion created by the firm attitude displayed by the government and the nation in a struggle of three years' duration. But we must also recall to mind other claims which France was the first to acknowledge—our loyalty and the rectitude of our intentions. Spain manifested no private ambition; she avowed her respect for the integrity of the French territory; never displayed a feeling of animosity towards France; and merely combated an anarchical power, which France herself abhorred, and succeeded at last in destroying.

If no other nation so effectually resisted the gigantic forces of the republic; if no other power can point to successes more glorious or to losses less severe than ours; if, after two years of warfare, France had scarcely invaded a few leagues of our territory; if, when the danger was the most urgent, the courage of our armies rose in proportion with it; if in this crisis Spain, always loyal and disinterested, never for a moment entertained the thought of aggrandising herself at the ex-

pense of France; if she disdained the subsidies and aid of all foreign nations; if she adopted no other than her own peculiar policy; if she kept all her actions under due control; if she proved herself a formidable adversary, a true and sincere friend,—was it not natural that France, on the other hand, should respect a people whose heroic constancy was not dejected by the reverses which befell them in this obstinate struggle? Was it not consistent with justice that France should evince her sympathy for a people who in the heat of the contest never forgot that the French nation was their ancient friend and ally? Such was that war, such that peace, in both which Spain obtained greater advantages than any other power of the coalition; a war in which our soldiers forfeited none of their old and brilliant renown; an honourable peace, which was the reward of countless deeds of valour and of a wise and dignified policy.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

Testimony of French Writers.

I AM not led by purely personal considerations when I impose upon myself the task of writing my justification on the subject of the war and peace: the national honour is as dear to me as my own. To those who have affected to undervalue the glory of our common country, (how could such deplorable folly enter the minds of Spaniards!) I oppose the testimony of foreign, especially of French writers, who are the more entitled to credit when they speak in our favour, as they were our adversaries in the contest, and might naturally feel inclined to describe it as redounding to their advantage. I subjoin a few lines taken from M. Lacretelle's History of France during the eighteenth century, vol. xii. b. 23rd, p. 230, and succeeding ones:

"The French government, that is to say, the Committee of Public Safety, appointed by the Convention and revived by the decree of the 9th Thermidor, was the first to mention the subject of a peace with Spain. Its ambition, how-

ever great, was not altogether boundless. . . . . In spite, moreover, of the victories achieved, the conquest of the Spanish dominions still struck every imagination as too gigantic a project: no such chimerical hope was entertained as that a party might on a sudden be kindled in Spain, which should proclaim itself, as in Holland, the ally of the conquerors. Several fortified towns were yet unbesieged, and the Spaniards had displayed unbending firmness in the greater part of the sieges they had hitherto sustained. Numberless dangers awaited the French armies in the ill-cultivated and almost barren provinces they would have to traverse. Lastly, the generals were unsparing in their praises of the valour of the Spanish soldiers; and this valour, stimulated by despair, and roused by the influence of every religious feeling, might operate wonders.

"Under the influence of these motives, the French government commissioned M. Bourgoing formerly ambassador in Spain, to address letters to MM. d'Ocariz and Yriarte, which might lead to a negotiation redounding to the advantage of Spain. The cabinet of Madrid received those overtures with the characteristic national phlegm. The Duke d'Alcudia (afterwards Prince of the Peace) coupled imposing military movements with the negotiations about to be opened. It was, perhaps, with a view of dissembling the desire that was felt for peace, the acknowledgment

of which is always irksome to the vanquished, that he adopted a mode of negotiation which could not fail to produce tardy results."

M. Lacretelle next adverts to the appointment of Yriarte, then absent from Spain; our ignorance of the place where the new minister plenipotentiary was to be found; the perplexity of the couriers sent in search of him.

"The perplexity of a courier, who vainly sought him at Vienna and Berlin, and found him at last in Venice, prolonged the scourge of war between two nations weary of combating each other. The French government appeared as much annoyed and uneasy as the court of Madrid at these unexpected delays.

"Another negotiation was opened between General Servan and the Marquis d'Iranda, at the foot of the Pyrenees. But the Spaniards exerted, in this interval, the greatest efforts to repel the French from their territory. They had the boldness to appear before Rosas; and, combining their land and sea attacks, were on the point of forcing their way into the town. They had already commenced its bombardment; but were at last compelled to relinquish their attempt, though not without exciting the admiration of the French at a courage which reverses had but raised to a higher pitch. They advanced with no less impetuosity against the army of the western Pyrenees, and succeeded, at first, in driving

it from the heights of Pampeluna. Our army, however, soon regained possession of them;[1] but the confidence and energy of the Spaniards rising with the danger, they maintained themselves between the two armies which bore upon them, and already meditated a bold diversion in the French territory."

Thus much we have extracted from M. Lacretelle. Let us now turn to M. de Marcillac. "At the period of the signing of peace, the army of Navarre, notwithstanding the reverses of the campaign of 1794, was in the finest condition,

[1] This observation of M. Lacretelle is not altogether correct. In order to attack Pampeluna, Moncey had first to carry the position of Erice, which was occupied by the left of our army. He had, moreover, to possess himself of the entrance of the defiles of Ollareguy, and especially of the post or plateau of La Meceta, where the defile becomes considerably narrower.

On the 22nd July, the enemy encountered a vigorous resistance, and was driven back with severe loss. This defence redounded to the glory of the two battalions of the regiment of Africa, commanded by Don Agustin Goyeneta, who died in the field of honour, as well as Lieutenant-colonel Don Joseph Gonzales de Acuña, his second in command. The banners of the regiment obtained a special decoration in memory of that exploit. After the check experienced by General Moncey, our left, having been adequately reinforced, was not content with keeping the position covering Pampeluna, but made a movement in advance, in order to cut off the portion of the French army stationed in Alava and Biscay. Intelligence of the peace reached them at that moment. Moncey was fortifying in haste his positions of Doña Maria and Iziar, in front of the Bidassoa, with a view to keep our troops of Navarre in check. The war had already terminated.

well organized, and, from the reinforcements it had received, was superior in numbers to the French. If it had been more concentrated; if, collecting in Navarre a considerable body of troops, the Prince of Castel Franco had proceeded at once to the province of Guipuscoa, masking the position of Doña Maria, in advance of the Bidassoa, the French army in Alava and Biscay would then have been compelled to fall back in order to avoid being cut off, and would have had to take up a permanent position in the intrenched camp of Ernany. I cannot say whether this plan was adopted by the Spanish, but he appears to have been forestalled by the French general. Neither commander suspected, that, whilst they were planning the success of their operations, H. C. M. was intent upon procuring to his subjects a solid and durable peace, and was sacrificing the prospects of triumph indulged in by his armies to the repose of the nation committed to his care." [2]

The same author relates in the following language the recent military events in the eastern Pyrenees:

"General Urrutia, probably not aware that a peace was under discussion at Bâle, sought to resume the offensive. It is reasonable to suppose that he was planning an invasion of the county of

[2] History of the War between France and Spain in 1793, 1794, and part of 1795; by M. de Marcillac; pp. 109 and 111.

Foix; for he detached, in the beginning of July, the Camp-marshal La Cuesta with a strong division of the army, which was in advance of Gerona, and ordered him to compel the evacuation of the part of Spanish Catalonia which was occupied by the French troops. Passing by the Col de Moyans, this general attacked the French camps before the Seu d'Urgel and Puycerda. They were carried notwithstanding the most obstinate resistance, and the troops of the camp of Puycerda retreated into the town. La Cuesta summoned the commandant to surrender; but the latter having refused, the general ordered the assault. After a sharp firing of two hours, the Spaniards gave the assault, carried the place, and had the humanity to make the garrison prisoners of war; the two generals who commanded it were also taken prisoners. The post of Belver surrendered on the day after the taking of Puycerda; and by that capture the Spanish general had it in his power to annoy the enemy's territory, and to combine such comprehensive movements as might have compelled the French army of the Lampourdan to evacuate that conquest, and withdraw to the other side of the Pyrenees for the purpose of resisting the threatened invasion of the Roussillon."[3]

I also subjoin a passage from M. Thiers' work: "Peace was signed at Bâle on the 22nd of July, at

[3] Pages 336 and 337.

the very moment of the disasters of Quiberon. The conditions of it were, the restitution of all our conquests in Spain, and the cession to the republic of the Spanish part of St. Domingo; a gratuitous concession on the part of Spain, for St. Domingo, in reality, no longer belonged to any one."[4]

Lastly, I quote the work entitled "Victories, Conquests, Disasters, Reverses, &c. of the French from 1792 to 1815." The principal authors of this work were military men, most of them eye-witnesses of the facts they have related. Every page containing allusions to the Spanish armies, bestows encomiums upon them, which occasionally partake of enthusiasm; they take a pleasure in acknowledging the courage of the soldiers and the skill of many of our general officers. On the subject of the peace they carry their praise to a degree bordering upon flattery. I transcribe their own language:

"The news of the peace concluded at Bâle reached the two armies, and reconciled two nations which had waged an obstinate war against each other with a bravery and resources nearly balanced. But it will no doubt be a subject of wonder to all who have formed an accurate notion of the haughtiness and pride of the Committee of Public Safety, that the first overture for peace was made by that republican government which had lately vowed destruction to every crowned head. We

[4] Volume iv. chapter xi. p. 246.

have already had occasion to account for this singular phenomenon; it arose out of the memorable revolution of the 9th Thermidor (23rd July 1794). Those exaggerated and demagogic ideas which appeared to be the sole rule of conduct of the republicans of the *Mountain*, had suddenly given way to an unexpected spirit of moderation, which the Thermidorians skilfully wielded to bring round to their side the countless multitude of peacefully disposed Frenchmen who had timidly embraced the cause of the revolution. The attempts made by the government to bring about the pacification of La Vendée were the first fruit of that moderation; peace with Prussia and Holland might be considered as the second; the third was naturally to be seen in the termination of hostilities with Spain. Nevertheless, several members of the Convention, and even of the Committee of Public Safety established after the 9th Thermidor, were still tormented with that republican fever which thirsted after a war against royalty wherever it might be found, and vehemently opposed the project of concluding a peace with Spain, as they had already done when the treaty of peace with Prussia was under discussion; but the majority, which inclined to moderate measures, carried their point. . . . . However brilliant, moreover, were the victories won, the republicans felt alarmed at the idea of attempting to conquer the Spanish dominions: they recollected that ever since the

period of the Romans, the Spanish nation had always fought with despair in defence of their national independence, and had rarely succumbed to the temporary yoke of foreign invaders. These considerations are creditable to the loyal and humane feelings of the then existing governments. Alas! if at a later period a man more powerful than they had entertained the same dread of exasperating that generous and enthusiastic people, our country would probably not have to deplore at the present day those heavy disasters which have for a time obscured her glory.

"The court of Spain, on the other hand," (add the same writers,) exhausted by the efforts it had made, and being divested of the means of renewing them,[5] had to apprehend lest the French republic, taking advantage of her foreign and domestic conquests, might suddenly invade the Spanish territory with forces so overwhelming as to crush all resistance. Already in possession of part of the frontiers, and of the country most dif-

[5] Let us not forget that this is the language of foreigners. If the war had continued, it would have called for further and still greater sacrifices; but our zeal would have proved adequate to the emergency. We had carried on the three campaigns with our own unaided resources; large sums of money had been required: however, Spain had not yet been reduced to the extremity of paying her soldiers with paper notes, in imitation of the example of France. It proved a fortunate circumstance in this war that it was a national, not a cabinet one; and in Spain, more than in any other country, the resources for carrying on a national war are inexhaustible.

ficult of access, the French, whose last successes had brought them nearer to Pampeluna, might seize upon that capital of Navarre, and by this means open an easy road for invading the two Castiles and Arragon: in order to uphold the throne, it would have become necessary to call the whole nation to arms, and kindle a war the results of which were incalculable, and which, by occasioning a collision with the French, might produce on the public mind a moral revolution quite as dangerous as the invasion itself.[6]

[6] Such was, in fact, one of the motives which determined the council of state to vote unanimously in favour of peace. This was likewise my opinion: not that we had to dread the least change in the minds or sentiments of the immense majority of the nation; the danger was, for the moment at least, of quite a different character. The history of past times, the evidence of our own days, warned us not to be insensible to the power and resources of *minorities* when resting for support upon foreign aid, especially when those minorities succeed in drawing to their side the popular masses, the disaffected, the idle and profligate, by stirring up the passion for change,—a powerful lever which the French Propaganda never failed to wield for the purpose of disturbing every country into which their armies penetrated! In Spain, this minority gave slight indications of its existence: it was indeed scarcely perceptible, though capable, nevertheless, of doing much mischief; for, independently of the revolutionary example set by our neighbours, the annals of our own country could, without going so far back as the old monarchy of the Goths, occasionally supply us with some dangerous examples, such as the deposition or dethroning of King Henry IV; the holy league of the Commons of Castile and the brotherhood of Valencia under the reign of Charles V; the traditional prestige of the ancient constitutions of Arragon; the troubles of that kingdom under Philip II; the ever-painful

"No sooner had both nations discovered that their mutual interest recommended a cessation of hostilities, than every other arrangement became

remembrance of its liberties crushed by the monarch.* The public mind was in a state of ferment; clandestine projects were even meditated and planned; in June 1795, an intercepted correspondence apprised the government that the French were not wholly unsuccessful in their efforts at making proselytes on many important points; the first indications soon assumed the character of positive proofs. Secret juntas were discovered, which were engaged in forming democratic plans; all aimed at the same object, though each had its own favourite system. They debated as to the adoption of a single Iberian republic, or of as many republics as there were provinces. Opinions only differed on those two questions. The French, for the better attainment of their object, recommended a subdivision into federal states. One of these juntas, the most active of all, held its meetings at a convent, and the principal members of the club were monks.† The contagion was gaining ground. When the French threatened to cross the Ebro, the secret society of Burgos had already prepared to send a deputation for the purpose of fraternising with them. . . . . In Madrid itself, young men belonging to distinguished families‡ had the boldness to present themselves with caps of liberty at one of the principal theatres; ladies of the highest nobility§ affected to appear in public adorned with tri-coloured ribbons. . . . . Great were the calamities impending over us if the continuance of the war amidst such a conflict of principles, opinions, and interests, had caused a democratic revolution to break out! How easy it would then have been for the republicans to direct and take advantage of the movement!

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* Philip II. Death of the chief judge Lanuza, &c.

† At the capuchin convent at Xadraque.

‡ Amongst others, the brothers Acuña, the Marquis d'Escalona, now Marquis de Bedmar.

§ The Duchess of Ossuna, and other ladies of the same rank.

easy of accomplishment. Nevertheless, an accidental occurrence greatly delayed the definitive conclusion of the treaty of peace. The Spanish government, having acceded to the first proposals of accommodation made to it in the name of the Committee of Public Safety by M. Bourgoing, formerly ambassador at Madrid,[7] thought it right to open a communication with M. Barthelemy, the then ambassador of the republic to the thirteen Swiss cantons, who, by his personal merit and diplomatic talents, and especially by the treaty concluded with the King of Prussia at Bâle through his exertions, enjoyed the highest consideration in foreign countries. M. d'Yriarte, whom the court of Spain intended to entrust with its full powers, was on terms of friendly intercourse with him. When ambassador to the republic of Poland, M. d'Yriarte had witnessed the final overthrow of the Polish nation; and ever since the partition of that unhappy kingdom between the three sovereigns who had taken up arms for the purpose of crushing it; the Spanish diplomatist had been travelling in Europe under the incognito of a private individual. After pro-

[7] The authors of this work had previously noticed in the same volume iv. chapter x. page 32, the first conference between General Servan and the Marquis d'Iranda on the subject of peace. These conferences were broken off, as I have already mentioned, because the French set up a claim, in the first instance, to retain possession of the fortresses in their power until a general peace.

ceeding to Austria and Berlin in search of M. d'Yriarte, a courier found him at Venice, and announced the new dignity conferred upon him by his government. Yriarte took his departure in all haste for his destination. However, pending the delay in discovering his place of residence, hostilities were still carried on; and French and Spanish blood, thus shed to no purpose, sufficiently attested that the cabinet of Madrid had not yet adopted a fixed determination."

CHAPTER XXIX.

Reply to those who have questioned the propriety of the Peace with France at the period when it was concluded.

In the year 1806, Napoleon had thrown aside the mask. Infatuated with the idea of his Western Empire, his first object was to set aside the Bourbons, and seize their vacant thrones. I then deemed the opportunity a favourable one for protecting the Spanish dynasty from the dangers which threatened it; but my efforts were paralysed by men who proved faithless to their sovereign and country. They denounced to Napoleon the cabinet of Charles IV. as hostile to him. They sought a foreign protection, with a view to attain their object and overturn the throne. On the approach of danger they deprived Charles IV. of every means of defence. After stripping the father of his diadem, they hurried away the son to the ambuscade laid for him at Bayonne; delivered him up to the ravisher's mercy; and left the country without a chief, without a guide, like an orphan suddenly deprived of his natural protectors.

How could the multitude, fascinated and convulsed by dark manœuvres, penetrate the mystery of those perfidious machinations? It was easy to lay every wrong, every error, to my charge, whilst, gagged and loaded with irons, I could neither breathe nor refute the calumny!

Finding themselves thus at liberty to attack me with impunity, my detractors began by pointing to the glorious treaty of Bâle, signed thirteen years before, as the first *misdeed* of my political life. This treaty was, in their judgment, the source of every evil, even of the recent catastrophe, which the dastardly and senseless conspirators had alone drawn down upon the royal family and upon the country.

I shall soon have to advert in greater detail, and in its proper place, to that handful of intriguers and traitors. I reserve them for my triumphal car, after I shall have branded them with infamy. My innocence and their iniquity shall appear conspicuous to my country and to foreign nations: the question shall be fully cleared up. Let us first remove the vulgar imputations which were but the forerunners of the last and most serious charge.

Reverting to the subject of the peace of Bâle, what other conduct could Spain have pursued? The coalition was dissolved; the King of Prussia had withdrawn from it; many princes of the empire adhered to his policy, and embraced, along

with him, the system of neutrality; the other princes manifested the same disposition; all were anxious for peace, and the diet urged Austria by their unanimous decision to come to a treaty with the republic.[1]

I omit for the present the weighty political reasons which recommended the termination of the war, and will even suppose that under certain circumstances it might have been proper to carry it on. . . . . Let us consider the question: Holland, formerly hostile to France, had become her ally; Prussia, and most of the princes of the empire, had deserted the coalition; the intentions of Austria were not known, nor was it possible to ascertain them.

Was Spain to stand alone against France victorious in every quarter; was she to allow the favourable opportunity to escape; was she to bear the whole weight of the war, and expose herself to the necessity of signing, at a later period, a peace imposed upon her by force of arms, and therefore a disgraceful one? . . . . What would thenceforward have been the object of all our

[1] The secession of the King of Prussia was instantly followed by that of the Landgraves of Hesse-Cassel, Hesse-Darmstadt, Baden, Dourlach, Wirtemberg, Anspach, Bayreuth, and other princes of Swabia and Franconia. Amongst those princes ranked the King of Sweden as Duke of Pomerania, the King of Denmark as Duke of Holstein, and even the King of England as Elector of Hanover.

sacrifices? Was it any longer a question of compelling France to alter her form of government? Far from it: Prussia, Sweden, Denmark, Tuscany, Switzerland, Genoa, Venice, the Ottoman Porte, had acknowledged the republic; Austria herself and the whole empire were prepared to acknowledge her if she consented to relinquish her conquests. This is so true that every subsequent discussion was one of interests, and no longer of principles or of the form of government to be adopted. What motive could then induce Spain to continue the war? Was it her duty to fight for the purpose of compelling France to repair the losses of Austria and of the empire? What power would have engaged to indemnify us for our own losses, which might also have proved considerable? Russia at least, whilst she carried on a war of ukases and of distant threats —Austria and Prussia, whilst they only employed part of their forces in the struggle— had partitioned Poland between them; whereas Spain was fighting without any compensation, and alone, of all the coalesced powers, without private or personal ambition. What aid had ever been tendered to us? What proof did we ever receive that we had been thought of? Each power, it will be said, had enough to engage its undivided attention. But why should Spain obstinately persist in this dangerous struggle, which was productive of a result different from what had been

anticipated? for the war obviously strengthened the republic instead of weakening it.

I must repeat what I have already affirmed,—the continuance of this war proved most fatal to Europe! The republic was already tottering; it was sinking under its own weight; its foundations were giving way; the popular feeling was adverse to it; it was repugnant to the national manners; its first essay in the career of crime had excited the hatred and execration of all; the immense majority of Frenchmen would have preferred a wisely constituted monarchy; those amongst the republicans who were candid and sincere were disabused of their vain theories, and gradually approximating to monarchical forms of government. What was the tendency of public opinion in Paris and in the provinces, after the stormy days of April and May, especially after the 5th October (13th Vendemiaire) 1795? How near we were witnessing the downfall of the republic! Had one of the French princes then presented himself with no other retinue than a few enlightened royalists; had the Count de Provence, for instance, appeared in some province favourable to his cause, and proclaimed his compact, which conciliated the old with the newly created interests; the restoration would have been accomplished.[2] But England had not yet attained the

[2] So long as there existed a chance or a probability of success, Spain defended in earnest the cause of the French princes;

object of her profound policy; France, in her estimation, was not sufficiently exhausted or degraded to be so soon restored to her legitimate kings. To complete the measure of her misfortunes, the republican government obstinately persisted in maintaining her conquests over Austria and the empire. Every means of conciliation were exhausted. . . . . The triple alliance of

Spain alone supported them, and exerted her efforts, in vain, to recall them to some point of the French territory. The Count de Provence (afterwards Louis XVIII.), sensible of the loyal intentions of our cabinet, and grateful for the large sums of money occasionally supplied to him, addressed many letters to me on the subject; in one of them he candidly explained the equivocal and painful position to which certain cabinets appeared determined to bind him. When he expressed the intention of coming to Spain in accordance with the wish of Charles IV, who was preparing for his unfortunate cousin a reception worthy of both, the dark intrigues of England opposed every obstacle to this project.

M. Thiers seems inclined to do justice to the friendly disposition of Spain, when he speaks of the emigrants in the following language: "They admitted that they could no longer place solid reliance upon any power except Spain; that the King of Spain was the only true relative and sincere ally of the French royal family; that from him alone they could entertain any hopes. Austria had no sooner obtained possession of Valenciennes and Condé, than she hoisted her own standard, the sight of which alarmed the French for the integrity of the national soil; Prussia had kept none of her promises; Pitt was designated by no other name than that of the *perfidious Englishman*, whose guineas were found acceptable, but whom it would afterwards be justifiable to deceive, should an opportunity offer," &c. History of the Revolution, vol. vii. page 110.

Austria, Russia, and Great Britain, rekindled the war, and drew off to foreign countries the conflagration of which the interior of France would, otherwise, have exclusively felt the effects.

A government defective in its form, but more tractable, more easy of access than the Convention in her last paroxysms, succeeded in rallying the army; and, if it failed to conciliate all France, was supported by that numerous class which is always at hand to represent the will of the usually passive masses of the community. The slumbering factions might have still revived; it was the part of prudence, therefore, to avoid exciting or provoking them by warlike menaces. The opposition from without should have been of a purely political nature, for the French are attracted by the allurement of glory, as iron is attracted by the loadstone; and if a government which had cast off what was most obnoxious in its forms should succeed in obtaining the support of victories, nothing was left for Europe but to resign itself to the consequences. There was no possibility of foreseeing where the conflagration would stop. The new revolutionary planet exhibited no encouraging signs. The storm accordingly broke out; all apprehensions, all the calculations of statesmen, fell short of the frightful reality. From those overwhelming misfortunes and dangers Spain was preserved by the treaty of Bâle.

The youthful Bonaparte, until then scarcely

known, and almost a stranger to France, was at once called upon to draw his sword in defence of that decaying Convention for which he felt no sincere attachment or esteem. He swept the streets of Paris with cannon-shot. His first embroidered uniform was stained with the blood of his fellow-citizens. Become the object of public aversion after an exploit of so repulsive a character, he never could have calculated upon a single electoral vote in the assemblies of his country. He was selected to wage her wars under the fine sky of Italy. Fortune here consorted with talent. He who had only tried his character and courage in a bold attempt against the citizens of the banks of the Seine, suddenly sprang up into the hero of his age; a devastating hero, whose glory proved so costly to the whole world, and especially to France; a child of the revolution of which he usurped the inheritance, or, as he has been already designated, the revolution personified.

A warrior in the most eminent degree, instinctively hostile to liberty, he did not disdain the juggling which demagogic charlatans had already resorted to. Italy was as much conquered by his intrigues as by his victories. Unfortunate people! Whilst the great captain defeated and dispersed the five armies of Austria, the political conjurer skilfully set all the springs of the *propaganda* in motion. He affected sentiments which were alien

to him. Equally popular and eloquent, he courted at once the sciences, the fine arts, and the multitude; the thunderbolt hurled from his hands only struck the highest in the social scale; a liberator of the oppressed, he found partisans in all directions. . . . . In a short time, republics alone existed from the summit of the Chiavena to the meeting of the Po and the Oglio.

"People of Italy!" he exclaimed, "the French army comes to break your chains asunder; the French people are the friends of all nations. Hasten to our standards; your religion, your property, your manners shall be respected; we wage war like generous friends; our sword is only formidable to the tyrants who oppress you!"

What happened to the princes who reigned in Italy? Bonaparte left for a moment an empty shadow of sovereignty to those who humbly solicited the favour of his protection, who supplicated for peace at the hands of the republic.

Victor Amœdeus retained his royal hereditary title; but, in exchange for such concession, he surrendered Savoy, and the counties of Nice, of Tende, and of Benil. His fortresses were occupied, and his estates subjected to military requisitions; the roads through his dominions were thrown open to the French armies!

The Duke of Modena fled to Venice; he purchased his return at the cost of enormous pecuniary sacrifices, and was soon compelled to with-

draw for the second time, and make way for the Cispadane republic.

Thanks to the mediation of Spain, Rome, Parma, and Naples obtained a respite: nevertheless, Bologna and Ferrara were wrested from the Holy See, whose harbours, as well as those of the kingdom of Naples, were to be closed against the enemies of France: the three governments were compelled to pay heavy sums of money; the museums of Rome and Parma were stripped for the purpose of adorning and enriching the gallery of the Louvre.

The Grand-duke of Tuscany, who was the first to acknowledge the republic, beheld the invasion of his territory; Leghorn was forced to receive a French garrison.

Did those countries derive greater happiness from the change? They were ground down by a foreign soldiery. . . . . Oppressive requisitions, subsidies, never-ending loans, the plunder of the church, the confiscation of the property of absentees,—all these they had to endure: discontent soon broke out; the Italians rose in a body; and the restorer of their liberty returned to chastise the refractory. On the vague report of this event, it was hoped that an Austrian army would soon come to their relief; Lombardy was in motion; Pavia gave the first signal. It was abandoned to the fury of the French soldiers; the whole municipal body was condemned to death; Vignasco

was burnt to the ground; the population of the fiefs of the empire likewise rose to a man; Arquata and several adjacent villages were reduced to ashes. The Romagna had followed the same impulse a few days before; a hundred French dragoons were massacred; the people ran to arms, and resolved to defend themselves to the last extremity; but the invading army soon crushed this tumultuous resistance. Everything was put to fire and sword.

What happened to Austria? Mantua, her only remaining town, surrendered to the French. Wurmser was taken prisoner; Beaulieu resigned the command. This veteran general lost courage and hope together; he recommended peace on any terms. Fresh reinforcements arrived from Germany; fresh defeats befell the Austrian armies. The gallant Alvinzi, the last resource of the empire, was instantly driven across the Adige. The Archduke Charles came up in all haste with the view of attempting at least to defend the gorges of the Tyrol.

The pope had also made an appeal to arms. Rome was again threatened, and the Spanish minister again succeeded, with great difficulty, in bringing about a treaty which saved the capital of the Christian world. The Holy See preserved her patrimony; but Bologna, Ferrara, and the Romagna were dismembered from it.

A year had not yet elapsed; the Tyrol, Istria,

Carinthia, and the Frioul were in the power of the French. Bonaparte marched upon Vienna; his head-quarters were at Ildemburg. Austria at last sued for peace. After eight days of anxious efforts, she procured the pitiful and celebrated preliminaries of Leoben, followed by the treaty of Campo-Formio: to the loss of her hereditary states of the Low Countries was added the loss of Italy.

There existed an ancient monument of European society, the first point of departure of the middle age towards civilization; this was Venice. A prey to disgraceful agitations, fomented by revolutionary anarchists, she fell, scandalously parcelled out between the two contracting parties, the victor and the vanquished, who divided the wrecks between them.

I should wander too far from my subject, were I to pursue the thread of events; I therefore content myself with pointing them out;—the invasion of Switzerland, that old ally of France, as well as the alterations which the Helvetic constitution was made to undergo; the subjugation of Rome, and the abolition of the papal sovereignty; the new war in Piedmont, and the final and deplorable downfall of the King of Sardinia; the fatal attempt of the King of Naples, the flight of his family, the Parthenopian republic, the royalist reaction, the disasters, the executions which embrued the capital and the provinces

with blood; the invasion of the Austro-Russian troops, the rigour and oppression of the new power, which attempted to visit upon the people their past errors; the return of the French sway, with a repetition of the same calamities; the re-appearance of the supreme dictator, in whose presence the tumult of arms was again hushed, and the overflowing stream of blood returned into its channel. . . . . The peace was signed at Luneville.

Had the coalition of Austria, England, and Russia adopted the wise policy of Prussia and Spain, when the sovereigns of these two kingdoms treated with the French republic; had the latter been left to herself and to her intestine quarrels, the mighty name of Bonaparte would perhaps have remained unrecorded in the pages of history.[3]

[3] It has been asserted, that if Prussia and Spain had continued the war, the republic would not have secured so easy a triumph. Let me ask, in turn, whether at a far more critical period, (1793 and 1794,) when as yet unprepared to resist the first coalition, France was not equally victorious, though Prussia and Spain took an active part in the war, in conjunction with the northern powers? What was then proved to be impracticable had not become easier of attainment: the armies of the republic, well disciplined, accustomed to conquer, and commanded by skilful generals, might defy the whole power of Europe.

Consequently, since the recourse to arms had failed; since the war only added strength to the republic, instead of weakening it; prudence recommended a trial of what might be the effect of peace, and of allowing France to fall back upon herself. On which side was the error? The events are my answer.

Let us now consider the result of a nine years' struggle, which had at first the sanction of justice and sound reason, but which, owing to the course of policy pursued, was ill understood and received a wrong direction. Prussia, the first to make war as well as to conclude a timely peace, lost her possessions on the left bank of the Rhine, under promise of an indemnity to be wrested from other princes of the empire.

Holland, deprived of her stadtholder and of her states-general, surrendered to France the fortresses and portion of her territory which the latter coveted as a barrier on the Maese.

The German princes whose territories were on the left bank of the Rhine, had to submit to the same mutilation as Prussia, indemnity being likewise to be procured for them at the expense of others; that is to say, the weakest were to be despoiled for the benefit of the strongest.

The concession of these sacrifices, nevertheless, spared them the infliction of heavier ones. . . . .

The governments which had again compelled France to take up arms, had to bear the whole weight of the war. They had kindled the fire; they were consumed in the flames.

The King of Sardinia, after suffering all the degradation of a treaty which bound him hand and foot, and placed him at the mercy of the republic, finding that he was not allowed in his own dominions to exercise the extent of autho-

rity commonly vested in a mere provincial prefect, and that his subjects were become demoralized, determined to abandon his capital, and voluntarily withdrew to the island of Sardinia.

The Duke of Modena, the last remaining descendant of the house of Este, lulled for a time with the hope of recovering his estates, finally lost his money and his crown.

The Grand-duke of Tuscany, who had never been the enemy of France, was compelled to seek an asylum in Germany.

Rome, twice saved by the mediation of Spain, having again provoked the intervention of France, beheld a phantom of a republic installed in the Vatican; and when the vicegerent of Jesus Christ was allowed to re-ascend the throne, his three legations and the town of Ancona had changed masters.

Naples, which was the sanguinary theatre of re-actions, and made peace and war by turns, was at last compelled to yield to France the island of Elba, the presidencies of Tuscany, the principality of Piombino, the towns of Gallipoli, Brundusium, and Otranto, to which we must add enormous contributions, and the closing of her harbours against all the enemies of the republic.

Lucca, compelled to exchange her old liberty for the new one, was deprived of her independence.

Genoa, the country of Columbus and of Andrew

Doria, after having been alternately lured by England, Austria, and France, saw her aristocracy humbled, and had to submit at one and the same time to the institutions and the yoke of the French republic.

Switzerland, the faithful and sincere friend of her mighty neighbour, was nevertheless invaded, sacked, curtailed in her territory, and delivered up to a reckless democracy.

The queen of the Adriatic, she who in the days of her prosperity claimed to be the rival of ancient Rome, — the impregnable Venice, no longer ranked among nations.

Lastly, the Emperor of Germany, who so long carried on the war, and with greater obstinacy than any other power, aided by all the princes of Italy, abundantly supported by the subsidies of England, and in whose favour the northern barbarians, after an absence of fifteen centuries, again brought the terror of their presence to Italy,—that emperor, so worthy of a better fate, lost at this frightful game, 1st, his rich provinces of Belgium; 2ndly, the county of Salkeinstein; 3rdly, the Fricktal and his other possessions between Zurzach and Bâle on the left bank of the Rhine; 4thly, the Brisgau; 5thly, Austrian Lombardy, the territories of Bergamo, the Brescia, and Cremona; the town, citadel, and country of Mantua, as well as the Italian fiefs of the empire.

But, amongst so many continental powers, was not one found to preserve her territory inviolate, and whose limits were respected by the desolating storm?

Spain alone enjoyed this privilege: she lost not a hair of her venerable head, not a gem of her crown; her pure and virginal gold was not tarnished by the slightest, the most transient vapour.

Had Spain no treasures calculated to tempt the cupidity of the common foe?

She had greater wealth at command than any other nation; all her reserve capital was untouched; the treasures of the church, those of private individuals; her navy, her harbours, her galleons from both Americas; the manufacturing riches of her frontier provinces. . . . Where could more tempting objects be found? Notwithstanding so attractive a bait, the French republic respected Spain, her laws, her principles, her manners, her habits; no missionary of anarchy came to disturb our provinces: the republic was satisfied with our alliance and our friendship; she had sought the one and the other; they proved alike sincere and lasting.

What! with a Bourbon? with the near relative of the fallen family? Yes; and that Bourbon was not only respected, but liked, courted, endowed with a new crown for one of the members of his august family: another Bourbon, an Infant

of Spain, was called to reign over the country of the Medicis; and the republican power, which had overturned so many thrones, was found to restore one in favour of a nephew of Charles IV.

What procured for Spain so flattering a distinction? The dignity of her conduct, her firmness in the war she carried on, her seasonably concluding a peace. For my part, I merely consulted public opinion and the national interest. This was my only merit.

Why was this treaty of peace broken off? An ambitious stranger discovered—not in Spain, but in the treachery of a few Spaniards, enemies of their country—pretexts for interfering in our domestic affairs, and facilities for the promotion of his views.

Was it then impossible to oppose and repel such foreign interventions?

When we were perhaps yet in time to do so, and as soon as Napoleon appeared to have meditated the invasion of Spain, I attempted to ward off the danger. The traitors, whom I have almost designated by name, robbed me of the glory of accomplishing this object. They paralysed all my efforts, and themselves urged Napoleon's invasion. The latter hastened with all eagerness to seize upon his prey. Though the chance of successfully resisting this colossus was already far remote, relying nevertheless on the patriotism, the honour, and the courage of Spaniards, and

determined to make head against the storm, I sought to rescue my sovereigns and my country; I prepared and collected in haste every means of resistance and attack. . . . Treason had undermined the throne, and my own lot was a prison.

The treaty of Bâle was not the occasion of this disaster.

CHAPTER XXX.

Motives of the rupture with England and of the alliance with France, fourteen months after the Treaty of Bâle.

The treaty of Bâle left our independence undisturbed, and the French government manifested much good faith pending the negotiation: an instance will suffice to prove the assertion. Spain remained perfectly free to preserve her friendly intercourse with the other powers of the northern coalition, not excepting England. The republic had no wish to weigh us down, or drag us into the wars she had to carry on.

Guided by a well-understood policy, France neither required nor proposed anything that could prove injurious to our commerce, or expose our colonies to the ambitious cupidity of England. The French government was, besides, pre-occupied at the time with a paramount idea,—that of a general peace. The neutrality of Prussia and Spain encouraged the hope that it might achieve such a peace by our mediation with the cabinet of St. James.

But the latter rejected it. The war, undertaken at first under the auspices of morality, in

the name of justice and social order, was for England nothing more than a matter of calculation and a means of gratifying her animosity.

Our alliance with her was generous and disinterested. Prepared at all times to second with frankness the efforts of the coalesced powers, our co-operation was not burdensome to England; we never solicited subsidies or succours at her hand; but our moderation did not disarm her rancour.

Disdainful, indifferent, and acting moreover with bad faith towards us, as she had always done when the opportunity offered, how could we expect her to appreciate the friendly dispositions which, even after the peace concluded with the republic, Spain had always eagerly evinced towards England as far as the laws of neutrality left us at liberty to act.

How can I describe the new struggle I had to carry on with the British cabinet? It insisted on our again plunging into the embarrassments of a fatal war, in which other states had embarked. Promises, threats, flattery, insults, supplications, intrigues, all kinds of attempts and allurements,—gold, in short, in as great abundance as I might demand,—nothing was left untried; the most persevering efforts were made to deprive us of a peace inoffensive to all the belligerent powers.

I have spoken of the bad faith of England in her character of an *ally*. I am far from accusing the whole nation; the English people and their

cabinet are in perfect contrast with each other. Solely and exclusively attending to the advantage of the country, the administration openly manifested the object it aimed at obtaining. Once mistress of the seas, England would sway the continent; she would command the monopoly of industry and commerce. . . . . A system favourable, no doubt, to British interests, but unjust in the highest degree towards every other nation. Should she succeed in her views, there would be an end to fraternal intercourse between nations: friends, enemies, all were alike condemned to bend to the exclusive principle set up by England. She claimed supremacy over all; she claimed the first consideration; again she stepped in under another character: she was everywhere to be found. Other nations were to rest contented with the crumbs that might fall, if she allowed any to fall, from her table.

Unquestionably the complaints of Spain were not vain subtilties, or pretexts invented in order to break off with England. How many insults did we not endure without remonstrance? How many acts of ingratitude and treachery had we not to complain of, even at a time when we were her allies! The expedition to Toulon, the deplorable result of which is so well known, and which, had it been properly directed and supported in accordance with the plan originally adopted, would have altered the aspect of affairs, at least in the

south of France; that expedition alone, I repeat it, furnished a sufficient ground for breaking off with England. Spain, assuredly, would never have taken part in it for the object of setting fire to a harbour and ransacking the arsenals of the French navy. We suffered as much as France by this proceeding; our honour was compromised; Castilian loyalty had to blush at an act of infamy in which she appeared to be an accomplice.

It was unfortunately impossible for us, at that moment, to break the chains of that alliance; the time had not arrived for publicly revealing our motives, or explaining our sentiments in the face of Europe. The English were well aware that we were embarked in the struggle, and their subsequent conduct sufficiently demonstrated that they had no apprehension of our taking offence. They followed up their insults.

Though we were in alliance with them, they mysteriously concealed from us all their operations; we had no share in the advantages obtained, but were always sharers in the losses. Though we were their allies, they treated with whomsoever, and whenever they thought proper, without our ever being taken into consideration. It was not from them that we received the first intelligence of the treaty of 24th November 1794, with the states of the North American Union; a treaty in which nothing was stipulated in our favour: on the contrary, our interests were not only neglected,

but sacrificed to those of England, or abandoned to the chances of a doubtful futurity. A special convention, which I had myself drawn up with Lord St. Helens, stipulated that the ships and cargoes retaken from the enemy should be mutually restored. We rigidly adhered to this convention on every opportunity that offered: and yet the English cabinet refused, on its part, to conform to it; preferring the wretched detention of a ship loaded with gold to the consideration of what was due to its own honour.[1]

We were allies, and our traders experienced every species of insult, under pretence that Frenchmen had an interest in the cargoes, though the certificates given in Spain were in due form and properly authenticated. We were allies, and they confiscated the naval effects actually purchased by the Spanish government, and on their way to our harbours in Dutch vessels under our own flag! Our coasts were so infested with smugglers,

[1] The Santiago, a galleon, on its way from Lima. The cargo of this ship was worth ninety-six millions of reales or twenty-four millions of francs. The Santiago was captured in the first instance by the French privateer, the Dumourier. The English recaptured it after it had been twenty-four hours in the power of the republican privateer. It belonged to the English agreeably to the maritime law; but the private convention between Lord St. Helens and myself had anticipated the case, and expressly provided that all vessels which might be recaptured, at whatever period the occurrence might take place, should be restored. Such grasping avidity is truly inconceivable; nevertheless, the fact is historical.

their adventures were calculated with such positive precision, that the greater part of our manufactures were broken up! We were allies; and yet abusing our confidence, they never ceased exploring the shores of our American possessions, organising a system of smuggling, and enticing the natives of the country, in order to secure to themselves the possession of our commerce in both hemispheres! Lastly, we were their allies, and in a moment of embarrassment occasioned by the necessity of providing for the third campaign, England abruptly refused to assist us in that emergency!

If such was her conduct whilst we were her allies, what had we to expect when, standing no longer in any other character than that of neutrals, our harbours were to be indiscriminately opened to French and English vessels?

Nevertheless, the Spanish nation bore insults upon insults, in order not to raise a fresh obstacle to the general peace, the hope of which was still fondly indulged.

However, every despatch from our ambassador in London announced the hostile intentions of the British cabinet, and urged upon us the necessity of adopting measures of defence. This intelligence was confirmed by the provocations and violence to which our flag was everywhere subjected. The English minister, whilst he laid stress upon his friendly dispositions, replied to our

complaints that, "in so serious a struggle, in so colossal a war, it was impossible that the comprehensive measures to be adopted against the common enemy should not, to a certain degree, affect those nations which were in contact with that enemy." This language was a mere mockery.

It was followed by promises for the future, not one of which was attended to. . . . . Such a state was infinitely worse than an open rupture; and if we did not apply a remedy to it, if we still allowed ourselves to be enticed by vain hopes of peace, it could never prevent the war from breaking out, and would fasten upon us the disgrace of having hesitated to fight when honour pointed to that course.

I had fortunately prepared myself beforehand to bear this fresh trial which it was the fate of Spain to undergo. I had foreseen the dangers that threatened our possessions beyond seas if our alliance with England should be brought to a close. I issued, in time, the requisite orders: the maritime towns of both continents and of our islands were placed in a state of defence; our arsenals were suitably provided; the number of our cruisers was increased; our fleets were reinforced. The co-operation of the local authorities, of the commanders of the land and sea forces, was not left in doubt. If the war should take place, we were in readiness at all points.

I did more; I had taken to heart the treaty

which, unknown to us, the English cabinet had negotiated with the United States of America: this treaty afforded great latitude to evil designs; it was possible to injure Spain in an indirect manner, and without risk, in her distant possessions.

I endeavoured to conclude another treaty with the same states, and had the satisfaction to succeed in my object; I obtained unexpected advantages, and met with sympathy, loyalty, and generous sentiments in that nation of republicans.

This was not a mere treaty or alliance; it was, moreover, a formal act of navigation. Independently of carefully providing for the common interests of both nations, we realised the first application of modern ideas respecting the equality of maritime rights, and the measures which humanity enjoins in order to lessen the evils of war; ideas hitherto recorded in books, proclaimed by the civilization of the age, but the practical application of which has at all times been opposed by England.[2] This creditable and successful transaction has been suffered to pass unnoticed, like so many important facts of my political life. The treaty was signed at the Escurial, the 27th of October 1795, by citizen Thomas Pinckney and myself, without any other intervening party. The secret was so well kept for a whole year, that the

[2] The text of this treaty will be found in the explanatory documents, No. 2.

English only had knowledge of it on the 4th of September 1796, when it was made public; the war having then been determined upon.

Yes; the war was determined upon: our patience could endure no longer. We had exhausted every means in our power to protect our independence in our intercourse with England. We were now bound to protect our honour.

Nevertheless, this determination, and the measures consequent upon it, were not my own work, or an act exclusively emanating from my own political views. I was desirous that the king should cause a matter of so much importance to be maturely and leisurely considered by his council, and that his majesty should afterwards pronounce his sovereign decision, after having heard and weighed the opinions of his state counsellors.

Anxiously alive to the result of these weighty deliberations, France repeatedly offered us her alliance, and alluded, on the occasion, to the family compact. The question was new to us, and required to be seriously considered, notwithstanding the advantages which it offered in the event of a war becoming unavoidable with a power which exercised over the seas an undisputed sway.

CHAPTER XXXI.

Continuation of the preceding Chapter. — Discussion in the Council of State.

By dint of uncontradicted assertions, it was at last credited throughout Europe, that my power in Spain was that of a viceroy, or of a mayor of the palace, who had the uncontrolled disposal of everything at will, and directed the views and acts of the government.

I should feel no reluctance to accept an honour thus intended for me by my enemies: for if every act really emanated from me, and me only; if I succeeded in happily steering, unaided, the vessel of the state, in spite of the many shoals calculated to impede its course, and the violent storms which convulsed all Europe; if, I say, the vessel only perished when directed by my enemies, when, after forcing me away from the helm, they took upon themselves the management of it; it is no slight merit to him to whom it has been ascribed, that he should have so long preserved the vessel uninjured. But it would be as unfair in me to set up an exclusive claim to this merit, if merit it shall appear, as it would be unfair in others to make me alone responsible for the

errors which may have been committed. Few Spanish ministers have summoned councils to their aid with greater abnegation of self-love, with more honest intentions than I evinced. None ever showed greater zeal and readiness to enhance the services of the ministers who shared the anxieties and cares of the government. My views being at all times directed to the welfare and prosperity of the state, I have constantly sought for information in all quarters, without distinction of persons, and whatever might be their presumed or avowed opinions in my regard. Is blame to be cast upon the alliance with France, or the war against England? This double resolution obtained the unanimous assent of the council of state, and that of all the men of honour, knowledge, and experience who were otherwise consulted. If all were in error, having readily adopted their advice, I assume to myself the whole weight of responsibility. I even claim it as mine alone; well satisfied as I was at the time, and as I am still at the present day, that Spain was indebted to this determination for her existence in both hemispheres.

The motives upon which the opinion of the council was founded will now be laid before the reader. A brief analysis of the votes will serve as a reply to the calumnious accusations emanating from party spirit.

The council had frequent meetings and at various intervals; in other words, it acted with calm

deliberation, and had full leisure for reflection: it was proper to avoid, as much as possible, awakening the attention of the representatives of foreign countries. To the usual number of voters were added several general officers of the land and sea forces, two ministers of the council of Castile, two from the council of the Indies, and some diplomatists selected amongst those who were the most skilled in European politics. I had ordered, on the other hand, circumstantial reports, and every requisite information, to be prepared for the council's consideration.

After presenting a candid statement of the political situation of our cabinet, I proposed that a close inquiry should be instituted into the diplomatic proceedings of my department before and since the peace of Bâle, up to the time of their meeting. The despatches of our ministers in Paris, in London, and at the principal courts of Europe, were attentively read. These documents included the important correspondence of Don Domingo d'Yriarte during the short period of his life subsequently to his signing the peace of Bâle.[1] All

[1] This worthy minister, so advantageously known, and so highly esteemed in Europe for his excellent qualities and his consummate knowledge, was no less distinguished for the resources of his mind and his skill in political combinations, than for his moderation and his engaging manners, which won him every heart. He was in the prime of life, and might still have rendered essential services to his country, when death overtook him at Gerona, on his return from Bâle, the 22nd November

the reports and intelligence communicated to us affirmed that the republic acted with good faith towards Spain and Prussia; that she was not only sincere, but eager, in her desire for a general peace; that the discussions between France and Austria, respecting the restitution of conquered countries would bring on an obstinate war, the chances of which were likely to prove adverse to the latter; that some successes of a doubtful character, obtained at the close of the campaign, encouraged Austria to prosecute the war, notwithstanding her weakness in Italy, where the republican spirit was making rapid strides, the consequences of which none could foresee; that the indifference evinced by the people of Germany scarcely justified Austria in relying upon Saxony, Bavaria and Swabia; that the Empress of Russia would content herself with threats and promises, without any intention of carrying the one or the other into effect, — her well-known policy was to suffer the other powers to waste their strength in the contest, and gradually to erect herself into the arbitress of the affairs of Europe; that England, to whom alone the coali-

1795. He died at the mansion and in the arms of his friend, Don Thomas Lorenzana, the bishop of that diocese. Yriarte confided to this worthy prelate, on his death-bed, his last despatch addressed direct to the king, in which he advised his majesty, as the last prayer of a loyal subject and of a friend of his country, to maintain himself at peace with the French republic. The king had just appointed him his ambassador at Paris.

tion had been profitable, was unceasingly bent upon increasing her navy; that her ambition exceeded all bounds; that, already mistress of the seas, she fanned the flame of war between France and Europe: that amongst the intrigues upon the success of which she placed strong reliance, without even disavowing their treacherous character, was to be numbered the plan of disturbing the peace between France and Spain, whether by promising troops and subsidies to the latter, by stirring up a spirit of discord and mistrust between both nations, or threatening to attack Spain; for it was her intention to render Spain the theatre of the war, as Holland could no longer be a stage for carrying it on. Thus it was that the cabinet of St. James's hoped to establish its influence over the Peninsula; that this cabinet, solely intent upon its own interests, was but slightly affected at the frightful evils which would overwhelm the Continent if France should again be called upon to put forth the commanding resources she had already wielded in preceding campaigns. Lastly, that such a war being, with respect to Spain, without a motive and without an object, would naturally terminate to the advantage of England, Austria, or France, probably to the benefit of the latter; when we might expect as a necessary consequence, that the balance of Europe, already endangered but not yet destroyed, would be wholly swept away.

From the first opening of the negotiations at Bâle, until the last moment of his existence, Don Domingo Yriarte never ceased to report that it was morally impossible to maintain ourselves at peace with France, and England at the same time. "If we conclude a peace with the republic," said he, "and desire scrupulously to adhere to it, the cabinet of St. James's will not be slow in declaring war against us. It aims at our navy as much as at the navy of France; its policy, whether in time of war or during peace, will ever be the same; it will ever be our enemy. *In the present situation of Europe, we are not left to choose between good and evil, but out of two evils that which is the least pregnant with dangers, which least threatens to disturb the monarchy and to entail upon it irreparable losses.*[2] The continuance or renewal of the war will involve immense sacrifices, which may possibly be unattended with any useful result; but in a war with England, the natural strength of the country, and the patriotic zeal of the Spaniards, will prove adequate to keep the English in check in Europe as well as in America. At all events, Spain may rely upon France in case of a maritime war. Citizen Barthelemy opened his mind on the subject with-

[2] This argument has had no weight in the sequel, though it was then perfectly solid and correct. The whole council admitted its force. We were under the necessity of choosing between two unavoidable evils; for it was beyond our power to escape the one and the other at the same time.

out disguise; he spoke of the propriety, the necessity, of an alliance between both nations, in which Holland would at once take part, and would at a later moment be followed by the republic of Genoa, by Denmark, and other states. The King of Prussia is bent upon a general peace: he is especially apprehensive lest the balance of Europe should be disturbed by a protracted war; he approves of such an alliance as would compel England to adopt a less turbulent, a less hostile system; he would be ready to concur towards promoting it in the north, with a view to prevent the English from extending their sway in that quarter. Let us allow these ideas to ripen, and pause for some time longer. The horizon is too obscure to allow of our anticipating the result of the conferences at Bâle, where so many negotiators are met. We cannot, in my opinion, expect that England, or the Emperor of Germany, will evince any disposition towards peace at the present moment. With respect to us," he added, "my sentiments are unchanged; it is our interest to remain at peace with France so long as she may find her account in appreciating the honour and advantage of living in good harmony with Spain. The republic, as now constituted, prides itself in entertaining these views."

Our ambassador in London complained, in all his communications, of the contempt with which

Mr. Pitt affected to speak of the rights of neutrality and of the generous intentions of Spain, upon which he appeared to set no value, assuming as a pretext the dangers and emergency brought about by the struggle against France. England was unwilling to bend to the common law of nations; "*neck or nothing*," such is the perpetual burden of the minister's song; "the nature of this war does not allow us to draw any distinction between enemies and neutrals."—"If this be the case," replied the ambassador, "Prussia, Spain, and the other powers that have hitherto endeavoured, whilst treating with France, to prove their regard for England, must henceforth be on their guard."—"My language is to be taken hyperbolically," rejoined Mr. Pitt; "but I lay it down as a principle, that the distance between friends and neutrals is immense: it is small, on the contrary, between enemies and neutrals; the slightest accident, a mere chance, the least mistrust, a false appearance, is enough to efface the distinction between them."

The same ambassador announced, in another despatch, that the following questions had been discussed in a cabinet council: 1st, to take possession of a Spanish harbour; 2ndly, to land an army; 3rdly, to renew the offer of an alliance with England, and compel Spain, by fair means or by force of arms, to renew the war against France. In his subsequent reports, the same am-

bassador alluded to projects of seizing upon several points of our American possessions, especially in the archipelago of the Antilles. These plan were publicly spoken of. He had lost all hope of our maintaining any longer a friendly intercourse; and he pointed to the urgent necessity of forming a maritime alliance with France and other states at war or dissatisfied with England. He wrote anew that reports were spread in London of an approaching rupture with Spain; that these rumours seemed to be circulated with the intention of their coming to his knowledge. "They are threats," he added, "which are intended to frighten us, and thereby to secure the object they have in view; nevertheless they are not devoid of truth. The war is impending; and it will be entered upon in a treacherous manner so soon as they shall have lost all hope of rendering Spain the instrument and the permanent theatre of their quarrel with France."

Our minister in Paris reported that, without entertaining any doubt of our good faith, the Directory was nevertheless apprehensive lest an opposition party, which already manifested its leaning towards England, should succeed in imposing upon the loyalty of Charles IV; or lest its influence, strengthened by the fear of a rupture with Great Britain, should create hesitation in our cabinet. "Our naval forces," added the mi-

nister, " were not in a condition to make head against the English navy: how could we adequately provide for the safety of our Indian possessions? Since the intentions of England are no longer doubtful, and we cannot expect, on the other hand, to preserve much longer the state of neutrality so scrupulously observed towards her, is it not incumbent upon us to dispel any hope she might still indulge in of compromising us with the French, and to endeavour at the same time to baffle her ambitious projects? The Executive Directory was most anxious to enter with us into a treaty similar to the old family compact; whilst it wished it to be clearly understood, that no intention was meditated of drawing Spain into the continental wars, or of inducing her to fall out with any who might not be her avowed enemies. With regard to a maritime war, the Directory tendered the assistance of France and Holland; and hoped to procure the co-operation in it, at a later period, of other states already inclined to shake off the yoke of British tyranny." The reports of our ministers were frequent, and always in the same strain: the French government was urgent in its proposals; and its ambassador in Madrid, in his friendly and courteous communications, expressed himself to the same effect.

After the perusal of those official documents, I laid before the council the intelligence occa-

sionally transmitted to me of the constant provocations we received from the English on the high seas. I presented the numerous reports forwarded at my request by the chief superintendents of our harbours, and by persons of note in other parts of the country.

All opinions were agreed on the following points:

1st. The strong prejudice excited against France, three years before, by the political and religious crimes which had spread dismay throughout Europe, had been removed, owing to the reaction produced in France itself against the anarchical party, to the adoption of a more regular system of government, or to the brilliant triumphs which had given solidity to the republic: nevertheless, this change of opinion had not weakened the loyalty of the Spanish nation towards her legitimate sovereign; but the rising generation evinced a lively predilection for France under its new aspect,—a feeling which more especially prevailed amongst young men of the middling and others of the privileged classes, without excepting the clergy itself.

2ndly. The peace of Bâle had given general satisfaction even to those most averse to the republican system and to the French revolution, because it had dispelled all apprehensions of an invasion, then deemed of possible occurrence after what had taken place in Italy,—an invasion

the more to be dreaded, as intrigue and seduction would be promoted by means of a powerful army; and, in a contest carried on within our territory, we had to guard ourselves against the insurrection of the mass of the people, who were easily led astray by the cry of liberty and the allurements of a better fate.

If the peace created general satisfaction on the one hand, the attempt of England on the other to deprive us of that peace when we were beginning to taste its fruits, would be treated with feelings of intense indignation; for the taxes had been diminished, and were become as light as before the war. The commanders of provinces, the superintendents of harbours, and other persons consulted in mercantile towns, communicated to the government that the commercial community manifested an excellent spirit, and offered to bear the expenses which an augmentation of our naval forces would call for; that many private individuals were prepared to equip letters of marque in order to avenge the insults offered by Great Britain to the Spanish flag.

The communications from the bishops teemed with expressions of thanks and with blessings on account of the peace with France. "This peace," said the bishops, "has saved the throne and the altar; it has crushed the hopes of those who dreamed of establishing a republic in Spain!" All the prelates spoke in unequivocal language.

Whilst they detested the principles of the revolution, they congratulated the king on a peace which had averted the scourge from Spain. Some went so far as to exhort his majesty to repel every insinuation of England. I retain a more particular recollection of the report of the Archbishop of Granada, a venerable old man, as much versed in political matters as in those appertaining to his functions.[3] As if he had guessed or rather anticipated the motives of the court in asking his opinion, he commented upon the risk of extensive disorders occurring in America, should Spain, yielding to the suggestions of England, engage in a new war against France.

"The preservation of those vast colonies," said the prelate, "depends upon the tranquillity of the mother country. Should public order be dis-

[3] Don Juan Manuel de Moscoso y Peralta, a native of Arequipa in Peru. He rendered, when Bishop of Cusco, the most signal services on the occasion of the revolt of the noted Tupac Amato. Shamefully calumniated by his enemies, the prelate had to submit to the affront of being brought back to Spain, with a sentinel placed to keep watch over him on board ship, as a flagrant state criminal: this happened under the administration of Count Florida Blanca. After undergoing various other humiliations whilst in Madrid, he not only succeeded in proving that he was innocent, but that, by his talents, zeal, and firmness, he had brought about the downfall of the rebel and saved Peru. This was demonstrated in the clearest manner. Charles IV. would not leave such virtues and such signal services unrewarded. M. Moscoso received the grand cross of the order of Charles III, and was appointed Archbishop of Granada.

turbed in Spain, should a foreign power, especially, exercise any sway over us, America, under pretext of escaping that foreign control, will listen to the counsels of men who already dream of independence. Should Spain, in consequence of involving herself in a new war, experience such misfortunes as have befallen Italy, what assistance can we rely on to aid us in preserving our distant possessions? Shall we rely upon England? A deep-laid rancour, selfish considerations of interest, would urge her to seize upon the trade and wealth of the New World. Should Spain, in alliance with England, suffer reverses in a new struggle against France; should she be compelled to direct all her attention, and exert all her resources, to the defence of the Peninsula; shall she confide to England the care of protecting and watching over America? Would not this be tantamount to introducing the wolf into the sheepfold? . . . . You know what they have attempted to do during the three years of the past war. It is easy to foresee what they will do, should a new war, carried on with still greater obstinacy, and likely to be attended with more serious consequences, afford them facilities to ruin the system of reciprocal interests which binds America to the mother country. I speak of my own certain knowledge and from personal experience; for no one in Spain can be better acquainted with, or form a more correct judgment

of, the affairs of America. These countries evince no disposition to sympathise with England; they show, on the contrary, a strong leaning towards the French. If you disregard the latter, and manifest a partiality for the English; if they are allowed the privilege of supplying our harbours, and receive every facility to minister to the taste and captivate the good-will of the natives; you afford them an influence and a lever which have hitherto been wanting to them. My conscience, my loyalty, my character of bishop, of natural counsellor of the crown, may perhaps warrant me in overstepping the limits which I should otherwise have prescribed to myself; and my duty commands me to enlighten the government on this subject, because few persons in Spain are acquainted with the real state of America. The question is generally ill-understood. The views of England in provoking the war are not directed against the strength of France as a European power; what she aims at and covets is the wealth of our colonies, which the treaty of Bâle has rescued from her ambitious rapacity."

Such was the substance of the opinion of this octogenarian prelate; an opinion the more remarkable, as it evinces a deep knowledge of the interests of the country, and of the spirit of the age. His report embraced a positive knowledge of the state of our colonies, suggestions for securing the undisturbed possession of them,

warnings as to the course of policy it behoved us to pursue in the existing condition of Europe; accordingly it was often read and consulted during the repeated sittings of the council.

I shall not dwell much upon the answer of the supreme tribunal of the Inquisition. It had watched with intense anxiety the march and effects of French ideas in religious and political matters. The holy office lamented the extraordinary progress of those ideas, especially in the maritime provinces: nevertheless, it acknowledged that the success of the Propaganda coincided with the critical epochs at which reverses were experienced by our armies; and that the contagion stopped short in its course so soon as the war was brought to a close. The tribunal inferred from this circumstance, that France, no doubt, ceased at that moment to wield the doctrinary policy; and that the restoration of peace, instead of favouring the relaxation of religious zeal, appeared rather to have consolidated sound principles along with the Catholic faith. . . . . For the rest, it prayed not to be impeded in its endeavours to pluck the weeds, not to be fettered in its course; and concluded by denouncing several persons of merit as holding dangerous doctrines.[4]

[4] The holy tribunal received for answer, that it must confine itself to gentle and conciliating measures, and avoid increasing the number of proselytes by the exercise of an ill-judged seve-

When the reading of every document was concluded, the council had to deliberate upon an anonymous pamphlet, which the party devoted to England found means to convey to the king's hands: its title was as follows, *War with the whole World; peace with England.* It consisted of a long series of violent declamations against France, of exhortations to undertake a new crusade against the republic, of flagrant exaggerations on the advantage of an English alliance, in the absence of which it asserted that Spain herself would soon merge into a republic. Though this pamphlet did not allude to me by name, or openly attack me, nevertheless it evidently was a first experiment of my enemies, instigated by the cabinet of St. James's. The object aimed at was to ruin me in the king's good opinion.[5] My request that the pamphlet should be read

rity. It was admonished that the public announcement of its decisions and censures only stimulated the desire to read forbidden books; that it should act with moderation in this regard, reserving to itself the right of keeping a watchful eye over everything, and reporting to government the result of its inquiries.

[5] Well-founded conjectures ascribed this intrigue to the Duke D'Infantado, the champion who first manifested an intention to enter the lists against me. The Anglomania of this Spanish nobleman is known to every one. During the most critical moments of the war of Independence, he would fain have urged the Spanish nation to surrender to the English the direction of her government and of her armies. At the period of

from beginning to end was assented to; when the council came to an opinion that it was hardly worth the trouble bestowed upon its perusal, which had proved a mere waste of time.

which I am now speaking, I opposed every inquiry into the origin of the pamphlet, and, be the author who he might, evinced my contempt for him.

CHAPTER XXXII.

Questions submitted to the Council of State.—Resolutions adopted.

After a long and minute investigation of all the reports, advices, and intelligence communicated to the government, the following questions were laid down:

First. Do the situation of Spain, and the conduct of France towards us since the 22nd of July last year,—date of the treaty of Bâle, afford a legitimate pretence for renouncing the pacific system we have adopted towards the republic?

The unanimous reply was in the negative.

Secondly. Should the apprehension of a maritime war, with which England threatens Spain, compel us anew to take up arms against the republic?

The unanimous reply was also in the negative. This question, which was examined and discussed under every political and military point of view, as well as on grounds of economy, was most earnestly considered by the council, and was at last brought forward under a new aspect: "Supposing that a war either with France or England should

become inevitable, which of them is it preferable for us to encounter?"

All the members of the council decided against the latter power. "A war with France, undertaken for no other motive than to avoid a war with England, would be unjust; and it does not become the dignity of the Spanish cabinet thus to bend to the will of a foreign power. A war with Great Britain will doubtless be injurious to our commerce; but a war with France will bear heavily upon all classes of the community, not excepting the commercial class. Such a war will call for gigantic efforts, for enormous sacrifices, having no other object in view than a compliance with the wishes of England: it may be the means of exciting civil dissensions; and, notwithstanding the spirit of loyalty which characterises the generality of Spaniards, a handful of wicked or misguided men will be sufficient to create serious evils. When once we shall have engaged in the struggle, when the din of arms shall have spread in all directions, republican ideas, hitherto kept in check, will revive; and if we meet with reverses, the basis of the monarchy may be shaken, and even the prerogatives of the crown again called in question."

Several counsellors spoke at great length on this important article of discussion. "Have we not witnessed," they argued, "what has happened in Belgium, in Savoy, in Holland, in Italy, and even

amongst us at the close of the second campaign—the surrender of Figueiras, the treacherous giving up of St. Sebastian? The latter misdeed was assuredly the result of the republican illusions spread through the province of Biscay." Other members of the council insisted upon the contrast we had always discovered between the promises and performances of England, a contrast too often attended with fatal consequences to us not to warrant future circumspection on our part. They instanced the expeditions of Holland, of Toulon, Quiberon, L'île Dieu, each of them as blustering as they proved disastrous to the French royalists. They laid stress upon the great danger of admitting an English army into the Peninsula. "If once allowed to land on our shores, would it not insist upon being put in possession of one of our harbours, under pretence of securing its retreat? and if the English should be compelled to withdraw, would they depart without pillaging our arsenals and destroying our navy? What may not the stay of a foreign army in Spain compel us to endure from a soldiery whose language, habits, and manners have no affinity with ours! Sacrifices of every kind, useless if the English army should prove inadequate to ensure a victory to our cause; burthensome, oppressive, out of all proportion with our means, if that army should fall short of the numbers required to meet the emergency! What will be the fate of our manufacturing in-

dustry? English armies are wont to engage in commerce; they bring in their train more bales of merchandise than ammunitions of war; a new mode of spreading in all directions the surplus of their manufactures, and of carrying on a contraband trade under protection of their armies! . . . . But the greatest of all calamities is that of being under a foreign yoke; and we shall have lost our independence so soon as the English shall have succeeded in obtaining a footing in the Peninsula: Spain will then be placed between two fires. What will then become of our already exhausted manufactures, if, in order to complete their ruin, and to take advantage of it, the British generals should purposely draw the war into our manufacturing provinces? Heavy will be the misfortune of Spain if condemned to become the theatre of an obstinate war between France and England? Who can measure the extent of such a contest?

"The cabinet of St. James's has not forgot our co-operation in the North American war. Once introduced into the Peninsula, in possession of our harbours, exercising full sway over us, England will have a finer opportunity for gratifying her old rancour against Spain than if she were at open war with her. It is the interest and the wish of the English government to compromise and ruin us by compelling the adoption of the course to which it heedlessly urges us, in order to stir up our colonies, and to obtain undisputed

possession of them. What a disgrace would it not be for us to renew the war against France upon no other ground than that England has frightened us into it."

Other arguments were added to the preceding ones. Counsellors, ministers, generals, all who attended the deliberation, decided with common accord that, in the rigorous alternative of coming to a rupture with France or with England, honour, justice, and the national weal, commanded us to break off with the latter power.

Third question. Supposing a war with England to be unavoidable, are we to contract an alliance with France?

Opinions were agreed on this question: all admitted that Spain, left to her own resources, was unable to contend with success against the English, considering the immense extent of the possessions she had to protect from attack. It behoved her, therefore, to call in the aid of her allies. All were of opinion that the naval forces of France, combined with those of Spain and Holland, if insufficient to crush the power of England, might, at least, so engage her attention in Europe as to preclude her making any attempt against our colonies. It was likewise hoped that other northern states, which were not engaged in the coalition against France, would sooner or later shake off the tyrannical yoke of England, and assist us in the like attempt.

Fourth question. What ought to be the con-

ditions of the alliance with France? Shall it be a purely defensive and offensive treaty against England, or will it be proper to renew the old family compact?

The members of the council were nearly unanimous in considering the family compact as the most effectual means of forming a solid alliance. They alleged that "this compact had been confirmed at our request in 1790; to depart from, or attempt to modify it, now that it was called for by the republic, would be to convey a suspicion of our not being actuated by the friendly intentions we professed towards the new government: though motives were not wanting for a circumspect conduct on our part, nevertheless it was consistent with sound policy to avoid exhibiting a spirit of mistrust calculated to damp the good feeling openly manifested in our regard. Left with a choice of evils, it behoved us to dispose of the most urgent, which was the state of uncertainty with respect to the measures to be adopted in order to keep England in check and put an end to her intrigues: to seek a middle course, and fetter the alliance by restrictions, would expose us to its rejection, and consequently to the necessity of resorting to evasions towards England, and of patiently enduring her insults; a course which, when she should discover our weakness, and the misunderstanding growing up between France and Spain, would not prevent her availing herself of the first op-

portunity to attack us at advantage: we should then be compelled to have recourse to France, and to solicit what we had previously rejected with more pride than sound wisdom. The singular condition of Europe at the present moment greatly tended to modify the ordinary rules of policy; nearly every question then under agitation was to be solved by the paramount law of self-preservation, as it must always happen on occasions of imminent danger, when human prudence recommends the adoption of that course which is attended with the least inconvenience, whilst it calls for no sacrifice of honour. It was far safer to renew with France the old family compact, a pledge of union tried by the test of thirty years. The change effected in the forms of the French government brought no change in the reciprocal interests of the two countries: Spanish honour was open to no reproach, since the government was intent on preserving the vast dominions of Spain, and had that very object in view when treating with the republic: no law, no rule of policy or of convenience, precluded a monarchy from entering into alliance with governments under other forms: the French republic was acknowledged by several powers entitled to respect, and indirectly by those, not excepting England, which were at war with her, since all had, at least, manifested the desire to negotiate with the republic; and the continuance of hostilities had no longer for object to

restore the old monarchy, or to overthrow the new system, but rather the restitution of conquered territories. Lastly, admitting, as a principle, the imperious necessity of concluding a general peace in order to deprive France of the opportunity of aggrandizing herself and overthrowing the balance of Europe, a treaty of alliance was, in the opinion of every impartial man, a means of obtaining that peace so earnestly desired by all; for it must remove from the belligerent powers the hope of conquering France, strengthened as she would then be by the support of Spain."

Two or three members of the council—my memory does not assist me in recollecting a greater number—gave utterance to a different opinion: "Should France refuse every arrangement short of the family compact, should England on the other hand persist in her unjust dealings towards us, let us stand on our defence; assume an attitude independent of both, and oppose to them an armed neutrality: this will be the means of satisfying the demands of England, if she is really jealous of our predilection for her rival; and of satisfying France likewise, if she should entertain apprehensions from our present state of peace with England. The cabinets of St. James's and of Paris will perceive that we act an impartial part, and that our pacific intentions claim the respect of both."

Those who argued in this manner gave evi-

dence that they were in earnest; they weighed the character of the British cabinet by the standard of their own sentiments. It never entered their minds that France could be brought to mistrust us. But this opinion had been suggested to them; ideas such as these were insidiously propagated by partisans of England: had they been adopted, a rupture between France and Spain would have become immediate and unavoidable. On the other hand, the pure and simple adoption of the family compact, as recommended by the rest of the council, was not free from difficulties which might have compromised us with the coalesced powers at that time on friendly terms with Spain. The war they were waging against the republic was undertaken in virtue of a league, the object of which — though it eventually failed of success—was to invade the French territory, and attack the national independence. Such being the case, the family compact, if substantially renewed, obliged us to assist France in repelling her aggressors. I was now called upon to emit my individual opinion: I demonstrated that "the principle unquestionably led to the consequence pointed out; but we were bound, at all risks, to protect ourselves from its application. With regard to the armed neutrality towards France and England, I was too well acquainted with the cabinet of St. James's to hesitate a moment in combating so great a delusion: I proved by numberless instances how inadequate is the precarious

resource of a neutrality, when a nation is placed between two gigantic powers, with whom it falls into unavoidable contact, is constantly exposed to obstruct their course, and comes in for a share of the blows they level at each other. Such had been the fatal position of the republic of Genoa, which, failing to command the respect of either party, was by turns an object of derision to the French, the English, and the Austrians." I reminded the council of what had just occurred in Tuscany: "Notwithstanding the protests of the sovereign, the English had seized upon the port of Leghorn, thus openly violating the well-known neutrality of the country; Bonaparte, no less insulting in his conduct, had forthwith caused Leghorn to be occupied by his troops, and scarcely deigned to notify to the peaceful archduke this act of aggression." I represented "the inveterate character of the present war between England and France,—a war at variance with ordinary contests, and regardless of private rights." After having refuted, upon principle, the paradox of an armed neutrality, "In our present position," I added, "whichever way we turn, we can only expect war. Superior to other nations as a maritime power, England acknowledges neither an armed nor a peaceful neutrality: she well knows that the impartial, the conciliating character of our government admits of no doubt or mistrust; but England has appropriated to herself this axiom, *he who is not with us is against us;* a

divided friendship is, in her estimation, valueless; she rejects any friendship that is shared with a nation at war with her. Deaf to reason and to justice, will she respect our forces, the inferiority of which on her own privileged element is so well known to her? Whatever attitude we may assume, as she has little or nothing to apprehend from our naval armaments, she will wage a hidden war against us, as she does at the present day, so long as it may suit her convenience, so long as she may indulge the hope of forcing upon us a different political system; but no sooner shall that hope have vanished than we must expect an open declaration of war. I dread far more the first species of warfare; because, if we consent to submit to it, we compromise our honour, have the same dangers to apprehend, and shall never succeed in extricating ourselves from the difficulties in which her craft and audacity will not fail to involve us. If we attempt to retort upon England her unjust dealings towards us, we cease to be neutrals, and the war will have begun. In order to maintain an armed neutrality, we should be enabled to wield forces superior, or at least equal, to those which might be brought to bear against us. Should such superior forces be wanting to us, the pretended neutrality becomes a chimerical illusion: it will raise a smile of pity or contempt.

"With respect to France, I suppose for a moment that England, influenced by sounder con-

siderations, should consent to accept our neutrality,—a circumstance very unlikely to occur: rest assured that, sooner or later, war would be the result. The French republic, a new government, the legality of which is not acknowledged in some parts of Europe, finding itself exposed to the attacks of foreign powers, and of a host of internal enemies who threaten its existence, will not take in good part that Spain should place herself upon a war footing, or rather, that she should arm against France.

"The republic must ever be under an apprehension lest Spain, her late enemy, and in readiness to wage war at a moment's notice, should be tempted to renew it on the slightest check that might befall the French armies. In spite of the just confidence inspired by the loyalty of our monarch, will it be in the power of the republic to forget that he is a king and a Bourbon? . . . . I entertain the firm conviction, which you all share with me, that the French government would reply by a declaration of war to the first intelligence of military preparations along our frontiers. How singular is our condition! to be threatened with a twofold war, by land and by sea at the same time, both impending over us, against two nations equally formidable; worse than all, to be compelled to fall out with one of them, without much reliance that we shall be assisted by the other; exposed to be plundered and sacrificed by both, if, as I have

already observed it to have occurred under like circumstances, they should be weary of contending against each other, and become reconciled at our expense.[1] Let history be our guide; the future is indicated by the past. We have not to blame ourselves for the painful situation of Europe at this moment, the rebound of which reaches as far as Spain. How many nations are more ill-fated than we are! Let us not lightly, and through a mistaken pride, adopt a system which would lead us to certain ruin. In politics, an extreme resolution is assuredly not open to censure, unless it be dictated by fear, perversity, or baseness. Should the irresistible force of events, which it is neither in our power to arrest nor to modify, compel us to adopt a course not in accordance with our wishes, prudence and duty alike bid us be resigned. This is the point of view under which we are to consider our alliance with France in the painful alternative which England imposes upon us.

"In what relates to the nature of the treaty, I must always maintain, that whilst we approxi-

[1] Scarce a twelvemonth had elapsed since Europe was a witness to arrangements which morality condemns, though policy sanctions them. Venice, in her endeavour to preserve her neutrality between France and Austria, forfeited her very existence; the treaty of Campo Formio was concluded at her expense. Not a voice was raised in her behalf. That state, which had subsisted with glory through a long series of ages, ignominiously disappeared. Such was the punishment which befell her wavering and dastardly conduct.

mate more or less to the family compact, we are in honour bound never to wage war in the train of France against other powers in alliance with Spain. I feel confident you will coincide with me in this opinion, and I am bound to declare, that my mind is unalterably made up on the subject. Let us sign the treaty for the purpose of lowering the pride of England; let us identify our interests and views with those of France on a footing of perfect equality; let it no longer be said that she draws us along with her into her distant wars, but that we jointly wage war against England: to this I agree. France and Spain have a common cause of complaint against her."

The whole council readily, I may say enthusiastically, adopted my opinion: each of my honourable colleagues loaded me with assurances of sincere adhesion to my sentiments, and of the liveliest interest. "Well then, gentlemen," I said, as we parted, "let us trust to Providence; let us hope that Heaven will throw its shield over the fortunes of Spain; may it grant me the means and the glory of fulfilling the engagements I am contracting towards our common country!"

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

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